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ABSTRACT 
In November 1939 the Australian Acting Federal Treasurer, Percy Spender, 
brought down a supplementary budget that resolved the problem of how Australia was 
to marshal the resources needed for the war effort. Spender's innovative approach was 
to forestall suppressing consumption by raising taxes or issuing public loans but instead 
exploit the slack apparent within the economy. This approach stemmed from advice 
tendered by an influential committee of economists. In contrast, the Federal Treasury 
wanted to immediately channel resources away from private consumption to war ends 
in a bid to prevent both inflation and external account difficulties from developing. This 
pre-Keynesian approach to war finance was rejected by Spender. The supplementary 
war-budget was a remarkable document. It heralded, in the subsequent 1940 Budget, the 
application of inflationary/deflationary gap analysis that Keynes had presented in How 
to Pay for the War (1940). When Spender interpreted war finance as primarily a 
problem of the 'organisation of resources rather than of money' it coincided 'with the 
economists of his own generation' (Swan, 1939, 67). A Keynesian 'revolution' in 
policy, albeit fleetingly, had arrived in Australia (Cornish, 1992). Swan continued "If 
the beneficence of contemporary economic ideas be granted it is greatly to be hoped that 
the Treasurer's future financial proposals will confirm Keynes's confidence that 'soon 
or later, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil."' 
In that light this dissertation is partly about the development of economic ideas 
and their primacy in ultimately shaping Australian economic policy, though it 
recognizes, as surely as Keynes did, that their progression is subject to a whole raft of 
conditions and influences. The economists who advised Spender had assimilated 
Keynes's theoretical framework contained within the General Theory. With Spender, in 
turn, convinced by their argument, the impact of academic economists upon Australian 
public policy came full circle. Nine years earlier, in another mobilization of economics 
expertise, economists conceived a plan for the financial rehabilitation of Australia. 
These prescriptions, later known as the Premiers' Plan, were generated from an 
analytical framework adapted for the peculiarities of and circumstances facing the 
Australian economy. The Plan, itself, as economists quickly realized, was deflationary 
and lopsided. Now, in 193 9 and operating under a different theoretical framework, 
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economists urged the authorities to be bold and continue expansion until all idle 
resources were exhausted. In the intervening years economists had undergone a seminal 
shift in understanding how their economy functioned. 
This thesis primarily focuses upon the transformation in economists' thought 
and ideas during the period 1929 till 1939. In a decade marked by depression, recovery 
and international political turbulence Australian economists moved from a classical 
orthodox economic position to that of a cautious Keynesianism by 1939. In the 
literature upon the diffusion of Keynesian economics there has been little recognition of 
just how extensive the pre-war conversion of Australian economists actually was. That 
advance in theoretical insight was, moreover, channelled into policy. 
Since its inception the Australian economic profession has always been a 
publicly-focused one. This thesis will, therefore, look at how economists tried to 
influence policy-making in the thirties. Having devised the stabilization package in 
1931, economists felt obliged to seek changes to the parameters as economic conditions 
altered but, more importantly, as the~ insights about optimal economic management 
changed. This aspect will require investigation of the interplay between economic ideas, 
players and policy. This approach aids our primary thesis by teasing out the growing 
divide between the perspectives of economists and that of policymakers. 
There are three related themes that underscore the thesis. Firstly, the 
prof essionalisation of Australian economics took a big leap in this period, aided in part, 
by the adverse circumstances confronting the economy but also by the aspirations 
economists held for their discipline. This necessitates looking at the activities of the 
economists through the thirties as they tried to enlighten preconceived economic ideas 
and conventions amongst policy makers. 
A second thesis relates to the rather unflattering reputation foisted upon interwar 
economists after 1945. A consensus was formed that their anti-depression advice was 
unfortunate, inappropriate and mis-timed. This view will be strongly contested in this 
thesis by showing how, in fact, Australian economists moved quickly and radically 
away from the analytical framework that underpinned their earlier advice. 
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That transition underlies a third theme of this dissertation, namely, that 
Australian economists were emboldened by Keynes's General Theory to confidently 
push for greater management of economic activity than hitherto. By 1939, and perhaps 
earlier, Australian economists conceptualized from a new theoretic framework and from 
one which they advanced comment and policy advice. When the committee that advised 
Spender was first appointed in 1938 it drew one economist, E.R. Walker, to proclaim 
that 'The value of economic science was at last recognised' (cited in Brown, 1994, 93). 
Australian economists illuminated the shift to macroeconomic management. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An Outline of the Study 
1.1 Background to Argument of the Thesis 
J. M. Keynes once remarked that there had been 'few passages in the history of 
controversy more valuable ... than that which took place among economists in the ten 
years ... before the war'. 1 This study directs that attention to Australia and her economic 
profession. By the eve of the Second World War Australia's small community of 
academic economists had been swept along by the Keynesian tide. A new vista of 
managing the economy was at hand. Aside from the intellectual activity Keynes's 
General Theory stirred among Australia's economists, they had long been articulating 
the need for greater control over the economy before war broke out. During the thirties 
relations between Australian economists and the federal government had wavered 
between considerable relevance to quiet neglect. In 1931 economists and politicians 
came together to frame a cohesive and unique policy response to the depression within 
Australia. That outcome, the Premiers' Plan, was an attempt at economic 
experimentation which its prime architect, Douglas Copland, billed as 'constructive 
deflation' (1937, 409). This plan was hurriedly designed to meet the country's need for 
financial rehabilitation and structural readjustment. At that point the Premiers' Plan led 
the world in economic experimentation against the slump; it elicited intellectual 
curiosity and scholarship from afar (MacLaurin, 1936; Dow, 1937; Hawtrey, 1934; 
Garnett, 1949). It was acknowledged that Australia 'Yas one of the first countries to 
appoint a brains-trust of economists, with some degree of executive authority to help 
guide the nation out of its difficulties (Heaton, 1938, 120; Goodwin, 1974, 235). 
Only a short time before economists had neither the plan, nor authority, to deal 
with Australia's peculiar economic difficulties. The Premiers' Plan was, by necessity, a 
politically-inspired one with events pushing economists to the forefront. In private, 
Copland referred to it, with good reason, as 'the economists' plan' but it was politicians 
that had to implement it. It was not long before economists grew concerned that 
1 J.M. Keynes to E. Durbin, 1942, Keynes Papers King's College Cambridge (hereafter KPKC). 
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economic policy settings were too deflationary and preoccupied with the external 
account. It was also the case, though, that as the economy slowly recovered the less 
inclined were the authorities prepared to tum, again, to economists. On the whole 
Australian economists did, however, make inroads into the world of policy advice 
during the thirties. By 1938 for instance, Australia's central bank, with economists in 
the backrooms, dealt effectively with the threat of an internationally-transmitted 
recession. The year after, economists, with some now serving in a semi-official 
capacity, had further success with a plan to facilitate Australia's war preparations 
without causing economic disruption. Why was it, then, that Australian economists 
were becoming more influential with policy-makers? The answer was not just they had 
always been a policy-focused profession but, more importantly, their advice sprang 
from new economic ideas. 
This gulf between economists and politicians is, of course, hardly a unique 
occurrence. Policy-making is renowned for being an intramural, suffuse process with 
many divergent interests impinging upon it. Politicians rarely look to economists to tell 
them what to do; rather economists, as with the Premiers' Plan, usually provide 
rationales for action or inaction (Harcourt, 1986). The predominant new paradigm of 
economic thought in the thirties was the birth of macroeconomics. Keynes's General 
Theory, which, once absorbed, made economists energetic in calling for greater 
ambition in managing an economy. The failure of Keynes to win much policy ground in 
Britain during the late thirties has been well documented (Peden, 1988; Middleton, 
1985; Tomlinson, 1984; Skidelsky, 1992). Treasury officials in Britain would prove too 
skeptical, by nature and training, to be swept along by a 'revolution' in economic theory 
until the outbreak of war changed this (Peden, 1988, 120). 
When policy-making institutions in Britain did display an acceptance of 
Keynes's General Theory it was usually muddled, ambivalent or incomplete (Bridges, 
1964). While his ideas and theories swept through the cloisters, the corridors of power 
proved therefore another matter. The diffusion process was held back, by circumstances, 
bureaucratic inertia, the climate of opinion, and, not least, the nature of the ideas 
themselves. It was only when Keynes entered the British Treasury that his ideas found 
applicationjn policy. Even then, a little known memoir of him recalls that Treasury 
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officials still felt that Keynes did not seem fully aware of the recalcitrance and 
intractability of the political process (Le Pan, 1979, 83). 
The transmission of Keynes's ideas into the Australian political mainstream, in 
contrast, was smoother and innovative, attributable to the useful start economists had 
made in establishing a rapport and credibility with Government leaders. Australia 
seemed fertile ground for authentic Keynesian economics to take root though not 
necessarily in officialdom (Markwell, 1985; Smyth, 1994; Turnell, 1999). Australia in 
1937 was described by one commentator as 'the utopia of practical economists' (cited in 
Goodwin, 1974, 236). Apart from the avowedly public orientation of their profession, 
economists also owed their influence to the fact that economic policy was not entirely 
within the Australian government's ambit. Four extra-parliamentary agencies; namely, 
the Arbitration Court, the Tariff Board, the Commonwealth Bank and the Australian 
Loan Council exercised a 'quadripartite control of industrial and financial 
circumstances' (cited in Brown, 1994, 91). 
As the Commonwealth assumed greater executive command over the shaping of 
monetary and budgetary policy, academic economists were replaced, to some extent, by 
'inside economists' (Corden, 1968). They were, however, still cut from the same cloth. 
In international forums, too, Australian economists had gained pre-eminence by 
adopting a proto-Keynesian stance for restoring balance to the global economy (Turnell, 
1999). More importantly for our purposes Australian economists were freshly apprised 
of the latest developments in economic theory and practice. 
Against the light of economic reason stood a federal government comfortable 
with the recovery achieved by economic readjustment and fiscal consolidation. 
Notorious for its 'let business alone' stance, the three Lyons Governments (1932-39) 
were prone to intellectual torpor (Hart, 1967). Throughout the thirties academic 
economists, in a bid to change the climate of opinion, made representations to 
politicians directly and via the press. On balance, as many overseas commentators 
noted, Australian economists were quite influential with policy-making authorities 
relative to their overseas counterparts. How they achieved that profile had to do with the 
circumstanc_es facing Australia, together, with axioms and conventions that underpinned 
the economics profession. 
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The groundwork was already in place, then, that would spearhead Australia's 
acceptance of Keynesianism. However, it did not come, alas, with an accommodating 
'explicitly altered economic vision' among political leaders (Heilbroner and Milberg, 
1995, 43). The first threads of comprehensive economic management in Australia came 
with the 1939/40 budget which put into circulation the Keynesian technique of 
estimating the inflationary gap (Cornish, 1992; Markwell, 1985). The war finance 
approach that Keynes (1940) outlined in How to Pay for the War, that is, how to shift 
resources from civilian to war purposes without incurring inflation, was with early 
success acted upon by Australian economists (Walker, 1939). 
1.2 The Thesis Stated 
The contribution of this thesis is to show how the ideas and theoretical thinking 
of Australian economists, seen through the prism of their policy advice, underwent a 
major transformation through the thirties. This thesis intends to argue that Australia's 
small nucleus of economists were emboldened, as the thirties wore on, to push for a 
more informed, and more expansionist line upon economic activity than hitherto. In 
short, economists had a fundamentally different theoretical and policy outlook in 1939 
from that which they had in 1929. The thesis will gauge the change of their theorising 
and policy advice during that period and contrast it with the marked lack of change in 
politicians' outlook. This divergence of opinion between the two groups will be set 
against the peculiarities of Australian economic experience in the thirties. This includes 
not just the slump and protracted recovery but also the precariousness of the external 
account, together, with fears of another boom-bust. It will also be set against the 
economic events that punctuated the period like the Royal Commission on Banking 
Systems, the Treasury bills and Funding debates, together, with preparations for war. 
This thesis also seeks to reveal the process by which Australian economists 
came to achieve a superior command of Keynesian statecraft earlier than most of their 
overseas counterparts. It does so by tracing the development in their thought over the 
years 1929 till 1939. While the thesis is set within the province of the history of ideas it 
is also a study in political economy. That is, it focuses upon the complex interaction 
between economic ideas, events, personalities and policy in interwar Australia. It will 
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closely examine the process Australian economists endured in coming to terms with 
new ideas on economic philosophy in the thirties and, whether or not, they shaped 
economic policy. The activities and input of economists, expressed through numerous 
committees, meetings, correspondence and memoranda will be traced through to reveal 
a conceptual gap between economists and politicians. After being uncommonly 
influential in 1931 it will be argued that the new conceptual vision of economists, 
expressly to do with economic management, was frustrated by political inertia, vested 
interests and complacency. The publication of Keynes's General Theory, once 
understood, fortified the intellectual shift towards economic management. As the first to 
be liberated from old ways of thought, how Australian economists went about 
propagating that new wisdom will be examined. Usually their advice fell on deaf ears, 
but not always. That is, new economic thought raced ahead of political convention and 
attitudes. This was to prove evident when examining the appropriate economic policy 
settings for Australia in the late thirties. 
To reiterate, this thesis argues that by 1939 Australian economists were 
articulating a coherent form of macroeconomic management, informed by Keynes that 
was distinct and more concrete than their earlier longings for 'planning'. This 
philosophical shift took some time, of course, to materialise at the official policy level. 
Some agencies, like the Federal Treasury, remained unmoved by the 'new economics' 
of Keynes. That is a body of economics with its central focus on the principle of 
effective demand with policies like public works, budget deficits and cheap money as 
the appropriate response for an economy in semi-slump. Simply put, it brought a 
physical resources perspective to economics. That is, demand could be safely expanded 
so long as there was generalized idle capacity in the economy. A commitment to 
counter-cyclical management of overall demand is too indiscriminate. At a more 
sophisticated level it translated not just to the manipulation of aggregate demand but to 
eschew reliance on market forces to deliver an economy from the slump. While the 
term 'Macroeconomic' policy only came into circulation in 1941 Keynes's unmistakable 
emphasis upon the aggregate dimension in his Magnus opus in 1936 marked the 
effective start of macroeconomics (Clarke, 1996, 68-9). This thesis closes by examining 
the propitious pre-conditions that underpinned the early acceptance of the Keynesian 
economic p91icy in wartime Australia. 
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1.3 Aims and Significance of this Research 
The hiatus in Australian economic history from Depression to the Second World 
War - a period of recovery and reconstruction - has been explored by economic 
historians (Cain 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1987a, 1987b, 1988a, 1988b; Schedvin; 
1970; Sinclair, 1974; Clark, 1976; and Gregory and Butlin, 1988). In a series of papers, 
Neville Cain made a pioneering study of the players, including economists, officials and 
politicians behind the formation of Commonwealth economic policy from the 
Depression through to 1936. No work, however, cogently and systematically looks at 
how Australian economists moved towards a new constellation of economic ideas in the 
years leading up to 1939. This thesis intends to fill that gap. 
Most of the literature on the arrival of Keynesian economics usually, of course, 
dates it from the Second World War. As Little (1957, 35) put it, 'Thanks to Keynesian 
ideas (and the war) the economist has found his way in to government'. In Australia it 
was somewhat different. There was, seemingly, a 'revelatory' adoption of Keynes's 
General Theory by Australian economists (King, 1997). Turnell (1999, 13) posits that 
the rapid propagation of Keynesian economics in Australia was because economists had 
adopted a proto-Keynesian line in the various international forums, together with 
unpublished writings, all of which focused upon their advocacy for international 
reflation. In contrast, domestic economic policy was, given the adverse circumstances 
confronting the economy, quite orthodox and deflationary. The Premiers' Plan became 
the 'leitmotiv' of Australian economic policy in the thirties (Turnell, 1999, 23). This 
discontinuity between domestic and international strands of Australian economic 
thought and policy, Turnell argues, detracts from reaching a true picture of the 
receptivity of Australian economists to Keynes's General Theory. 
This thesis complements and adds to Turnell's (1999) finding by showing how 
Australian economists urged a more expansionist line to domestic policy settings from 
1932 onwards. They were not prepared to wait for an upturn in export prices to bring 
about recovery; nor did the weight of Australia's external obligations totally 
circumscribe domestic attempts to reflate. Indeed, the failure of the two major 
international. trade and monetary conferences held in 1932 and 1933 to engineer a global 
economic stimulus from the industrialized countries that would lift the export incomes 
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of countries like Australia forced reliance upon domestic expedients. This approach was 
encouraged and theoretically informed by Keynes, not just in 1936 with the publication 
of the General Theory, but earlier in 1932 with his incisive critique of the policy-
thinking of Australian economists. For the most part, this expansionist line by 
Australian economists was rejected by the authorities. They did have some success, 
however, in preventing monetary policy from becoming too contractionary during the 
mid-thirties. There was further recognition of the value of economics expertise when the 
Federal Government established a committee in 193 8 to expedite the transition to a war 
economy (Coombs, 1981, 7). 
There are other reasons for the study. In the literature upon the spread of 
Keynesianism across nations only a handful of studies have touched upon the reception 
of the General Theory in Australia (Cain, 1983; Cornish, 1992; Markwell, 1985; 
Turnell, 1999; Smyth, 1994; and Whitwell, 1994). Cain (1983, 21) urged others to 
investigate the 'antipodean impact of the General Theory' upon both economists and 
policy-makers before 1939. This will be the secondary objective of this dissertation. 
There has been little work, too, on how economists shaped Australian domestic 
economic policy during the thirties other than the aforementioned contributions of Cain 
and the works by Copland (1934), Walker (1933a) and Schedvin (1970). There is little 
literature examining the deliberations and scope of Australian economic policy from 
1936 through to 1939. In that regard it has been claimed that all Australian economists 
were basically Keynesian, both in theory and policy, by the advent of the Second World 
War.2 Given this, it might be said that Australia, bar Sweden, led the way in terms of 
adopting Keynesianism (Winch, 1966). One historian claims that Australian monetary 
authorities practiced Keynesian - inspired policy in 1938 to quarantine the nation from 
the impact of the American recession (Gilbert, 1973, 219). However the accepted 
literature of both the depression and Australian economic policy during the thirties is 
usually much bleaker; both the efficacy of economic policy in the thirties and the 
theoretical and public contributions of economists were called into question and judged 
to be comparatively poor against efforts made overseas (Schedvin, 1970). * This thesis 
will re-examine and ultimately reject that finding. 
2 Melville Trc 182. 1971, pg 158, NLA. 
* Boris Schedvin's work Australia and the Great Depression (1970) derives from his Sydney University dissertation 
which was entitled "Economic policy in Depression and Recovery in Australia 1927-1935" (1963). As Schedvin's 
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1.4 Methodology 
In much of the literature for this period there has been little examination of the 
factors that helped shape Australian public policy, particularly the interplay between 
economic ideas and economic policy. Peter Hall's (1989) edited study of the diffusion 
of Keynesian ideas across nations found that the influence of Keynes's ideas cannot be 
divorced from particular national circumstances. Hall pioneered three analytical 
approaches in the study of the way this new economic wisdom percolated down to 
policy. A 'state-centred' approach focuses upon the role of policy-making bureaucracies 
as the creators, or more likely, inhibitors to the diffusion of new economic ideas (Hall, 
1989, 10-12). In this regard it might be argued that Australia was philosophically 
attuned both in its institutions and prevailing culture for a ready embrace of 
Keynesianism (Smyth, 1994). Institutionally Australia had an extensive public sector 
and economists, which, up to a point, supported tariff protection and public investment 
projects as both pro-development and pro-employment (Whitwell, 1986, 57). It also 
had an active core of university economists pre-disposed and well versed in the art of 
giving practical, level-headed advice to governments (Green, 1960, 29-32; Cain, 1973; 
Copland, 1951). Partly by design and partly by accident, the central bank financed 
budgetary deficits using Treasury bills during the depression and thereby kept the 
banking system liquid (Copland, 1932a). Lastly, Australia possessed a centralised wage-
fixing system 'another form of economic control', that gave an independent but trusted 
body, the Arbitration Court, a direct lever over wage levels (Copland, 1940). 
Administratively, therefore, Australia had more than the rudiments of institutional 
apparatus necessary for economic management. An embryonic Keynesianism was there 
but without the philosophical and intellectual conviction among the policy elite.• 
A second approach of Hall's is a 'coalition-centred' one where economic policy 
depends upon the interplay between politically-mobilised interest groups (1989, 12). 
Here the emphasis is upon politics serving as the clearing house of pressures for 
different groups with divergent interests (Hall, 1989, 13). The last approach is the 
study effectively concludes in 1935 it concords with Hancock's observation that Schedvin pays relatively little 
attention to the years 1935-39. Dyster and Meredith corroborate this (1990, 146). 
• Gordon Wood spoke in 1940 of Australians having become 'accustomed to the theory and practice of national 
control' (Cited in Brown, 1994, 94) 
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'economist-centred approach'. Here, economists and intellectuals playing a leading role 
in not just the dissemination of new economic ideas but also their moulding into policy 
(Hall, 1989, 9). As Whitwell notes, the economist-centred approach tends to exaggerate 
the influence economists and new ideas actually have on policy formation (1994, 123-
124). While Hall has argued that for a new paradigm to take hold a nation must have 
favourable conditions for all three dimensions, this thesis will primarily focus upon the 
latter approach since it is most compatible with the research question. 
One attraction of this approach is that it draws 'attention to the qualities of 
Keynesian ideas themselves. It suggests that these ideas may have a persuasiveness and 
a political dynamism of their own; and it forces us to ask which ideational qualities 
made for persuasiveness and which detracts from it' (Hall, 1989, 9-10). One must be 
wary, of course, of taking a 'delightfully simple' view of visualising 'economic theory as 
the main force behind policy' (Booth, 1983, 104). Other factors and variables, besides 
politics enter into the process. We adopt this approach, however, because it allows us to 
focus upon how economists underwent a sea change in their thinking and whether that 
bore any imprint on official economic policy. 
1.5 Structure 
The dissertation is composed of ten chapters broken down into three thematic 
parts. The first part entitled 'Backing into the Limelight - The Interwar Australian 
Economics Profession' sets the scene for the study. Chapter Two reviews the literature 
on economic ideas and policy, together, with an early, equivocal assessment of the 
interwar economists drawn from secondary sources. Chapter Three provides some 
background upon the monumental problems confronting the Australian economy in the 
nineteen thirties and the economic institutions and conventions which policymakers 
relied upon. The last chapter of Part One uncovers the capstone of this study, namely, 
the Australian economics profession and their theoretical and practical grounding. 
Part Two of the thesis, entitled 'Triumph and Tribulation', recounts how 
economists seized the opportunity in 1931 to present a economic stabilization plan 
adapted and._moulded, with a little improvisation, from existing economic theory. 
Chapter Five discusses the theoretical origins and rationale of the Premiers' Plan and 
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the measures that preceded it, together, with how it was then regarded as a towe1ing 
achievement for the local econonucs profession. The years that followed, however, were 
marked by disappointment for the profession with subsequent and quite innovative 
economic thinking being rejected by official autho1ities. These setbacks to enlightened 
economic policy form the basis of both Chapters Six and Seven. One reason why this 
professional advice went unheeded was because economic recovery was well grounded 
by the mid-thirties and the political and monetary authorities was reluctant to do 
anything to jeopardize it. This could not be said of the bleak years, 1932 through till 
1934, when expansionary economic policy advice prepared by a connnittee of 
economists was rejected by the monetary authorities. 
The last Part of the thesis, entitled the 'The March of Keynesian Ideas', consists 
of Chapters Eight, Nine and Ten followed by a sho1i conclusion. As 1nonetary 
reformers, Australian economists had the fortunate opportunity to be able to present 
their latest views upon economic policy, especially the choice between price stability 
and exchange rate stability, to an official enquiry. This Royal Commission sprang from 
community dissatisfaction with the conduct of both trading banks and the central bank 
during the Depression. Chapter Eight discusses the Commission's findings, a great part 
of which was shaped by the evidence submitted by economists. Since some of that 
evidence cited Keynes's General Theory, its early reception among Australian 
economists will also be examined. It was a case, as Chapter Nine shows, of the new 
wisdom finding fertile ground with Australian economists applying this new theoretic 
insight to dealing firstly with an imbalanced economy, and then, secondly, the risk of 
being affected by an international recession. The first exigency was met by economists 
recommending a real wage increase while the second was addressed by the central bank 
taking pre-emptive monetary action to insulate or fire-proof the economy from 
fluctuations in Australia's trade account. The final Chapter b1iefly discusses how 
economists played a critical part in shaping Australia's war finance. Before the advice 
of economists penetrated into the upper reaches of official policy the federal 
government endured a difficult time reconciling greater defence spending with more 
social spending. Besides dealing with an economic slowdown it also had to contend 
with a reluctance by the States to restrict their borrowings. The judicious advice from 
economists, t9gether, with a new Treasurer would lighten the Government's woes. 
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PART ONE 
Backing into the Limelight: The Interwar Australian Economics 
Profession 
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CHAPTER2 
Economic Ideas and an Assessment of Australian Economists in the Nineteen 
Thirties 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter briefly reviews the existing literature upon two areas central to this 
thesis. Firstly, we briefly examine, in the form of a backdrop, the problematic issue of 
the relationship between economic ideas and policy. While Keynes's oft-quoted and 
noble peroration about the power of economic ideas marks the start of the discussion 
there is no simple, linear relationship between ideas and policy. Indeed, the whole 
gamut of policy-making is enveloped by the fog of disparate influences, interests and 
entanglements, many of which could detract from the ambition of this thesis. If anything 
we might say that the ideas and thinking of economists rarely immediately shape 
economic policy. In the Australian case there were instances, however, where the ideas 
of economists did cast some bearing upon official policy but only after they had 
establishing themselves into positions of some influence and where their views were 
palatable to politicians. The passage of time and the review of past performance also 
carried some weight. 
The second field of study in this chapter is more straightforward. It provides a 
self-contained historiography of how economists, then, and in the post-World War Two 
period, assessed the policy contribution of their predecessors in dealing with Australia's 
economic problems in the thirties. The subsequent literature, it will be found, is largely 
a negative one with the interwar economists criticized for rendering incorrect economic 
advice in 1931 and then failing to engage intellectually with new paradigms of 
economic thought then unfolding. 
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2.2 Ideas and Economic Policy 
It is agreed the process by which ideas come to influence economic policy is not 
completely understood, even from a historical perspective. In a famous quote, Keynes 
suggested that: 
'The ideas of economists .... are more powerful than is commonly understood. 
Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves 
to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of 
some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are 
distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am 
sure that the power of vested interest is vastly exaggerated compared with the 
gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately, but after a certain 
interval, for in the field of economic and political philosophy there are not many 
who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of 
age, so that the ideas which civil servants and politicians and even agitators 
apply to current events are not likely to be the newest. But, soon or late, it is 
ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil' (Keynes, 1936, 
383-4). 
While this passage adorned the end of the General Theory Keynes was too 
politically astute to know that it was entirely true. There is a difference, firstly, between 
new ideas or views and them being actually implemented. In a letter to George Bernard 
Shaw where Keynes spoke about writing a book which would revolutionize the way the 
world would think about economic problems he qualified it by adding 'when my ne,N 
theory has been duly assimilated and mixed with politics and feelings and passions, I 
can't predict what the final upshot will be its effect on action and affairs' (cited in 
Clarke, 1988, 309). The important rider on theory being immersed into the milieu of 
'politics and feelings and passions' is often overlooked by those trying to prove when a 
Keynesian revolution in policy took place. In other words, Keynes knew that particular 
circumstances and actual situations were far more telling than the ideas themselves in 
shaping official policy (Comish, 1992, 1 ). The word 'revolution' was an inappropriate 
one, therefore, to describe any change in economic policy by the fact that the policy-
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making process is usually incremental, responding tentatively to a number of different 
processes and strains (Cornish, 1992). Keynes's stricture was that economic models 
must always be relevant to the contemporary world; if the context in which economic 
activity took place changed then a new rationalisation and explanation was needed to 
overcome dogma. Keynes reminded his audience that his own economic remedies 'are 
on a different plane from my diagnosis .... they are not meant to be definitive, but subject 
to all sorts of special assumptions and are necessarily related to the particular conditions 
of the time' (Keynes, 1973b, 122). 
Some have inferred the mistaken view that ideas do, in fact, conquer political 
and social obstacles, even in the short run, that it, as Winch puts it, fans the 'rationalist 
fallacy that ideas alone are powerful enough to determine the course of history' (Winch, 
1969, 24). According to Austin Robinson, Keynes observed that it took over fifty years 
for Adam Smith's ideas to make an impact in the political sphere ( cited in Leeson, 1996, 
45). For his own theory, Keynes predicted - correctly as it turned out - a ten year lag for 
his vision to be taken up at the political level (Keynes, 1973a, 492-3). It confirmed 
Sayers' observation that 'views from academic sources always reach Whitehall sooner or 
later' (cited in Moggridge, 1986, 365). One of Keynes's contemporaries, Lionel 
Robbins, agreed that: 'In the short run, it is true ideas are unimportant and ineffective, 
but in the long run they can rule the world' (1932, 199). He later felt that the 
interpretation of Keynes 's oft-quoted peroration overlooked the role of political 
philosophers; it is the conjunction of the two, namely ideas and intellectuals, which, in 
the right circumstances, made for irresistible force. 
The misinterpretation of Keynes's famous quote mirrors another, but less 
familiar tale, closer to our study. It relates to E. R. Walker's tale of how a copy of 
Keynes's General Theory in the Commonwealth Parliamentary Library was apparently 
dog-eared in the last 80 odd pages, where the practical application of Keynes's theories 
lay but of virgin whiteness where the supporting theory was worked out (Cited in 
Cairncross, 1996, 255). Australian politicians' assimilation of Keynes 's new framework 
was just as protracted as elsewhere. 
Econ_omic ideas are not always powerful enough to change the course of events 
or shape economic policy. A.C. Pigou would have found favour with Keynes in saying 
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that 'Economic analysis can provide data for statesmen; but the attitude of public 
opinion and the current political and diplomatic situation are dominant factors in 
determining what on the whole it is best to do; and these lie beyond our range' (1927, 
280). William Barber supports Pigou's position, arguing that there is an element of 
exaggeration in the claims made for, or by, academic scribblers. In other words, 'the 
process through which new ideas are generated and ultimately translated into policies 
and programs that shape the flow of history may be too complex to be reduced to a 
simple and unidirectional schema' (Barber, 1993, 119). In that light, one might say that 
all economic policies evolve within a context, characterized by a mosaic of norms, 
beliefs, goals, interests and pressures different from that enshrouding academia. 
Economists and ideas, in any case, exert only one influence in the composition of 
economic policy (Arndt, 1996, 97). In short, economic policy derives from the 
confluence of ideas, politics, circumstances and ideology (Winch, 1969, 20-21). 
Garside's comparative study of the pattern of various countries' responses to 
Depression boiled it down to 'an amalgam of circumstance, historical legacy and 
expediency' (1993, 16). Ideas for solving economic problems are plentiful, but it is only 
the ideas that attract support from those in political power that ultimately matter. Ideas, 
taken in isolation from individuals, circumstances and interests are unlikely to provide 
an adequate explanation of policy changes (Battin, 1997). Seldon puts it plainly that 
'Ideas, to be successfully taken up, need advocates (individuals or interests), they need 
to square with the facts, to have a dominant idea or interest benign or positive, and to be 
launched into positive circumstances' (Seldon, 1996, 289). Seldon pointedly reminds us 
that if internal interests are set against a change in policy, no change is likely to occur 
even if the ideas, circumstances and intellectual leadership are quite favourable. In short, 
ideas matter but not in isolation. An opponent of this view, Nigel Ashford, believes that 
ideas reign supreme and shape economic policy far more than supposedly independent 
factors like interests and circumstances (1997, 25). Ashford plausibly argues that 
circumstances and problems are, in themselves, the consequence of old and changing 
ideas. 
The political theorist, David Marquand, inverts Keynes's words 'Madmen in 
authority may distil the frenzy of academic scribblers, but academic scribblers respond 
to the pressures of the society around them, and their scribbles resonate only when 
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allied with social forces. If practical men are to be enslaved by defunct economists, 
living economists inhabit a world managed by practical men' (Marquand, 1996, 6). 
Practical men, in the sense that, as politicians, they are quite capable of fashioning ideas 
as weapons to promote their interests and support their policies (Skidelsky, 1996, 44). 
As intellectuals, academic economists can exercise influence, but wield little 
direct power (Etzioni-Halevy, 1985, 11). In the transmission of ideas it is ultimately 
political forces that drive economic policy, not vice versa; that is, economists propose 
but politicians dispose. New economic theory can only become effective when it is 
politically accepted (McKibbin, 1990). Nonetheless economists can exert some indirect 
input into policy decisions by shaping the climate of ideas and shading the perspective 
in which policy decisions are made (Etzioni-Halevy, 1985, 27). Their input may even 
prove decisive in fostering policy that is considerably different from what it would have 
been without their involvement. Failing that, the academic economist's first duty, when 
solicited for advice, is to 'furnish knowledge-based advice on the available options for 
policy decisions. This, in itself, is an important contribution to policy formation' 
(Etzioni-Halevy, 1985, 25). 
In illuminating the political context in which economic debates take place it is 
important to examine how the ideas of economists percolate down to policy. This is 
particularly so in a setting when the political process is diffuse with the key players not 
renowned for their perspicacity in matters of economic thought. There has been a rich 
vein of research upon this topic, especially how the depression and economists' 
response to it resulted in the birth of macroeconomics and, more important! y for our 
purposes, the idea of demand management (Battin, 1997; Hall, 1989). Economic policy 
has never really been the simple translation of theory into action. Seldon's 
straightforward model of how ideas actually result in significant policy change dissects 
the process into four dimensions. These determinants are firstly, the ideas themselves, 
secondly the individuals who carry them forth, thirdly, the circumstances of the period 
and, lastly, the events that punctuated the period (Seldon, 1996, 263). His study can be 
compared against Hall's schema mentioned above. Economists, if listened to, have to be 
theoretically and rhetorically persuasive but also politically attuned with their advice. 
The audience_ economists catered to had to be convinced of the plausibility and 
applicability of theory to policy questions (Moggridge, 1986). The British economic 
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mandarin, Alec Cairncross, in a definitive chapter upon economists and policymakers, 
details the non-economic sources of resistance to the spread of new economic ideas and 
especially their imprint upon policy. Policy may be under the influence of non-
economic considerations even the views of non-economists or economic dogma that is 
out of date. Ideas might not translate into policy because they are insufficiently precise 
or built upon inappropriate assumptions. In the prism of the policy-making process, 
planners and politicians are 'as a rule ... slightly deaf, there is too much noise' 
(Cairncross, 1986, 21). 
Economic policy is governed by both 'the general climate' of economic ideas and 
by the direct advice given to government by its economic advisers (Tomlinson, 1995, 
78). There may be some symmetry in the process whereby, as we shall see in the 
Australian case, economists might spend much time in public affairs and be, the ref ore, 
'policy-intensive'. Equally policy-making may, at times, become 'economist-intensive' 
(Sandelin et. al. 1997, 1). Pigou reminds us that economists are more likely to clarify 
issues than formulate solutions; they are 'engineers, not engine-drivers' (1933, v). The 
conditions for a revolution in policy go beyond a mere mental leap in the minds of 
policy-makers (Tomlinson, 1984, 261). Moreover, as Winch notes, even to pose a 
connection between economic ideas and policy, is both an optimistic 'conception of 
technocratic status of economics, and a naive view of the processes of political decision-
making' (Winch, 1969, 19). In Keynes's case, and for some countries, the link was 
reversed: the General Theory was written to give theoretical support to the expansionist 
economic proposals put forward in the thirties (Beaud and Dostaler, 1995, 45). That is, 
the political or intuitive vision preceded the theoretical one. 
The diffusion of ideas, in short, is a complex process; Solow suggests that the 
demands of the political process are such that there is a bias for theories or ideas that are 
simple and uncomplicated and therefore capable of a high guarantee of success (1993, 
81-82). Cairncross points out that policy is 'intrinsically political' whereas economists 
have a fixation on the scientific and the apolitical. This raises the issue not just of the 
political acceptability of new ideas but also of their facility of being comprehended by 
politicians (Caimcross, 1996, 255). Apart from political and other groups resistance to 
new thinking, there had to be a public clamour for change. Keynes alluded to this 
problem when he confessed that with reference to the new ideas within the General 
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Theory ' ... even if economists and technicians knew the secret rell1:~dy, they could not 
apply it until they had persuaded the politicians; and the politicians, who have ears but 
no eyes, will not attend to the persuasion until it reverberates back to them as an echo 
from the great public'. (Cited in Cornish, 1993, 44). 
Ideas might, therefore, be the 'ultimate reality' as the Australian economic 
historian Edward Shann once put it, but a fundamental reorientation of them within 
society was 'a protracted affair' (Copland, 1945, 4). Copland believed it took a decade 
for people to recast their ideas about economic policy. Policymakers were, the ref ore, 
frequently to be seen fighting the last war. This response-lag, as it were, squares with 
politicians taking up 'the Keynesian crusade' with relish in the forties so as to put behind 
them the experience of mass unemployment (Tange, 1996). Ten years earlier informed 
opinion was fixated upon the spectre of inflationism and the boom-bust cycle. The 
weight of the past, therefore, together with economic dogma, made bankers, Treasury 
officials and politicians 'prisoners of doctrine' - a doctrine that had little relevance to the 
problems of the thirties (Butlin, 1961, 389). Nor, as we shall see, could these artefacts 
be shed overnight. In Australia, during the nineteen thirties, a coalition of political and 
financial interests opposed calls for economic expansion premised upon proto-
Keynesian and then Keynesian lines. As Australian economists discovered in 1931, 
public opinion mattered as much as the machinations of the political elite. As Keynes 
had predicted, 'these new ideas, this new wisdom must have a solid foundation in the 
motives which govern the evolution of political society' ( cited in Clarke, 1988, 309). 
Keynes added that ideas only resonate when they fit the conditions of the time.* More 
pointedly, Keynes's ideas would only be potent where reinforced by group interests or 
where they touched some deep-seated emotion in the community. As late as 1939 
Keynes acknowledged that in Britain at least the resistance to his new theoretical 
framework meant that the import of the General Theory would have to wait: 'A change 
in mental atmosphere was a necessary condition for the bold experiment in achieving 
full employment by the methods I advocate' (cited in Harrod, 1951, 446). 
* Skidelsky, Keynes 's biographer puts it sublimely, 'The rise or fall of ideas in economics is as much connected with 
attendant circumstances, including ideological and political circumstances, as with their logical properties or their 
power of passing ·any test of prediction' (Skidelsky, 1996, xviii). One dissident to this generous view is Leon 
Keyserling, a Washington official who felt that the New Deal initiatives 'would have been enacted in just the form it 
was, if there had never been a Lord Keynes ' (Colander and Landreth, 1996, 224). 
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In Australia what was missing was not just the enabling vision from politicians 
to close the gap between them and economists but also public opinion in favour of 
reflation: the 'boom and borrow' policies of the twenties cut deep into the Australian 
psyche. Escape from this mindset could only be alleviated by intellectual input, by ideas 
and the propagation of those ideas. In Australia's case, obstructionist financial interests, 
mediocre political leadership and the pressing force of circumstances kept the new ideas 
of economists at bay. The marked increase in economic intervention or 'planning' that 
did take place in Australia during this period lacked the ref ore, for the most part, a 
considered political philosophy or coherent strategy. Within academe, however, 
'Instructed opinion was already far in advance of public policy' (Keynes, 1977, 427). 
That last sentence might serve as the leitmotiv for this study focusing upon the 
theorizing of interwar Australian economists and their subsequent policy advice. 
2.3 Australian Economists and the Depression: a Historiography 
The key issue in contention within the literature upon Australian interwar 
economics has been the appropriateness of anti-depression policy. Much of that issue 
crystallizes around the two leading protagonists, Copland (1934) and Schedvin (1970) 
and their respective and considered views of the role economists played in the thirties. 3 
That in mind, it was only in the post-World War Two era that intellectual recrimination 
and revisionism about the worth of interwar economic policy especially the Premiers' 
Plan really began (Clark, 1958, 222). Even some of the players peripherally involved in 
the thirties, like H.C. 'Nugget' Coombs and Colin Clark were critical, in part, of the 
advice emanating from their older colleagues. Coombs remarked that the thirties 
showed 'evidence of economic mismanagement' and that the confrontation between the 
Commonwealth Bank and the Scullin Government intensified and prolonged the impact 
of the depression (1981, 107-8). Clark was blunter, accusing Australian economists of 
lamely following public opinion in opting for balanced budgets, regardless of the state 
of the economy (1958, 222-223). Spearritt (1981) picks up on this theme saying that 
economists used the cloak of scientific respectability to recommend conservative 
economic policies. 
3 A fuller version of this section is in Millmow (2003a) . 
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In the heyday of post-war Keynesianism, Copland, looking back over the early 
thirties, issued an apologia noting that 'the mistake was made of not recognizing clearly 
enough that government activities needed to expand tremendously to offset the fall in 
private spending' and that there had not been enough deviation 'from the deflationist 
line' (1951, 21-3). Copland also ceded errors in the conduct of economic policy, firstly, 
in the authorities opposing monetary expansion, and secondly, and perhaps more 
forgivably, in seeing the depression purely in monetary terms (1951, 21-22). In a tribute 
to a fellow economist, Copland ( 1950, 107) lamented that had Edward Dyason' s 
expansionist prescriptions been followed in 1931 'the impact of the depression on the 
public mind might have been much less severe'. Copland (1934, 145) apparently 
reached this conclusion in his 1933 Marshall lectures, commenting that the lack of a 
stronger stimulus, in the form of public works, had been a grievous error. He remained 
adamant that the adjustment in relative costs 'was a mistake in degree rather than 
principle' (Copland, 1951, 23). Along with his colleagues Copland insisted that the 
circumstances at the time dictated fiscal balance to help restore business confidence 
(1951, 21). There was also Australia's external commitment to uphold. Much later an 
Australian Federal Treasurer, R G. Casey, could claim that his country was 'at the 
forefront of the world's most trustworthy borrowers' .4 In his last retrospective on the 
Premiers' Plan, Giblin proffered that 'heavy unemployment was the inevitable price of 
national solvency' (1951, 81).* He went on to defend the plan stating ' ... that it was not 
far from the very best that was possible with a public inexperienced as it was at the time 
in violent economic vicissitudes and their remedies' ( 1951, 81 ). 
Before and even after the Second World War it was accepted that Australian 
economists were not only instrumental but quite correct, if not heroic, in putting 
forward the Premiers' Plan because it enabled Australia not to default upon her foreign 
debts (Goodwin, 1974, 231-232; Hall, 1938; Dow, 1937; Garnett, 1947; and Mandle, 
1978). Copland (1934) declared in his Marshall lectures that the deliberate policies put 
in place by the Commonwealth Government and, inferentially by the economists, were 
also responsible for Australia's economic recovery (Hawtrey, 1934). Copland 
emphasized that university economists had, from May 1930 onwards, played a bold and 
prominent part in framing remedial policies. This was an achievement in a country said 
4 R.G. Casey to Sir M.Norman, 7/3/1938, Bank of England (hereafter BE): G 1/288. 
* A view candidly shared by Melville in personal communication with the author. 
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to 'despise scientific economists' (Hancock, 1930, 86). Copland's theme in his Marshall 
lectures was that in facing a difficult price-cost problem, Australia's institutions namely, 
the Arbitration Court, Loan Council, Commonwealth Bank and Tariff Board, allowed 
the economy to respond flexibly to the crisis. A unique 'middle road' was hewn out, 
encompassing both cost cutting with a modest expansionary monetary element 
(Copland, 1934). In a latter commentary, Copland (1936, 11) was adamant that too 
much had been made of the orthodox or 'sound' features of the Premiers' Plan and not 
enough of its more expansionary aspects. 
Besides there being few economists within the public service, Carden attributes 
the influence of academic economists to the need for expert guidance in the crisis facing 
Australia (1968, 58). More importantly, economists had begun to become employed in 
some key advisory posts or, at least, having their opinions sought via the media of 
committee work (Cain, 1984). A few years earlier, economists had advised the Bruce 
Government upon the economic rationale for the Australian tariff; a practice Jacob 
Viner felt worthy of imitation by other nations. Economists also had input into the 
Development and Migration Commission and other Committees of Inquiry (Cain, 1980, 
14-18; Harcourt, 1986). The growing .sense of professionalisation was marked, too, by 
the later placement of economists within the Commonwealth's public service 
strengthening the 'technocratic application of economic ideas' (Winch, 1969; Petridis , 
1981). 
Australian economists were uncommonly influential in the thirties since the 
policy-making process was accessible, shaped, in part, by four extra-parliamentary 
agencies - some of which occasionally called upon the services of economists (Dow, 
1938). There was also the Commonwealth Grants Commission, established in 1933, 
which inquired into matters of economic equity between the States and the 
Commonwealth. Australia's centralised wage-setting process , too, afforded a clear 
advantage in that the Arbitration Court could facilitate an enviable degree of money 
wage flexibility both in times of economic duress and prosperity (Reddaway, 1938, 
335). The interaction, moreover, between the Loan Council and the Commonwealth 
Bank was a 'guarantee' that a moderate policy outcome would be forthcoming (Copland, 
1937, 422). Meanwhile Prime Minister Lyons, who dominates the period under review, 
enjoyed a certain rapport with economists and solicited counsel from those considered 
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not too unorthodox (Hart, 1967, 12; Cain, 1983). Ultimately, however, Lyons was 
forced by a trenchantly conservative cabinet to reject the bolder advice of economists. 
Economists were not just influential because the general public had lost faith in 
its politicians but also because they were a small cohesive group with a fair degree of 
authority. Secondly, and just as important, the public statements made by economists 
struck a chord with the Australian electorate. 5 Non-partisan 'experts' would deliver 
Australia from the crisis better than any meddling politicians (Nicholls, 1992). That 
they did cemented the standing and prestige of interwar Australian economics 
(Goodwin, 1966, 638). The whole interwar period has been mooted as something of 'a 
golden age for Australian economics' in the sense that national problems were met by 
national economic expertise (Groenewegen and Mcfarlane, 1990). 
The overriding impression, then, was how a small core of economists had saved 
their country from defaulting on its loans (Shann and Copland, 1933). At the time 
Australian economists were hailed for the role they played in the crisis and thereafter. 
At the Ottawa Trade talks in 1932, for instance, the Australian economist, Edward 
Shann reported 'On all sides we are greeted by the remark that Australia has made the 
best stab of all at keeping her economy liquid and active' .6 D.H. Robertson, the 
Cambridge economist, had Sweden and Australia distinctly in mind when he wrote 
'There are said to be, in the far north and far south, lands where economists all give the 
same advice, where the Government listens to it, where the public understands why the 
Government has listened' (1940, 122). An Australian economist at Oxford, Robert 
Hall, believed the Premiers' Plan set a marvellous example of what cohesive economic 
advice could achieve (1938, 120). Ralph Hawtrey stated that Australia had anticipated 
the United States in having an economics brains trust at their disposal (1934, 1). One 
American historian called the Premiers' Plan 'the most remarkable exercise in planned 
economy that had been carried through by any democracy up to that time' (Garnett, 
1948, 96). Keynes told one of his abler students, W.B. Reddaway, to spend some time 
in far off Australia because their governments heed the advice of their economists 
(Tribe, 1997, 77). 
5 D. B. Copland to B. Rurnl, 15/12/1936, University of Melbourne Archives, Faculty of Economics and Commerce 
(Hereafter UMA FECC), Box 50. 
6 E. O.G. Shann to A.C.Davidson, 21/7/1033, Bank of New South Wales Archive (hereafter BNSW): A-53-409. 
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An American observer, Rupert MacLaurin (1936), writing upon Australia's 
economic recovery policies agreed with Copland's premise that, together with some 
ration of luck, a small open commodity-based economy could take measures to escape 
the clutches of the slump. More intriguing, however, was MacLaurin's view, later 
developed upon by Boris Schedvin, that Australian economists had, at times, played 
only a spasmodic part in formulating recovery policy: 
'The economists were used only in a haphazard fashion. That is to say, they 
were called on only on special tasks and with a particular problem to report on. 
When economists tried to broaden the bases of their inquiries in order to make 
their work more effective, governments not infrequently were resentful. 
Economists never had an opportunity to make a report on an entire economic 
programme' (1936, 257). *** 
In other words, economists were never allowed full latitude in the policy advice 
they could convey to the Commonwealth. Despite this finding, the public perception 
endured that economists played a significant part in composing an economic plan that 
helped rehabilitate the Australian economy. One reviewer of MacLaurin's work - a 
newspaperman - suggested that 'Australia's recovery was not quite the neat and ordered 
thing that Mr. MacLaurin and other economic authors have pictured it to be. The rules 
were not written round a study table and pinned on a University notice board. They had 
a more exciting, more dangerous birth and infancy' (Adam, 1937, 278).7 
Schedvin' s book Australia and the Great Depression was not just a detailed 
narrative of the origins and impact of that event but, more importantly for our purposes, 
a study in role of economists in the making of economic policy at the time. While 
ostensibly a work in economic history, the focus upon economic policy necessitates 
*** MacLaurin in his lengthy study tour of Australia was chaperoned and greatly assisted by C~pland who wrote 
letters of introduction for him to the key figures involved in 1931. MacLaurin noted that economists 'agreed in the 
beginning of the depression, that to be effective they must refrain from public controversy and concentrate on 
pushing the measures on which they concurred' (1936, 255). This was a slightly different experience to that of 
Britain where the Economic Advisory Council (E.A.C.) was beset by disagreement amongst the serving economists 
(Howson and Winch, 1977, 72). In his history of the British Treasury Lord Bridges felt that the E.A.C. was 'rather 
remote from the active centre of things ' (1964, 90) 
7 As editor of the Economic Record, Copland interestingly elected not to have one of his colleagues review 
MacLaurin' s book opting instead for an outside independent voice that might do, as Copland put it 'a little 
debunking' over reputations won in the drama. For his part, Copland felt that MacLaurin's work was 'a little tinged' 
by the author's reluctance to bless the 'heresies' Australian economists had resorted to (D.B. Copland to H. Adam, 
6/10/1937, UMA FECC, Box 141). 
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some inquiry into the public activities and ideas of economists. However, Schedvin 
undertook only a cursory examination of this aspect. This can be related to his key 
finding that, for the most part, economic policy was essentially shadowing the market. 
Schedvin took the view, therefore, that anti depression economic policy was not the 
product of 'expert' opinion but rather responses that were either accidental or mirrored 
what would have been market outcomes. This view was first suggested by the 
University of Sydney economist, E.R. Walker (Cain, 1983). The Schedvin view has , 
however, been questioned by Gregory and Butlin (1988) in a symposium held to re-
examine the experience of the Australian economy during the thirties. They found that 
economic policy did matter to some extent though its benefit was belated. 
In contrast, the central thesis of Schedvin's book was that 'deliberate policy 
measures were comparatively unimportant in influencing the nature of the contraction 
or the speed of recovery ' (1970, 372). Consequently economists had not played a 
decisive role in rescuing Australia from the slump. The germ for this idea came from 
his doctoral supervisor, S.J. Butlin. In his history of the Australia and New Zealand 
Bank Butlin suggested that the measures that emerged from the famous 'battle of the 
plans ' episode in Australian history were actually the 'traditional responses of the free 
market'. He went on to state that the 'planning' of 1930-32 'was directed not to novel 
policies but to traditional ones dictated by inherited ways of thought; it represented 
rather the inevitable political process by which conflicting interests were finally brought 
to compromise, not a resolution of significant differences in policy' (1961 , 390). In 
short, the Premiers ' Plan was really a cosmetic exercise disguising primal political 
forces at play. Butlin had earlier summed up the economists ' handiwork contained 
within the plan as merely the extension of the welfare economics drawn from Edwin 
Cannan' s text Wealth but watered down to everyday discourse (1948, 40). 
Apart from not bringing about recovery, the Premiers' Plan, Schedvin contended, 
was also needlessly deflationary. Policy was too cautious and more - though he rarely 
says what - could have been done to alleviate the slump (Arndt, 1971, 123). To argue 
the counterfactual aspect as Schedvin does is , however, fraught with difficulty. In the 
psychological and economic setting Australia was placed in there could be little 
recourse to pµblic reflation of the economy. As a loyal member of the Empire 
Australian authorities felt it paramount that the nation honour its debts to London and 
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steer clear of default. Devaluation of the currency, too, could not be overplayed. 
Schedvin ( 1992, 50) believes that not allowing the exchange rate to find its natural rate 
was probably the cardinal policy error of the thirties - a view shared by economists at 
the time (Shann, 1934, 89). 
Schedvin bemoaned that even if economists had heterodox notions in their head, 
they were, in any case, quite powerless since strong external and internal pressures 
prevailed over the economic parameters. Recurrent deficit budgets, whether accidental 
or deliberate, were equated with the spectre of default. Australia's foreign exchange 
reserves - or London balances - together with the repayment of overseas debt, precluded 
policy expansionism. Hart's (1967) definitive account of the Lyons' Government 
concurred, noting how subterranean influences, mostly financial, underpinned the 
administration. The Board of the Commonwealth Bank in ideological league with the 
other trading banks, together, with a pliant Loan Council, presided over monetary policy 
(Butlin and Boyce, 1988; Gilbert, 1973). Exchange rate policy was one area where 
economists' advice, to some extent, bore sorne influence, and they always encompassed 
it as part of the Premiers' Plan (Markwell, 1985, 22-23). In contrast, Schedvin (1970, 
156) saw the 1931 devaluation as an isolated market-driven event 'not part of any plan 
or policy'. According to Valentine the devaluation was more a 'passive reaction to 
balance of payments pressures than a deliberate policy measured aimed at improving 
matters' (1987, 67). 
In sum, Schedvin's argument that anti-depression policy was, in fact, largely 
market-generated than considered policy meant that it hardly deserved the effusive 
praise Copland showered upon it, particularly its 'institutional and theoretical novelty' 
(1970, 252). To Schedvin's eye: 
'The Premiers' Plan was merely the embodiment of a series of expedients 
designed to maintain external solvency. The plan was not conceived as a means 
to promote recovery, nor did it so in any tangible way. The view that the 
Premiers' Plan was the foundation of Australia's recovery, that it represented a 
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judicious and deliberate mixture of deflation and inflation is a figment of Sir 
Douglas Copland's imagination' (1970, 7).* 
Since the Premiers' Plan policies were essentially reactive and market-driven, 
Schedvin argued that economists were ciphers in the policy-making process; their 
primary function being to knit the fabric of 1931 Premiers' Plan into a 'shroud of 
technical competence and expertise' (1970, 9). That is the economists' policy-making 
activities in 1931 and thereafter was designed to 'to embellish the (federal) government-
bank compromise with a veneer of impartiality' (Hancock, 1972, 77). Schedvin's 
reassessment of the federal authorities' policy during the depression is, however, on face 
value, tendentious, for it is difficult to distinguish at times between the effects of policy 
and that of market forces, with each interacting upon the other (Forsyth, 1972, 376). 
Since the publication of Schedvin' s book there has been renewed debate over 
both the genesis and economic soundness of the Premiers' Plan in dealing with 
Australia's debt and budgetary imbalance problem. Moreover, in a point lost in the 
review literature, Schedvin admitted that 'serious work on the interwar period is still in 
its infancy and this study bears the mark of that uncertain exploration' ( cited in Clark, 
1981b, 192). The Premiers' Plan, politically at least, might have been part accidental but 
whether the policies that flowed from it were ineffective, as Schedvin alleges, is highly 
debatable. 
Despite its severity, the business and financial community drew enormous 
psychological relief from the Premiers' Plan in the belief that it would deliver Australia 
from liquidation. Leaving it to market forces to engineer the same adjustments would 
not have triggered the same response but, more likely, have drawn militant resistance. 
There was, in fact, great community compliance with the plan as demonstrated by the 
successful and irreversible internal debt conversion process - something Lang thought 
would never succeed (Dow, 1937, 96). Higher tariff protection gave the 
* 
Schedvin is of the opinion that Australian authorities lacked the know-how to mount a reflationary policy (1970, 
373). A full-bodied economic reflation for Australia or any other country for that matter in the thirties would have 
required 'extensive state supervision of the economy', which itself implied drastic political action (McKibbin, 1990, 
227). Germany under Hitler proved one exception. There was, in any case, an absence of 'a mature reflationary 
economics'. The alternatives open to Australia was not deflation or reflation but, in fact, drift or deflation (McKibbin, 
1990, 217, 224-225). 
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Commonwealth government some latitude in the deployment of public works without 
putting pressure upon the exchange rate (Arndt, 1971). Sinclair admits that this 
response, partly at the behest of Australian economists, was in some defiance of 'the 
rules of the game' permitted by the Gold Standard. The Bank of England's advice that 
Australia deflate its internal level of income to maintain the Australian pound' s parity 
with sterling was rejected outright by Australian economists who elected for 
devaluation coupled with tariffs and monetary stimulus (Sinclair, 1974, 57). 
Of even greater interest to this thesis is Schedvin' s attack upon interwar 
Australian economists for failing miserably: 
' ... to work towards the building of a positive policy in the later depression 
years, when this task was the preoccupation of overseas economists. When they 
should have been questioning traditional modes of thought, they clung to the 
myth of the efficacy of the Premiers' Plan and implicitly condoned thereafter the 
inept policies of the Lyons Government. There was nothing remotely 
comparable in Australia to the vigour of the New Deal or the Cambridge 
intellectual revolution' (1970, 225) . 
Nor did Schedvin discern any evidence of an intellectual hunger for 
experimentation within academe: 'There is nothing in Australia which even 
approximates the widespread intellectual reconsideration of traditional doctrines which 
occurred overseas ' (1970, 374). These are strong charges and they find some 
corroboration in Tim Harcourt's survey of Australian economists' theoretical views 
upon unemployment at that time (1986, 87). 
This minimalist view of the role economic ideas and indeed economists played 
in 1931 and beyond will be strongly contended throughout this thesis. For the moment 
Schedvin' s thesis can be questioned by listing some of its more telling omissions. First 
and foremost, Schedvin study only extends till 1935 meaning that the economists' 
evidence - verbal and written - upon the conduct of economic policy put before the 
Royal Commi ssion on Monetary and Banking Systems was not covered. Nor, by the 
same token, d9es Schedvin' s study discuss how the General Theory was received and 
adapted by Australian economists. There are, moreover, more telling sins of omission 
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that apply before 1935. These are covered in forthcoming chapters but we can briefly 
mention some of them. Schedvin completely overlooks, for instance, Copland and 
Giblin' s advice of following Keynes's stricture of seeking price level stabilisation in the 
face of deflationary pressure by resorting to cheap money and devaluation (Cain, 1987a; 
Clark, 1974, 50). Nor does Schedvin acknowledge Keynes's qualified approval of the 
Premiers' Plan contained in his Report of the Australian Experts (Keynes, 1982). It was 
devaluation and Treasury bill finance that, both Copland and Shann ( 1934, 87) felt were 
the really 'heretical' or unorthodox parts of the Premiers' Plan. A.C. Davidson, the 
powerful head of the Bank of New South Wales, who was instrumental in forcing the 
devaluation initially, opposed it until economists persuaded him of its merits (Holder, 
1970). Even when the Premiers' Plan was put into operation the authorities were not 
wholly conscious that some of its measures would impart some mildly expansionary 
effect upon the economy; the economists, however, knew better. Moreover some 
economists had begun to relax their strictures upon fiscal consolidation when they saw 
that the economy was in need of monetary stimulus by the end of 1931 (Copland, 1951, 
22). This view gathered strength as the recovery in export prices failed to materialise. In 
1933, for instance, Giblin found support in Keynes's pamphlet The Means to Prosperity 
for his own position with its message that an increase in expenditure would expand 
income, rather than prices. Meanwhile Davidson's bank, with its own economics 
department, put out a circular in 1933 declaiing that 'Deflation in Australia has reached 
a point at which it may be dangerous to continue'. 8 It went on to urge the economic 
benefit of public works rather than the stimulus from trade. Again, in 1934 a group of 
Sydney University economists, led by E.R. Walker, composed a proto-Keynesian plan 
for the NSW Premier to take to the Australian Loan Council. 
In a retrospective interview, Leslie Melville strongly contested the Schedvin 
thesis of the impotency of interwar economists' ideas. He defended his colleagues and 
the advice they gave to the Commonwealth Government. Their advice not only 
prevented breakdown of the monetary system but also played an important part in the 
recovery process (Cornish, 1993, 17: Cornish, 1999, 132-133). To wit: 'The fact is that 
measures taken on wages, on the exchange rate, on budgets were the result of deliberate 
policy and were decisive in preventing the flight of capital and external default' .9 In a 
8 
'Towards Recovery' BNSW Circular, May 1933, pg. 8. 
9 Melville Trc 182. pg 145, NLA. 
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review of Schedvin' s book, Melville expressed wonderment about how an ensemble of 
measures including tariffs, devaluation, wage cuts and easy money, all of which were 
ultimately sanctioned by authorities, could not but have had a conscious and beneficial 
economic effect. This view has been supported by Alford ( 1994) in her reappraisal of 
interwar economic policy, especially the importance of the manufacturing sector. 
Melville did agree that more could have been done in 1932 to aid economic recovery 
but only by further devaluation - something that was articulated by economists in a 
commissioned report to the government. Despite being the last surviving member of the 
economists behind the Premiers' Plan, Melville's categorical rebuttal of Schedvin has 
not changed the prevailing view that Australian economists did perform poorly in the 
depression and thereafter. Only Arndt (1971), Boehm (1973) and Budin and Boyce 
(1988) offer a sympathetic account of the advice the economists tendered. In contrast, 
the contributions by (Catley and McFarlane, 1983; Clark, 197 4b, 1981 a, 1981 b; 
Hancock, 1972: Sinclair, 1974; and Spearritt, 1981) are unforgiving in their assessment 
of the role Australian economists played during this period. 
In a commentary upon 1931, Sinclair argued that 'Australian governments had 
some freedom of action and failed to choose the fiscal action appropriate to the highest . 
attainable level of employment' (1974, 58). Sinclair concluded that the timing of 
Premiers' Plan proved abysmal in that the moment of external crisis had passed when 
the elected policy of making sharp reductions to governmental expenditure began to 
take effect. Put simply, public policy exacerbated the slump.* Consequently the 
economists involved in formulating the plan should be apportioned some blame for 
unleashing this deflationary impulses upon the economy. This view is shared by David 
Clark (1981b, 190-1) and Keith Hancock (1972), both of whom argued that the 
economists' advice both in 1931 and again in 1932 was totally inept in the 
circumstances. In terms of their assumptions and advice, and without having recourse 
to Keynesian preconceptions, Hancock judged that the interwar economists 'performed 
badly' (1972, 78). 
The concerns of external balance and business confidence which economists 
then regarded as crucially important were overlooked by Clark, who, in one account, 
* A view incidentally shared by a current first-year Australian University economics textbook (Parkin, 
McTaggert, and Findlay, 1993). 
29 
revisits the episode through the eyes of R.F. Irvine, a defrocked Hobsonian economist 
of the period (1974b, 50). In their study of the history of Australian economic thought, 
Groenewegen and McFarlane (1990, 128) offered only lukewarm support for the 
Premiers' Plan. They noted how that the enshrined 'principle of equal sacrifice' or wage 
cuts across-the-board inadvertently delivered recovery only by improving international 
competitiveness and allowing greater import replacement. Catley and McFarlane (1983, 
58) denounced the Premiers' Plan as solely deflationary, concocted by 'the most 
reactionary' of Australian economists. They admonish the interwar economists for 
being preoccupied with external balance to the detriment of internal balance (Catley and 
McFarlane, 1983, 59). Spearritt (1981, 5) presents Copland and Giblin as tendering 
advice intentionally injurious to the working class. 
Certainly it was true that the authorities' reluctance to question deflationary 
policy or contemplate a further devaluation in 1932 proved tragic. Australia, 
consequently, endured an unemployment rate of 20 per cent for four years. Australian 
economists had, however, long pushed for another devaluation to ease the external 
constraint. They would have readily agreed, therefore, with their modem day critics that 
another devaluation would have allowed more policy-induced domestic expansion to 
have been attempted (Butlin and Boyce, 1988, 205; Gregory and Butlin, 1988, 14-16; 
Arndt, 1971). Gregory and Butlin (1988) found that Australia was not alone in being 
reluctant to devalue. Only in Australia, however, were economists successful in not 
only persuading that step to be first taken but persuasive, too, in preventing the reversal 
of that measure by the central bank (Eichengreen, 1988, 57). It is true the advice of the 
economists was mostly rejected in 1932/33 as the conservative forces behind Lyons 
exerted their influence. The steadfast reluctance to experiment, to authorise even modest 
public sector stimulus, even when pressure upon Australia's foreign exchange had 
eased, aggrieved the economists. While Australia did suffer significant! y high 
unemployment rates through the early thirties, an incipient economic recovery quelled 
the official need for any major revisions to policy. The critical absence of a Keynesian 
conceptual framework in the late thirties gave the Lyons government a difficult time 
reconciling the competing resource needs between war and civilian needs (Ross, 1995). 
The S9hedvin-Copland debate about how effective economists and economic 
policy actually were in combating the depression has a critical bearing upon this 
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dissertation. If one adopts the Schedvin view that economists were, despite their public 
profile, really only minor players in formulating Australian economic policy during the 
early thirties, it lends support to the view that the ideas of economists made little impact 
except where their advice was congruent with prevailing political currents. Political 
advocacy for a new economic approach was obviously unlikely to gain support if public 
** opinion, supreme politics and high finance railed against it. Nonetheless Australian 
economists were influential in this period far more than Schedvin gives them credit for. 
They showed, moreover, a fine appreciation of Australia's place in the international 
economy and the possibility of staging a multilateral effort at co-ordinated expansion 
led by the industrialized countries (Turnell, 1999). When that avenue failed they 
continued their quest within the bounds of national economic policy. This meant 
lobbying and arguing for greater ambition with economic policy. Economists were also 
intent upon fostering a greater manufacturing capacity for Australia. Apart from 
Melville's (1970; 1971; Cornish, 1993) and Arndt's (1971) rebuttals this rather 
belittling view of Australian economists during the thirties has been allowed to stand. 
Rejecting the Schedvin judgment and rehabilitating the reputation of Australian 
economists during the thirties is one of the desired ambitions of this dissertation. Pulling 
both major sections of this chapter together is a good opportunity to rephrase the actual 
research question of this thesis. 
2.4 A Restatement of the Thesis 
In Australian economic history the thirties is often presented as the interregnum 
between depression and war, a lacuna of nine years where supply-side economic 
policies were in place; a period of readjustment and resolution, but not of experiment. 
The 'grin and bear it' believers in natural forces and in 'the healing virtues of time', as 
Keynes termed it, found root in the Australian psyche (cited in Leeson, 1996, 50). The 
period was however, punctuated by events and circumstances that, it will be argued, 
propelled the case for a greater management of the economy. It was, as this thesis will 
** To Keynes's mind, popular opinion came a long way first. As he told a correspondent: 
'The mistake .. . is in thinking that the difficulty lies in conceiving a plan; in truth there is not much 
difficulty in that. The difficulty is to think of a plan which can be dressed up in such a form that there is the 
slightest likelihood of its being adopted. It is not so much a question of discovering the truth, as of 
adapting to one's ·ideas the common opinion which it would take years to modify ' J. M. Keynes to A.S. 
Darroch, 6/6/1934. L/32/128, KPKC. 
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argue, a period of immense mental activity and excitement - and frustration - within the 
small, but not inconsequential, economics profession. Much of the change in their 
thinking was conveyed in the policy suggestions they put forward in various national 
and international forums. Economists had begun to slacken in their support for the 
Premiers' Plan and urged more ambition in economic policy. This process was aided by 
the penchant Australian economists had for a practical view of matters - the end-result, 
Copland suggests, of being called in to advise upon matters of economic management 
(1951, 16). A theoretical framework, nonetheless, still underpinned their advice. 
Critically, that outlook would shift over the thirties. 
While ideas about demand management had begun circulating among Australian 
economists following the publication of the General Theory, Keynes's new theoretical 
framework attracted little attention from policy-makers until 1939. For Australia, the 
juncture, when Keynes's new theory translated into policy, came only with the 
preparation for and prosecution of war. This, as we shall see, was earlier than either 
Britain or America though it has never been explicitly recognised. Keynes, for instance, 
rejoiced at the initiative of President Roosevelt's New Deal and regarded Washington as 
'the economic laboratory of the world' (cited in Skidelsky, 1996, 97). In the literature 
'the Keynesian Revolution', in policy terms, became a Trans-Atlantic phenomenon. Yet 
the Australian economy, with its institutional framework, its milieu of State-led 
development and tradition of egalitarianism, together with the influence of its 
economists was more amenable to the ready adaptation of Keynesian ideas. The 
Australian historian, W.K. Hancock (1930), who had noted his countrymen's disdain for 
economists also observed the tendency of social and political developments in Britain to 
follow a course already mapped out in his own country; that is, the periphery could 
sometimes lead the metropole, and to the Empire's benefit. All these preconditions 
suggested an early official adoption of Keynesian ideas within Australia with 
economists leading the crusade. 
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CHAPTER3 
The Australian Economy during the Depression Decade 
3.1 Introduction 
D.B. Copland once noted 'Rarely, if ever, has the economy of a country been 
subject to such penetrating scrutiny as was the Australian economy in the years 1927 to 
1939' (Palmer, 1940, 224-5). Not the same could be said, however, of Australian 
economists, particularly their advice to combat the depression and promote economic 
recovery in the thirties. The purpose of this chapter is to undertake a survey of the 
Australian economy during the thirties, using both contemporaneous and revisionist 
accounts of the traverse from slump to recovery. This will entail highlighting the 
marked peculiarities of Australia's economic experience through the decade. This 
background is useful to understand the economic environment Australian economists 
had to contend with and, in some cases, were held accountable for. There are, moreover, 
differing accounts of the causes both behind the slump and the recovery within 
Australia and, germane to this thesis, _the role professional economic advice played in 
driving that process. 
The second part of this chapter is to review the existing economic policy 
machinery and the dogma and conventions that underpinned it. Largely to do with 
monetary matters, it was an area where the ideas of academic economists did not at first 
intrude. The advice of 'academic gentlemen' upon monetary management was usually 
dismissed by bankers and policy-makers but the events of 1931 altered this. 
3.2 Causal Factors behind the Depression in Australia 
With the notable exception of Schedvin ( 1970) most of the literature upon the 
causes behind Australia's depression cites external factors as the leading factor. These 
were, namely, the calamitous fall in export prices, coupled with the closing of the 
international capital market to Australian borrowing. There has, in brief, been 
considerable debate about the competing strengths of these two factors. Greasley and 
Oxley (1998), for instance, emphasize the worsening terms of trade in reducing 
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Australian incomes while Valentine ( 1987) argues that the fall in export prices was the 
cardinal factor behind Australia's woes rather than the cessation of borrowing. In an 
exhaustive study of the causes, Schedvin (1970) identified long-run internal factors that 
greatly contributed to the severity of Australia's depression. For instance, apart from 
private investment reaching its peak in 1924 there had also been cutbacks to public 
sector projects due to disillusionment with the benefit of rural development programs 
(Sinclair, 1974, 56). There had been overexpansion in too compressed a period. In 
contrast, Valentine (1987) and Siriwardena (1995) downplay the role of internal factors 
behind Australia's depression which they believe to be somewhat exaggerated. In his 
contemporary account Copland (1934), too, ascribed the depression entirely to the drop 
in export prices, the cessation of overseas borrowing and the concomitant lack of 
confidence in the country's political and economic stability. 
In a nutshell, then, it was export prices that proved an infallible index to 
Australian prosperity. Its corollary, the external account, preoccupied policymakers 
minds in the sense that there had to be a sufficient level of external reserves ready to 
meet the exigency of poor seasons or low prices. It was that factor that dominated over 
all other considerations and to which we now turn. 
3.3 The Australian Economic Predicament 
In 1929 Australia was basically a small, open economy specialising in exporting 
primary goods within the British imperial trading circuit. Nearly 50 per cent of 
Australia's exports went to Britain (Ross, 1995, 186). It was an asymmetric 
relationship; Australia needed Britain more than Britain needed Australia. The 
dependence was not just for trade access for Australia's primary products but also 
foreign capital. Economists estimated that roughly 25 per cent of Australia's national 
income was generated by exports with another 25 per cent from tariff-protected 
industries (Copland, 1937, 412). The other half of national income was generated by 
sheltered industries. These ratios changed with the attendant structural change that 
ensued in the thirties. Australia's role in the imperial circuit was to absorb British 
capital and migrants recruited for ambitious rural development schemes which would, 
in tum, gener.~te exports to the mother country. An oversupply of primary commodities 
in the global economy drove down prices spelling embarrassment for Australia 
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(Schedvin, 1970, 21-34). Her greatest economic booms were attributable to capital 
inflow and favourable export prices (Walker, 1933, 209). Australia's exports were 
predominantly wool, wheat, hides, metals, dairy and fruit produce while her imports, 
mostly manufactures, were drawn from Britain. About 40 per cent of Australia's exports 
consisted of wool, while wheat comprised another 20 per cent. Foreign investment, 
mostly in the form of loans was, apart from export prices, the principal cause of 
Australia's prosperity. The prices of Australia's export staples were volatile, highly 
susceptible to economic fluctuations. At the peak of her pre-depression prosperity in 
1927 /28, Australia had managed to disperse her exports to many markets other than 
Britain. This she was compelled to do to maintain the debt servicing costs on loans 
taken out from London. 
In the blind rush to development the overseas debt of Australian Governments 
by June 1929 stood at just over 631 million pounds. The capital was sunk into public 
utilities and infrastructure necessary for the expansion of primary and secondary 
industry. While the borrowing created a form of hothouse prosperity, normal 
unemployment remained high. Copland, amongst others, defended the subsequent 
expansion in industrial and agricultural capacity positing that it would bear fruit in the 
future. It would eventually allow Australia to raise the volume of its primary exports by 
one-third by 1932. However this increase in volume came with the turbulence of lower 
prices meaning that Australia earned only two-thirds of the income it had earned in the 
twenties (Oyster and Meredith, 1990, 132). 
Since 1919 the foreign debt had grown by 73 per cent with the most rapid build 
up in the late twenties, averaging 4 7 million pounds per annum. Consequently, Australia 
faced a rising external interest bill equivalent to 40 per cent of her export receipts. This 
impost, the legacy of large scale borrowing from London was, as Table 1 shows, to 
linger through the thirties meaning that, even in very good years, Australia could still 
not easily trade her way out of difficulties. During the depression Australia's London 
funds fell from about 108 million pounds in 1928 to 27 million pounds in 1931 when 
usually 70 million pounds was regarded as the absolute minimum to service Australia's 
needs. This conundrum afflicted policy-makers and economists with a preoccupation 
with the exterp.al balance and 'a brooding pessimism' about its prospects (Carden, 1968, 
15). 
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Table 1 Australia's balance of payments 1928/29-1940/41 (£ million 
Invisible items 
Visible 
Visible Visible trade 
Year exportsx importsx balancexx 
Interest and dividends 
Credits 
Public Private Total 
debits debits debits Balance 
1928-29* 141.1 147.4 -6.3 3.1 28.2 12.4 40.6 -37.5 
1929-30* 106.0 146.8 -40.8 2.1 31.6 13.5 45.1 -43.0 
1930-31 104.1 82.1 22.0 2.5 41.0 11.3 52.3 -49.8 
1931-32 101.7 57.8 43.9 3.9 33.8 7.4 41.2 -37.3 
1932-33 106.0 73.5 32.5 2.3 32.4 7.5 39.9 -37.6 
1933-34 122.9 76.8 46.1 2.4 31.1 8.3 39.4 -37.0 
1934-35 112.2 93.7 18.5 2.2 30.2 8.3 38.5 -36.3 
1935-36 135.2 108.2 27.0 1.9 28.3 10.2 38.5 -36.6 
1936-37 159.5 103.0 56.5 3.6 27.4 14.9 42.3 -38.7 
1937-38 154.1 127.2 26.9 3.8 27.3 15.9 43.2 -39.4 
1938-39 136.7 109.4 27.3 3.8 27.6 15.8 43.4 -39.6 
1939-40 169.0 123.3 45.7 3.8 28 .. 0 18.0 46.0 -42.2 
1940-41 160.7 102.1 58.6 3.7 28.4 17.4 45.8 -42.1 
Notes: xexcluding gold and specie; including gold production; xxexcluding gold and specie. 
Sources: N.G. Butlin, Australian domestic product, investment and foreign borrowing 1861 -1938/39 (Cam 
1962) 442-44; Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, The Australian balance of payments Ji 
Appendix tables I and VII. 
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Nor did Australia's terms of trade much improve over the thirties, except as 
Table 2 shows, for a brief period following the adverse movement between 1928/29 and 
1932/33. 
Table 2 Australia's net commodity terms of trade, 1924/25-1940/41 (1913-14 = 
100) 
Index of Index of 
Year export prices* import prices Terms of tradeX 
1924-25 215 164 131 
1925-26 165 163 101 
1926-27 160 156 103 
1927-28 172 153 112 
1928-29 158 151 105 
1929-30 122 146 84 
1930-31 92 146 63 
1931-32 92 144 64 
1932-33 90 134 67 
1933-34 114 131 87 
1934-35 96 131 73 
1935-36 121 133 91 
1936-37 146 139 105 
1937-38 131 146 90 
1938-39 108 144 75 
1939-40 127 164 77 
1940-41 140 194 72 
Notes: *In Australian currency: in sterling terms Australia's export prices were 
approximately 20 per cent lower from January 1931. Xlndex of export prices divided 
by index of import prices. 
Sources: Susan Bambrick, 'Australian price indices', unpublished PhD thesis, 
Australian National University, 1968, Table VIII/1; Bambrick, 'Australia's long-run 
terms of trade', Economic Developme.nt and Cultural Change, 19, 1, 1970, 5. 
The annus horibilis for Australia was surely 1929. In mid year export prices 
plunged 30 per cent -equivalent to a 9 per cent fall in real GDP - while investors began 
to sell Australian securities on the London market making it more difficult for Australia 
to raise capital. Australian Governments were forced to take out overdrafts with London 
banks. By October the London balances, essentially Australia's foreign exchange 
reserves, were depleted and the Scullin Government agreed to a Commonwealth Bank 
request to requisition gold and control its export. In 1929/30 Australia shipped 25 
million pounds of gold to London effectively taking her off the Gold Standard. The 
37 
initial fall in export prices was a reflection of a decline in global demand caused by the 
slump in the USA and the transmission effects thereof. It raised Australia's current 
account deficit to 11 per cent of GDP as against the four-year average of 7 per cent. The 
bind Australia was in marked the onset of acute financial diplomacy between Canberra 
and London. As subsequent chapters recall, the Bank of England was prepared to assist 
but only under the most austere conditions. The City and the English press had been 
alarmed at the scale of Australian borrowing in the twenties. There had been 
forebodings expressed locally about the reliance upon the huge build-up of capital 
inflow but the warnings were lost in the euphoria of 'men, money and markets'. 
3.3.1 The Trade Account 
Table 1 shows a panoramic view of Australia's trade and capital account for the 
period under study. The surge in imports, allied with the huge scale of capital inflow, 
accelerated until 1929/30. Following that dramatic year was the inverted story of a 
famine of imports and a capital outflow from Australia. Capital left Australia when 
there were market concern about the country's exchange rate and, relatedly, the overall 
degree of political and economic stability. The subsequent reversal in Australia's trade 
performance, spearheaded ·by a massive dose of relative cost adjustment together with 
deflationary economic policy, brought forth a huge expansion in the tradeables sector of 
the economy. It was aided by a run of good agricultural seasons. For instance, in 
1931/32 the volume of Australia' exports had risen by 25 per cent since 1928/29. The 
devaluation of the Australian pound in 1931, along with the elasticity of domestic costs 
that ensued, were the factors underpinning this performance. It was made all the more 
remarkable given the adverse international trading environment. Following trade 
concessions won at the Ottawa Imperial Trade Conference, Britain took a marked 
increase in Australian produce (Rooth, 2000). Japan and China compensated for 
depressed markets elsewhere (Oyster and Meredith, 1990, 133). Meanwhile, imports 
. from Britain shrunk dramatically. Apart from the dramatic impact of deflation, 
Australia's relative cost adjustment lay behind the plunge in import volumes falling 
from 143 million pounds in 1928/29 to 44 million pounds in 1932/33. With import 
consumption falling faster than national income, opportunities arose for domestic 
manufacturers to capture more of the domestic market (Oyster and Meredith, 1990, 
135). 
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High tariff barriers, in tandem with the devaluation of 1931 and the measures 
taken upon relative costs, were extremely conducive for a marked rise in import-
replacing manufacturing. Imports as a proportion of gross domestic product fell from an 
average of 18 per cent in the twenties to 12 per cent by the early thirties (Schedvin, 
1970, 303). In this respect, Schedvin asserts that the mild expansion in manufacturing 
that occurred in 1933 was 'sufficient to initiate more general recovery' (1970, 148). It 
became the conventional wisdom in the post-war years to ascribe recovery largely to 
this development, much of it financed by British capital (Schedvin, 1970, 295). That is, 
Australia was forced to turn to 'new and untried factors to initiate the recovery' 
(Walker, 1933a, 209). In the recovery years imports recovered some lost ground while 
export prices rose intermittently meaning renewed pressure was placed upon the balance 
of payments. 
Australia had to endure one of the worst unemployment experiences resulting 
from both the effect from the depression and structural adjustment policies put in place 
to deal with it. Table 3 shows the unemployment rate for Australia using the most 
accurate data available. At one stage the unemployment rate hovered near 30 per cent of 
the workforce (Valentine, 1987, 63). The blow to employment came from the adverse 
movement in the terms of trade together with the termination of public works financed 
by overseas capital. Added to this was the near collapse in business and consumer 
confidence about the country's immediate economic future. Private capital investment 
expenditure plunged over the years 1929 through to mid-1933 (Valentine, 1987, 64). As 
Table 3 shows, after the nadir of 1932, the unemployment rate began to improve and 
fell in 1937 /38 to pre-depression levels. This, as we shall see, was enough for 
economists to proclaim that full employment had been reached. There was a slight 
relapse in 1938/39 as the fallout from an international recession hit Australia. By the 
outbreak of war unemployment was again at 10 per cent. 
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Table 3 Unemployment in Australia 1929-1939 
Year Per cent of trade union 
members. 
1919 6.6 
1920 6.5 
1921 11.2 
1922 9.3 
1923 7.1 
1924 8.9 
1925 8.8 
1926 7.1 
1927 7.0 
1928 10.8 
1929 11.1 
1930 19.3 
1931 27.4 
1932 29.0 
1933 25.1 
1934 20.5 
1935 16.5 
1936 12.2 
1937 9.3 
1938 8.7 
1939 9.7 
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Graph 1. Australia's Export Prices Index and Commonwealth Basic Wage 
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Source: Duplicate of the original exhibit presented to Arbitration Court in 1937 by 
W.B. Reddaway. 
In Graph 1 the export price index shows the overall movement in prices and how 
they staged a continuous recovery from 1935 following an abortive recovery in 1933. 
These prices are matched against the trend in the nominal wages which were raised 
following the Arbitration Court's 'prosperity loading' in the 1937 National Wage Case. 
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3.3.2 Public Spending and Public Borrowing 
Australia had extensive experience with public works programs through the 
twenties; indeed public sector investment had played a significant part in Australia's 
economic development. During the thirties the Lyons Government's fiscal stance was to 
achieve budgetary surpluses and dissipate them by tax remissions. 'Sound finance' was 
regarded as proper and honest (Groenewegen and McFarlane, 1990, 162-3). Balanced 
budgets were, therefore, de rigueur while deficits were regarded as inflationary and 
perversely affecting business confidence. This had added force with the weight and the 
guilt of the reckless expenditure that had been incurred in the twenties. Consequently, 
public investment spending fell in the period between 1929 and 1932 (Valentine, 1987, 
· 64 ). Capital markets, here, and in London, blessed the fiscal consolidation strategy and 
rewarded Canberra by usually subscribing to loans or facilitating loan conversion 
operations. After subtracting for external payments the combined net government 
surplus rose from 7 million pounds in 1930/31 to 25 million pounds in 1932/33 and 
remained there till defence preparations spelt greater federal outlays. 
The States mostly subscribed to the same dogma, but not all. The Loan Council 
and Commonwealth Bank monitored public sector borrowing but could not prevent 
some States engaging in borrowing for public works using the channel of semi-
governmental authorities. Business and financial groups were steadfast in warning of 
the inflationary dangers that would ensue from tampering with money supply or running 
deficit budgets. Federal budget deficits were regarded as equivalent to creating credit. 
On that note the Lyons government strongly adhered to the Treasury-Commonwealth 
Bank line that using credit to hasten economic activity would lead to inflationary 
repercussions (Ross, 1995, 117). This issue is more fully discussed in Chapters Five and 
Six. 
3.3.3 Economic Policy and the Recovery 
Australia's national income fell from 650 million pounds in 1928/29 to 450 
million pounds in 1931/32 - a fall of nearly one-third making it one of the largest 
contractions suffered by any western economy. There was a swift reaction to this in 
both official and unofficial policy terms. Apart from increasing tariffs and a market-led 
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devaluation another response was the Arbitration Court's decision to attempt to reduce 
real wages by 10 per cent (Copland, 1934). Further, given the widespread deflation, 
wages were indexed downwards resulting in an overall money wage cut of 20 per cent. 
Since interest and rental income receivers increased their share of national income 
between 1929 and 1931, it became necessary, in the name of burden sharing, that their 
allocation of income fell proportionately. This was executed with the successful bond 
conversion operation of 1931 which was an integral part of the federal government's 
policy response to the crisis. There was also retrenchment of public expenditures and 
tax increases to repair budgetary imbalances for both tiers of Government. 
MacLaurin ( 1936) dates the first green shoots of recovery from the last months 
of 1932. It was there perhaps that the economy's generators of income were close to 
'bedrock levels' (Sinclair, 1973, 200). The recovery, initially weak, grew in strength 
and continued till a slight relapse in 1938/39. Real GDP began to rise from 1933/34 and 
increased steadily to 1937/38 when it was 20 per cent higher than 1928/29. 
Commentators at the time attributed the upturn to the return of business confidence 
along with the tonic of public spending and cheap money (Copland, 1936; MacLaurin, 
1936). However, the overall timbre of economic policy was a supply-sided one. It was 
export prices, particularly wool and wheat, which were still the ultimate determinant of 
prosperity. Graph 1 above shows a spasmodic recovery in export prices from 1933. 
While there was considerable laxity and resistance in implementing the fiscal 
austerity of the Premiers' Plan the removal of th_e Scullin Labour Government reduced 
the risk of psychological crowding-out (Walker, 1933). Public works were resorted to it 
as a palliative, not for achieving a permanently higher level of activity. Apart from fears 
of crowding-out private investment, it was held that greater public sector spending 
would inflate the domestic price level and put an added burden upon the export sector 
(Plumptre, 1935). Nor it seemed was the electorate ready for more bold measures like 
reflation (Nairn, 1986, 235). Any commissioned public works had to be, given the waste 
of the twenties, 'reproductive' yielding, within a reasonable period, a revenue at least 
equal to the debt (Robinson, 1986, 84 ). As the thirties wore on some could dispute 
whether there was, in fact, a need for public sector-led stimulus since the economy 
showed signs .of over-expansion from 1935 onwards. This came with concomitant fears 
over the external account and the level of foreign exchange reserves. Consequently, 
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policy-making authorities wanted to continue to scale back both public and private debt, 
unaware that debt sometimes engendered productive enterprise. Indeed, as will be 
shown below, the recovery was interpreted as conditional upon the authorities not doing 
anything rash in economic policy and thereby affecting business confidence. There was 
little recognition by the Commonwealth of manipulating policy levers to achieve a 
higher level of output and employment, except the traditional faith in counter-cyclical 
monetary management. From 1932 onwards, remissions of taxation were made from 
the Commonwealth's budget even where it compelled commensurate retrenchment in 
government expenditure. The fact that these tax cuts came from consolidated and 
improved budgetary outcomes was well advertised, so as to placate community 
concerns about future debt levels (Ross, 1995, 109-10). 
Until export prices recovered, the Commonwealth sought to reduce the costs of 
primary production by bearing down upon cost levels. Cheap money was the other 
policy fundamental the Lyons Government upheld throughout the thirties (Mills and 
Walker, 1952). The low interest rates were the fruit of the money market's confidence 
that the high inflationary road would not be taken; more materially, they were the end 
result of Treasury bill finance used to cover Government budget deficits. This supply-
side economic strategy was rigorously upheld until the threat of war intruded (Ross, 
1995, 110). This condition was also, in part externally imposed since the London capital 
markets remained closed to Australian borrowers. The year 1937 /38 would be an annus 
mirabilis for Australia with the recovery continuing to the astonishment of economists, 
where, as exports faltered domestic expansion and import replacement took up the 
slack. 10 Fortune, too, played some part in the recovery. Australia enjoyed seven 
successive good agricultural seasons during the thirties. 
Following Schedvin (1970), the new conventional wisdom of the recovery 
process was attributed to the rise of the manufacturing sector and the employment it 
generated. Apart from making a greater show at import replacement, the plasticity of 
local wage rates meant that Australia enjoyed a real devaluation in 1931. Economic 
historians have contested the alleged structural pre-eminence of manufacturing in 
driving recovery. Schedvin does not fully document, for instance, how developed the 
10 
'Australian business on continued upswing', The Financial Times Banking Supplement 2/5/1938. 
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manufacturing sector actually was before 1929 (Alford, 1994, 10). Manufacturing, for 
instance, already employed more of the labour force than the rural sector by 1926. Nor 
does Schedvin take into account how manufacturing employment actually suffered more 
than any sector as a consequence of the depression (Boehm, 1973).Whatever the relative 
magnitude of manufacturing' s contribution to recovery it did generate more 
employment than the huge lift in rural output which, in itself, accounted for one third of 
the improvement in GDP (Dyster and Meredith, 1990, 147). 
Gregory and Butlin argue that Schedvin also overlooks the huge increase in 
primary sector production that took place in the thirties. They also visualize the rise in 
manufacturing as taking place within the broader scheme of things. That is, the recovery 
process in Australia, as elsewhere, exhibited 'a rubber band effect' in that the upswing 
was 'a mirror image of the downswing' (Gregory and Butlin, 1988, 25)~ the vigour of 
the recovery corresponded with the severity of the preceding recession. They agree with 
Schedvin only in the sense that market forces, not Government policy, per se, largely 
engineered the traverse. However they do not totally dismiss the intent of the Federal 
Government's recovery policies as Schedvin does. Following Eichengreen (1988), 
Gregory and Butlin (1988) insist that had there been an earlier devaluation Australia 
might have escaped the worst of the slump~ a similar finding to the advice Australian 
economists stated before a major inquiry into banking and monetary policy in 1936. The 
nature of the response by the authorities suggests a brief appraisal of the policy 
apparatus at their command. 
3.4 Economic Institutions and Monetary Arrangements 
Colin White has interestingly argued that there v,1as a delay or 'policy vacuum' 
within Australia in coming to terms with the colossal external shocks of falling export 
prices and the near cessation of capital inflo\N. This was due to the absence of a 'central 
economic authority' (1992, 190). This is debatable but there was undoubtedly dithering 
and inaction in responding to the problem largely because the Scullin Government had 
been elected upon a non-economic platform. The Bruce Government (1923-1929) was 
chided for its complacency by observers like Shann and Eggleston, who, like many, 
detected the emerging economic problems and conveyed warnings to those in power 
(Osmond, 1985, 148). Shaping a meaningful response to the gathering storm was 
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hampered, not just by an antipathy to economists, but also adversarial politics 
complicated further by the Federal-State divide. For instance, while the Commonwealth 
and the States were all regarded as equal partners in economic enterprise, it was still an 
era when citizens attended more to their own state Government than the federal 
government. One upshot of this was that Premiers' Conferences had to deliver 
unanimous agreement before any national policy could be put into place. Another was 
that expenditure upon public works and the relief of unemployment were the 
responsibility of the states. 
As to the 'absence of a central authority' it was true that the Commonwealth 
Treasury, as a central coordinating agency, was then quite insignificant. This was 
because the Cornrnonwealth played only a minor part in the economy; taxing and 
spending powers, together with borrowing rights, rested with the States. Cornrnonwealth 
outlays, even in the mid to late thirties represented only a modest fraction of total 
national income. The Federal Treasury performed not much more than an auditing role 
(Whitwell, 1986, 54). While ably staffed, none of its senior officers had formal training 
in economics; nor would things progress much by the mid-thirties. Crisp gave some 
inkling of the Treasury's role during the thirties: 
'The establishment still saw government and Treasury as sideline aids to a 
substantially autonomous and preferably self-acting national economy ... the 
level of loan raisings, London funds, tax revenues were indicators of the 
economy's health and not instruments for its regulation or stimulation. One 
gathered that the general level of economic activity had an effect on budget 
totals, but hardly the reverse. It was essentially old world, pre-Keynesian stuff. 
Neither the Treasurer nor his senior officers of those days had a training such as 
would make them quickly aware of or eagerly responsive to new economic 
ideas' (cited in Hudson, 1986, 98). 
Nor did the Federal Treasury employ economists until L.F. Giblin's arrival as 
Acting Cornrnonwealth Statistician in 1931. * The Treasury's standing within the 
* Roland Wilson .arrived at Treasury in 1931 inauspiciously disguised as an assistant to the 
Commonwealth Statistician L.F. Giblin (Wilson Transcript, NLA). Wilson recalled that he was truly a 
'backroom boy at Treasury working in statistics to keep me out of sight of Treasury officers' (Wilson, 
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economy was elevated, however, when the Australian Loan Council was established as 
a statutory body by the Bruce Government's Financial Agreement Act of 1927; the 
Federal Treasury was to act thereon as the Council's secretariat and it was from there 
that it started to gain some influence upon the setting of monetary policy through the 
vehicle of the Australian Loan Council (Schedvin, 1970; Gilbert, 1973). Against the 
Loan Council stood the Com1nonwealth Bank Board, which exercised an intimidating 
presence over monetary matters under its chairman, Sir Robert Gibson. 
The Board of the Commonwealth Bank was dominated over by Gibson who 
closely monitored the note issue and Australia's capital borrowings. In truth, however, 
the Commonwealth Bank did not truly function as a central bank partly because the 
trading banks need not keep reserves with it and, in fact, regarded it as a competitor; nor 
was Australia strictly on the gold standard (Coleman, 1999, 163). Moreover, the Bank 
Board did not possess the expertise and knowledge needed for the art of central 
banking. The Bruce Government had made amendments to the Commonwealth Bank 
Act, one of which, made the Board of Directors free from political interference but, alas, 
unaware of the science of central banking (Schedvin, 1992, 50). This antagonised the 
Labor Party who felt that proper central banking was negated if it was free from 
political persuasion. There were other obstacles to the bank operating as a central bank. 
It was, for instance, unable to exert control over the exchange rate or even gauge the 
depth of Australia's external reserves or 'London Funds', held by Australian trading 
banks. The latter aspect was remedied by the Mobilization Agreement of August 1930. 
The mechanics of Australia' s banking position was that a fall in London funds 
caused by a rise in imports or fall in Australia's export receipts meant that the advances 
to deposit ratio rose. The decline in bankers' cash would lead to stringency in the 
money market which could only be relieved by central bank action. Throughout the 
thirties, then, Australia had an underdeveloped money market and an immature central 
bank presiding over the country's financial affairs. Gibson and his Board, together with 
the Secretary of the Treasury did, however, exert authority over interest rates, though 
here, again, 'the more powerful banks could usurp this power. On matters of monetary 
doctrine, the Bank Board rigorously upheld parity with sterling and was paranoid about 
Trc. 1612, NLA). He was, nevertheless, considered to be the first professionally trained economist to 
serve with the Commonwealth Government. Giblin, like Keynes, was a mathematician by training. 
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'monetary credit' abuse (Schedvin, 1992, 50; Coleman, 1999). Parity with sterling was 
enshrined till 1930 when the carded rate came under severe market pressure. To the 
Board, 'inflation' translated into any expansion of the note issue whatever the 
circumstance. This stance helped explain the Commonwealth Bank's reluctance to 
provide Treasury bill finance to cover budget deficits until after the June 1931 
(Schedvin, 1992, 50). Confusingly, the Bank also regarded currency devaluation as 
nothing but another form of inflation and those that supported it as expansionists 
(Copland, 1932a, 114). The Commonwealth Bank Board regarded exchange rate 
stability, therefore, as the best means to guard against inflation (Schedvin, 1992, 52-53). 
Many in the financial world, too, wrongly linked currency inflation with currency 
devaluation. It was true the currency inflation could led to a currency devaluation but 
the 1931 measure, as we shall see, was triggered by a trade imbalance. 
Gibson was probably mindful of his lack of central banking expertise but 
equally wary of letting monetary experts dictate policy to him or, for that matter, anyone 
else upon the Board. He did, however, move with the times and appoint a monetary 
expert to the Bank. It came in the form of a cautious one-year appointment of a young 
academic economist, Leslie Melville. It matched the Bank of New South Wales's 
appointment of Edward Shann as its economic adviser in November 1930. 11 
As will be seen, the Bank Board throughout the thirties remained extremely 
vigilant about the extent of the short-term federal government borrowing sanctioned by 
the Loan Council and expedited by Treasury bills. Externally, the Bank Board 
monitored, in tandem with the Australian Loan Council, borrowings against the existing 
London balances. The two institutions orchestrated, therefore, the borrowings of all 
Australian governments (MacLaurin, 1936, 24-25). These decentralised and vague 
monetary arrangements brought the trading banks into almost immediate friction with 
the Scullin Government over the drain of Australia's gold reserves and the cessation of 
borrowing from London. Given the central bank's refusal to rediscount Treasury bills, 
falls in the London reserves meant that the trading banks had to, quite properly, restrict 
their advances (Butlin and Boyce, 1988, 197). Labour politicians saw the subsequent 
credit squeeze, however, as deliberate sabotage. Later, the conflict between the two 
11 R. Kershaw to L.F Giblin, 29/5/1947, BE: Gl/288. 
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parties would escalate as to who had the final say in determining monetary and 
economic policy. 
For all Gibson's intransigence and ignorance of central bank techniques he was, 
as Schedvin (1970) and Giblin (1951) state, the most important individual in 
* determining the course of economic policy during the depression and beyond. Both Sir 
Montagu Norman and Sir Otto Niemeyer of the Bank of England played upon this and 
acclaimed Gibson as the man 'who is saving Australia' from default. 12 13* The media, 
too, conveyed the same message; the dour Scot was the upstanding guardian of the 
people's money. ** The presence of Gibson at the helm gave the financial and business 
community some degree of psychological assurance (Copland, 1936, 16). It was for this 
reason alone that Scullin reappointed him when his term of office came up for renewal 
in 1930.+ Gibson soon showed his metal, informing Scullin before his departure for an 
Imperial Conference in London that his Government must implement immediate 
expenditure cuts or face impending bankruptcy with the internal and external loans fast 
maturing. Scullin pinned his hopes on a sympathetic London and the prospect of 
assistance. 
* Leslie Melville who served under Sir Robert Gibson as the Commonwealth Bank's resident economist disagreed 
with Schedvin's assessment but does admit that the Board never voted against Gibson. (Melville, Trc. pp.21-25, 
NLA) 
12 Sir 0. Niemeyer to A.H. Lewis, 19/10/1932, Gibson Papers, Latrobe State Library of Victoria. 13 E.O.G. Shann to Finlayson, 5/5/1931. BNSW: A53/409. 
* Shann reported dinner party conversation where Billy Hughes complained how Gibson was 'consumed with vanity 
and utterly without foresight or imagination' (E.O.G. Shann to A.C. Davidson, 18/4/1933, BNSW: GM 302:590). 
** The opening lines of the Ballad of Sir Robert Gibson declared 
A dour hard-headed gentleman 
who guards the treasure hoard 
Sir Robert Gibson, he sits light 
As Chairman of the Board 
+ Edmund God ward of the Bank of Australasia found Gibson 'overly susceptible to praise and not adverse to flattery' (E. Godward to Cowan, 15/12/1932, Bank of Australasia, D/O Correspondence, ANZ Group Archives. The sad truth for Labor too was that there was no one else, Dyason's name was mooted but not held to be generally acceptable to 
the business community - a fair point given his later embrace of fanciful monetary experiment. Dyason was however 
sounded out in late 1931 as a possible Board member for the Bank. He demurred, pleading, rather sardonically an ignorance of monetary affairs (The Argus 28/10/1931 in BNSW: GM 302/221 ) (Melville, Trc, pg. 29, NLA). 
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CHAPTER4 
The Interwar Australian Economics Profession 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the development of the Australian 
economics profession and how the Depression played a part in its elevation. The 
opening part of the chapter briefly recounts the onset of depression within Australia. 
How the interwar economists perceived the origins of the depression and their initial 
responses to it are discussed in section 4.6. Australian economists had already made a 
start in advising State and Federal governments upon economic matters and section 4.5 
of this chapter draws out that early relationship. The main part of the chapter, sections 
4.3 and 4.4, deals with the nature of the Australian economics profession at the time, 
together with some detail upon prevailing economic thought and philosophy. The last 
part of the chapter contains a reassessment of the Niemeyer mission showing, in 
particular, how it galvanised local economic expertise both in terms of thinking and 
policy advocacy 
4.2 Grim Forebodings 
In Australia' s history, no administration, it has been argued, was more 
challenged by economic circumstances as that which faced the Scullin Labor 
Government (Denning, 1937, 11). Scullin took office only days before the Wall Street 
Crash of October 1929. Yet for all the scale of the undertaking Labor was elected into , 
many, including Scullin, in his earlier guise as Opposition Leader, had foreshadowed 
that the day of reckoning was coming for Australia. During the federal election 
campaign. of 1929 Scullin warned voters that Australia was incurring an excessive level 
of foreign debt to finance infrastructure projects at a time when export prices were 
slipping (Robertson, 1970, 34). Scullin's warnings had an air of Greek tragedy to them. 
As Robertson (1974, 3) his biographer, remarked 'It is often the fate of prophets to be 
ignored; but it _does not always follow that the prophet is destroyed by the calamity he 
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has foreseen'. A hapless Scullin while aware of the economic problems besetting the 
Commonwealth, shunned, until too late, the advice of economists. 
A quick recapitulation of the conditions prevailing in the late twenties illustrates 
the debt-deflation trap which the Australian economy was falling into. The Bruce 
Government's philosophy of 'men, money and markets', much of it underwritten by 
British capital, fuelled economic activity. The loan proceeds financed a huge appetite 
for imports, which left, in turn, the Federal Government awash with customs duty 
revenue. In his study of the economic philosophy guiding the Bruce Government, 
Richmond (1983, 257) linked the administration's optimism with 'development' 
schemes to a grand imperial vision. However, the scale and extent of Commonwealth 
and State undertakings from the London capital market greatly concerned the City. 
While aware of London's concern about Australia's borrowing Bruce remained 
unrepentant; it was a sparse population, not debt, which was Australia's besetting 
problem (Cumpston, 1989, 74; Tsokhas, 1993, 102). The bellwether of success for 
Bruce's program was judged in terms of per capita income, rather than the aggregative 
performance of the economy - a view shared with economists (Cain, 1974, 346). For 
eight years during the twenties the Commonwealth had imports running ahead of 
exports with the debt servicing met from the proceeds of fresh borrowing (Clark, 1981, 
23). While there were some institutional checks the prevailing psychological mood was 
one of unbridled optimism. 
Wrestling free from what the polymath, Frederic Eggleston, called a 'prosperity 
complex' Bruce predicted that Australia take measures to confront both the falling 
exports and loan income otherwise there would be a slump in wealth, employment and 
standard of living (Osmond, 1985, 149). The inevitable task of economic re-
adjustment along, with the transfer problem of annually paying some thirty million 
pounds in interest abroad, would be inherited by the Scullin government. 
Within days of Scullin' s coming to power the paradigm of 'development' came 
to an abrupt end. The Chairman of the Commonwealth Bank Board, Sir Robert Gibson, 
informed Scullin that the borrowing of overseas funds could no longer be sustained and 
that he would.veto any further floating of Treasury bills until commitments were given 
towards achieving budgetary equilibrium (Shann and Copland, 1931a). 
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The depression in Australia itself was triggered by marked falls in Australia's 
two major exports - wool and wheat - which merely compounded the deep-seated 
structural economic problems. The loss in export revenue of some forty million pounds, 
together with the cessation of borrowing of some thirty million pounds, translated into a 
loss in national income of some 10 per cent in one year alone (Copland, 1930, 644-5). 
The cessation of borrowing imparted a huge deflationary impulse through the Australian 
economy (Schedvin, 1970, 4).* Servicing Australia's huge overseas loan portfolio 
would now have to be drawn from local resources. On the external account, interest and 
dividend repayments rose 50 per cent during the late twenties meaning that the export 
revenue to servicing costs rose from one-sixth to just over a quarter (Schedvin, 1970, 
73). 
South Australia had a foretaste of what was soon to become a general 
occurrence. The economist Leslie Melville recalled: 'We had some sort of recession in 
South Australia earlier than the rest of the Australia .... By 1927 we were in trouble ... . 
and we certainly there saw it coming from the consequences of the loan expenditure ... . 
The interest bill was climbing very rapidly and we weren't getting revenues to meet the 
increase in the interest bill that was pressing on us' .14 He was alluding not just to a fall 
in export prices but the cutback in public investment spending (Cornish, 1993, 3). 
Initially, the economists were, along with many others, not unnerved by the severe fall 
in export prices.* The October stock market crash on Wall Street, however, made the 
then predicted 'minimal' reduction in living standards look sanguine. 15 * Arguably, no 
corrective action could have checked the colossal and sustained fall in output that 
marked the Depression's impact upon Australia. Deflation had to come. 
* Leslie Melville, using Giblin's export multiplier, had come out with a predicted unemployment figure of half a 
million workers Melville, Trc. pg. 19, NLA. 
14 Melville Trc, 1971, pg 15 NLA. 
* 
. The newly elected Prime Minister Mr. Scullin heroically took a remarkably benign view of unfolding developments. 
On 21st November 1929 he publicly intoned ' ... we do not view the future with alarm - our troubles will soon be 
over' (cited in Anstey, 1978, 371). 
15 Melville Trc. 1971, pg 18, NLA, 
* According to Valentine, export prices fell by 7.7 per cent in 1928/29 and 22.7 per cent in 1929/30. 
These adverse movements in Australia's terms of trade were due to a contraction in world economy. The 
terms of trade movement between 1929 and 1932 delivered a 9 per cent fall in the real GDP (Gregory et 
al, 1988, 405). Valentine's empirical research showed that the price falls in wool and wheat mirrored falls 
in real GDP in ._1927/28, 1928/29 with a more severe fall in 1930/31 (Valentine, 1987, 64). The 
proportion of Australian exports to service the foreign debt grew from 16 per cent in 1919/20 to 28 per 
cent in 1928/29 (Schedvin, 1970, 73). 
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The Scullin Government's first budget in July 1930 responded to falling export 
prices and loan cutbacks with an austere economic package. Scullin asked the Anglo-
Australian financier, W.S. Robinson, and a grise eminence to the Labor Government, to 
make secret representations to the Bank of England about deferral of an impending loan. 
Robinson was given short shrift by representatives of the Deputy Governor of the Bank 
of England, Sir Ernest Harvey 'Please don't ask for that perforce I must refuse' 
(Robinson, 1967, 147). Australia, by dint of some years of negative but, for the most 
part, accurate reporting particularly by The Financial Times, had become the 'bad boy 
of the Commonwealth' and an example to be made of (Giblin, 1951). 16 Lyndhurst 
Falkiner Giblin, the elder statesman of the Australian economics community, felt the 
Bank's action 'very cold. Its attitude was rigid ... Australia must solve its own trouble 
for itself' (1951). Before turning to see how and his colleagues responded to the crisis 
some detail of the local economics profession including, their pre-analytical vision is 
required. 
4.3 The Australian Economics Profession in 1929 
Numbering only a handful of souls, Australian economics in the late twenties 
was a fledgling, scattered university discipline with only six chairs extant - Melbourne 
(1923), Sydney (1913), Hobart (1920), Adelaide (1929), Brisbane (1926) and the 
isolated post at Perth (1925).* Before then, economics was considered a politicized 
subject, appropriate only for instruction by the Workers' Educational Association 
(Heaton, 1926, 235). There were neither qualified instructors nor any body of Australian 
economic literature to rely upon (Heaton, 1926, 238). Even with the founding of the 
Economic Society in 1925 economics was still a Cinderella science. The challenges 
ahead heralded not only opportunity for the profession but also national prominence 
(Bourke, 1988, 67; Cain, 1973). The interwar generation of economists was a 
remarkable and versatile group even though most had not been formally trained in 
economics (Butlin, 1966, 509). Much of the learning of the older generation of 
economists was done 'on the job' (Cain, 1973, 2). Perhaps the best example here was 
16 D.B. Murdoch, Secretary to the Commonwealth Bank Board, later told Giblin he was astounded at Sir 
Ernest Harvey's refusal to grant emergency financial assistance to the Scullin government given that he 
had been 'a good.friend' to Australia earlier (D.B. Murdoch to L.F. Giblin, 8/4/1947, GLG-51-5, RBA). 
* Two of these chairs, at the University of Queensland and the University of Western Australia, occupied by Adcock 
and Shann respectively were joint chairs in economics and history. 
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Giblin who was the Official Statistician for the Tasmanian State Government before 
taking up a position as an academic economist. Given their number and the tasks 
assigned to them, they were to fulfill Herbert Heaton's description of them as 
'economic general practitioners' (cited in Cain, 1984, 76). 
Australia's development strategy of 'men, money and markets' meant demand 
for economics expertise (Cain, 1974). Like their British counterparts, Australian 
politicians had begun to solicit their advice. It gave the local profession a policy-
intensive focus (Sandelin et. al., 1997). There was something, moreover, within the 
nature of the Australian economics profession that lent itself to giving practical advice 
rather than engaging in scientific research. Giblin later reflected upon the values and 
axioms that characterised the local profession: 
"In Australia economists are a peculiar tribe. Rarely are they nourished by the 
pure milk of the word. Mostly they have been advisers to governments for many years -
permanently or intermittently, publicly or privately. Governments do not love them but 
are inclined to believe honest. .. They are frequently more practical and realistic than 
businessmen ... They are resented of course by sectional business interests. The word of 
complaint or abuse is 'academic'; but, in truth, they are the least academic of God's 
creatures" (Cited in Hytten, 1960, 154). 
His colleague, Douglas Berry Copland, said that the distinguishing feature of 
interwar Australian economists was the habit of 'seeing the economy as a whole, and of 
realizing the possibility of instituting centrally planned policy to counteract 
maladjustment within the economy' (1951, 16-17). This bias in Australian economic 
establishment towards 'empiricism and pragmatism' as Schedvin (1970, 375) puts it, 
was so entrenched that Melville - who held the foundation chair at Adelaide - felt it was 
to the detriment of theoretical innovation (Bourke, 1988, 63). Echoing Giblin, Melville 
recollected that 'Essentially we were all pragmatists dealing with applied economics, 
applied to practical problems that were developing very rapidly, and there wasn't much 
development till a good deal later' .17 This penchant, for practicality over theoretical 
innovation, assumes some importance in the telling of our story. However it can be 
17 Melville Trc. pg.9 NLA. 
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oversold. While the attribute paid dividends in pushing economists into the limelight it 
did not really mean that they were tardy in acclimatising to new theory or, as we shall 
see, even pioneering new theoretical innovations. The policies they advocated during 
the depression and thereafter sprang from the very latest theoretical and applied research 
(Copland, 1951, 17). 
At the six universities offering instruction in economics the specific problems of 
the Australian economy framed the agenda. These were issues like economic 
development, economic growth, land settlement, tariffs, price movements and 
monetary, not fiscal, theories of the trade cycle. Heaton (1926, 245-247) told an 
American audience that the predominant research interests of their Australian 
counterparts were the economics of federation, wage fixation and banking and currency 
policy. In terms of ranking, Melbourne had overtaken Hobart in prominence since it 
had become, in 1925, the newly-established home of the Economic Society of Australia 
and New Zealand. Giblin' s arrival in 1928 from Tasmania, moreover, to fill the newly 
created Ritchie Research Professorship gave Melbourne a further edge in research 
profile (Hagger, 2001, 13-15). ** Another member of the staff was Gordon Wood, an 
economic geographer by training. 
Before then Hobart had been the original home of Australian economics with 
many interwar economists having taught or studied there (Castles, 1996; Coleman and 
Hagger, 2003; Roe, 1994). In its heyday, Brigden and Giblin had made pioneering 
contributions in multiplier analysis and the optimal degree of tariff protection needed to 
promote economic development and population growth (Copland, 1951, 16-17; Cain, 
1973). For a brief period, then, Hobart resembled the 'Edinburgh of the South' in terms 
of theoretical innovation (Coleman and Hagger, 2003). Roland Wilson was another 
product of this faculty (Comish, 2003, 9-11). Despite his academic promise, evidenced 
in his book Capital Imports and the Terms of Trade Wilson dedicated his considerable 
** Giblin then Deputy Government Statistician won the post almost certainly with Copland' s connivance. Giblin had 
acted as a referee for Copland when he applied for the chair in economics at Melbourne. Giblin was unanimously 
elected despite his lack of academic standing and his 'unorthodox appearance' (D.B . Copland to R. Downing, 
25/6/1959, UMA FECC Box 220A). It was a position Giblin approached with some trepidation. It was only with 
Brigden' s encouragement - someone Giblin felt should have won the post- that he accepted the challenge. He told his 
wife, Eilean, 'They have offered me the Ritchie chair and I have not read any of their damn textbooks'. When his 
wife conveyed this -to J.P. Clapham, the English economic historian he replied 'Economics is mathematics and 
common sense. We all know about the first and he has more of the second than anybody I know' (E. Giblin to J.M. 
Garland, 6/6/1954, GJG-59-5, Garland Papers, RBA). 
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expertise to the Federal Treasury (Cain, 1983, 23; Cornish, 2003, 19-20). Other 
eminent scholars who hailed from Hobart were Arthur Smithies (Harcourt, 1987, 375-
376) and Keith Isles. Later, a Federal Treasurer, R. G. Casey, commented upon the 
remarkable profusion of economic talent that sprang from Tasmania. 18 
The Economic Society, founded by Copland, was made possible by the 
enthusiastic co-operation between economists and businessmen (Downing, 1971, 466). 
As both Scott (1988, 3) and Hodgart (1975, 2-3) note it was the business community in 
both Sydney and Melbourne that pushed for the greater edification of economics. The 
Economic Society was sponsored by the business community, as a means to isolate and 
suppress the radical outpourings from the economic underworld (McFarlane, 1966, 17; 
Clark, 1974; Clark 1975; Roe, 1984; and Mauldon and Weller, 1960). It also marked, as 
Heaton ( 1926, 235) noted, the first systematic study and teaching of economics within 
Australia. The Society brought, therefore, businessmen, economists and public servants 
under the one roof. In that regard, Copland, Foundation Dean of the Faculty of 
Commerce at the University of Melbourne, 'conspicuously identified with the business 
community' (Harper, 1986, 43). One instance which caught the attention of the Trades 
Hall was where Copland, in formal morning dress, regaled a gathering of conservative 
luminaries about the dire state of the economy (Spierings, 1989, 132-3). Copland was 
regarded as politically safe and 'the proper custodian and expander. .. of absolute and 
unbending economic laws' (cited in Spierings, 1989, 133). Consequently, he was 
marked out for special attention by Labor politicians, one of which regarded him as 'one 
of the most conservative economists in Australia ... and whose opinions are not worth 
much' .19 Aware of an antipathy towards economists within Labor circles, Copland 
assured Giblin that the Melbourne faculty was, in fact, beholden to no one. 20 It was 
ironic that, after the Premiers' Plan, Copland was shunned in certain financial quarters 
as his political views became more interventionist (Caldwell, 1960, 2). 
In his inaugural lecture as Dean, Copland looked forward to forging greater links 
between 'town and gown' (Spierings, 1989, 128-9; Hodgart, 1975, 9). In revamping the 
syllabus of the commerce degree, Copland, as he had done in Hobart, eschewed narrow 
18 
'Export of Brains' The Mercury, 20/7/1936. 19 N.J. Makin in Hansard, pg. 1356, 18/10/1931 
20 D.B . Copland to L.F. Giblin, 6/6/1927, UMA FECC, Box 220. 
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specialisation in economics for a broad-based education that would suit graduates 
entering the business world (Selleck, 2003, 607). The commerce course proved 
dramatically popular when first launched in 1925, even if many of the students were 
part-time (Selleck, 2003, 608). Business houses supplied Copland's department not just 
with guest lecturers but also tangible support by way of equipment (Spierings, 1989, 
129). Copland invited representatives from business and finance houses and the Trades 
Hall to be on the Faculty Board. This included Sir Robert Gibson, then President of the 
Victorian Chamber of Manufactures, Edward Dyason, company director and 
stockbroker and the Commonwealth Statistician, Charles Wickens. 
Neville Cain casts Copland as 'the public relations man of university economics 
selling its "practical usefulness" to city men ... and to politicians' ( 1980, 2). The Collins 
House Group of companies, and later the Premier of NSW, Bertram Stevens, hired him 
as an economic adviser. The Canadian economist, A.F.W. Plumptre (1934, 490), would 
marvel at Copland's gifts of combining being an able economic theorist, propagandist 
and financial expert in one. Richard Downing later reported upon the 'excitement' of 
being an economics student at Melbourne and having Copland or Giblin give their 
lectures straight from meetings with business men. Students 'were bred to the world of 
affairs, public policy and applied economics which they brought to the Melbourne 
school' (cited in Brown, 2001, 30). 
Because of this engagement with public affairs, Cain finds - somewhat unfairly 
- that Copland's academic output was 'largely derivative ... evidencing little theoretical 
penetration' (1980, 3). For all that, he was Australia's leading monetary theorist, if not 
the British Commonwealth21 having been given a thorough grounding in the subject at 
the University of Canterbury under James Hight. Keynes told Copland in person that the 
training there was as good as any other place of the same size. 22 At that same meeting, 
Keynes told his antipodean visitor that classical theory 'had rather worked itself out' 
and that he was writing a book that would revise it.23 Copland was also, like Giblin, 
adept in the art of economic policymaking, particular! y in devising workable 
21 Giblin is attributed to saying this in J.B. Condiffe' s autobiography. Condiffe was also a graduate of Canterbury. 22 
'A professor peregrinates' (extract from Copland's diary of his 1927 trip to study economic education abroad) The Margin 3(1) pg. 7:Visiting London, Copland had lunch with Keynes who he described as a 'leading British 
economist', 19/6/1927. 
23 Ibid. 
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compromises (Harper, 1986, 43). Copland was, moreover, to draw international fame 
when he delivered the Marshall lectures at the University of Cambridge upon how 
Australia's mix of economic policies and institutions helped Australia emerge from the 
depression. Torleiv Hytten, who held the chair at Hobart from 1928, found the 
hyperactive Copland 'an extraordinary person ... with little sense of humour and one 
never knew what he was going to do next' (1971, 45). 
Copland co-edited the Economic Record_along with one of his former 
Melbourne students, Claude Janes. The regimen of early issues of the journal reflected 
the applied, business-oriented aspect of the Australian economics profession (Scott, 
1988, 14; Fleming, 1996, 30; Perlman, 1977). The special problems of the Australian 
economy - the tariff, demography, economic development and cyclical fluctuations -
formed the main focus of enquiry (Cain, 1974). Typically, Copland wrote on monetary 
and banking matters, while Brigden specialised upon tariffs and population. Mills and 
Giblin wrote on public finance and federalism, while Wickens was the authority upon 
statistical matters (Scott, 1988, 14). Its audience was not just academics but 
'responsible men of political and commercial affairs' (Perlman, 1977, 219). S.J. Butlin 
attributed the Record with having a 'seminal influence on the thought and policy in high 
places' because its literary style rnade it accessible to 'men of affairs' (1966, 516). 
According to Copland, the average reader of the journal was a 'fairly intelligent person 
but not with a scientific interest in economics and one who would quickly lose his 
interest if the Record became too dull' .24 
Apart from Giblin and Copland at Melbourne the other luminaries within the 
profession were R.C. Mills in Sydney, Edward Shann in Perth and Melville at Adelaide 
University. The latter two soon joined banks in advisory capacities with the latter 
making a permanent move to the Commonwealth Bank. Brigden left the chair at Hobart 
to become an economist with a shipping concern in Sydney before moving to 
Queensland to become Director of the Queensland Bureau of Economics and Statistics 
(Roe, 1994). At Sydney University, Mills diligently set about building a 'factory' of 
local economic expertise (Butlin, 1953). Despite Melbourne's prominence, Sydney 
University would boast that it had Australia's only ensemble of professionally-trained 
24 D.B. Copland to H. Belshaw, 20/10/1937, Economic Society of Victoria Branch, UMA FECC, Box 139. 
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economists (Butlin, 1978, 102). To achieve this, Mills encouraged his staff to further 
their studies abroad either in England or America (Tumy et. al. 1991, 576). There was, 
therefore, a Melbourne - Sydney rivalry developing with the latter tending to regard 
their counterparts as too pragmatic and involved in public affairs (Butlin, 1978, 104). 
Despite that difference in orientation there was some commonality in analytical vision 
to which we tum. 
4.4 The State of Australian Economic Opinion 
Australian economists had looked to the old country not just in terms of capital 
and trade flows but also in terms of economic doctrine. By and large the Australian 
economics fraternity was an outpost of the Cantabrigian tradition, but with an 
idiosyncratic twist (Cain, 1980; Cain, 1973; Harper, 1986, 37). The economics of Edwin 
Cannan of the London School of Economics was also influential with his stress upon 
welfare analysis (Butlin, 1966, 509). Cannan had personally tutored Brigden while 
Mills had attended his lectures (Roe, 1994, 73). National income, even the level of real 
wages, was taken as an index of economic welfare (Cain, 1974, 74-77). National 
income became the focal point of policy long before it became officially adopted as in 
Britain in 1941 (Whitwell, 1994). Apart from the London School, the main influence on 
Australian economics was Cambridge with its Marshallian-Pigovian tradition. 
Cambridge became the place, therefore, of higher learning for the crop of young, 
aspiring Australian economists although two Rhodes scholars, Roland Wilson and 
Arthur Smithies went to Oxford (Cain, 1984, 77). 
Australian economists were philosophically in favour of competitive markets to 
harness private interests provided governments were on call to eliminate market 
distortions and reconcile private and social costs (Harper, 1986, 37). Limited public 
works held some appeal to Australian economists since they were predisposed to see the 
economy as a whole and placed the state before the consumer (Brown, 1994, 89-92). 
There was also a role for the state in fostering economic development. That world-view 
had partly come about due to the nation-building paradigm of 'development' and, 
relatedly, the influence of the Hobart school (Cain, 1973). The research upon 
ascertaining the cost of the tariff assistance, together with Giblin' s quantitative 
multiplier analysis, bestowed Australian economists with an economy-wide perspective 
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of the costs and benefits of external economic shocks. This would become useful when 
they adopted the 'spreading the loss' doctrine after Australia's export income 
plummeted in 1929. 
The question that dominated the Australian economics fraternity in the twenties 
was determining Australia's optimum population size and the standard of living that 
could be afforded (Cain, 1973). Stemming from Brigden's bleak assessment about 
Australia's economic future Hobart was wary that diminishing returns in primary 
produce which would not only skew income distribution to the landowners but drive 
down welfare levels and restrict the absorption of a growing population (Cain, 1974, 
352; Roe, 1994, 76). Brigden (1925) had argued, therefore, that tariff assistance was 
justifiable for Australia's economic development, welfare and population growth. He 
found, somewhat controversially, that protection had been as 'beneficial' for Australia 
as much as free trade had been for Britain (Brigden, 1925, 45). His finding presaged the 
more comprehensive Brigden Report which stated that the fall in income that would 
ensue from unimpeded rural development and population growth was prevented because 
tariffs maintained real wages by redistributing income from landowners to labour. The 
tariff, moreover, kept the terms of trade favourable by placing a tax on rural exports 
(Coleman and Hagger, 2003, 15). 
Giblin would later corroborate the Hobart view by calculating the amount of 
rural production Australia would have had to produce to generate an equivalent standard 
of living. Such an effort would have driven down produce prices and made Australia 
acutely vulnerable to world trends (Groenewegen and McFarlane, 1990, 122). That 
aside, by the end of the twenties some economists, particularly Shann and Melville, felt 
that the economy, especially the labour market, was riddled by too much government 
intervention. There was also a growing recognition among economists that Australia's 
high real wage levels were kept up by protection and public works. A technical 
correction was imminent (Cain, 1973, 20). 
As the depression descended, money and banking theory assumed the leading 
research focus. A devotee of the quantity theory, Copland moved with the trans-Atlantic 
tide of monetary reformers like Irving Fisher, Ralph Hawtrey and Keynes (Cain, 1987b, 
3; Cain, 1980). The reformers held that the way to avoid economic fluctuations was 
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price stability, meaning that monetary policy should make this its overriding goal. 
Copland's first published work had appeared in the Economic Journal and corroborated 
Fisher's quantity theory using Australian data (Coleman and Hagger, 2003, 12-14). 
Keynes's Tract registered a significant impact with Copland, especially the finding that 
fluctuations in the price level were more likely to be a function of monetary demand 
rather than a money supply increase. This revolutionary finding was that, with a 
variable velocity of circulation, prices and output could change without the actual stock 
of money changing. In short, fluctuations in economic activity were due to price level 
instability aggravating the gap between product prices and costs (Turnell, 1999, 26). 
Inspired by Keynes's TractJ. Copland ( 1930) was among the first among his colleagues 
to argue that internal price stability should rank as a policy objective before exchange 
rate stability and that the transmission of large movements in credit, via the external 
account, be avoided in the name of economic stability. Henceforth the policy focus in 
Copland's eyes, focused upon credit growth as distinct from money supply; it was, 
however, to be a point hopelessly lost upon the Commonwealth Bank Board which 
remained fixated upon the latter. 
In the twenties Copland devised a schema that underpinned how to both 
visualize and manage the Australian economy. The preservation of economic activity in 
an open economy, like Australia's, required insulation against fluctuations being 
channeled through the trade account. This meant establishing a managed monetary 
system aimed at stabilising prices and regulating the credit cycle to eliminate short 
period fluctuations (Copland, 1933, 73). Since Australia was a small, open, debtor 
country with its national income largely determined by commodity prices the economy 
could achieve price stabilisation by aligning its exchange rate with sterling. Britain, 
Australia's creditor and largest trading partner, eff ecti vel y set her monetary policy. 
This was an optimal arrangement in times of normalcy and also when Australia had an 
underdeveloped central banking apparatus. Moreover, it kept mischievous hands at bay 
for the Gold Standard was 'knave proof' with banking and monetary policy controlled 
by mandarins rather than by politicians. The orthodox strictures about quarantining 
credit and currency matters from political interference found an appreciative audience in 
Australia (Middleton, 1982, 65). These institutional and banking arrangements were 
enveloped witp in an air of anti-intellectualism which sought to separate the 'sound' 
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views of the real world financier from the 'academic' opinion of monetary ref armers 
(Winch, 1966, 92). 
Australia's harmonious link with the Bank of England came unstuck, however, 
with the calamitous fall in her export prices in 1929. The voluntary moratorium upon 
federal and state Government borrowing from London compounded Australia's 
difficulties. Under the traditional rules of the game, Australia could only recover 
external balance by a severe deflation brought about by a direct reduction in bank credit 
consistent with Australia's dwindling London funds. Deflation and austerity meant the 
intensification of unemployment. It also meant pressure upon wages that would lead to 
social unrest, especially where rentiers, benefiting from the deflation increased their 
hold over consumption. The financial architecture of the economy would also be placed 
under great pressure. Copland felt this form of relative cost adjustment too draconian. 
The more palatable alternative was to break with sterling and implement wage cuts. 
This would allow Australia to find a more appropriate relationship between her export 
p1ices and domestic cost structure. Exchange rate autonomy, Copland held, would give 
Australia's export trades and unsheltered industries a more favourably price-cost 
relationship and thereby prevent economic activity from plunging. The markedly lower 
real wage would improve Australia's cost structure. Copland's analytical framework 
was strengthened with Giblin' s export multiplier - the greatest theoretical innovation of 
the interwar Australian economists - which showed how a fall in export revenue 
delivered a direct and amplified effect upon output (Cain, 1980, 10). The concept was 
especially useful for an open economy dependent upon its primary produce for its 
prosperity (Wilson, 1951, 194-5) .. Typically, Giblin had stumbled upon it while 
undertaking some applied work on the effect of building a railway as part of a rural 
development project. Giblin 's prototype multiplier, introduced into the public domain in 
late 1930, had a value of three with imports tumbling along with the fall in national 
mcome. 
Cutting the link Virith sterling was viewed Virith horror in financial circles. As Vi'e 
shall see, even Copland's colleagues were initially aghast at his suggestion \¥hen he first 
put it to them in May 1930 (Cain, 1987b, 5-6) .. The timing of Copland's apostasy is very 
interesting. Just two months earlier, Keynes, in evidence before the Macmillan 
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Committee in Britain, outlined seven expedients the Bank of England could tum to 
maintain economic activity given pressures on her external account (Booth and Peck, 
1985, 170-174). 
Keynes gave a practical demonstration of his new dynamic model of changing 
equilibria in his evidence before the Macmillan committee on industry and trade. He 
outlined seven expedients which Britain could resort to. Keynes's evidence was shaped 
by the analytical framework from his latest work, the Treatise on Money which would 
be published in October of that year. Using the interest rate to stimulate activity or, in 
terms of the framework of the Treatise to align savings and investment was impeded by 
Britain's need to maintain a high Bank rate necessary to keep her on the Gold standard. 
Keynes told the Committee that Britain should not apply wage cuts or even consider the 
heresy of devaluation. One expedient that took the interest of Australian economists was 
to have an internationally co-coordinated expansion led by the central banks of the 
creditor nations. This would deliver an increase in both trade and commodity prices for 
primary producing export countries like Australia. Turnell ( 1999) has written of how 
this expedient informed and motivated the Australian economists' advocacy for 
monetary reform at the Ottawa Imperial Trade Conference. 
Among the other more feasible options canvassed by Keynes's was his own 
'favourite remedy' of public works (Booth and Peck, 1985, 174). That is, public 
investment financed from excess savings could be a boon to private enterprise though it 
would mean rising prices. This latter option was unthinkable for Australia but she 
could, within reason, resort to devaluation and wage cuts, or a composite of both, as the 
best means of making a relative adjustment instead of going through the ritual of 
deflation (Cain, 1987a, 3).This expenditures switching policy - what Copland called his 
middle course - was later presented to Australian policy-making authorities (Cain, 
1987a, 2). Devaluation and a wage cut would assist the import and export industries 
besides transmitting a real income loss across all tiers of the community. It was similar 
to another of Keynes's expedients, namely, a National Treaty arrangement where all 
economic classes surrendered some income. Once converted to the Copland's monetary 
analysis, economists faced the task of enlightening high opinion away from the Anglo-
Saxon fetish tpat a unit of money, namely the Australian pound can be a variable unit 
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and not something immutably fixed (Dyason, 1931, 236-7). It was to prove a long 
struggle. 
4.5 Economists and their early contribution to economic policy 
Giblin, who Roland Wilson later called 'the fabulous old man of Australian 
economics', felt the early thirties transformed economics from a 'Cinderella' science to 
one of public influence (Wilson, 1951, 1; Goodwin, 197 4 ). Economic circumstances 
propelled this. The leading political and economic issues in the twenties all required 
scientific analysis and input (Cain, 1973, 2). The various committees of economists that 
tendered advice to the authorities in the early thirties were perceived to be remarkably 
consensual, even innovative, on the direction and content of macroeconomic 
stabilisation policy (Goodwin, 1974). The pioneering spirit of economists carried 
through to official policy; where, in contrast to British efforts, there was neither a 
reliance upon 'muddling through' nor great division in framing Australia's policy 
response to the depression. It marked, then, a 'brief interlude of a genuine Australian 
economics' with native economic expertise dealing with essentially national economic 
problems (Groenewegen and McFarlane, 1990, 115). 
The relations between economists and the political elite that unfolded in the 
thirties in Australia can be better understood when one considers the antecedents. 
Starting with Giblin' s position as statistical adviser to the Tasmanian Government and 
Mills and Brigden' s participation in the Queensland Basic Wage Commission 
Australian high politics had established the precedent in the twenties of calling upon 
'experts' to advise upon aspects of public policy ranging from child endowment to 
national insurance (Fleming, 1996, 29; Cain, 1980, 80; Clark, 1950, 2). Calling upon a 
repository of economic wisdom was also in the new found spirit of 'scientific 
administration' or ' salvation through science' (Howson and Winch, 1977, 159). The 
success economists received in tendering advice to Australian authorities was the 
embodiment of the Marshallian-Pigovian ethic of serving humanity (Fleming 1996, 31 ). 
Since the twenties Copland had been promoting the idea of placing economists 
into policy formulation. In 1927 he published the results of investigations made while 
visiting America and Europe to examine developments in the teaching of the social 
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sciences, especially economics (Bourke 1988, 58). Copland saw how 'University-
trained men' were making inroads in both the business world and the public service. 
Herbert Hoover, then US Secretary of State, informed Copland that the American 
administration was 'honeycombed with economists'. 25 It moved Copland to declare that 
'the economist is king in every country' (cited in Spierings, 1989, 131). It was not yet 
the case, however, in Australia. To amend that Copland felt that the Commonwealth 
public service should have openings for graduates. Consistent with this ambition was 
the recommendation from Mills that there be chairs of economics established in every 
Australian university. 26 
Consistent with the acceptance of economics as an academic discipline there 
was a raft of initiatives aimed at coordinating economic affairs (Cain, 1974, 356). The 
Migration and Development Commission established in 1926, for instance, was 
designed to place the British Australian '34 million pound agreement' on migration and 
development upon a more scientific footing (Cain, 1974, 356; Richmond, 1971, 246-
247; Roe, 1995, 118). Melville felt the Commission would tailor development 'in a way 
which aims at being methodical, consistent and economic and based on sense rather 
than sensibility' (cited in Cain 1974, 356). The businessman Herbert Gepp, equally keen 
on the potential of economic expertise, headed the Commission (Kemp, 1964, 36). 
The issue of business stability concerned policymakers as much as the optimal 
level of protection. The Development and Migration Commission issued a study written 
largely by Gepp's offsider, F.J. Murphy, entitled Unemployment and Business Stability 
in Australia (1928). The study was notable for empirically rejecting the popular view 
that Australia' s mounting unemployment was attributable to high wages, excessive 
British migration and imports. Rather, at Copland' s research showed, the problem was 
pinned on business cycle fluctuations, though the fits and starts of public-sector 
spending, financed by overseas borrowing, did not help matters. 27 As Australia's 
leading theorist in cyclical fluctuations, Copland wrote an influential adjoining study 
and apparently had a hand in drafting the Commission' s recommendations. 28 His 
findings presaged his later stand in the thirties on the need for a contra-cyclical policy 
25 
'Varsity men in business ' , The Herald 18/8/1927. 
26 R. C. Mills 'Economics and Social sciences ' . SMH 12/10/1927. 
27 
'Causes of unemployment in Australia', The Commercial:_ 9/8/1929. 
28 The Age 21/6/1928. 
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(Cain, 1980). In clear prose, Copland relayed the latest conventional view that experts 
study the economic picture, give warning of booms and slumps so that policymakers 
could moderate or, at least, cushion their impact by tapering public works expenditure. 29 
The Commission also proposed the Commonwealth Bank manage the exchange 
rate, taking action to safeguard the balance of payments, for instance, by reducing 
imports when export revenue was likely to decline. Cyclical instability could be 
countered by adjusting levels of government expenditure spent upon development 
projects. It was a commonplace view in the economics literature that an increase in 
spending would raise incomes and possibly produce further increases in spending. 
Long-range planning of public works would allow policy-making bodies time to 
regulate the level of expenditure thereby securing some regularity of employment 
besides raising funds abroad to protect the exchange rate. Bruce agreed with Gepp that . 
the ideas contained in the report were 'somewhat ahead of the times in which we live'. 30 
Copland's framework was echoed in a memorandum upon trade cycles prepared 
by two Sydney economists, E.R. Walker and R.C. Mills.31 They believed that cyclical 
fluctuations were made worse by the comparative rigidity of the wage costs. This, 
together with the imperfect mobility of labour, was, they held, the real factor behind 
unemployment. Both subscribed to the creed that wage regulation should, in time of 
depression, give way to the capacity to pay criterion. 32 Mills and Walker, besides 
manipulating loan expenditure, argued for a greater 'plasticity of wage rates ' to control 
unemployment. They were, however, hesitant about recommending monetary policy 
since the economic fluctuations may be externally borne, a factor that Australian policy 
authorities could do little to address (Cornish, 1990, 60-61). Walker shared Copland' s 
view that public works be used 'as a counterpoise to the business cycle ' but he lamented 
whether the authorities had the ability to synchronise expenditure with the cycle (1930, 
39). 
29 
'Planning ahead to meet the bad times ', The Herald 71211927. 30 Unemployment and Business Stability in Australia' AA: A 786 z l/1 . 31 Walker had been one of Mills' s students at Sydney. In his recommendation to the Board of Research Studies at 
Cambridge University in 1930 Mills hailed Walker as the 'most distinguished and brilliant student' he had seen in ten 
years of economics instruction at Sydney (R.C. Mills to The Secretary, Board of Research Studies, Cambridge 
university, 16/10/1930, E.R. Walker Papers, Canberra). Mills and Copland had awarded Walker first class honours 
for his thesis upon unemployment in Australia. 
32 
'Memorandum by which Greater security of Economics be Guaranteed to all Classes of Work' n.d. UMA FECC, Box 9. 
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It was, of course, the Brigden Committee's review of the Australian tariff that 
first made the name of Australian economics (Fleming, 1996, 29-30). In the foreword to 
The Australian Tariff: An Economic Enquiry Bruce hailed it as 'a free gift to the 
Australian people'. This was a reference not just to the Report's clarity and lucidity but 
also how economists had laboured without compensation (Davidson, 1977, 146-7). 
Charles Wickens, Chairman of the Tariff Committee, reminded his colleagues that they 
should speak with one voice on the subject. Disunity, he felt, would jeopardise the 
proposed establishment of a Bureau of Economic Research (Harper, 1989, 9).33 34 
According to Hytten, the Committee got off to an impolitic start when Copland 
wrote 'a learned paper' extolling the merits of free trade. Bruce dispatched his secretary 
to tell the economists that they must do better. 35 Brigden and Giblin, thereupon, took up 
the cudgels of drafting. What emerged was a 'compromise' document between the 
equivocal Melbourne economists (Copland, Dyason and Wickens) and the more 
protectionist Brigden and Giblin at Hobart (Coleman and Hagger, 2003, 16). Their 
finding, in brief, was to reject the orthodox contention that Australia could have 
maintained its present population at a higher standard of living under free trade (Dow, 
1936, 114-5). However they found instances where the cost of protection exceeded the 
benefits. They concluded that the level of tariff assistance was now at its optimal level 
whereas population and the level of real wages had surpassed that criterion (Cain, 
1973). 
The authors were anxious to see how their overseas counterparts would judge 
the findings (Harper, 1989, 22). Jacob Viner praised Bruce for having commissioned 'a 
disinterested and non-political inquiry by competent and unbiased economists into the 
merits of a policy to which his party and his country are so strongly committed' (Cited 
in Davidson, 1977, 147). Keynes also applauded the report as 'a brilliant effort of the 
highest interest' with a 'method of approach most original' .36 Frank Taussig from 
Harvard University hailed Copland and his colleagues for their work on the Report: 'I 
wish I could say that work as good came from the immensely larger number of 
33 C. Wickens to L.F. Giblin, 14/5/1928, UMA FECC, Box 213. 
34 J.H. Simpson (B'ruce's secretary) to L.F. Giblin, 11/5/1928, UMA FECC, Box 213. 35 Hytten autobiography UT pg. 52. 
36 J.M. Keynes to L.F. Giblin, 28/8/29, UMA FECC, Box 213 . 
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American economists' .37 The Report triggered a long-lasting controversy in existing 
trade theory (Coleman and Hagger, 2003, 16-18). For our purposes, however, it marked 
the start of Australian economists engaging into Australian 'economic problems with 
,38 gusto. 
This early policy work of Australian economists mirrored, if not anticipated, 
comparable developments in Britain where extra-parliamentary economic expertise was 
pursued with some vigour, especially after the onslaught of the depression (How~on and 
Winch, 1977). Bruce's 'eyes and ears' in London, Major R.G. Casey, the Australian 
liaison officer with the Foreign Office, wrote of the rising power of economics: 
'Economics was beginning to show signs of asserting itself' and 'being recognised as 
the sharp and effective tool of those in power' (Hudson and North, 1980, 502). By 1929 
Bruce had an Economic Bureau on the statute books (Scott, 1988, 16; Roe, 1995, 119; 
Castles, 1997, 26-28). 
Copland had been the first to raise the idea of such a Bureau (Spierings, 1989, 
132).39 Giving evidence before the Royal Commission on the Federal Constitution in 
1927, Copland said a special authority was required for the development of economic 
research along the lines of the Commonwealth's Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR).40 David Rivett, the Chairman of CSIR, dissuaded Bruce however 
from attaching an Economics Research Division to his organisation. The British 
Economic Mission (1927) also advised against it because of the fear that the CSIR 
would, under the proposal, become politically contaminated (Schedvin, 1987, 60). The 
economists were keen on the Bureau being self-supporting since it would guarantee the 
necessary freedom that they would not have if attached to a government department 
(Rivett, 1972, 110). Interestingly, the Director of the Bureau was, as originally 
outlined, to have freedom from political interference (Scott, 1988). Copland hoped that 
this dimension would allow the Director to freely initiate inquiries into wage regulation, 
unemployment, overseas borrowings, tariffs, development policy and inter-government 
37 F. Taussig to D.B. Copland, 13/12/1929, UMA FECC, Box 48. 38 Melville Trc, pg. 9, NLA. 
39 D.B.Copland to L.F. Giblin, 6/6/1927, UMA FECC Box 220. 40 The Mercury 23/3/1928. The Melbourne stockbroker E.C. Dyason was also in favour of a permanent body of economics specialist 'railed off from politics' whose key task would be to issue periodic reports on the economy Memorandum on the Increase of Production in Australia upon a sound economic and social basis'. N.d. UMA FECC, Box 8. 
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relations before they became politicised. Lastly, Copland saw the Bureau as working in 
cooperation with other policy-making agencies thereby delivering both coordination and 
assessment of the wider effects of public policy.41 Given his lobbying for the Bureau, 
Copland was shocked when Brigden showed him Bruce's offer to become its first 
director.42 Affronted, Copland asked Bruce why he should not be considered for the 
post. Annoyed at the breach of confidentiality, Bruce withdrew the offer to Brigden 
(Hytten, 1971, 53). 
The idea of a Bureau of Economic Research was cut short with the defeat of the 
Bruce Government. The Labor Party had already voted against the Bill. One Labor 
MHR stated that the Bureau would have been staffed with economists 'brought up in 
schools of economic thought and ideas quite foreign to conditions prevalent in 
Australia'. 'The economist' Arthur Blakely continued, 'is academic, conservative and 
anti-working class and lives in a world of his own' .43 John Curtin saw the Bureau's 
likely agenda as waging an intellectual assault upon the wage fixation system with the 
power of wage determination handed over to 'quarrelling economists'. Scullin, too, 
criticised the ostensibly 'academic' orientation of the people who would staff the office; 
'The textbooks teem with the opinions of the so-called leading economists of the world 
on the subject of free trade and protection .... [The people] are not concerned with the 
opinions of learned persons who talk about a wonderful flow of trade through 
uninterrupted channels' (cited in Castles, 1997, 28). 
With this view of economic expertise it came as no surprise when Scullin also 
abolished the Development and Migration Commission. Labor believed that the high 
volume of imports and heavy immigration was responsible for the escalation in 
unemployment between 1927 and 1929 (Roe, 1994, 119). The Scullin Government 
moved therefore to postpone assisted migration and significantly raise tariff protection. 
Sir Richard Hopkins, a British Treasury official, found this good cause to recommend 
that the London market terminate lending to Australian governments (Roe, 1995, 143). 
Despite Labor's hidebound attitude to economics expertise there would shortly come a 
41 
'New aid to Government' , The Herald 25/2/1928. 42 According to Giblin it was the New Zealand economist, J.B. Condiffe, who was earmarked for the position of director of the Bureau. This was corroborated by Hytten. After Condiffe began to haggle over the conditions of 
appointment and b~fore negotiations were complete the Bruce-Page government was thrown out (R. Wilson to L.F. Giblin, 2/11/1950, GLG-50-1, RBA) (Hytten autobiography UT pg.57). 43 
'Another weapon against Workers', The Worker 24/5/1929 
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time when it would have no choice but to accept it. It is to those circumstances that we 
tum. 
4.6 How Interwar Economists Saw the Origins and Nature of the Depression in 
Australia 
'The time is coming when ... every battery of science will be required for the 
defence of our standard of living' J.B. Brigden 1928. 
This part of the chapter highlights the long-run internal and external factors at 
play which interwar economists felt made Australia acutely vulnerable to any downturn 
in the world economy. It is commonly agreed by economists that much of the seeds of 
the Australian economic malaise that unfolded in 1929-31 were sown in the mid-
twenties. In his 'reinterpretation' of the causes behind the depression, Schedvin argued 
that the interaction between external and internal factors was the clue to understanding 
the severity of the crash in Australia. Having just undertaken an inquiry into the 
Australian tariff the economists were well aware of hov1 the capital-driven rapid 
expansion in both resource development and population could collapse if Australia' s 
export prices fell in tandem. As we shall discover, economists attributed much of the 
damage from the fall in the terms-of-trade to State and federal Governments' fixation 
with overcapitalised 'development' (Shann, 1930; Richmond, 1971 , 248-9 ; Osmond, 
1985, 148). Frederic Eggleston' s studies of Australia' s finances in 1928 had already 
convinced him that 'developmental' policy was 'out of date and inapplicable to our 
economic circumstances' (cited in Osmond, 1985, 148). He warned J.G. Latham, the 
then Federal Attorney General: 
You are in for a difficult time. The finances of the States are so bad and the 
failure of Government intervention in economics is so conspicuous that I don 't 
think any Government can do what ought to be done without losing office. You 
people have not seen the drift of things in time [or] prepared the people for a 
change in policy which is overdue' (cited in Osmond, 1985, 148). 
Eggleston longed for a Prime Minister who would have the 'courage' to do little 
on the development front (Cain, 1974, 357). Economists would have shared in this 
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sentiment. Aware of the incipient economic problems and their perception, both at 
home and abroad, Bruce was reluctant for electoral reasons to act upon them (Bruce, 
1927, 19-21; Lloyd, 1984).* Earlier, Shann had prophesised in his pamphlet The Boom 
of 1890 - and Now ( 1927) that the seeds of the Depression were sown in the twenties 
with the first manifestation of crisis sprouting in 1927 when wheat and wool prices fell 
calamitously on international markets. In the same year in a lecture aptly titled 'The 
Road to Ruin' Giblin expressed concern about Australia's voracious appetite for 
i1nports. 
Unemployment, which had been chronically high throughout the twenties, crept 
upwards as the external blow percolated through the economy. Most Australian 
economists sheeted the blame for high structural unemployment on high real wages and, 
by direct linkage, tariff protection (Cain, 1974, 351; Hancock, 1984, 72-73). As the 
Brigden Committee had noted, tariffs had altered production towards labour intensive 
ends. By placing a tax upon primary production and supporting the workers' livelihood 
at the expense of the rural sector, protection allowed both Australia's population and 
economic base to diversify more than it would have been under free trade (Brigden et. 
al., 1929). The Brigden Committee warned, moreover, that overseas borrowing could 
not continue unimpeded 'unless some totally new resources such as a great mineral 
field, are discovered' (cited in Dow, 1936, 119). Australia's high real wages, a Tariff 
Board Report noted, were supported not just by protection but also by foreign 
borrowing that underpinned a high level of economic activity (Shann and Copland, 
193 la, 40-52). The Tariff Committee all but admitted that Australian real wage levels 
were unsustainable and would surely slip in the near future (Cain, 1973). 
By 1927, two-thirds of Australia's capital borrowings had been undertaken for 
the purpose of economic development and took the form of public works (Mills, 1928, 
112). The warnings of economists about the dispersal of public-sector borrowings into 
* In post prime ministerial life as Assistant-Treasurer then High Commissioner for Australia in London, 
Bruce made amends for his earlier laxity in monitoring Australian borrowing. So adroitly did he attend to 
managing Australia's borrowing portfolio or 'loan-mongering', which together with his command of 
economic matters, that he was touted as successor or alternative leader to Lyons. His decision to 
withdraw from Australian political scene as Assistant Treasurer to Lyons in 1933 to take up appointment 
as Australia's High Commissioner in London was seen by the Sydney Morning Herald as a great loss to 
the nation (S.M.H., 6/10/1933). The inference was that the Lyons cabinet was short of talent and 
expertise - a view Bruce and Casey shared with each other (see PRO: Tl60/807 /l 1935/5 Hankinson to 
Secretary of State for Dominions, 8/2/1932) (AA 1421 Bruce-Casey Correspondence 1933-1937). 
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unproductive ventures were not heeded. In one year alone, Australian Governments 
floated 45 million pounds worth of long-term debt upon the London capital market. 
From January 1929 no long-term loans were issued to placate London's concerns about 
the escalation in Australian debt.+ The laxity of the Bruce Government found its origin 
in Walker's view that conservative governments could get away with what a Labor 
government could not (Cain, 1983, 16, 10). 
Bruce had always expressed confidence that his capital-intensive rural 
development schemes, operating, in tandem, with British migrants and underwritten 
with British capital, would prove remunerative (Cumpston, 1989, 65; Richmond, 1971, 
248). Bruce had hoped to use the British Economic Mission to alleviate growing 
concern in the City over Australia's rate of borrowing (Roe, 1995, 126). The Mission, 
however, in a reprise on London opinion, criticised Australia's new protectionism. The 
concern about Australian cost levels drew the attention of one member of the Mission to 
note: 'The nub of the problem had been identified as the great and growing costs of 
production, for which growing tariffs and correspondingly growing costs of living and 
of labour are primarily responsible, and which are further enhanced by all 
unremunerative expenditures of borrowed money' (Malcolm, 1929, 19-20). The 
Mission encouraged the Bruce Government to square the circle by attempting to lower 
production costs while continuing to promote development (Cumpston, 1989, 86). Their 
advice encouraged Bruce to embark upon industrial relations reform - an action that 
spelt the electoral demise of his government. 
University economists were heartened by the Mission because it assailed the 
intrusive nature of government intervention within the economy, particularly the 
'vicious' link between tariffs and wage arbitration, a concern the Tariff Board had 
alluded to time and time again (Cain, 1974, 355). Economists made themselves 
unpopular by railing against the power of the oppressive state and the dangers of over-
expansion. Indeed Shann's oeuvre had been solely dedicated to tracing the growth and 
development of, in his eyes, the sacrosanct wage-fixing system that arose in the first 
quarter of twentieth century. His work had yet again publicised the effects of 
+ The Bruce-Page administration left overdrafts in London of £3.3 million and loan commitments of £71 
million maturing within one year of leaving office. There was also a deficiency of £49 million in the 
London funds (S.M.H. 24/1/1931). 
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protectionism and brought out the key distinction between sheltered and unsheltered 
industries, a distinction was to play a critical part in the policy response to the 
Depression (Hytten, 1960, 156). 
Shann's major work, An Economic History of Australia (1930), offered up as a 
blueprint for economic reconstruction, concentrated upon the author's lifelong interests 
of perceiving Australian economic enterprise being shackled by a raft of regulations put 
in place by the 'apostles of restrictions'.* The book proclaimed Shann's 'credentials as 
the leading neo-liberal voice in economic discourse' (Snooks, 1993, 23). It was a 
detached view of Australian economic policy written in the splendid isolation of the 
west (Copland, 1935, 599). In an earlier pamphlet, Shann (1927) drew parallels with the 
1890s and made the poignant remark about overcapitalisation. Three years later he was 
adamant that while 'public works are excellent things but only for so long as the balance 
is preserved between capital and earning power, between equipment and its use in 
furthering production .... overset that balance and they become a burden as voracious as 
the grasshopper' (Shann, 1930, 28). By 1930 Australia had overstepped the mark: 'This 
is no time for additional public works. One of our main troubles is an interest bill .... on 
public works that do not earn interest' (Shann, 1?30, 54-5). Shann's words on the 
capital sunk into public works would haunt the thirties. He also warned that if the price 
of Australian staples fell, the interest bill would not fall, pari passu. All this came to 
pass. Shann colourfully extolled the predicament facing the Scullin Government: 
'We have fixed costs and (living) standards. The markets we serve have fall en 
away and left on fixtures as high and dry as a steamer on the nor' west coast tied 
to a jetty when the tide is out, though with the difference that the tide may not 
return. And all that Labour can suggest is to build a little dock around the vessel 
and float it again on the contents of its reserve banks'. 44 
* By this Shann meant the endless and intrusive government regulation in commodity and labour markets in particular 
the connection between high protection and high wages which penalised the export sector. Protection all round Shann maintained ultimately retarded the rate of economic growth and the rate at which working class standards 
could be raised (Snooks, 1993, 27). In his polemic, Shann staged the argument in terms of a heroic individual 
struggle against the.dark forces of restriction which wanted to extend wage fixing, tariff protection and protection all 
round. 
44 E.O.G. Shann to C.A.S. Hawker, 3/12/1929, Hawker Papers, NLA. 
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Brigden's pamphlet Escape to Prosperity (1930) also raged against urban and 
rural over-development but with an evangelical call for action and community co-
operation.** Meanwhile Wood was finishing off his magnus opus, Borrowing and 
Business in Australia (1930) in London. Casey, allowed to read the draft, feared that its 
'depressing' tone would have a bad impact upon London opinion (Hudson and North, 
1980, 544). So gloomy was Wood's analysis that Casey got Wood to stress that it was 
an academic work rather then a forecast of the Commonwealth's future. 
In its report, the British Economic Mission commented that Australia 'had been 
mortgaging the future too deeply and would do well to restrict her expenditure of 
borrowed money for development' .45 The Mission praised deflation as 'the cause of 
wisdom' and urged that a 'cadre' of highly qualified men staff the economic agencies 
(Roe, 1995, 128). The general impression formed in London from the report was, as 
Casey relayed to Bruce, that ' ... they do not think we have been very clever with our 
nation planning in the past' (Hudson and North, 1980, 462). 
Copland gave the best contemporaneous account of how Australia's economic 
difficulties had steadily mounted in the late twenties. He identified four 'danger-spots' 
or 'weaknesses' in the economy, namely, the rising ratio of interest payments to export 
revenue; the increasing levels of tariff assistance; the growing disparity between 
Australian and foreign price levels and, not least, State and Commonwealth deficit 
budgets (Shann and Copland, 1931, 95). There was undue profligacy with public 
expenditure consuming 29 per cent of national income in 1928 which would rise to 45 
per cent by 1931 unless otherwise checked (Raws, 1931, 38). All this, Copland 
reasoned, would have necessitated some adjustment for the economy notwithstanding 
the deterioration in the world economy (Shann and Copland, 193 la, 95). Copland 
rejected the argument that there had been gross economic mismanagement. A dependent 
economy, he said, was 'only partially master of its own house'; in that sense Australia 
had been embarrassed by the calamitous fall in export prices (Copland, 1930, 638-640). 
He did admit, though, that the distorted pattern of development would have required 
** Shann so savagely reviewed Brigden's pamphlet - compiled from radio talks 'it would not be to the 
credit of Australian economists' - that Copland shelved the idea of having the review placed in the Record (E.O.G. Shann to -D.B. Copland, 4/7/1930 and D.B. Copland to E.O.G. Shann, 3/7/1930, UMA FECC, Box 134). 
45 Report of the British Economic Mission C. P. P. 1929, Pg.19. 
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some adjustment, certainly on the wages front, irrespective of adverse external 
developments (Clark, 1981a, 21; Cain, 1973, 20). 
Nor were Australian economists totally against the idea of large-scale 
development. Melville defended the public works undertaken, underlining the capital 
intensive nature of these works as the economy moved from a rural to an industrialised 
base.46 Melville held out hope that once export prices recovered, together with more 
sensible policies pertaining to tariff and wage matters, Australia could resume where it 
had left off (Cain, 1974, 354-5; Melville, 1929). On loan allocations, economists called 
for greater disclosure of where the funds were intended and the returns of the 
borrowings. The real priority for Australia was not 'less borrowing but wiser spending' 
(Mills, 1928, 116-7). Only Shann, Brigden, Eggleston and, before them, Frederic 
Benham, were pessimistic about Australia's long-term economic prospects given the 
amounts of foreign capital recruited into low return ventures (Cain, 1974, 355). 
4. 7 Niemeyer and the Australian economists 
It seems local economists were probably taken as much as by surprise as Labor 
Party officials were when informed that the Bank of England was dispatching Sir Otto 
Niemeyer to Australia to undertake an evaluation of the economy's finances.47 It could 
be said that the local nucleus of economists was grateful for Niemeyer' s visit since it 
added a much-needed degree of gravitas to the unfolding problems. Indeed Giblin, on 
behalf of his university colleagues, sent Niemeyer a note of welcome.48 If the thirties 
were to be the making of Australian economics in terms of policy influence it was in no 
small part due to the public and political reaction against Niemeyer. The concluding part 
of the chapter shows how this was set in train. 
A banker brought home perhaps the true legacy of the Niemeyer visit, 'It is the 
first occasion in half a century that economic talks may be brought home forcibly to the 
people of Australia and those who rule over them' .49 He was inadvertently right for the 
controversy ·surrounding the visit, together with the draconian advice that sprang from 
46 Melville Trc pg. 13 , NLA. 
47 A fuller version.of this section appears in Millmow (2004). 48 L.F. Giblin to Sir 0. Niemeyer n.d. Giblin papers, NLA. 49 A.C. Davidson to Sir 0. Niemeyer, n. d, BE: OV9/288. 
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Niemeyer' s lips, gave local economists an opportunity to exercise what would 
ultimately prove a more acceptable solution to Australia's woes: for Niemeyer, as 
Gibson anticipated, brought the house of English orthodox economics down upon 
Australia's head.* It would materialise in Niemeyer attacking the 'Ark of the Covenant', 
namely, Australia's living standards which he considered unsustainable. 50 
The high point of Niemeyer's fact-finding tour was his infamous address at the 
Melbourne Conference of Commonwealth and State leaders where he told his audience 
that the 'cold facts must be faced'. He told his audience that came with stern 
admonitions about how tariffs, in league with arbitration and excessive government 
borrowing, supported unsustainable living standards (Goodwin, 1974). Real wages had 
to be quickly reduced; the therapy was couched in phrases like restoring 'equilibrium' 
and 'equal sacrifice.' His diagnosis of Australia's predicament was blunt, if not 
predictable: 
'In short, Australia is off budget equilibrium, off exchange equilibrium, and 
faced by considerable unfunded and maturing debts both internally and 
externally, in addition to which she has on her hands a very large program of 
loan works for which no financial provision has been made' (cited in Shann and 
Copland, 1931, 21). 
Niemeyer visited Australia because Scullin was tempted by the possibility that 
the Bank of England might accommodate Australia with a loan to cover liabilities to 
English banks, especially if the federal government followed Niemeyer's advice. 
Niemeyer' s mission, of course, was to diagnose the nature of the Commonwealth's 
economic problems and put forward advice as to its resolution. It afforded London 
another opportunity to launch another critique of Australia's pattern of economic 
development (Roe, 1995, 148). 
The British Treasury had been monitoring Australian assisted immigration and 
development programs through the twenties and one of its officers, Skevington, visiting 
* One of the conditions of Niemeyer' s visit was that Sir Robert Gibson was to have the first interview with the Bank 
of England man and be allowed constant access to him (Ricketson Diary extract, 25/6/1930). 
so 'Sir Otto Niemeyer in Australia', Nation and Athenaeum, 17/1/1931. 
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the year before Niemeyer, voiced critical remarks about the Australians' self-belief in 
the great potential of their country. He found 'their ignorance of economics ... pathetic' 
(cited in Roe, 1995, 136).* As an old Treasury man, Niemeyer might have read 
Skevington' s dispatches. For his own part, he would also be only articulating what had 
already written upon for the Bank of England's edification (Attard, 1992, 81). 
Niemeyer' s address was composed after he had audited all Governmental 
budgets with assistance from his economic adviser, Professor Gregory, of the London 
School of Economics and an assistant from the Bank of England, Richard Kershaw. 
They had also examined each Government's portfolio of internal and external debts. 
Niemeyer made much of Kershaw' s data showing the movement in money wages, per 
capita productivity and unemployment, even finding a spot in his diary (Love, 1983). 
For Niemeyer, it was an open and shut case. 
Niemeyer's advice at the Melbourne Conference was politely listened to and 
seemingly consented to. However, as Tsokhas (1995, 20-21) identified, the peculiarity 
of Australia's political and institutional arrangements, especially the federal structure of 
governance, deprived Niemeyer of having a 'single point' whereupon he could 
concentrate pressure upon the need to reform. Moreover the States resented having to 
make greater proportionate expenditure cuts than the Commonwealth (Tsokhas, 1995, 
22-24). It could be said that the Scullin Government, while agreeing that budgets had to 
be pruned, exercised a policy of 'passive resistance' to Niemeyer' s advice, in the 
expectation that something would tum up. It was open to more palatable medicine. 
Niemeyer found the Australian resistance to buckle under disconcerting, believing they 
were far too optimistic about their country's future prospects. What irritated Niemeyer 
most was the boundless optimism of his hosts that there must exist an easier way out of 
their predicament. In a long missive to Montagu Norman, Niemeyer vented his 
frustration: 'They are occupied half the time saying that the present difficulties are not 
their fault but somebody else's - either Bruce' s or the London Markets or the general 
perverseness of the world and the other half in trying to find ingenious ways by which 
* He was not alone in this view. Alfred Davidson, the newly appointed General Manager of the 'Wales', bemoaned in 
a letter to Shann the same problem among his staff. He elected to establish a Bank circular that, freely distributed, 
would attempt to lift the community's level of economic literacy (A.C. Davidson to E.O.G. Shann, 14/5/1930, 
BNSW: GM 302:590). Another bank circular, prepared by the economic department with the same mission, was 
circulated only to branch managers. D.B. Copland was on the mailing list (See UMA FECC, Box 42) . 
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somebody else should help them out' .51 When Niemeyer read in local papers that the 
British Government was still considering a proposal guaranteeing loans for further 
migration and land settlement he cabled Harvey: 
'Can you tell me whether there is any truth in this, as rumours have bad effect on 
these optimists? Australia is a poor country probably over-populated with a 
higher percentage unemployed than U .K. Settlement hitherto has been very 
costly and unsuccessful; future development at present seems to me insane' .52 
Despite Niemeyer warning Scullin that London would not give him a warm 
reception, Scullin asked whether the Bank would provide the money to enable the 
Commonwealth to pay off some five million of maturing Treasury Bonds (Tsokhas, 
1995, 25). Harvey, who had visited Australia in 1927 to advise upon establishing a 
central bank, declined because the Australian government had, so far, not moved to 
implement Niemeyer' s advice in any way, shape or form. Earlier, the Bank of England, 
at Niemeyer's suggestion, was prepared to help finance the maturing of Treasury Bonds 
in late 1930, but only if the Scullin Government implemented the August resolutions 
which had, in fact, met with approval of five State Premiers.* The Treasury mandarin, 
Sir Richard Hopkins annotated a copy of the report of the interview between Scullin and 
Harvey with the comment 'It is a bad business'. 53 
Meanwhile Niemeyer was unimpressed by the 'personnel all round - political, 
administrative and banking - is, with rare exceptions, lamentable, a circumstance which 
is accentuated by the marooning of the Commonwealth Government and administration 
on a sheep run 200 miles from anywhere' 54 (Tsokhas, 1995, 24). To E.T. Crutchley, the 
resident British Government adviser upon migration matters, Niemeyer confessed 'he 
had had a lot to do with bankrupt countries but have never seen one more utterly 
51 Sir 0. Niemeyer to Sir M. Norman, 1/9/1930, BE: G 1/291. !2 Sir 0 . Niemeyer to Sir E. Harvey cablegram, 14/8/1930, PRO:T161/396/l 1935/02. 
Scullin's extraordinary requests might be understood by Theodore having received a letter from a press agent, The Financial Times', J.M. Myers, who informed him that the Bank of England might give Australia direct financial 
assistance as a result of the large gold shipment which had proved extremely useful to the Bank in its dealings (J.M. Myers to E.G. Theodore, 6/8/1930 Theodore Papers, NLA). Casey had earlier complained to Brnce that Myers' paper 
was chiefly responsible for fomenting negative sentiment about Australia's finances. 53 Copy of interview with Scullin and Sir Ernest Harvey PRO: T161/396/l 1935/02 54 Sir 0. Niemeyer to Sir M. Norman, 1/9/1930, BE: Gl/291. 
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impotent to help itself' .55 Even Gibson, the only man the Bank of England trusted, 
'staggered' Niemeyer by prophesising - correctly as it turned out - that Britain would go 
off the gold standard within six months.56 Apart from that indiscretion, Niemeyer told 
Lady Gibson that her husband was 'the most outstanding figure of all those I met' 57 and 
in another instance 'Australia could never repay Sir Robert Gibson in thousands what he 
had saved the country in millions' .58 Niemeyer was so impressed by Melville that he 
probably recommended him to Gibson as the Commonwealth Bank's first economic 
adviser. 59 Melville, who drew strength from Niemeyer' s visit, tried to entice him to 
give the Joseph Fisher Lecture.* Niemeyer declined the honour, as he did with many 
invitations, especially after his August speech and maintained a studied reticence on 
economic policy matters; what E.R. Riddle, the Governor of the Commonwealth Bank, 
called a 'blasphemous silence' _++60 
There were, as will be shown in the next chapter, less austere homespun plans 
drawn up against Niemeyer' s prescriptions, the most outstanding of which was the 
Melbourne school. There was no record in Niemeyer' s diary or papers of having met or 
corresponded with its arch-architect, Copland. Giblin, in his recollections to Walker, 
reported however frequent clashing with Niemeyer especially over the issue of 
protection (cited in Cain, 1987, 6). For his part, Niemeyer found Giblin 'pretty 
disappointing' (Love, 1982, 273). Gregory did, however, see Copland and Giblin a day 
* before Niemeyer' s keynote address before the Melbourne Conference. Gregory 
55 E.T. Crutchley Diary, 14/8/1930, NLA. 
56 
'Recollections of Sir Robert Gibson' by Sir Harold Clapp, Gibson papers, Latrobe library 57 Sir 0. Niemeyer to Lady Gibson, 1/1/1934, Gibson Papers, Latrobe Library Box 3. 58 Manuscript by M. Gibson on her father, Sir Robert Gibson p. 50, Gibson Papers, Latrobe library 59 E.O.G. Shann to W. Young, 17/2/1932, BNSW: A 53/409. 
* Professor Gregory gave the oration and he took the opportunity to attack, in a digression, the Melbourne school 
advocates of 'a little amount of local inflation' then extant whose 'ultimate consequences would be fatal' not just to the banking structure but economy overall' (1933, 109-111). 
++ Niemeyer's celebrity was such that he was inundated with invitations to speak or visit towns and shires. Persistent 
invitations came from a one E.D. Ogilvy, an old student of Balliol College, Oxford. Impressed by his tenacity, 
Niemeyer relented and accepted the offer to visit the Glen Innes grazier. He probably wishes he had not for Ogilvie 
apparently gave him an ear load of the need to devalue the Australian pound. The visit to Glen Innes was also where 
Niemeyer almost crossed paths with the electioneering Jack Lang (Lloyd, 1986, 46). Ogilvie also wrote in parody 
form to Keynes outlining the problems Australian graziers faced, but made no mention of his famous visitor. Keynes 
responded that while sympathetic to Ogilvie's call for more depreciation advised as he had in his comment on the 
Wallace Bruce Report that Australia should not force too much adjustment on itself (Ogilvie to J.M. Keynes 
29/6/1932, A/32/1/359 and J.M. Keynes to Ogilvie A/32/1/383, KPKC). 60 E.R. Riddle to Sir 0. Niemeyer, 17/11/30, BE: OV9/286. 
* It would not have mattered what the views of these gentlemen were. Niemeyer had already made up his 
mind what he was going to say, and, indeed had already given an important speech to Commonwealth and 
State heads of government the night before along the lines of the Canbeffa statement of Feb. 1930. Niemeyer had 
been well briefed upon Australian financial affairs while at the Bank of England, and before that at H.M. Treasury (see Attard, 1992, 77; Roe, 1995). 
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cryptically reported back that the conversation gravitated around two points, the 
exchange rate and real wage cuts. Gregory posed the question to the two academics of 
what was Australia's optimal path out of its depression namely, deflation or 
devaluation? He found Copland more careful in his qualifying analysis than Giblin, but 
also more likely to be 'inflationist', by that, meaning a rise in the price level via 
devaluation. In the record of that interview there is no mention of Copland's expedient, 
articulated in his 1930 Economic Journal article, of a money wage cut that would 
deliver a real wage cut of 10 per cent. Giblin and Copland spoke rather about a 10 per 
cent devaluation to suppress imports, and how, more importantly, it would give a boost 
to primary and secondary industries. This decision was to be coupled with 
compensating reductions in the tariff. Gregory insisted that primary producers would 
not escape rising costs due to the import bill increasing. The Melbourne economists 
confided that they saw unemployment ballooning to 25 per cent. Significantly, Copland 
mooted the idea of 'a general scaling down' of interest rates, but Gregory thought it was 
not 'a considered point of view of what was possible on his part'. 61 
Apart from this interview and his Fisher Lecture, Gregory kept well in the 
background during his visit. His one contribution to the media, as events unfolded, was 
to prove an interesting and prophetic one. He categorically refuted the Labourist 
argument that a reduction in interest rates must precede a wage reduction: 
'If we look at it strictly as an economic proposition, both rising rates of interest 
and the growth of unemployment are evidence of maladministration in 
Australian economic affairs, and, from a strictly economic point of view, you 
cannot assert that it is unjust that interest rates remain high while wages fall if 
the high rate of interest is unnecessary to attract capital and a lower rate is 
necessary to attract a demand for labour'. 62 
Niemeyer wrote to Philip Snowdon, Chancellor of the Exchequer, that Gregory 
was returning home having had a 'close-up' of protection, over-expenditure and over-
borrowing. 63 
61 Notes on Conversation with Professors Giblin and Copland at Melbourne, 19/7 /30, BE: OV9/242. 62 Daily Guardian 29/8/1930 in BE: OV9/288. 63 Sir 0. Niemeyer to Sir P. Snowdon, 29/8/1930, BE: OV9/286. 
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As hopes of implementing the Melbourne Agreement faded, an embittered 
Niemeyer wrote to his old colleagues at the Treasury: 'This is an odd country, full of 
odd people and odder theories, but I think it has had a salutary effect. .. on your friend 
Gregory who left last week uttering the most orthodox and almost antediluvian 
sentiments on monetary and other matters' .64+ Meanwhile Melville had, at Niemeyer's 
urging, gone on the attack against the stabilisation views of the 'Melbourne School'. 
Niemeyer encouraged him to keep up the fight against 'Copland and Co' and their 
'dangerous nonsense' part of which was about letting the exchange rate depreciate.65 
Niemeyer, along with the trading banks, saw little logic in Australia having to pay more 
to service its debt or imports. It was held that the primary producers, too, would extract 
little benefit because of the higher costs inflicted by the devaluation.** 
In a concluding dig at the Melbourne school Niemeyer remarked how 'curious a 
commentary it is on human psychology that the same people talk in one breath of the 
boundless potentialities of Australia and in the next of the necessity of writing down 
those potentialities by 20 per cent' .66 A heartened Melville replied that the Melbourne 
school was technically reduced to monetising the deficits directly since the trading 
banks would not expedite it by purchasing Government securities and, if that were to 
happen, there would be a flight from currency. He sought Niemeyer' s opinion about 
Giblin' s contention, reported in the press that 'our best efforts at balancing the budget 
were hopeless at the present time' .67 Niemeyer felt Giblin's pessimism about balancing 
the budget was symbolic of a 'quitter' mentality he had found with too many of his 
hosts. Niemeyer' s reply to Melville, a few days before he set sail for England, rounded 
64 Sir 0. Niemeyer to P. Hopkins, 1/9/1930, BE: Gl/291. 
+ While made in jest, Gregory's prompting and pronouncements through the thirties were certainly from Australian 
economist's viewpoint consistent with Niemeyer's description of him. Copland believed Gregory 'gave economists a bad name' with his emphasis on exchange rate stability (D.B. Copland to R.B. Lemmon, 15/6/1934, UMA FECC, Box 24). In the same letter to the Melbourne businessman Copland volunteered that Gregory 'had learnt nothing 
since 1925'. Copland would have to do battle again with Gregory in 1932 when New Zealand was pondering whether 
or not to devalue. 
65 Sir 0. Niemeyer to L.G. Melville, 1/11/1930, BE: OV9/289. 
** Niemeyer ridiculed too the argument that there had been a bank-led deflation of credit - a view Labor parliamentarians, Curtin and Anstey, had been pushing. For relaxation on the voyage home Niemeyer read and 
scathingly critiqued John Curtin's pamphlet_Australia's Economic Crisis and the £55,000 Interest Bill. In a letter to W.J. Young, Niemeyer took issue with Curtin's argument that bondholders had gained at the expense of workers but 
rather insisted protected workers had gained at the expense of unprotected labour, civil servants and pensioners (Sir 0. Niemeyer to W. Young 16/11/1930 BE: OV9/289). Giblin and apparently Dyason applauded Curtin's views on the desirability of price stability (Giblin Papers 366/10/157). Curtin cited Keynes's article 'Commercial Reconstruction in Europe' as lending intellectual support to finding a way out of servicing Australia's huge national debt. Curtin expectantly quoted Keynes' .. .if the fixed charges of the National Debt bear too high a proportion to the 
nationa'. income, it may offer a problem insoluble by orthodox methods' (Curtin, 1930, 9). 66 Sir 0. Niemeyer to L.G. Melville, 1/11/1930, BE: OV9/289. 67 L.G. Melville to Sir 0. Niemeyer, 8/11/1930, BE: OV9/289. 
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on Giblin and Copland's 'hopelessly academic' measures as meaning only one thing -
inflation: 'The fundamental fallacy of course is the common Australian assumption that 
it is the business of the banks in general and the Commonwealth Bank in particular to 
provide capital in the strict sense of the word. The provision of capital is, of course, no 
part of the functions of any bank'. 68 Niemeyer pointedly remarked that there had 
already been some 'considerable inflation' in the financing of deficits; he speculated 
also where Australia would draw upon the resources to balance forthcoming budgets or 
finance public works. Niemeyer articulated similar forebodings when informed that the 
Scullin Government had, against all odds, actually managed to raise its December 
Conversion Loan of 28 million pounds.69 Pointedly, Niemeyer, unlike the reaction in 
London and Australia, pinned the success of the conversion to the public appeals made 
by Gibson, not Joe Lyons, the Acting Federal Treasurer (See Lloyd, 1986, 53). It was 
Lyons' star, however, that shone brightest from the action. Lyons' success, as Hart 
(1967) shows, was basically assured given the phalanx of conservative and financial 
interests milling behind him after he had withstood Labor party plans to defer the 
conversion. 
Niemeyer knew that the provisions of the Melbourne Conference were in 
technical limbo until the outcome of the NSW State elections was known. A victory for 
the conservative leader, T.R. Bavin, would mean that the process of fiscal consolidation 
could proceed in the strongest state in the Commonwealth and that a loan sponsored by 
the Bank of England might be in prospect. Unfortunately Bavin used the Niemeyer 
report as the basis of his campaign giving the unfortunate impression that he was 
advocating economy and retrenchment at the dictate of London.70 Jack Lang, to 
Niemeyer' s horror, mounted his entire electoral campaign against supporting the August 
resolutions - arguing instead for some form of repudiation. Victory for Lang would 
therefore be a severe blow to the Niemeyer plan and, as Norman told Hopkins at the 
British Treasury 'The game would be up'. 71 
Even on the day of departure Niemeyer still strove to expunge the inveterate 
optimism of his hosts , remarking to journalists that 'there was not enough pessimism 
68Sir 0. Niemeyer to L.G. Melville, 13/11/1930, BE: OV9/289. 69 Sir 0. Niemeyer to T. Bavin, 23/12/1930, BE: OV9/289. 70 
'Sir Otto Niemeyer in Australia' Nation andAthenaeum 17/1/1931. 71 Sir M. Norman to Sir Philip Hopkins, 23/10/1930, BE: Gl/291. 
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around' (Goodwin, 1974, 230-1). He remarked that Australians had 'hard times ahead 
of them but they don't know how to be pessimistic' .72 While he reportedly left Australia 
'to stew in her own juice' one positive outcome was that local sympathisers apprised 
him and Kershaw of Australia's dwindling finances and the unfolding political crisis. 
Indeed, communication links were formalised between Australian and British central 
banks. Niemeyer saw this as an alleviating factor, and cause for some optimism so long 
as the perception was not sown that the Bank of England was manipulating 
Commonwealth Bank Board policy (Tsokhas, 1995, 28-29). Much later, A.C. Davidson 
of the Bank of NSW, amongst others, would suspect that the Commonwealth Bank's 
views on monetary policy were well under the sway of 'a certain influential section of 
London opinion' .73 Gibson, and even Melville, would strenuously deny that there was 
dictation, only conferral. 
While many, including Montagu Norman, could foresee a looming crisis, some 
saw it as doing a power of good. Crutchley, for instance, reported that 'The 
Commonwealth Bank felt, as did other competitive authorities, that a 'crash' so long as 
it is internal in immediate effect, was not only unavoidable but should be expected as 
the only way of forcing the Governments and the public to face facts and acc·ept the 
hardships of reconstruction' .74 Theodore, too, reinstated as Federal Treasurer, was of the 
same inclination wanting a crisis to force the Commonwealth Bank Board to bend to his 
will. 
In hindsight, the Niemeyer mission was to provide Australian economists an 
excellent opportunity to present a fairer and idiosyncratic solution to Australia's 
economic problems in the 1930s - a point never made in the extensive literature on the 
Niemeyer mission. This was no mean achievement since the Labor Party usually 
shunned the advice of local economists as academic and impractical (Melville, 1971, 
34; Castles, 1997). Nor was anything Niemeyer had diagnosed about Australia's 
economic difficulties new. It was Niemeyer' s method of application of remedial 
policies, together with his air of superiority that proved mindlessly insensitive to 
political realities and earned him lasting opprobrium. As the British Senior Trade 
72 Adelaide Advertis·er 18/8/1931. 
73 A.C. Davidson to W.S. Robinson, 12/8/1938, BNSW: GM 302/574. 74 E.T. Crutchley to the Under Secretary of State, Dominions Office, 2/4/1931, PRO: T160/807/11935/1. 
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representative in Australia noted, 'Niemeyer was not the success he might have been; he 
lost his head a bit, was tactless and did some very stupid things' ( cited in Attard, 1992, 
82). Rather predictably, Niemeyer had forsaken Keynes's advice that with Australia's 
export prices already depressed it was 'not a time to choose for pressing her too hard' 
(Keynes, 1981, 381-2). Even Niemeyer's strongest supporter, Sir Robert Gibson, 
chided Niemeyer for his pessimism arguing that he did not give the Australian people 
enough credit to pull through. 75 Of course, it may well have been that Niemeyer was 
deliberating painting a gloomy picture to force the necessary measures to be taken - a 
point Copland felt was quite necessary in the circumstances . . This did not sway Wood 
however who fumed years later that 'The resentment of the Niemeyer mission goes 
deeper than perhaps you have been led to expect. The personnel was unfortunate, the 
job was badly handled and the general effect was almost disastrous, despite the 
necessity for telling the Scullin Government the true facts of the case' .76 Some years 
later Copland took delight at the sharp criticism of Niemeyer' s style and therapy 
amongst Cambridge economists.77 
As a mark of things to come, the Melbourne stockbroker, Dyason, who had also 
been in intermittent communication with Keynes over Australia's economic distress, 
told the Acting Treasurer, Joe Lyons, his concerns about Niemeyer's advice, 'I believe 
that the present policy is inimical to the national interest and dangerous to the social 
fabric' .78 Giblin added his weight, telling Lyons that if deflationary policies were 
carried out, as intended, Australia would have a 'bad smash with the chance of 
revolution and chaos' (Clark, 1986). The Scullin Government had been elected on the 
promise that they would shelter the living standards of the working man from the 
economic blizzard. The degree of subtlety required to negotiate through the crisis could 
only come from economists with an unerring common touch. They had to be able to tell 
parables to explain abstruse economics in order to generate the consensus for the 
measures needed. Along with Copland, Giblin would later claim that the Australian 
economists' solution to their country's predicament was quite removed from the 
Niemeyer blueprint which he believed was both harsh and ill-founded (Giblin, 1951, 
75 
ewspapers obituary on Sir Robert Gibson, Gibson Papers, Latrobe library 76 G. Wood to W.S : Robinson, 21/4/1932, UMC FECC, Box 14. 77 Occasional notes on his visit to Cambridge 26/5/1933 in B SW: GM: 302/412. 78 E.C. Dyason to J. Lyons, n.d. Box 1, Folder 2, .Lyons Papers, NLA. 
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84). It was only in April 1931 that the Labor leadership, albeit reluctantly, turned for 
help to the temperate advice of local economists. 
Yet Niemeyer would prove a little vindicated when he told Montagu Norman 
'We have given them a concrete plan to pull on and sooner or later even those who now 
hold back will follow it'. 79 Norman could only but agree, cabling ' ... we have shown 
(the) Premiers a reasonable way of avoiding bankruptcy' .80 In a sense they were right, 
and a placatory missive from Claude Reading, a member of the Commonwealth Bank 
Board, assured Niemeyer that the subsequent Premiers' Plan was 'in effect merely 
going back to everything you said when you were here and adopting the remedies which 
you concluded would be necessary' (cited in Tsokhas, 1995, 30). The Australian 
economists' plan was neither as deflationary nor as iniquitous as Niemeyer' s plan. And 
even if their plan was a 'makeshift' one it was to make their fame. 81 
4.8 Conclusion: The Legacy of Niemeyer 
Despite it humble beginnings the Australian economics profession had come some 
distance in a very short period of time. The profession had established a good theoretic 
founding taking the peculiarities of the Australian economy into account. It had, 
moreover, already established the practice of offering scientific input into community 
issues. This progress culminated in Australian economists offering a more palatable 
alternative to Niemeyer' s prescriptions. 
79 Sir 0. Niemeyer tb Sir M. Norman, 8/11/1930, BE: Gl/291. 80 Sir M. Norman to Sir 0. Niemeyer. 6/11/1930, BE: Gl/291. 81 Mauldon's review of D.B. Copland's The Australian Economy in UMA FECC, Box 20. 
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PART TWO 
Triumph and Tribulation 
86 
CHAPTERS 
Australian Economists and the Depression 
5.1 Introduction 
Australian economists played a key role in developing the policy alternatives to 
deal with the nation's economic crisis. Contrary to Schedvin's view that economists 
played only a superficial role in the depression, Copland ( 1934, 29) saw it as a defining 
moment for the economics profession. The purpose of this chapter is to recount how 
economists responded to the economic crisis of 1930/31. While Neville Cain has 
undertaken an exacting study of the origins of the Premiers' Plan, this account, using 
new archival material, will attempt to retrace the subtlety and nuance of the path 
towards economic reconstruction. When reviewing Schedvin' s work, the economic 
historian, N.G. Butlin suggested that 'the Battle of the Plans' was not just fought in 
academic seminar rooms. 82 That is, it_was not just a contest of economic ideas but an 
unfolding political drama. Consequently there must be some discussion of the political 
backdrop, especially the two opposing economic plans put forward by the two 
protagonists, E.G. Theodore and J.T. Lang. This chapter reassesses Theodore's 
fiduciary issue plan, given its contextual and theoretical importance, and contrasts it 
with Lang's plan. This is done in section 5 .2. Both plans fell from grace in quick order. 
Not the same could be said of the economists' composite plan drawn up within the 
ambit of what the financial community would then allow. 
The iconic figure of Copland was to prove instrumental in marshalling 
economists behind a plan that rescued the country from the economic mire ( 1932, 134-
153). 83 It was a plan that embodied existing economic thought. Reflecting on the period, 
Copland argued that Australia fallowed two distinct phases of policy response to the 
Depression . . The first phase was an 'experimental' stage in which the authorities, 
lacking cohesion and direction, tackled the crisis from a short-term view. The 'battle of 
82 The Bulletin 5/12/1970. 
83 D.B. Copland to McDougall, 19/4/1932, UMA FECC, Box 11. 
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the plans' phase, and thereafter, was when the Federal Government, albeit reluctantly, 
heeded the advice of economists. Strands of earlier memoranda of economic advice and 
thought were distilled into the shape and elixir of the Premiers' Plan of June 19 31. 
Moreover, as this second half of this chapter will show, the plan also had a touch of 
Niemeyer about it to allay the concerns of powerful financial interests. 
5.2 The Political Economy of the Battle of the Plans 
The Theodore Plan 
Before the Scullin Government succumbed to economic orthodoxy Theodore 
had, with the critical support of the left, a last throw of the dice with his 'forward policy 
for Australia' or Fiduciary Issue Plan. 84 The Scullin Government had apparently 
embarked upon such a desperate endeavour because it had become, in Frank Anstey' s 
(1978, 389) words, 'a truculent, valiant, revolutionary' position against the prevailing 
financial orthodoxy being pushed upon them by the banks. Theories once regarded as 
'disastrous' and 'fantastic' or 'not practicable' by Theodore, were now embraced by the 
party leadership (cited in Cook, 1979, 385; Hart, 1965, 3). Emotive statements like 'The 
banks denied credit to the government; it was therefore necessary to create it' and 
'credit can be expanded at will' disconcerted economists and bankers (Shann and 
Copland, 193 la). Shann told an English correspondent that Theodore was leading a 
'debtor's revolt' with his policy of heavy inflation. 85 
The private banks echoed the Commonwealth Bank Board's opposition to 
Theodore' s Fiduciary Issue scheme. The National Bank denounced the Treasurer's 
'quack remedies and stimulants' (cited in Cannon, 1996). Another bank, another banker, 
the enlightened A.C. Davidson, who had written a pamphlet on centre reserve banking, 
wrote 'There is a large body in the Labor Caucus at Canberra which holds extraordinary 
theories in regard to money, credit and banking' (cited in Cannon, 1996, 33). The 
imperial view, held by H.M. Treasury and the Bank of England, was that monetary 
stimulation to induce a higher level of activity would merely raise domestic costs and 
84 SMH28/1/1931. 
85 E.O.G. Shann to H. Finlayson, 5/5/1931 , BNSW: A53; 409 . 
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price levels above those of other trading nations and thereby exacerbate Australia's trade 
account difficulties. 
The vociferous reaction to Theodore's proto-Keynesian experiment, not least 
from economists, was to have a subliminal influence upon economic policy in the 
thirties. Just as economists could prove to be constructive, so equally could they prove 
destructive in their criticism of the plans and ideas of others. It mirrored in a way 
Theodore's rather problematic relationship with the economists, finding at times half-
hearted support for his measures, at other times, vehement disapproval.+ There was also 
an element of admiration for the Treasurer, and as we shall see, there was to be a sequel 
to this story in 1939. Economists were not alone in appreciating Theodore's technical 
abilities. A political opponent, the NSW opposition leader, Bertram Stevens, who came 
into his own element later, described Theodore as 'possessing the coolest, best, and 
most experienced financial brain in the southern hemisphere' (cited in Kennedy, 1988, 
278).86 Bruce reportedly considered Theodore as Australia's greatest Treasurer 
(Calwell, 1972, 62). The economists would later find, perhaps to their embarrassment, 
that some of Theodore's economic vision was ahead of their own (Kennedy, 1988). 
Initially Theodore held court with Copland, Giblin and the stockbroker, Edward 
Dyason, but the university men parted company over the Fiduciary Issue scheme. 87 
Dyason remained committed to it. 88 Economically literate, Theodore, was allegedly 
privy to the views of R.F. Irvine, the defrocked professor of economics from Sydney 
University known for his under-consumptionist views (Clark, 1974; Fitzgerald, 1994; 
McFarlane, 1966). Irvine had already won notoriety having battled out an honourable 
draw - intellectually at least - with Copland in the 1930 National Wage Case, arguing, 
86 Theodore had already shown his intellectual qualities by bringing the Central Reserve Bank Bill before parliament. 
The attempt to redesign Australia's financial architecture was to be abortive. Theodore wanted more effective control 
over the mobilisation of credit and to split the commercial activities of the Commonwealth Bank from its central 
banking duties. Theodore had already attacked the trading banks' powers to determine the extent to which credit 
could be expanded or contracted. In arguing his case for the legislation Theodore cited A.C. Davidson's work on the 
subject and claimed ' there is a generally held opinion among economists, bankers and financiers generally, that our 
existing banking and financial system has proved defective' (CPD Hansard, 1 May 1930). Davidson did not return the 
compliment fearing that the Commonwealth Board of directors would become politicised and approve Labor's wild 
credit schemes (Schedvin, 1988, 343). While certainly to Melville Theodore's proposal was never taken seriously 
some of its attributes like concentrating the gold reserves of the private banks into national control came to pass in the 
mobilisation agreement of August 1930. This enabled the Commonwealth to obtain information on the trading banks 
foreign exchange and thus allow the possibility of exchange control (Cornish, 1993, 11). 87 Melville, Trc. pg.43, NLA. 
88 E.C. Dyason to L.F. Giblin, 27/2/1931, UMA FECC, Box 20. 
89 
with some support from the business community, that wage cuts would merely suppress 
purchasing power (Cain, 1987b; Clark, 1981b). According to David Clark (1975, 30), 
Irvine's evidence on monetary circuits bore a 'remarkable resemblance' to Theodore's 
proposals that came not long afterwards. Copland, who emphasised the capacity to pay 
argument before the court won the case but the presiding judge was also swayed by 
Irvine's submission that reducing wages would, by reducing purchasing-power, make 
matters worse before they got better (Hancock, 1984, 73) (Cain, 1987b, 11-15). 
Theodore deplored the Court's decision believing political forces had put the judges up 
to it. 89 A heartened Shann ( 1934, 87) felt that the Court's decision showed that it 'knew 
no politics'. 
Having undergone an intellectual metamorphosis in 1930 Theodore saw the 
depression as due to a breakdown in the credit creation process. Deflation, he held, was 
'the policy of despair'. 90 Monetary stimulation would arrest the economic decline and 
reignite economic activity. Some parliamentary support for the plan came from the 
NSW State Labor member, Clarence Martin, who possessed an economics degree from 
the University of Sydney and was a devotee of Keynes. 91 ** What became known as the 
Fiduciary Issue Bill had unclear parentage. It was partly inspired as Castles (1997) 
shows, by a memorandum prepared by the Commonwealth Statistician and Actuary, 
Wickens for the Acting Prime Minister, Mr. Fenton.*** His memorandum to actually 
engage in the process of price stabilisation using a statistical index attracted criticism, 
not just for his foray into policy-making, but the very nature of it (Castles, 1997). 
Castles ( 1997, 29) contends that such was the Scullin Government's contempt 
for 'scientific economists' that Wickens was the only trusted expert to which they could 
89 SMH 9/2/1931. 
90 SMH 9/2/1931 
91 Melville, Trc pg. 43, NLA. 
** C.E. Martin presented evidence before the 1930 Basic Wage Case offering alternatives to wage reduction (SMH 13/12/1930). Martin served in the short-lived Lang Labor Government (1930-32). In his maiden speech Martin quoted 'probably the world's greatest economist' Keynes and his belief that the reason for the slump was due to the high rate of interest inducing a fall in investment. In his speech Martin put the case for a 'restrictive and carefully 
managed inflation' which, in turn would necessitate a reformed central bank along Theodorean lines. Martin was bated for his 'Karl Marxian' theories (see Mitchell Library MSS 4947 MLK 04389 Parliamentary Speeches of C.E. Martin, MLA for Young, 4 December 1930 pp. 229 and 9 December 1930). Martin spoke directly in support of 
:);eodore's legislation in a speech on 27 January 1931. 
Arthur Caldwell, leader of the ALP in the sixties, relates in his memoirs the rather remarkable claim that Theodore 
attributed Gibson as·the one who suggested the very idea of a fiduciary issue (Calwell, 1972, 68). Simply put Gibson 
was quite keen to help the Scullin Government but drew back from assisting, in any shape or form, the Lang Government. Just possibly Caldwell might have confused Gibson the banker with Giblin the economist. 
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turn.92 He did not pull his punches: 'Australia had been living in a 'fools' paradise' of 
bountiful harvests, high export prices and borrowed money all of which had now 
vanished. Facing three choices Australia had to decide between Repudiation, Inflation 
or Readjustment. ' The latter option in his view meant the selection of an equitable price 
level index, an accommodating monetary policy and with it, a flexible exchange rate. In 
other words, stabilisation of prices was more important than stabilisation of exchange: 
it was to become an issue that would dominate the thinking of economists in the thirties. 
This attracted the bile and bite of Davidson, who likened Wickens' inflationary scheme 
to that of alcoholic addiction: 'Another little drink wouldn't do us any harrn ... but he is 
in shockingly bad company.' Davidson also ridiculed the very idea of price level 
targeting and queried what means were in place to prevent overshooting: 'Who is to bell 
the cat?' he pondered. 93 
Theodore's plan was encased within three bills put before the House of 
Representatives in February 1931 : 
• A rate of interest bill 
• A Fiduciary Notes Bill; and 
• A bill to amend the Commonwealth Bank Act in respect of the note issue. 
The less well-known first bill provided for the appointment of a board to make 
recommendations to the Treasurer concerning bank interest rates. The second 
authorised the issue of 18 million pounds of public works expenditure facilitated , in 
part, by the third bill by relaxing the note issue regulations of the Commonwealth Bank. 
Theodore's plan was a collage of the Melbourne school mixed with the works of Irvine 
and Wickens ' s memorandum. 
The trading banks were suitably outraged at Theodore's bill. 94 Couching his 
words within a familiar analogy, Sir Ernest Wreford of the National Bank warned that 
'Australia is financially sick and will not get well by drinking the financial champagne 
of further borrowing or note inflation' (Blainey and Hutton, 1983, 209). Despite the 
outrage in parliament and elsewhere that greeted the initiative, Theodore stressed that he 
92 Wickens was a foundation member of and President of the Victorian Branch of the Economic Society. 93 
'A Statistician's Advice', A.C. Davidson Papers, N2/97 BNSW. 94 SMH 23/2/1931 
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was not an inflationist even though the restoration of price levels to the average of their 
1929 levels meant 'heavy inflation'. The economists took action. Shann and Melville 
lent their imprimatur to the pamphlet, The Menace of Inflation, condemning outright the 
Treasurer's policy. The pamphlet was penned by Archibald Grenfell Price, an Adelaide 
polymath (Kerr, 1983, 91). The banks financed its mass circulation. Apart from the tacit 
approval of Wickens and Dyason, the only lasting support for Theodore's plan came 
from Irvine who congratulated Theodore on his new financial policy: 'You have gripped 
the truth that every bank advance means an increase in deposits and every cancellation 
d f d · , 95 of advances means a ecrease o epos1ts . 
The highpoint of the Theodore plan was when he gave a virtuoso performance in 
Parliament in March 1931 defending it by citing the works of Keynes, Hobson and 
Cassel, all of whom were in favour of reflation, rather than both expenditure and wage 
cuts (Kennedy, 1988, 298).96 Theodore knew his scheme was bound to provoke 
furious reaction so he cast it in the verbiage of a reduction of pooling or 'spreading the 
loss' mentality that economists were keen to convey. Theodore showed an easy 
familiarity with a crude version of an expenditure multiplier in his advocacy of easier 
bank credit.97 He used Giblin' s multiplier showing some output elasticity to defend his 
proposal of injecting credit into the economy (Cain, 1987, 21 ). In the same speech 
Theodore noted that achieving budgetary balance was a function of economic recovery 
itself (Cain, 1987, 21). While technically correct this allowed him to downplay the need 
to make immediate economies - something which horrified the economists. Theodore 
proposed that the Australian pound free itself from 'the conservative fetish of parity' 
and find 'a level commensurate with the disparity in the Australian price levels as 
compared with those overseas'. 98 The Australian pound had, as we shall see, had 
already been devalued in January 1931 but this scheme spelt further weakness. When 
95 R.F. Irvine to E.G. Theodore, 22/1/1931, Theodore Papers, NLA. 96 CPD Hansard 17/3/1931. 
97 It had been Theodore who theatrically held aloft a copy of Keynes's Treatise on Money - presumably Volume One 
- in the House of Representatives and declared that, 'as a textbook will stand for fifty years as a guide to the intellectuals of the nation on the subject' . Theodore was the first person in Australia to have a copy, expressly sent to him by the mining magnate and his close friend W.S. Robinson (Melville, TRC pg. 42, NLA). Clark however records that liberal quoting from the Treatise was done by the Lang political machine (Clark, 1975, 31). The Treatise's primary policy emphasis was to use cheap money to bring savings and investment into equilibrium at full employment. It was also true that Keynes has described public works as a 'weapon by which a country can partially rescue itself when its international disequilibrium is involving it in severe unemployment' (Keynes, 1930, 376). But what if in Australi_a' s case the extravagant use of public spending had, to some extent, landed her in that international disequilibrium? 
98 SMH 9/2/1931. 
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Theodore claimed that the Fiduciary Notes Bill had the imprimatur of the Melbourne 
economists and even Brigden, the Opposition leader, J.G. Latham, retorted this was no 
longer, if ever, the case. Theodore responded, 'I did not say that the scheme was 
supported by them. I quoted their works to show that the same ideas were supported by 
them'. With Theodore, expediency came before conviction. 
Markwell recounts another episode of an intellectual sleight of hand where 
Theodore selectively quoted Keynes's remarks disavowing wage cuts as a cure for the 
depression yet deleting his preceding remarks that the credit restriction policies carried 
out by the Bank of England had been relatively mild.+ As Melville recalls, Theodore 
was, first and foremost a politician, and engaged in theatrical distortions, 'violently 
attacking' the banks for purportedly restricting credit when the opposite was more 
true.99 Theodore's Fiduciary Issue Bill could easily be interpreted as an inspired act to 
secure the support of the left of the ALP to advance his leadership aspirations. 100 In that 
light, Theodore's plan would politically neutralise the Lang camp and sweep him to the 
party leadership. 
The vociferous reaction to Theodore's proposals reflected the widespread fears 
that linked currency expansion with inflation. His plan consequent! y ran into fierce 
institutional and political opposition from both the Commonwealth Bank and the 
Senate. Nor did Theodore's plan of financial rehabilitation convince the Premiers. 
Theodore made the mistake of assuming others could understand the mechanism of 
controlled credit and a purported rise in economic activity (Cain, 1987b, 18-19).* 
Copland and Giblin, who months earlier had entertained the notion of price 
stabilisation, distanced themselves from Theodore's ideas stating that his strategy 
diverted attention away from Australia's fundamental problem of a distorted, 
+ The Sydney Morning Herald detected another misrepresentation of Keynes' views used by Theodore to justify his fiduciary issue plan in its editorial of 11/2/1931. The former NSW Treasurer B.S.B. Stevens noted during the Parkes by-election where Theodore unveiled his initiative that he claimed economists had favoured inflation but he had not disclosed they were equally adamant for cutting Government spending and costs (SMH 16/1/1931). 99 Mel ville Trc 1971, NLA 
100 
'Mr. Theodore evolving a sound plan', SMH 31/1/1931. 
* Even Niemeyer had Kershaw or Gregory draw up a description of the credit creation process for his own elucidation to help explain what the Federal Treasurer was about (B.E.: Gl/291 Appendix). 
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-unfavourable export price - domestic cost relationship.* After consulting Melville, 
Copland also attacked Theodore's plan upon the basis that it would destroy confidence 
and lead to capital flight. Copland was always wary about the money supply becoming a 
political football. Nor did the Treasurer's plan make clear the need for substantial 
expenditure cuts or embody any wage or income cuts. 101 102 Theodore's reliance upon 
solely using monetary policy to make the economic adjustments necessary to restore 
employment and national income attracted Copland's ire (Cain 1987, 25-26). No 
manipulation of the currency, it was held, could restore the real income of the country 
(Copland and Shann, 1931). Also undergoing a change of heart was Theodore's friend, 
Giblin. He attacked the 'foolishness' of printing notes or releasing credits in one of his 
John Smith commentaries that appeared in the Melbourne Herald. 103 Giblin insisted that 
the only solution to an 'outside problem which is causing an inside problem' was an 
interim cut in real wages. He did, like Copland, see merit in having an issue of credits 
to maintain the price level. Giblin was adamant, however, that monetary stability was 
necessary for recovery and that it be exercised by an independent but informed 
authority. 104 Rejection of the Theodore Plan would clear the field for a compromise 
Melbourne plan encompassing balanced budgets, some credit expansion, lower interest 
rates, money wage cuts and a depreciated exchange (Shann and Copland, 1931 b, 27-
28).105 
The timing was never right for Theodore's scheme; its licentiate expansionism 
went against the collective guilt-ridden reaction to the profligate borrowing and 
spending of the twenties. At a deeper level, schemes of fiduciary currency were held to 
bring about the collapse of moral standards and the breach of contracts (Nicholls, 1992, 
* 215). Giblin later told the Sydney University economist, Ronald Walker, that the 
Theodore plan was intrinsically 'reasonable and sensible' but strikingly at odds with the 
prevailing psychological mood ( cited in Cain, 1987, 26). The policy would, like its 
* Theodore' s principle to restore price levels to their 1929 level as the means to recovery belatedly met with the 
approval of financial high authority in London with The Tuesday Club consisting, of inter alia, Niemeyer, Keynes, Stakosch, Stamp, Sir Charles Addis and Sir Richard Hopkins (Kennedy, 1988, 300). 101 D.B . Copland to L.G. Melville, 13/2/1931, BNSW: A53-412. 102 
'Memorandum on the Theodore Plan' , 25/1/1931 , Brigden Papers, NLA. 103 24/11/1930. Giblin Papers, NLA. 
104 Giblin Papers, NLA. 
105 
'Mr. Theodore plan: fundamental weaknesses' , SMH_23/2/l 93 l and 'Creating credit; its limitations and dangers' , SMH 30/1/1931. 
* Ralph Hawtrey deemed inflationism "a derogatory term thrown at a school of thought by their opponents, as the 
te1m Christian was by the people of Antioch at a new sect ... The inflationist dog has been given a bad name" (Hawtrey, 1928, 64). 
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proponent, have a deleterious effect on business confidence. It threatened the pecuniary 
interests of the powerful banking and rentier community. 
The Lang Plan 
Given the colossal political impact Jack Lang wielded in 1930-31 it is 
remarkable how little economists, apart from Shann who held the demagogue in utter 
contempt, actually spoke out against his repudiation plan. Another view might be found 
in Brigden' s critique of Theodore's plan: 'to extend credits to Government as an 
alternative to equality of sacrifice .... would most certainly lead to default abroad with 
substantial inflation at home. Mr. Lang's policy is much preferable, for it would be 
certain and would not inflate.' 106 Nonetheless it would be drawing a long bow to argue 
that repudiation, even a moratorium on paying interest on the London debt, had the 
approval of Australian economists. Perhaps Lang's overt populism, his scathing 
dismissal of intellectual input, no less economists, did not warrant a considered rebuttal. 
Giblin was right to believe Lang's plan was circulated to maliciously disperse support 
for Theodore's blueprint (Young, 1963, 40). As the last chapter showed, Lang's rise to 
the NSW Premiership had already put at risk Commonwealth policy, namely, upholding 
Australia's good name in the London capital market. 
More positively, Lang's crusade brought home to economists the imperative of 
constructing a recovery plan that would quell community tensions. This could be 
achieved, as Lang argued, by having all parties contribute to Australia's salvation. 
Cutting interest rates would help kindle recovery. On an intellectual plane, Lang's 
under-consumptionist argument, together with his scurrilous attacks on English finance 
stemmed from the economic underworld (see Clark, 1977). Lang's pamphlets did, 
however, cite Keynes's Treatise especially on public works and the need for low 
interest rates (Clark, 1981, 180). One of Lang's assistants, A.C. Paddison, who wrote 
the pamphlet The Lang Plan, an ex post rationalisation of the makeshift program, sent a 
copy to Keynes. He received a courteous reply agreeing in part upon the need for an 
altered exchange rate. However the matter of repudiating Australia's overseas debt or 
even the idea of a moratorium upon paying it, struck Keynes as a 'rather crazy' 
106 
'Memorandum on monetary policy', late 1930, Brigden Papers, NLA. 
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policy. 107 True to his propensity for changing his mind when the circumstances change, 
Keynes later told Giblin that default on Australia's sovereign debt, might, in some 
cases, be a defensible option. 108 
In the same vein, Cook argued that the ALP at the time was not really interested 
in radical ideas and theory but like any political party only really interested in retaining 
office. This might offer some explanation, too, about why Labor ultimately succumbed 
to the Premiers' Plan with Theodore admitting that it would restore confidence (Cook, 
1970). Melville was of the opinion that the Government had no other option (Cornish, 
1993). What ultimately put to death the Theodore plan, therefore, was not the 
intermittent attacks of economists but political circumstances like the 1931 Parkes 
federal by-election which was basically fought over the 'controlled inflation' issue. The 
Niemeyer plan too, one recalls, had also been put to the electoral test (Lloyd, 1984, 
* Chap. 5). The Parkes by-election result also torpedoed Theodore's Central Bank Bill, 
since the Scullin Government would hardly force a double dissolution over the issue. In 
a confidential letter to Niemeyer, Claude Reading intimated that Theodore had 
committed himself to so many positions within the last twelve months that it was 'only 
a matter of time' before the Scullin government fell. His letter concluded: 'The drift in 
Government finances still continues, but as far as the Board is concerned we are 
determined not to make it easy for the drift to continue' .109 
Two months later, Sir Robert Gibson effectively put an end to Scullin's 
vacillation and Theodore's vain hopes of a Deus ex cathedra by refusing to extend the 
Commonwealth overdrafts any further. As a last gasp before the inevitable, Theodore 
had Robinson make further representations to the Bank of England whether Australia 
could obtain reasonable credits in London during the next three years if she could 
balance her budgets with reasonable speed. 110 The request suffered the same fate as 
Scullin' s two meetings with Harvey the year before. Another plan had to be found and 
one that included economic expertise. 
107 J.M. Keynes to A.C. Paddison, 20/4/1932; CO/6/3 . KPKC. 108 J.M. Keynes to L.F. Giblin, 31/8/1932; Co/2/213-5 , KPKC. 
* Shann sardonically observed Theodore 's economic oratory on the hustings, 'He seems to have swallowed Mr. 
Keynes 's Treatise on Money but to have found it indigestible' (The Statist 26/2/1931, Shann Papers NLA). 109 C. Reading to Sir 0. Niemeyer, 4/2/1931 , BE: OV13/l 453/2. 110 W.S. Robinson to Sir E. Harvey, 28/4/1931 , BE.: Gl/286. 
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5.3 The Premiers' Plan 
'The plan, the whole plan and nothing but the plan' E.O.G. Shann to D.B. 
Copland, 5/6/1931. 
The Premiers' Plan assumes the mantle of folklore in Australian history. This 
part of the chapter discusses its main clauses and, more importantly, how economists 
played a leading part in its formulation and entry into political orbit. As a piece of 
economic architecture, the plan provided the platform for Australia's economic 
recovery even though it was, in fact, quite deflationary (Walker, 1933). It did, as one 
American observer noted, contain some departures from orthodoxy which, even if were 
accidental as Walker argued, were both economically and ethically justifiable (Garnett, 
1947, 100; Cain, 1983, 4-5). The plan was directed first and foremost at establishing 
budgetary equilibrium. It was to operate for three years and was agreed to by all the 
Premiers and the Commonwealth Government giving it, therefore, binding force. The 
measures, moreover, were seen as a comprehensive, indivisible whole, simultaneous in 
operation. They were also complementary to the Arbitration Court's 10 per cent wage 
cut of January 1931 together with the devaluation of the Australian pound - measures 
where economists had proved remarkably instrumental. The Plan was predicated on 
primary product export prices falling no further than they had in 1931. 
In their meetings called to discuss the crisis economists showed an acute sense 
of 'practical politics' in corning to some agreement about what precisely to do. 111 As 
Hytten recalled 'While the orthodox economic theories were no doubt at the back of our 
minds ... we were really pragmatists' .112 Copland, who, as one historian later put it, 
'sedulously propagated' the role of the economists in the episode was afterwards more 
candid about the compelling force of circumstance (Hancock, 1972, 7 6). He admitted to 
an associate 'Only the logic of events allows pure theory to get any triumph, and what 
we have been able to do here and elsewhere in this crisis must be attributed not to our 
own logic but to the inevitability of implementing the policy we propounded. 113 To 
another associate he confessed that 'The early severity of the crisis forced drastic 
methods upon us and we were perhaps fortunate in not being in a position to make a 
111 L.F. Giblin to E .. R. Walker, 19/4/1934, in Giblin Papers, NLA. 
t
12 Hytten autobiography UT pg.66. 
113 D.B. Copland to R.B. Lemmon, 20/3/1935, UMA FECC, Box 34. 
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deliberate choice. No doubt we would have failed to have taken the drastic action that 
we did'. 114 In short, it was the dire circumstances confronting the Australian economy 
that brought economists to the fore. 
These were not inconsiderable: 
• A collapse in national income, in nominal terms, from about £645 million 
in 1928-29 to £430 million in 1931/32 - a fall of some 34 per cent. 
• Unemployment rose from 9.3 per cent in 1929 to 25.8 per cent in 1931. * 
• A major diminution in both State and Federal Government finances due to 
falling customs and rail way freight revenue. 
• A worsening balance of payments with the London funds critically low. 
• A deterioration in confidence such that it was feared Australia could no 
longer raise loans in its own capital market to bridge government deficits 
and loan servicing costs. 
• A debt deflation problem threatening with exporters unable to meet their 
interest payments and their assets, pledged against debts, depreciating 
rapidly (Copland, 1937, 398-9). 
Australia was, as Giblin put it, 'in a difficult hole'; her problems were 
compounded by a trading profile marked by a limited export basket of goods yet 
dependent upon imports of capital and intermediate goods. 115 Australia had to generate 
in very quick time a trade surplus sufficient just to meet the yearly £30 million sterling 
interest debt. Over the past eight years, imports had exceeded exports with the interest 
payments drawn from the proceeds of fresh borrowing. On top of this came the 
problem of maturing debt, both external and internal, over the next decade. While 
Australian authorities had certainly been made aware of the gravity of the problem since 
Niemeyer' s visit, they had dithered in devising a plan of action. The fact that Australia 
had 'not got its house in order' dealing with these innate problems beforehand made her 
difficulties all the more burdensome especially when creditor nations like Britain also 
became engulfed by depression (Shann and Copland, 193 la, x). 
114 D.B. Copland to Downie-Stewart, UMA FECC, Box 19, 20/1/1933. 
* (These figures were provided by Trade Union secretaries.) Roland Wilson suggested that the trade union secretaries' estimates ' . . . were not worth the paper they were printed on.' (Wilson, TRC 1612, NLA) Giblin and Copland, however, set much store by them in 1930. J.K. Gifford had already questioned the integrity of these figures in 1927 
'Measurement of Unemployment' (Brisbane Telegraph 16/3/1927). 115 Memorar1dum No 20, 1932, UMA FECC, Box 32. 
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The key architect and publicist for the plan, Copland, transposed it into a 
conceptual framework. It consisted of: 
• A depreciation of the currency sufficient to restore real income in exports 
industries to 90 per cent of its former level; 
• A reduction in real wages of 10 per cent; 
• A general reduction in real government salaries and wages expenditure of 
10 per cent; 
• A supertax of 10 per cent on income from property; and 
• An expansionist monetary policy based upon the purchase of Government 
securities by the Commonwealth Bank with a view to maintaining the 
general level of prices 
• A proportionate reduction in rentier income derived from securities. 
(Copland, 1934, 66-67). 
These policy recommendations closely followed the recommendations of the 
economists and Under-Treasurer's Committee - informally named the Copland 
Committee after its Chairman (Copland, 1931). Three other economists - Melville, 
Shann and Giblin - sat on the sub-committee, together, with five State Treasurers and 
Commonwealth Treasury officials. Its brief was to compose a report entitled 'The 
Possibilities of Reaching Equilibrium in Australia'. 
What set the Premiers' Plan into formal motion was when a sub-committee of 
the Loan Council, instigated by the South Australian Labor Premier, Lionel Hill, was 
charged with investigating the steps needed to balance government budgets by the end 
of 1934 (Copland, 1931, 538-90). This action broke the Theodore-imposed deadlock on 
the Loan Council's ability to act. The Federal Government had already been warned by 
the Commonwealth Bank Board that its advances of Treasury bills were limited to 
£25,000,000. That decision to wrestle control of the public purse away from an 
overspending government brought forth a riposte from Theodore that would resonate 
through the decade: 'The attitude of the Board ... can only be regarded by the 
Commonwealth Government as an attempt on the part of the bank to arrogate to itself a 
supremacy over the Government in the determination of the financial policy of the 
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Commonwealth, a supremacy ... never contemplated by the framers of the Australian 
Constitution' (Shann and Copland, 1931 b, 48). 
Compounding difficulties was Lang's precipitate action of defaulting upon an 
overseas interest payment. The Federal Government hurriedly paid instead but 
Australia's credit rating was further tarnished (Walker, 1933, 142). It was time 'to call 
in' the economists. 116 It was at that juncture that economists 'rendered their country 
important service ... their advice was taken at a critical moment in the crisis' (Copland, 
1937, 400). Walker's contemporaneous account visualised the economists emerging 
with 'a compromise' to break the deadlock between the Federal Government, the 
Commonwealth Bank and the Lang Government (1933, 143). 
Apart from the influence of Melville, the Premiers' Plan had further South 
Australian connections with the Adelaide businessman, Sir Wallace Bruce, Archibald 
Grenfell Price and an accountant, Hardinge Brown, formulating a plan in May 1931 
known as the Discount Scheme (Kerr, 1983, 97). The scheme revolved around the idea 
of a national sacrifice that included all income recipients. Hardinge Brown wanted all 
financial institutions and bond holders to take a unilateral cut in their interest income. 
When Hardinge Brown and Grenfell Price first showed their plan to Melville he damned 
them as 'repudiationists who outrivalled Lang' .117 However, Melville quickly reversed 
his tune, telling Grenfell Price that the economists on the Copland Committee placed 
the Discount scheme at the forefront of their recommendations. 118 While the banks 
opposed the very idea, Grenfell Price claimed that his little coterie, backed by the 
popular might of the mass-based Citizens ' League, provided the progenitor for the 
Premiers' Plan. As he put it 'The important part for the Adelaide side was that the 
discount scheme was adopted by the experts in spite of Mel ville' s earlier opposition, 
and that it did lead to interest rate reductions and a scheme of general self sacrifice' .119 
Grenfell Price was quite unaware of Copland' s earlier work showing how 'heavy 
deflation' would, using Keynes ' s Treatise schema of savings and investment 
imbalances, aggravate social tensions within the community (Cain, 1980, 14). 
11 6 H. C. Coombs to E. 0. G. Shann, 4/6/1931 , Shann Papers, NLA. 117 
'The Emergency-Committee of South Australia and the origin of the Premiers' Plan ' (A. Grenfell-Price) p.24 118 Ibid. pp. 24-25 
119 Ibid. 
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Copland saw the plan achieving three significant things. First, it took the 
process of financial rehabilitation out of the political arena. Second, it laid to rest the 
Theodore policy of inflation. And thirdly, in contrast, the plan solidly committed 
Australia upon the road to deflation 'to an adjustment of her internal prices and costs in 
conformity with the fall in overseas prices' (Copland, 1931 ). His Sydney counterpart, 
Mills (1933, 221) in a review of the plan, said that it addressed the two key problems of 
restoring the balance between costs and prices in all industries, not just exports, 
together, with arresting the drift in public finances. Importantly it had to draw upon the 
critical support of the trading banks to be a success. They were to live up to their end of 
the bargain and promise interest rate cuts. The whole package, nonetheless, made for 
deflationary economics. 
The economists however, as Copland later intimated to Irving Fisher, were 
about a secret agenda; 'Our economists and monetary advisers knew pretty well what 
they wanted, but I am quite sure that neither the Treasury authorities nor the 
Commonwealth Bank Board quite appreciate the nature and importance of the 
experiment they were conducting' .12° Copland (1932, 113) added that banking and 
financial authorities, too, did not recognise the 'significance' of the policy they were 
administering under the Plan. The 'experiment' was to use Treasury bill finance to 
cover existing deficits and sustain both spending and the price level thereby preventing 
the burden of indebtedness from increasing. In correspondence to another academic, 
Copland confirmed that: 
'Australia did act upon expert advice and it was to some extent because of this 
she got so reasonable a scheme. Neither the businessmen nor the Labor people 
completely agreed with the economists .. .! think, however, it may be said that the 
policy that was ultimately adopted substantially agreed with the original 
schemes discussed and put forward by economists'. 121 
Melville admitted that there was a 'Machiavellian' touch behind the 
economists' rhetoric: 'We thought that the proper way to get results was to talk about 
deflation and inflate like hell'. 122 Another economist, Torleiv Hytten, attributed the 
120 D.B. Copland to·I. Fisher, 23/11/1934, UMA FECC, Box 23. 121 D.B. Copland to S.F. Ferguson, 5/8/1935, UMA FECC, Box 30. 122 Melville Trc, p.34, NLA. 
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plan to economists with 'a solid theoretical background but this was an exercise in 
applied economics, and the factual situation played the decisive part.' 123 Boris Schedvin 
has argued that the Premiers' Plan not only avoided a complete economic breakdown 
but was dedicated to restoring Australia's external equilibrium; a view Melville 
endorsed (1971). In a pointed dig at Copland's prolific rhetoric about the plan's merits, 
Mel ville reflected years later that: 
'Maybe some of us got a little hysterical about how good it was but it aimed to 
be only an attempt to get the budgets of the States and the Commonwealth under 
control and flowing from this we could see an avoidance of def a ult and we 
would see a more manageable external debt problem, which was no solution to 
the depression problem, but these were important issues that had to be 
tackled' .124 
Copland always took an extremely positive view of what the package actually 
achieved and the role of economists in carrying it through. No other country had done 
as much as Australia in its economic readjustment (Copland, 1931 a, 549). 'Australia', 
he claimed 'came out of the depression earlier than most other countries because of the 
approach that was made under the Premiers' Plan' .125 Economists, Copland 
proclaimed later 'went over the trenches in the grand manner, to occupy positions that 
had hitherto been beyond their reach' (1951, 9). Inevitably, there was overstatement in 
Copland's claims about what the Plan had done both for Australia and the economics 
profession. The plan, it was true, exhibited some element of forceful co-operation 
between the economic classes which was Copland's academic oeuvre, but, more 
importantly for our interests, it brought the two contending camps of economic advice -
the deflationists and the stabilisationists - under the one roof.+ In that regard there was 
early on, as Davidson recalled, some antipathy between Copland and Melville with 
Shann having the task 'poor chap .... of trying to bring them together'. 126 Apart from 
uniting the economists the Premiers' Plan met ,vith the critical approval of the Banks. 
123 
. Hytten Autobiography, 1971 p.67 (UT). 124 Melville Trc, pp. 48-49, NLA. 
12s C opland Trc, p. 10, NLA. 
+ Mooney (1995) has interestingly argued that there were, in fact, three schools of economic advice gravitated around the poles of Giblin and Copland 'the centralists', the orthodox shaded perspectives of Shann and Mills and lastly the radical school of Irvine. 
126 A.C. Davidson to T. Hytten, 27/5/1935, BNSW: A 53/446. 
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The Adelaide businessman and political savant, W .J. Young, conveyed the good 
news to Niemeyer: 'Copland has discarded any weakness he may formerly have shown 
and he and Melville are working loyally together' .127 Young meant by that Copland's 
earlier advocacy of price stabilisation. Sympathetic to the new breed of academic 
economist-cum-adviser, Eggleston hailed the plan as 'a magnificent conception' 
(Osmond, 1985, 155). Besides the overriding goal of fiscal consolidation, the Plan 
outlined how the burden of economic adjustment would fall equitably. This doctrine of 
'equality of sacrifice' which underlay the package came at the insistence of politicians, 
but it was Copland and Giblin who had first mooted the idea of all playing their part to 
restore Australia to an 'equable position.' 128 It struck a pious chord since the 
overindulgent spending in the twenties should be followed by collective penance 
(Nicholls, 1992, 216). 
At the Commonwealth-State Conference held in June 1931 to discuss the Plan, 
Copland and Giblin explained the technical provisions especial! y concerning the Loan 
Conversion operation (C.P .P., 1931 ). * One Premier bemoaned: 'The economists are 
like our wives; a perpetual plague while they are with us, but we can't do without them' 
(cited in Hytten, 1960, 154). When Scullin asked the Premiers whether they would 
consent to a reduction in government expenditure, Lang responded 'I do not accept it at 
all; I do not think that the facts are accurate. I do not think that the economists know 
much about it. .. We hear a lot of economists telling us what we ought to do. It is like 
their confounded impudence' (1970, 102). Nor was Lang impressed by the overall 
package; he insisted that Copland was a 'torchbearer for the Niemeyer plan' (1962, 
344). Lang held that neither economists, nor Treasury officials, should pontificate over 
policy; that was a duty alone of elected representatives (1970, 99). 
5.4 The Path to the Premiers' Plan 
How the four economists who composed the Premiers' Plan arrived at their great 
compromise .has been covered in exacting detail by Cain (1987a, 1987b). As is 
127 W. Young to Sir 0. Niemeyer, 23/3/1931, BE OV9/289. 128 
'The Economic Outlook for Australia' The Age 1/5/1929. 
* (For an impartial eyewitness account of the proceedings see E.T. Crutchley, His Majesty's Government 
representative in Australia in PRO T160/807/l 1935/2 and his diary held on microfilm in the National Library of Australia). 
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commonly acknowledged, the Premiers' Plan was, despite Copland and Giblin' s later 
protestations, probably closer to the Niemeyer prescription than the Melbourne School 
of stabilisation. However, to be fair, the two conservative economists, Melville and 
Shann, yielded ground on the need for some 'inflationary' financing of deficits and 
scaling down of interest rates just as Giblin and Copland relinquished the idea of price 
stabilisation. How economists responded to the onset of Australia's economic 
difficulties demonstrates not only their public-spiritedness but also their collegiality and 
mental versatility. The remaining part of the chapter will retell the story using new 
arc hi val material but also emphasize the traverse in economic thought economists 
underwent as they deliberated over an integrated plan that entailed not just public 
finance but also relative cost adjustment. 
The May Manifesto and the Assault upon Australian Wages 
As economists appreciated the full magnitude of the two external blows 
delivered upon the Australian economy, so too, did they tailor their advice to prevailing 
conditions. At first, the scale of the problem was lightly dismissed; as late as October 
1929, for instance, Copland predicted that the recession then affecting Australia might 
be 'temporary' (cited in Lowenstein, 1978, 433). As 1930 unfolded, however, a 
'violent change' shuddered through the Australian economic landscape (Bland and 
Mills, 1931, 119). 
At the end of the ANZAAS Conference in May 1930 the economists, at 
Melville's behest, moved to issue a statement or manifesto quantifying the loss in 
national income (Crawford, 1960, 194-5). Melville recalled Copland leading the cause 
(Cornish, 1993, 5). The manifesto was important because the signatories upheld, as 
Keynes did in The Tract, that internal price stability should take priority over 
maintaining the exchange rate. The economists bristled however at Copland's 
suggestion to devalue the currency. This informed and considered perspective by 
economists made little impact simply because of the speed and gravity of unfolding 
events, not least, the arrival of Niemeyer. It was also due to the fact that many Labor 
politicians, including Theodore, were wary of economists, fanned no doubt by their 
opposition to fD;rther protection, rigid real wages and monetary reform (Harper, 1986, 
45; Hart, 1965, 4; MacLaurin, 1937, 256). 
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Using the analytical framework provided by Giblin's multiplier, the economists 
argued that the loss in real income to the export sector be distributed across the 
community. This became a key theme in all their memoranda; indeed it was made the 
first condition of recovery. To that end, the economists, especially Giblin, Brigden and 
Copland, renewed their attack upon the wage fixation system, especially the tradition of 
indexation that locked Australia into rigid real wages and high unemployment 
(Hancock, 1984, 70-2). In arguing unanimously for real wage reductions consistent 
with the loss in the terms-of-trade, the economists were keen to qualify that they were 
not advocating wage reductions, per se, as the cure for business depression. It was, 
however, a point lost upon labour minds with the economists perceived to be at the call 
of bankers (Spearritt, 1981). Yet Mills (1929) had already publicly exposed this 
nostrum, in terms of the consequent diminution of purchasing power, at a lecture given 
at an industrial relations conference. Brigden, too, held that cutting wages should be the 
last resort as it entailed reducing purchasing power. 129 
An external crisis - a fundamental disequilibrium between domestic costs and 
international prices - changed all this.-The export industries had suffered a fall in their 
prices and workers there took wage cuts. Consequently, wages in the unsheltered 
industries were now lower than in sheltered ones. A general reduction in the wage level 
was therefore appropriate on equity grounds besides giving the export industries some 
relief (Copland, 1931, 535). It would also make a greater show at import replacement. 
This was the nub of the argument that Copland would put before the Arbitration Court 
(Copland, 1946, 164). Copland's analytical framework was further strengthened by 
mastering Keynes's new engine of analysis contained in the Treatise. With the savings -
investment dichotomy the goal of enlightened monetary authorities was to use the 
interest rate to ~ring the savings and investment into equality. Disharmony between the 
two would cause price movements which would, in tum, engender output changes. 
In his evidence before the 1930 National Wage Case Irvine, appearing on behalf 
of the trade unions, accused the economists of committing a fallacy of composition. 
However, his argument was set within the wrong context (Shann and Copland, 193 la, 
129 
'Notes on the Economic Position of Australia 1929', Brigden Papers, NLA. 
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88; Clark, 1974, 52). In his five days of evidence during October 1930 Copland, 
appearing as an expert witness and with his recently published book, Credit and 
Currency Controls close at hand, took issue with those who believed that cutting wages 
made for all-out deflation. Copland rejected the diminution in purchasing power 
argument on the grounds that it already had occurred with the decline in export prices: 
'The present depression was due not only to the lack of spending but to the fact that 
people did not have the money to spend' .13° Copland, though, was not prepared to have 
this adjustment borne through wage cuts alone. Arguing from a clear analytical 
framework that Keynes would approve of, Copland argued that with devaluation, export 
prices could rise relative to internal prices, giving the primary sector further relief. He 
was also in favour of some issue of credits to anchor the domestic price level (Dow, 
1937, 92). In short, Copland upheld balanced budgets, devaluation and lower wages as 
the correct path to take (Groenewegen and Macfarlane, 1990, 137). 
Copland turned Irvine's commonplace argument on its head; any reduction in 
costs, including wages that brought about a reduction in the prices of internal goods 
would lead to an increased output rather than a reduced one. He was emphatic that 
cutting wages would not reduce spending power in the sense that money saved on the 
wages bill would be spent by the employer. 131 The transfer of purchasing power would 
give employers an incentive to produce. Giblin and the other economists shared in this 
Say's Law perspective of wage cuts. While it seemed counter-intuitive to Labor minds, 
Copland was adamant that there would be no reduction in purchasing power since, to 
repeat, the reduction in output had already been incurred (1946, 166-7). 
While the Court was somewhat swayed by Irvine's testimony and purchasing 
:k power arguments it, nonetheless, went along with Copland's framework of analysis. · 
Copland informed the English political theorist, Harold Laski, that the Court had 
sanctioned the wage cut as a 'last resort'. 132 He was well aware how difficult it was to 
force wage cuts. The wage cut, the Court added, 'is not the magic wand which will 
130 SMH 21/12/1930. 
131 SMH 2/12/1930 and SMH 3/12/1930. 
* Apart from trade unions some employers groups also came out against the wage cuts. A newsletter put out by the Australian Manufacturers Association in July 1931 entitled 'The Folly of Wage Reductions ' pointed out that Montagu Norman at the Bank of England opposed the same expedient for Britain because of the effect upon internal trade (See UMA FECC, Box 225, Giblin material). 
132 D.B. Copland to H. Laski, UMA FECC, Box 44, 12/5/1936. 
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restore stability. But as part of a reasoned scheme it is unavoidable' ( cited in Cain, 
1987b, 15). The Court was also insistent that other non-wage income recipients engage 
in 'sharing the burden' (Dow, 1938, 92). For Copland, the Court's decision to cut 26 
federal awards by 10 per cent and the judgement that came with it marked 'the first sign 
of an adjustment in a community hitherto unwilling or incapable to effect change to 
straightened economic circumstance'; the first leg of economic adjustment was in place. 
Copland was effusive in praise of the Court in not just leading the way but of being 
vigilant and 'much more alive' to general economic conditions than any other official · 
body in the country. 133 The arbitration system, moreover, permitted a more elastic 
national wage policy than one dictated, say, by decentralised bargaining (Copland, 
1934). 
The Melbourne Manifesto - October 1930 
Before the national wage case opened there had been reluctance by the Federal 
Government to implement the Niemeyer Plan. With Scullin in London and Theodore 
standing down because of the Mungana scandal, Lyons, now Acting Treasurer, saw fit 
to commission Copland, Giblin and Dyason to frame an alternative plan. Copland 
identified this as the first instance in which economists were called to 'give official 
advice' against the economic crisis. It came about amidst great political drama coming 
a month after the Niemeyer address where he had put 'the hard word' upon his hosts. 134 
Giblin told Lyons that he was 'our last hope of a peaceful solution - but it is a 
tremendous perhaps an impossible job'. (Cited in Hart, 1967, 67). Giblin's hopes were 
well placed. Lyons was to prove, indeed, the man of the hour. Lyons, in his various 
guises, was quite deferential to the views of economists. He had already enjoyed a warm 
and steady relationship with Giblin and Copland during his tenure as Premier of 
Tasmania (Hart, 1967, 39). Copland reminded Lyons how he had saved his native state 
from insolvency (Denholm, 1977, 46; Lloyd, 1984, 47-8). 135 Giblin and Dyason 
enjoyed early success by persuading Lyons that blindly pursuing the Niemeyer line of 
parity with Sterling would be a 'fatal mistake' and would make the forthcoming loan 
133 D.B. Copland to R. MacLaurin, UMA FECC, Box 55, 1/10/1937. 134 E.T. Crutchley Diary, 18/7/1930, NLA 135 Enid Lyons Trc p 49, NLA. 
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conversion near impossible. 136 The self-effacing Giblin had deprecated earlier attempts 
at formulating a plan: 'From the economist side' he told Lyons, 'I don't think we have 
anything in the way of a plan to offer. But if in any respect they could be useful you 
know they would be very willing to do anything in their power. For myself, as for the 
others I don't think I see light on the whole problem' .137 Copland did not share in his 
colleague's despond. He had been assiduously chiseling away on his compromise plan. 
Three months earlier in July 1930, Copland had given a controversial lecture 
before the Victorian Branch of the Economic Society where he expounded his 'middle 
monetary policy' . Copland's model of economic adjustment was inspired by Keynes' s 
Treatise dealing with an open economy's adjustment to a disequilibrium situation. It 
took shape in a chapter from Copland's own work, Credit and Currency Policy (1930). 
The scheme entailed money wage cuts coupled with devaluation and some Treasury bill 
finance to tide over budget deficits but also to slightly raise the price level. This array of 
measures would depress real wages (Cain, 1987b, 2). Apart from the heresy of 
devaluation there was outrage at its price stabilisation or inflation aspect. Copland's 
ambition was open to misinterpretation. He eschewed the argument that printing money 
would assist employment and could not have been clearer in dismissing the inflation 
expedient: 'The remedy is much more dangerous then the disease, and no nation should 
enter upon a course of inflation without complete confidence in the powers and 
discretion of its banking authorities to check the expansion at the appropriate time' 
(Copland, 1930, 142). 
As an indication of their duty to explain the economic predicament Australia 
was in, economists had, for some years, contributed articles to newspapers.* The more 
famous of these was Giblin' s eponymous series of commentaries entitled Letters to 
John Smith (1930) which appeared in the Melbourne Herald. It was, in essence, the 
sequel to his well-received inaugural lecture on 'Australia, 1930' which a newspaper 
lauded as a 'consummately able analysis of Australia's economic position' .138 Giblin 's 
136 Giblin to Lyons, n.d., Giblin Papers, NLA. 137 Giblin to Lyons, 9/9/1930, Lyons Papers, NLA. 
* . Sometimes they wrote under a pen-name. Copland wrote a series of articles for The Age in 1927/28 under the cover 
of Lux. 
138 The West Australian 19/6/1930 
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lecture was billed as a tract for bad times and its author dubbed 'gloomy Giblin' .139 
Apart from the refrain of sharing the burden, the Letters were part of a campaign of 
wedding moderate labour voters to the idea that the 'experts' were in favour of the 
largely deflationary policy put forward by Lyons. The commentaries also gave notice 
that another 'old labor man' like Giblin had forsaken the extreme policies put forward 
by the Labor left. 
The Melbourne school of economists circulated their stabilisation plan in 
September displaying a middle way between inflation and deflation (Copland, 1937, 
408-9; Robinson, 1986, 8-11).+ Billed as 'A Plan for Economic Readjustment' 
Copland, Giblin and Wood outlined it in a lecture before the Victorian Branch of the 
Economic Society in October 1930. It was later reproduced in the Economic Record. 
The Melbourne school feared that with nothing to weigh against the externally-imposed 
deflationary shocks a 'deflation of the price level' would 'unduly lengthen the process 
of readjustment and delay recovery'. The increase in the level of the real debt would 
impair enterprise. The Melbourne economists felt a marked devaluation, instead of 
incremental, market-led moves as the best means of assisting the export sector 
(Schedvin, 1988, 345). This would check the fall in export prices and mitigate the 
effects of deflation. Using what Copland called the 'principle of equality of sacrifice' 
the Melbourne economists also wanted reductions in wages and interest rates. 140 The 
internal price level would hover near its pre-depression, 1929 price level by monetising 
budget deficits with Treasury bills. This aspect attracted ferocious criticism from many 
quarters, including other economists. 
Melville was particularly aghast at the Melbourne price stabilisation proposals 
(Cain, 1980, 22). Shann while less opposed, identified the practical difficulties of 
implementing it with an obstructionist Commonwealth Bank. Shann reassured 
Davidson that 'Copland and Dyason are certainly not trying to burke the fact of a 
139 
'Notes from hither and thither', The Margin 6(2) June 1930, pg.12. 
+ Dyason while not strictly an academic economist as such but a stockbroker was 'a valuable link between academic economists and the business world' (Tucker, ADB, 391). He was, like Davidson, however, highly involved with the Economic Society of Australia and New Zealand. More importantly, Dyason sought out Keynes's opinion on the feasibility and validity of unpegging the exchange rate. Keynes replied that he was 'heart and soul' with the line the Melbourne school was pursuing. Interestingly, Keynes added that forcing down wage rates as a means of escape from Australia's problem was likely to be inexpedient, (J.M. Keynes to E.C. Dyason, 16/10/1930, E.C. Dyason to J.M. Keynes, 3/9/1930, L/30/57, L30/54, KPKC). 
140 D.B. Copland to R.C. Mills, 25/11/1935, UMA FECC, Box 138. 
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reduced real income nor the necessity of reduced costs' .141 Undeterred, Shann wrote a 
confidential critique of the Melbourne school's plan, pointing out that a credit policy 
was already in full blast, 'The trio of equilibrists, however graceful and ingenuous their 
performance avoid finally coming to Earth'. Shann feared that their school of thought 
was really a 'stalking horse' for Labor interests pushing for a centralised and politically 
controlled banking system. 142 While critical of Gibson for not enforcing the August 
resolutions, Shann encouraged him on in 'the good fight against heavy odds in that den 
of iniquity'; a direct reference to the Melbourne school. 143 
In a newspaper article, Melville, too, criticised the rhetoric and ambition of the 
Melbourne school; 'To pretend that price levels can be stabilised .. .is affectation'. He 
also emphasised its odious political aspects and threw doubt upon the institutional 
competence to carry it out. 144* Melville believed, in contrast, that the rigours of the 
deflationist path had been exaggerated (1930). Even the self-made economist Davidson 
shuddered at the prospect of devaluation coupled with credit expansion. 145 
In a letter to Davidson, Copland vehemently rejected the 'stupid comment' and 
misrepresentation made of his proposals by Melville. He dismissed his critique as not 
really an analysis of the economic analysis of the proposals but rather a 'somewhat 
hysterical outburst' based upon the fear that the situation may get out of hand. Copland 
was emphatic that inflation formed no part of his plan but it had already been tainted. It 
left him exasperated that people were 'all too susceptible to read inflation into my 
proposals'. 146 The spirited correspondence between Copland and Davidson secured a 
bridge between one of Australia's most gifted economists and the nation's leading 
private banker. It was to pay dividends soon after when Davidson locked forces with 
Melville, Shann and Copland to force the breach with parity (Schedvin, 1988, 344). 
141 E.O.G. Shann to A.C. Davidson, 19/9/1930, BNSW: A53: 409. 142 
'Memorandum on the paper by Professors Copland, Giblin and Wood on the restoration of economic equilibrium' UMA FECC, Box 30. 
143 E.O.G. Shann to A.C. Davidson, 16/9/1930, BNSW: A53/409. 144 The Adelaide Advertiser 31/10/1930. 
* Melville's stand against the Melbourne school helped no doubt in his appointment to the Commonwealth Bank. Ricketson recalls that the Commonwealth Bank' s Actuary, B. Latham did not contradict him when he stated that it was Melville' s action of 'trouncing' Copland, Gibson and Dyason over their plan to extricate Australia from its difficulties that had impressed the Bank' s senior officials. (Ricketson Diary, 20/3/1931 ). 145 A.C. Davidson to D.B. Copland, 28/19/1930 and D.B. Copland to A.C. Davidson, 4/11/1930, BNSW: A53/412. 146 D.B. Copland to A.C .Davidson, 10/11/1930. BNSW: A53/412. 
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After receiving a copy of Copland's infamous lecture that had antagonised his 
Australian colleagues, Keynes replied that he had 'considerable sympathy with the line' 
taken, namely, price stabilisation via a fluctuating exchange rate as against outright 
deflation. 147 ** Recalling the episode, Wood marveled at how, not long later, Copland 
was placed in the enviable position of seeing economists who had 'pooh-poohed his 
stabilisation ideas in 1930 riding to acclaim as the saviour of the country by using his 
theories two years after they were formulated.' 148 Elsewhere, however, 'Melbourne 
brains' antagonised the conservatives. Niemeyer, whilst in Australia informed Harvey 
about 'Much wild talk in Caucus about expanding credits and tots of brandy inflation 
has supporters in Theodore and Melbourne economists' .149 
Meanwhile the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Harry Sheehan, had, in a 
memorandum to Lyons, corroborated the economists' findings about the loss in national 
income and the burden falling upon the export sector. Sheehan compared the 
Melbourne school blueprint with the Federal Treasury plan which comprised four main 
parts. Apart from the mandatory wage cut, the other measures were: a modest 
devaluation, the stabilisation of internal prices by monetary control and, lastly, an 
arrangement with the banks so that credits could be made available for industry .150 It 
was a remarkable submission from a Treasury that, like its British counterpart, was 
prone to orthodoxy. Whether the Federal Treasury took Sheehan's proposals seriously 
is a moot point but there was evidence that the contemporary outpourings of economists 
had cast some influence upon its making. 
Lyons took the Treasury's mildly deflationary plan to Caucus where it was 
rejected essentially because of the wage cut clause. Caucus remained more in favour of 
the more expansionary 'heavy inflation' plan put forward by Theodore's backers 
(Lloyd, 1984, 49-50). Lyons' dalliance with departures from financial orthodoxy 
offered hope for the future. But it went only so far. In his history of the UAP, Lloyd 
147 D.B. Copland to J.M. Keynes, 10/7/1930, J.M. Keynes to D.B. Copland, 20/8/1930, KCKP. 
** Copland's views were echoed by two authors from the economic underworld - J.A. Gunn and C.A. Alison had penned a pamphlet entitled 'Is this Depression Necessary? A Short Treatise on the Stability of Prices by Control of Exchange Rate '. Using the Treatise they advocated depreciation, cheap money and government stimulation as a form of domestic price stability (1930). A copy was sent to Keynes who responded 'I agree with you that there is a great deal to be said in the case of such a country as Australia, for allowing the exchange to fluctuate in the interest of stability of prices. ' 
148 G.L. Wood to W.S. Robinson, 21/4/1932, UMA FECC, Box 14. 149 Sir 0. Niemeyer to Sir E. Harvey cablegram, 3/11/1930, BE: Gl/291. 1so M emorandum by H. Sheehan 30/10/1930, Lyons Papers, NLA. 
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presents Lyons and his supporters as willing to consider a limited form of economic 
reflation but totally against schemes of repudiation or inflation. 
The November Agreement and the Second Manifesto 
By late November, the economists had tired of the Scullin Government's drift to 
the deepening crisis.+ For two days in late November a number of economists secretly 
convened at Dyason' s house in Melbourne.** The outcome of this gathering was to 
press for immediate cutbacks to public sector spending which they now held to be a first 
condition for the restoration of business confidence. The meeting was also to bring 
Melville and Shann into some compromise agreement with the others. Brigden's 
confidential memorandum (cited in Schedvin, 1970, 224) - the only proof that the 
meeting was ever held - showed that Copland and Giblin, at the others' urging, had 
gone cold upon price stabilisation by a release of credits, partly because that expedient 
was already being resorted to with Treasury bill finance.* The economists also felt they 
did not have the degree of confidence in monetary targeting to restore prices to 1929 
levels; whether the Commonwealth Bank would prove amenable to the experiment was 
another matter. Another reason was that restoring budgetary balance was now regarded 
as the most pressing objective. Henceforth, talk of expansion of credit was removed 
from the economists' lexicon though Copland, in the verbiage that surrounded the 
Premiers' Plan, always took semantic licence about the modest inflationary dimension 
injected by Treasury bill finance of budget deficits. Copland signaled his volte face in 
an article in The Australian Quarterly (1930). Shann interpreted it as a 'counterblast to 
Wickens and to Copland under the Dyason spell' .151 Shann encouraged Davidson to get 
a copy of Copland's article to Theodore as 'It may help to wean him from Dyason' s 
folly' .152 Much to Shann' s chagrin, Dyason, who had been associating with the Labor 
M.H.R John Curtin, remained an unreconstructed stabilisationist. 
+ The Arbitration Court took matters into its own hands by electing the ongoing National Wage Case to focu s purely on the need for an emergency reduction in the basic wage given the serious fall in the national income compounded by the sudden cessation of overseas loans. Copland had told a trade union representative, Mr. Crofts that things were so desperate Australia would be lucky to escape with a real wage cut of 10 per cent (SMH 3/12/1930). In the exchange with Crofts, Copland also expressed his displeasure at the failure of Governments to curb spending. The Scullin Government tried to hold up implementation of the Court's judgement much to Copland's annoyance. ** Among those invited by Giblin on behalf of Copland, Dyason and Wood for this grand council were Wickens, Walker, Shann, Hytten, Gifford, Brigden and Melville. All attended (Giblin Papers 366/15/338-9, NLA). 
* A point Niemeyer had pointed out to Melville in his letter of 13/11/1930. 151 E.O.G. Shann to A.C. Davidson, 28/11/1930, BNSW: GM 302: 509. 152 E.O.G. Shann to A.C. Davidson, 3/2/1931, BNSW: GM 302: 590. 
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The economists' memorandum ensuing from the conference which was entitled 
'Monetary Policy in the Crisis' proved a watershed. It honed in on the 25 per cent loss 
in national income as being part perpetrated by the lack of economic adjustment and, 
related! y, a lack of business confidence. Economists reasserted Copland's submission 
before the Arbitration Court that real wages had to be uniformly cut by 10 per cent; the 
mere creation of credits to spend on public works, the economists warned, would not 
promote recovery. They also reiterated that protection would neither solve the balance 
of payments problem nor unemployment. Whilst they saw the possibilities of 
synchronising real wage cuts with reductions in the rate of interest, they insisted that the 
government could not 'safely' force a drop in the latter. Finally, they called for 
immediate economic adjustment lest Australians suffer even greater losses of income. 
Brigden, annoyed at flagrant misrepresentation of his views upon price 
stabilisation, and how it could justify 'extravagant inflationary action' put out a 
memorandum for private circulation. 153 He concluded that price stabilisation was too 
dangerous because it diverted attention from making vital wage cuts and necessary 
economies in Government spending. Brigden' s memorandum also concurred with 
Shann' s view that trying to restore 1929 price levels was too risky a mechanism and 
that, in any case, Australia 'was least likely' to achieve it. This reflected as much upon 
the Commonwealth Bank's knowledge, personnel and powers of monetary control as it 
did upon Brigden's economic philosophy*: as the newly-appointed head of 
Queensland's Bureau of Economics and Industry, Brigden was, like Shann and 
Melville, sceptical of ready-made solutions or 'plans' and wary about monetary devices 
like the scaling down of interest rates (Wilson, 1951 ). According to Colin Clark, 
Brigden was, at one stage, prepared to consider the Federal Government borrowing and 
spending heavily once the requisite cuts to incomes had been implemented (1958, 223). 
That is, he was prepared to alleviate some deflationary pain by expanding credits - to 
check price deflation especially if prices fell faster than costs. 
153 
'Notes on Monetary Policy', 5/12/1930, Brigden Papers, NLA. 
* Giblin, in particular, lamented the fact that Australia's public service had few university men. He later told Theodore that Australia did not have the reserve of qualified personnel to staff his and R.F. Irvine' s idea of a National Credit Commission (L.F. Giblin to E.G. Theodore, 1933, UMA FECC, Prof Giblin Papers 92/141/Box A-J). 
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Shann' s philosophical disposition had always been to back 'the banker against 
the bureaucrat as the politicians' best economic adviser' .154 Any economic plan, in any 
case, had to be congruent with the Realpolitik of economic policymaking in that the 
banks, as powerful brokers, together with a vigilant London, had to be appeased (Butlin 
and Boyce, 1988). Shann put it succinctly, 'What we Anglo-Saxons need most is ideas 
which banks can finance' .155 Finally at Copland's and Giblin's behest, the economists 
sanctioned protection enabling secondary industries to absorb some of those laid off 
from the cessation of loan works. 156 
The Third Manifesto - January 1931 
With Davidson acting as their lightening rod, the economists publicised their 
new position with a statement released in January 1931 entitled, 'First Steps to 
Economic Recovery' (Shann and Copland, 1931a, 72-75; Holder, 1970, 693). Eight 
economists signed the memorandum. 157 Noting that the loss was still concentrated upon 
the export sector the economists called, again, for a sharing of that loss.* This would be 
enforced by a reduction of real wages, in tandem with cuts to public expenditure and a 
commensurate reduction in rentier income by scaling down interest rates. 
There was some intellectual antecedence for these measures in Keynes's 
evidence placed the Macmillan Committee. While it had not recommended devaluation 
the Committee praised it as 'theoretically the most obvious and comprehensive method 
of effecting an orderly contraction of money incomes in general' .158 It was true, 
however, that Australian economists were, like Keynes, beholden to the idea that 
regaining equilibrium would be assisted by lower interest rates. The withdrawal of 
governments from the capital market would, they argued, bring interest rate relief -
though Hytten was, to Shann' s consternation, impatient for direct action (Hytten, 1971 , 
66). Davidson articulated this very point before the Victorian Branch of the Economics 
154 
. E.O.G. Shann to G. Gordon, 30/9/1931, Shann Papers, NLA. 155 E.O.G. Shann to J. La Nauze, 11/8/1931 , La Nauze Papers, NLA. 156 
'Mr. Theodore's plans: fundamental weaknesses ' , SMH 23/12/1930. 157 
-D.B. Copland to E.O.G. Shann, 8/1/1931 , UMA FECC, Box 10. 
* Copland, Giblin,. Wood, Hytten, Melville, Gifford, Brigden, Shann and Mills signed the manifesto (See SMH 21/1/1931 and D.B. Copland to E.O.G. Shann, 8/1/1931, UMA FECC, Box 17). 158 Cited in the 'Macmillan Report and Australian Recovery ' Bank of New South Wales Circular Vol. II, no. 1, pg.2. 
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-Society in May 1931 arguing that lower rates would only materialise once government 
borrowing was checked. 
Where the economists departed company from the Commonwealth Bank was 
their striking advocacy of a floating or flexible exchange rate with no foreseeable return 
to parity. This was to become their pedigree of distinction throughout the early thirties; 
Copland would later hail it as a 'new maxim of advanced monetary authorities' .159 
Copland accepted that Treasury bill financing of Government deficits gave 'sufficient 
stimulus' to anchor prices. In public writings, and with the economists and Davidson's 
encouragement, Copland launched an offensive against the Theodore plan. 160 Indeed 
Copland wanted to go further and issue another manifesto denouncing the whole 
fiduciary issue idea. Shann counseled against this, arguing that economists would lose 
* 
authority if they issued too many statements denouncing the measures of others. Both 
economists, now working together despite initial policy differences, issued respective 
denunciations of the Theodore plan in bank circulars; Copland's piece appeared in the 
National Bank's circular. He was delighted at the opportunity it presented in terms of 
the edification for bankers.+161 Shann's more strongly-worded contribution, 'Political 
Control of Banking', appeared in a Wales Circular. 
The economists' association with the banks led the Labor Party to raise concerns 
about their true allegiances or what Copland joked to Shann as 'our year-long worship 
of mammon' .162 The enigmatic Giblin, in contrast, with his blunt manner, hobnail boots 
and homespun clothing did not get on with bankers so readily. In January 1931, with 
the exchange rate crisis extant, he predicted the possibility of dissolution between the 
banks and the people. At the time a London banker felt Giblin' s sentiments nothing but 
'pure bolshevism' .163 Walker would confirm this dangerous state of affairs in an inquiry 
into banking and monetary policy in 1936. 
1s9 D 
.B. Copland to F.S Alford, 2/12/1935, UMA FECC, Box 30. 160 
'Creating Credit: its Limitations and Dangers', SMH 30/1/1931. * To press home the attack Gibson's letter to Theodore on gold was included in the book as a 'magnificent device' to show how utterly Labor politicians, 'had failed to stop the rot' (E.O.G. Shann to D.B. Copland, 26/3/1931, UMA FECC, Box 12). 
+ While Copland had much earlier joked to Giblin that' ... my economic theories will never allow me to make money he was however not interested in leaving academia to become 'bank consultants' like his colleagues Melville and Shann. He was however ambitious for his discipline and the more economic analysis the banks invested in, the better for everyone (D.B. Copland to L.F. Giblin, 6/6/1927, UMA, FECC, Box 220). 161 D.B. Copland to E.O.G. Shann, 31/3/1931, E.O.G. Shann to D.B. Copland, 2/4/1931, UMA FECC Box 31. 162 D.B. Copland to E.O.G. Shann, 12/6/1931, UMA FECC, Box 31. 163 E. Godward to G.D. Healy, 26/2/1931, Bank of Australasia D/O Letters, ANZ Group Archive. 
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-Shann found that his involvement in these activities besides his work for the 
Wales undermined his credibility at his university (Alexander, 1963, 150-3). His initial 
appointment at the Wales bemused other bankers who, themselves, had little time for 
'theoretical gentlemen'. One local banker was told by his London overseer that 'some 
banks apparently have money to burn and Professor Shann is fortunate in finding a man 
like Davidson to provide him with jobs which can be of little practical interest and of no 
use to the Bank of NSW' .164 Davidson knew otherwise. 
Copland's casual involvement with the banks, particularly the Wales, signified 
his vaulting ambition not just for his discipline but for himself. His blossoming 
association with the mercurial Davidson was to be to his future benefit. At one stage, 
the key architect of the Premiers' Plan was enticed to go to England to take up a 
lucrative conference invitation. Shann begged him to stay, saying that it would 'earn 
you many more such opportunities and a bigger international reputation'. 165 Shann 
could not have been more prescient. By June 1931, Copland's public status was well 
established. The South Australian Labor Premier, Lionel Hill, invited Copland to 
become his full-time economic adviser. Copland demurred, preferring to be associated 
with the enigmatic Davidson, 'I'd much rather be associated with him than any 
Government' .166 The fawning praise reflected, in part, Davidson's ability to re-jig 
Australia's policy settings by breaking parity with sterling, a step critical in the 
economic adjustment process. 
The role of Davidson and the Bank of NSW 
'The compass has been damaged. The charts are out of date'. 
Winston Churchill, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1930. 
In his copious writings on the episode Copland would always perceive the 
Premiers' Plan as complementary to the measures undertaken both on wages and the 
exchange rate months earlier. Australian economists were emphatic that the 'spreading 
the loss' clause be implemented across all classes of the economy, including bond-
164 E. Godward to-G.D. Healy, 29/6/1933, Bank of Australasia D/O Letters, ANZ Group Archive. 165 E.O.G. Shann to D.B. Copland, 2/4/1931, UMA FECC, Box 34. 166 D.B. Copland to E.O.G. Shann, 19/6/1931, BNSW: A53-412. 
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holders. This, as we have seen, was the logic that persuaded the Arbitration Court to cut 
real wages by 10 per cent but to insist upon some release of credits. It also resolved the 
issue of which class would succumb to the first cut in income. In the same month, 
economists triumphed again by persuading the Wales to forcefully shed the last vestiges 
of parity. As Australia's strongest bank with many rural clients on its books, the Wales 
moved the carded rate in line with market pressures. Australia, beset by rough seas, was 
at last cut free from its sterling anchor. Other banks, including the Commonwealth 
Bank, lamely followed suit and a new exchange rate regime came into play (Holder, 
1970, 680-686). Gibson was 'apoplectic' at Davidson's actions, regarded parity as 
h . f . d . h 1 167 168 M . h sacrosanct even tot e point o cons1 enng exc ange contro . any 1n t e 
financial circles, including even Davidson at one stage, regarded devaluation as 
inflationary since it would raise exporters' costs (Schedvin, 1988, 343). Copland 
dismissed this saying that costs were hardly likely to rise during a period of falling 
prices; in fact devaluation checked the extent to which cost levels had to be adjusted in 
order to balance costs and prices (Copland, 1932a, 116). International prices, moreover, 
continued to slip. 
Davidson had been 'egged on' in taking this action by Melville, Copland and, 
especially Shann. The latter saw the action as forming part of a broader philosophical 
crusade: 'It may indeed set in motion forces working in the direction of stability, but in 
a country so wedded to the manipulation and restriction of economic forces it is an 
incessant fight to keep these forces unimpeded' .169 Shann had been advising Davidson 
for some time upon the desirability of a natural change in the exchange rate (Schedvin, 
1988, 346-347). Davidson remained, however, unmoved until late in the piece. 
Initially, he supported the Niemeyer line against the stabilisationists until self-interest 
and informed persuasion brought him round.* 
167 Hytten, 1971, UT, p.60. 
168 Gibson was perhaps more emaged at the Wales usurping the Commonwealth Bank than by the action itself. For he 
told Ricketson that he had been in favour of a ten per cent devaluation but the increase in tariffs obviated this (Ricketson Diary, 29/4/1931). Melville told the author that there could be 'two Gibson' one uttering public views the 
other private views. 
169 E.O.G. Shann to H.C. Findlayson, 25/3/1931 , BNSW: A53; 409. 
* It was held that a reduction in the rate of exchange would relieve budgeting pressures while Giblin estimated that 
though a 130 rat~ added £10 million to Australia's interest payments to London, there would be benefits to exports, 
employment and tax revenue. It also gave relief to those paying fixed interest rate charges. Higher monetary values 
would also keep up taxation proceeds. 
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Contrary to his peers at the time, Davidson was an enlightened soul, free from 
rigid orthodoxy and enjoyed the company of economists (Schedvin, 1988, 338; Holder, 
1970). He had already, for instance, established his own economic intelligence section 
within the bank which would allow his bank to, as he put it, 'be in a position to 
influence events' .170 Davidson's appointment as General Manager of the Wales in 
October 1929 was, therefore, to prove auspicious. At the onset of the crisis he had urged 
economists to present 'a united front' against Labor's unorthodox policies of 
inflationism and protectionism. 171 Melville astutely replied that it would be unwise to 
criticise indefinite policy and ventured that 'interference by university economists in 
public affairs is a delicate matter, because of the strong financial assistance rendered to 
universities by Australian Governments'. 172 Instead, Melville suggested that economists 
issue a statement dealing with the general situation. This, as we have seen, was done 
six months later, though in a situation worse than Melville could have imagined. 
Leading economists attended several weekend retreats at Davidson's Blue 
Mountains home at Leura to discuss policy proposals (Schedvin, 1988, 338). These 
informal arrangements preceded the 'coffee club' culture in Sydney, where intellectuals 
gathered to exchange ideas over economic policy (Coombs, 1982, 5). 173 + Apart from 
establishing an economics research section, Davidson launched public circulars that 
presented the steps necessary for Australia's economic reconstruction. Davidson would 
continue to be a thorn in the side of the Federal Government, and even more the 
Commonwealth Bank throughout the thirties as he criticised monetary policy settings. 
It would be wrong, however, to interpret Davidson as entirely the mouthpiece for 
dissident economic opinion; he was merely supporting a more enlightened approach to 
exchange rate policy that served his bank's interests (Holder, 1970). Nonetheless 
170 
'Intelligence department' BNSW: GM 302/281. 
171 A.C; Davidson to E.O.G. Shann, 4/11/1929, BNSW: 302/590/1. 
172 L.G. Melville to A.C. Davidson, 25/11/1929, BNSW: GM302/374. 
173 Wentworth Trc 1994, p.5, NLA. 
+ Davidson built up a huge economics research section totalling eighteen economists which vastly exceeded 
Treasury's or the Commonwealth Bank's economic advisory capacities (Schedvin, 1988, 347). Davidson's 
'kindergarten', as it became known, was the first 'private sector economic research group in this country' (Schedvin, 
1988, 347). Davidson had approached Niemeyer on the idea of wanting to establish some research capability within 
his bank with the medium of expert advisers guiding the general manager but, in truth, the very idea struck him upon 
his appointment as general manager. Davidson asked Niemeyer and Gregory whether they could recommend anyone 
to him.( A.C. Davidson to Sir 0. Niemeyer 28/11/1930, BE: OV9/289). At one stage Niemeyer and Gregory 
recommended the Cambridge University economist, Austin Robinson. Meanwhile the impatient Davidson settled for 
his friend, Shann t9 fill the role followed the year after by Torleiv Hytten and then A.G.B. Fisher (Hytten, 68-69) . 
Hytten and Shann were to remain the most influential economic advisers over his seventeen years as general manager 
(A.C. Davidson to T. Hytten, 29/10/1949, BNSW: A.C. Davidson Papers N2/92). 
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Holder, who worked in Davidson's economic 'kindergarten', rates Davidson's 
contribution to formulate a recovery policy so highly that it made him almost a 
'godparent' to the Premiers' Plan (1970, 692, 700). In that light this account will treat 
him as a central figure on a par with the other economists. 
The Treasury Committee Plan - February 1931 
Against the backdrop of a 30 per cent devaluation and wage cut, the Loan 
Council, having abandoned the Melbourne Conference resolutions to balance the 
budgets within one year, opted for a three-year plan. Officialdom was, at last, moving 
towards a compromise plan but was still some way off. The Loan Council 
commissioned a committee of Under-Treasury officials to report on Australia's 
finances. Four economists - Brigden, Melville, Shann and Hytten - were hurriedly and 
intermittently consulted in its preparation.* Brigden recalled that it was Shann and 
Melville who were most 'influential'. Brigden gave vent to his 'cut and spend' approach 
but this was dismissed by Melville. 174 The Treasury Committee plan, reflecting the 
serious erosion in budgeting finances, proved a rnarked departure from the Sheehan's 
** Federal Treasury memorandum of September 1930. The four State Treasurers and 
Sheehan traced the lack of confidence in the economy to unbalanced budgets and settled 
for a reduction of Government expenditure by £15 million over three years. The 
Committee regarded the level of government expenditure as 'the key to the whole 
position' .175 It was, in fact, not enough with economists reckoning the projected total 
public sector deficit of 39 million pounds for 1931/32.176 Perversely, the Committee 
regarded the depreciated exchange rate as a manifestation of that uncertainty and longed 
for the return of parity.+ Devaluation, they argued, merely added to the burden of 
overseas interest payments with the benefit to the export sector deemed purely 
temporary. It would be too easy, the Committee said, to 'gloss over the loss of 
prosperity by an alteration in the purchasing power of the currency. This was not a road 
* In his autobiographical memoirs Hytten recalls being astounded by the antics and histrionics of the chairman of the 
Committee, none other than Sir Robert Gibson (Hytten, 1971, 58). 
174 J.B. Brigden to L.F. Giblin, 1/4/1947, GLG-43-1, RBA. 
** J.G. Latham, the Federal Opposition Leader, equated the Treasury Committee's views as one with his own political 
party (The Hobart Mercury 13/2/1931). 
175 
'The Plan of Reconstruction', BNSW Circular Vol. 1, No. 4, June, pg 2. 
t76 Ibid. 
+ This could not have been the sentiment of the economists. Shann, for instance, called the depreciation of January 
1930 as 'manna in the wilderness' (E.O.G Shann to H.C. Finlayson 25/3/1931, BNSW: A53; 409). 
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to recovery, but to collapse' (Shann and Copland, 193 la, 162). The Committee argued 
that extensive Government borrowing would only crowd-out private capital expenditure 
and that genuine interest rate reduction would come only with the return of business 
confidence (Shann and Copland, 1931a, 164). The fact that the Chairman of the 
Committee, Sir Robert Gibson, confessed in a letter to Scullin that the Committee had 
'perhaps exceeded' the scope of its instructions in putting forth its recommendations 
was enough for Scullin to scuttle it. 177 
5.5 The Political Economy of the Premiers' Plan 
The economists had all but framed the blueprint of what was to become the 
Premiers' Plan by late November 1930 but it was only placed before politicians in May 
1931. While the economists drew some praise for their efforts it was their political 
masters that had to bow to harsh realities. This part of the chapter briefly recounts the 
capitulation of the Scullin Government to economic reality and also underlines the 
worth of the Plan. Australia's first imperative was external solvency and the adjustment 
of the domestic cost structure to contain and minimise the loss in real income resulting 
from the external shocks. ** Scullin's reluctance to put into effect the Premiers' Plan 
until the last moment was encapsulated by C.L. Baillieu: 'If he accepts fully and applies 
the Experts' report he will be forced to jettison policies which he has never ceased to 
proclaim .... and to see his party ultimately broken by courses which he has sworn he 
would never take'. 178 
Sir Alexander Hore-Ruthven, the Governor of South Australia, reported that 
Scullin and Theodore's 'last minute surrender to sound economics ' was essentially 
because the Federal Government had tested the public ' s patience. 179 Hore-Ruthven 
was correct in his assessment that it was the united opinion of the five State Premiers 
that kept pressure on the Federal Government to execute fully the recommendations of 
177 SMH7/2/1931. 
** In his apologia expressed in his History of the Central Bank, Giblin, in reviewing the depression policy of 1931 , 
bespoke the defence of the middle way stating that 'it was not far from the best that was possible with a public 
inexperienced as it was at that time in violent economic vicissitudes and their remedies ' (19 51). 178 C. L. Baillieu.to K. Murdoch, 30/5/1931 , UMA FECC, Box 204. 
179 Sir A. Hore-Ruthven to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs , Sir H. Batterbee, 11/6/1931 , PRO: 
T160/396/l 1935/02. 
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* the experts. Actually Theodore pragmatically bowed to orthodoxy and saw the 
'equitable reduction' of wages and interest rates 'as the simplest method of economic 
adjustment' (cited in Clark, 1974, 48). He resolutely defended the Premiers' Plan 
against dissidents in the Caucus and drew Shann' s praise for his 'drive and assiduity 
over detail in piloting it through Parliament'. 180 
Theodore justified his decision stating that it gave respite for the Government 
(Kennedy, 1988, 297). He confessed though, 'I never had any belief that the policy 
would restore employment unless it was accomplished by credit expansionism on a 
large scale and was accompanied by either an active program of expenditure by 
government or by a revival of business confidence' .181+ The irony was that there was, in 
fact, a revival of business confidence engendered by the Premiers' Plan whereas a 
policy of huge monetary expansion, with the obvious connotation with inflation, would 
have undermined business confidence. Then there was Theodore's colourful 
background. As The Age, a paper originally sympathetic to the Fiduciary Issue idea 
editorialised: 'Mr. Theodore .... is about the worst man who could have proposed it' .182 
The asymmetry was all the more galling since it had been the Scullin Labor 
Government, as economists conceded, that was the only one capable of piloting the 
Premiers' Plan through - a fact, Scullin felt his Government was never given enough 
credit for. 
Casey, having returned to Australia in search of a political career, apprised 
Kershaw at the Bank of England of the deliberations behind the Plan. He reported it as 
almost a triumph for Theodore who had 'subtly-managed' the proceedings and 
' ... has developed the situation very cleverly and with admirable political tactics 
- as he has shown the country that he has tried every possible expedient to avoid 
direct attack on the small civil service wage earner and on the small pensioner -
* Hore-Ruthven was, at Lyons' behest, became Governor-General Gowrie in 1936 (Wigran to J.A. Lyons, 2/7/1934, Lyons Papers Box 2 Folder 18 NLA). Hore-Ruthven urged the Governor of NSW, Sir Philip Game, to dismiss Premier Lang over the repudiation controversy ostensibly because of the damage it was doing to Australia's credit 
abroad. Hore Ruthven had been censored by the Adelaide Trades and Labour Council in 1931 for making blatantly political comments (Blanch, 1998, 102). 
180 Shann Papers, 13/8/1931, Box 2 NLA. 
181 E.G. Theodore to J. Curtin, 14/10/1932, Theodore Papers, NLA, 
+ Theodore corro~orated these views in an interview with Rupert MacLaurin (1936, 44) a visiting American scholar 
writing a thesis upon the unique attempt by Australia to extricate itself from the Depression. 182The Age 26/3/1931. 
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but owing to absolute lack of government funds, he is obliged at the last moment 
to give in to the advice of the experts and enforce the cuts - but, mind you, not 
until he has obliged Capital also to accept cuts of similar magnitude' .183 
Despite Casey's view, historians interpret the Premiers' Plan as a political 
triumph for Joe Lyons who had consistently called for balanced budgets and 
deflationary policy as the best way to resurrect business confidence (Lloyd, 1984; 
Schedvin, 1970; Hart, 1967). It was also a triumph for the Australian economics 
profession. 
5.6 Economists in Excelsis? 
'It is a great time for economists altogether. Long may they flourish!' 184 
The critical assumption underpinning the Premiers' Plan was a recovery in 
Australia's export prices within two years. On that premise Giblin figured it was the 
'wisest practical policy'. He was unapologetic about how makeshift the plan actually 
was, being the product of a 'number of divergent and sometimes opposing forces of 
opinion, economical and political' (1933a, 3). 
It might have been therefore a 'makeshift' solution to Australia's economic 
predicament but Shann saw an air of purposefulness behind it: 'The economists were 
under no illusion that their plan was more than a beginning. What they aimed at was a 
plan to balance budgets and the reverse of all our policies pushing up costs' .185 June 
1931 was, therefore, a defining moment for the Australian economics profession. 
Thrust into the spotlight, Australian economists showed considerable political 
aplomb and a 'native genius' in their deliberations (Cain, 1982). Their policy advice 
underwent a dramatic series of twists and turns within an over-politicised environment -
something Mel ville believed sometimes detracted from ascertaining a real 
understanding of the economic issues. 186 In the swirl of high political drama the 
183 R 
.G. Casey to R. Kershaw, 7/6/1931, BE: OV 13/1. 
184 G 
.L. Wood to B.H. Molesworth, 23/2/1932, UMA FECC, Box 14. 
185 E O 
. .G. Shann to Gordon, 30/9/1931, Shann Papers, NLA. 186 Melville, Trc pg.27, NLA. 
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economists excelled in what the English economist, Brian Reddaway, later called the 
'Australian genius for improvisation' .187 Also on display was a penchant for social 
experimentation in dealing with difficult economic problems (MacLaurin, 1937, 14 ). * In 
that respect, Australia was singularly blessed with economic institutions and 
conventions that could bend to prevailing winds of circumstance (Copland, 1934 ). For 
instance, the centralised wage-setting apparatus was praised for being 'indispensable to 
engineer the general fall in costs that was virtually necessary' in 1931 (Reddaway, 
1938, 335). While the artefact of the Premiers' Plan made for deflationary economics it 
did resemble Keynes's notion of a National Treaty expedient presented before the 
Macmillan Committee in 1930 where all income recipients, including rentiers, shared 
the burden of economic adjustment (Cain, 1983, 17; Cain, 1973, 82-83; Petridis, 1990, 
182). 
There were, to recall, consistent themes running through the economists' 
manifestos and memoranda. These were all the restoration of balanced budgets, a 
readjustment between export costs and prices, a flexible exchange rate and, under the 
rubric of spreading the loss doctrine, interest rate reductions. The overlapping 
theoretical framework was provided by Keynes's Treatise with its savings and 
investment dynamic. The unity between Australia's leading economists was made 
stronger by the seriousness of the situation. 188 + Their advice helped Australia navigate 
through the Charybdis of repudiation and the Scylla of deflation.** 
187 Giblin Papers, 30/11/1940, NLA. 
* MacLaurin visited Australia on a scholarship with the express intention of writing his doctorate upon Australia's 
unique recovery from the depression. MacLaurin turned to Copland as his first contact that took him under his wing 
and introduced him to the leading players in the 1931 drama. 
188 Melville, Trc pg. 41, NLA. 
+ At the height of this triumph G.L. Wood somewhat broke the consensus among economists by urging the 
reconstitution of a body like the DMC to enforce quasi-Keynesian policies of purposeful state action (AA: A 786; 
D19/2). Two former officers of the DMC, J. Gunn and J.P. Murphy called upon the federal government to boost 
spending (AA: A786; T22/8). Much more disturbing for the future however was A.C. Davidson 's reaction to Herman 
Gepp' s solicitous advice that the Sydney banker should, as the Melbourne economists had done, gather together a 
group of young economists for the express purpose of discussing current economic problems (BNSW: GM 302/357 
Sir H. Gepp to A.C. Davidson, 6/7/1931). On Gepp's letter, Davidson wrote in red ink 'What an atmosphere' and as 
to Gepp's talk of economic reconstruction Davidson annotated 'Theodorian or Dyasonian'. Davidson's sarcasm was 
not sparked by the Melbourne-Sydney rivalry but the possible fear that the Melbourne school was too 'red' for his 
liking. In his reply Davidson minced his words fearing that monthly talks between the same circle of economists may 
become 'didactic' and 'a little too high in the upper air of economic and monetary theory' (A.C. Davidson to Sir H. 
Gepp; 13/7/1931, BNSW: GM 302/35). 
** A.C. Davidson drew a comparison between the Copland Committee's advice and the advice contained in a leading 
article in The Econ:omist put forward to deal with Britain's own economic problems (A.C. Davidson to W.S . 
Robinson, 13/8/1931, BNSW: GM 302/574). For his part, Robinson held, ' ... that the Commonwealth will be setting 
an example to nearly all other countries' (W.S. Robinson to Davidson, 20/6/1931, BNSW: GM 302/574). 
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It also allayed the fears of British financial minds. At one stage the situation had 
become so grave that the British Senior Trade Commissioner, R.W. Dalton, believed 
that only 'an expert and impartial Financial Commission from the United Kingdom was 
needed to manage Australia's reconstruction' .189 An earlier expedient, canvassed by 
J .H. Thomas, the Secretary for Dominion Affairs, had been to consider sending out the 
high ranking Treasury official, Frederick Leith-Ross, as the next High Commissioner 
(Leith-Ross, 1968, 132). While interested, Leith-Ross felt it would be a heavy-handed 
move, signaling to Canberra Britain's palpable interest in Australia's financial 
rehabilitation, including the honouring of debt payments to London (1968, 132). After 
the Premiers' Plan was agreed to, Kershaw dismissed the alarmism of Dalton's missive 
telling the British Treasury that 'taking all factors into consideration .... putting Australia 
into commission was neither necessary nor desirable' .190 
While the Plan, as Copland (1935, 600) declared, was a 'composite' one drawn 
up by Australian economists it bestowed particular celebrity upon him. The Australian 
newspapers dubbed Copland the 'Keynes of the Commonwealth' (cited in Harper, 1986, 
46). The Harvard economist, Frank Taussig, saluted him 'Your own part gives one hope 
that after all, we economists are not so entirely useless as some of the critics allege' .191 
Two years later, Copland told Taussig that the Australian economists' ingenuity in 
masterminding their country's economic rehabilitation was only one part of the story; 
'It has been uncommonly successful, but it has been greatly helped by a run of 
good seasons. Whether we shall continue ... depends more upon the courage we 
show and the psychology of the people than upon the actual economic efforts 
themselves. If it succeeds it will at least establish the principle that 'intelligent 
economic control' is capable of handling a difficult situation with great 
advantage to all concerned' .192 
The English economist Ralph Hawtrey lauded Australia as the first country to 
appoint a brains-trust of economists to help guide the nation out of depression (1934, 
120). At a civic reception given to him in Geelong in 1931, Copland stated that had 
189 E.R. Dalton to Campbell, 20/5/1931, PRO: T160/366/l 1935/02. 190 R. Kershaw to .Sir Frederick Leith Ross, 27/7/1931, B.E.: OV 13/1/453/2. 191 F. Taussig to D.B. Copland, 19/10/1931, UMA FECC, Box 17. 
192 D.B. Copland to F. Taussig, 28/2/1933, UMA FECC Box 19. 
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economists had been listened to over the past five years Australia might have avoided 
the depression. 193 Apart from being diverted from their academic tasks, the economists 
involved in the Plan's preparation received little remuneration, much less gratitude, for 
their advice and labour (Alexander, 1963, 196-7). *194 One instance that exemplified 
that spirit was Giblin's readiness to 'do his bit' and take up the duties of Acting 
Commonwealth Statistician in Canberra at great personal inconvenience. 195 196 
There were, however, some isolated notes of derision about the worth of 
economists and from high places. Bruce told Frank McDougall at Australia House in 
London that Australian economists had seemingly 'reformed' and 'had come down to 
Earth'. Copland took umbrage, saying that it was not a case of economists deviating 
from the path of virtue so much as a 'deviation ... occurred with other people who now 
see the light where all was darkness' .197 Equally, when the Melbourne businessman, Sir 
Harold Luxton, reported that it was a sign of 'mental weakness' and 'a drawback in our 
national life' that economists were consulted to prise Australia out of her difficulties 
Copland replied that businessmen, like everyone else, had been demoralised by the 
crisis; only economists had conceived a practical reasonable plan to save Australia. 
Bankers, too, were scornful of the intrusion of 'academic gentlemen' into the 
world of economic advice. Ernest Wreford, Chairman of the National Bank of 
Australasia, told its directors 'I am one of many who feel that the world today is getting 
a little too much advice from professional economists (Blainey and Hutton, 1983, 205). 
Another banker, C.H. Tranter, Chairman of the Melbourne-based Associated Banks, 
was scathing over the role of economists in urging the break from parity: 'I am not too 
much influenced by the theoretical opinions of economists who, as a rule, take the 
academic course and have not had practical experience' (cited in Holder, 1970, 684). 
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'The Premiers' Plan and after', The Geelong Advertiser 41911931. 
* Due recognition perhaps would come in the afterlife. Copland jibed to an associate that, 'making the world safe for 
private profit and preventing the high priests of high finance from ruining themselves would guarantee a very warm 
quarter in the upper world' (D.B. Copland to Kitto 29/10/1935, UMA FECC, Box 35). Possibly, but Copland would 
later find his temporal aspirations spiked by those self-same interests he ridiculed. Already, the Commonwealth 
Statistician Charles Wickens had suffered an incapacitating illness in February 1931 more than likely due to 
overwork and the controversy his views had embroiled him in (Castles, 1997, 32). Shann's two year secondment to 
the Wales as economic adviser was creating animosity with university administrators and others in Perth (Alexander, 
1963). 
194 D.B. Copland to H. Luxton, 23/6/1932, UMA FECC, Box 11. 
195 Giblin to A. Blqkely, Minister for Home Affairs, 27/3/1931 UMA FECC, Giblin Papers, Box 1 92/141. 
196 J.A. Lyons to L.F. Giblin, Cablegram, 24/3/1931.UMA FECC, Giblin Papers 92/141. 
197 F. McDougall to D.B. Copland 23/12/1931, and D.B. Copland to F. McDougall, 19/4/1932, UMA FECC, Box 11. 
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Speaking for the English-owned banks, G.D. Healy pleaded with 'three professors of 
econo1nics' that devaluation was wrong and 'that even if their contentions were correct' 
it was not the time to put them into operation and that 'practical men' should be allowed 
to deal with the situation. 198 
There was resentment, too, from officeholders at the arrival of economists into 
positions of influence. McDougall agreed \Vith David Rivett of the C.S.I.R. that the 
economists had 'lost their heads' with their new found sense of importance. Sounding 
like an aggrieved banker, Rivett went on: 
'My interpretation of the position is that the 'homo economicus Australiensis' 
was a neglected species up to 1929. Then when depression broke upon us the 
harried politician hurried to him for aid and since that date your Giblins, 
Coplands, Shanns and Melvilles have been taken very seriously indeed. This 
sudden promotion of men whose experience in public affairs is limited seems to 
me to have had an unsettling effect upon their mental equilibrium' (Cited in 
O'Dea, 1997, 67). 
Others, like Walter Murdoch from the University of Western Australia refused 
to acknowledge the worth of economists: The economist has his uses in the world, and 
one use in particular ... The true use of the economic expert is to refute other economic 
experts ... He may have other uses, though I, personally, have not discovered them ... My 
wireless expert did put my set right; what has the economic expert ever put right?' 
(Cited in La Nauze, 1977, 118). 
While the Premiers' Plan was later castigated as deflationary and serving the 
interests of the banking community the economists drew praise by their insistence upon 
devaluation, Treasury bill finance and lower interest rates; what Copland called 
management by 'intelligent economic control' .199 There was also Copland's imaginative 
voluntary conversion of internal debt scheme. ** While Copland (1932, 378) admitted 
that he did not agree with Australian governments rejecting Niemeyer's therapy, in toto, 
I 198 G.D. Healy to E. Godward, D/O Letters, 20/2/1931, ANZ Group Archive. 199 D.B. Copland to F. Taussig, 28/2/1933 UMA FECC Box 19. 
** . Even at the hour of triumph Leslie Melville held grave concerns whether the loan conversion arrangement would 
work (L.G. Melville to Sir 0. Niemeyer, 6/6/1931, B.E.: OV9/289). 
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he was emphatic that his plan was quite removed from the Niemeyer blueprint. Copland 
had identified Niemeyer' s therapy as akin to an aboriginal circumcision causing 
'needless disorganisation and distress' (cited in Clark, 1981, 183). Nonetheless Copland 
regretted that allowing loan expenditures to fall to a nadir in 1931-32 was as much in 
error as allowing Australian Governments to engage in reckless expenditure during the 
twenties. 200 In other words, there was no recognition that public works expenditure be 
increased to the level occurring before the depression so as to offset the calamitous fall 
in private investment; nor was Giblin' s multiplier analysis ever applied to cutbacks in 
domestic expenditure until Kahn recast it in 1931 (Karmel, 1960; Wilson, 1951, 195). 
In his theoretical outlook Copland ( 1934, 64) set little store on the value of 
public works; lasting employment would be found in the export and import replacement 
industries. Attempting reflation by public works, it was believed, merely inflated the 
prices of domestic goods imposing further hardship upon the export sector (Plumptre, 
1935, 133). Public works was held only to be effective where they served as a stimulus 
to private enterprise and for this to occur business opinion was crucial (Brigden, 1934). 
In Copland's favour were the prevailing psychological circumstances which called for 
fiscal consolidation not expansion. 
There was contemporary criticism, too, from the Sydney economists, Bland and 
Mills, who, in their review of the Plan, felt that the equity aspect did not wholly extend 
to pensioners and the low-paid (1931, 166). In like spirit, Hugh Dalton, the British 
economist and Labour politician, praised Australia's wielding of the axe upon 
expenditure and incomes but wondered if it was 'truly scientific forestry'. He pointed 
out the gross inequality within the sharing of loss principle by pointing out that external 
bondholders were quarantined from having to partake in the sacrifice (1934, 441). 
Although there were engineered interest rate cuts Copland later admitted that the 
inflationary aspect of the plan was 'was not pursued by the same vigour and unanimity' 
as the expenditure cuts and tax rises (1960, 21). That said, the banks were praised for 
playing their part and not taking advantage of the reduction in interest to reduce the 
rates on their deposits (Shann, 1934, 92). Looking back Hytten (1935, 132) concluded 
200 The Herald 30/12/1935. 
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that the Premiers' Plan while it had been overly severe had 'done its work' in terms of 
reducing deficits and outlays. 
In his reappraisal of the Premiers' Plan, the New Zealand economist, A.G.B. 
Fisher ( 1935, 681-682) suggested that economists had erred in prescribing devaluation 
because it induced more unprofitable primary production at a time when the world did 
not desire it. This critique sprang from his research focus upon material progress 
showing how it did not just lead to a continuous increase in production but also 
increasing diversification of goods and services. In 1941 Giblin found time to defend 
the Plan's originality: 'It would have been difficult to find among those concerned with 
the Premiers' Plan any agreement with the theses of Niemeyer who had, in fact, left 
Australia long before the plan was thought of'. 201 He was well aware, too, that the plan 
was bound to be deflationary but Australia, at the time, had little choice. He also 
defended the 1931 wage cut for being a stimulus, material and psychological, to 
d . 1 f 202 exporters an import-rep acement manu acturers. 
5. 7 Conclusion 
In the last fifty years the Premiers' Plan has assumed a place of infamy in 
Australia's history. A retelling of its origins and rationale casts it in much brighter light. 
The economic and political drama of 1931 represented a wonderful but intense 
opportunity for Australian economists to combine the latest theoretical work of the 
monetary reformers with some native improvisation. The collegiality of the Australian 
economists bestowed upon the profession prestige and influence. For Australia the end 
product was a comprehensive plan that few other countries could match. 
201 
'The Myth of the Premiers ' Plan' , 6/11/1942, Giblin Papers, NLA. 
202 L.F. Giblin to E.R. Walker, 19/4/1934, Giblin Papers, NLA. 
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CHAPTER6 
Reconstruction and Relapse 1931-1932 
6.1 Introduction 
In his account of Australia's travail through the Depression, C.B. Schedvin was, 
as discussed in Chapter Two, dismissive of the efforts of economists in formulating 
policy dealing both with the crisis but also, more importantly for our purposes, in 
putting forward alternative economic policies (1970, 225).* Apart from his main 
contention that the Premiers' Plan had a comparatively minor effect upon the course and 
pace of recovery, Schedvin suggested that the economic policy decided upon in July 
1931 retarded, more than promoted, economic recovery. The interwar economists would 
have concurred; official economic policy in 1932 took a deflationary bias. The purpose 
of this chapter, however, and those following, is to show how Schedvin' s view of the 
role of economists is not grounded in the facts. In particular, this thesis's main task of 
tracking and underlining the development of Australian economists' thought and policy 
advice during the thirties leads to a categorical refutation of Schedvin' s claim that 
instead of academic economists re-examining traditional economic thought ' ... they 
clung to the myth of the efficacy of the Premiers' Plan and implicitly condoned the 
inept policy of the Lyons Government' (1970, 225). 
Australian economists had, in fact, begun to question the traditional patterns of 
economic thought as well as the appropriateness of the Premiers' Plan's especially as 
unemployment soared and export prices fell further. This chapter assesses, therefore, 
what Australian economists were saying during this period when economic activity 
reached the nadir. Some, as we shall see, had decided on bold new directions. After 
1933 the unity of the economists in promoting anti-Depression policies began to fray 
with a divide re-emerging between the stabilisationists and restrictionists, albeit in 
muted form, Before then, however, economists were asked to reformulate another 
bolder plan to retrieve Australia from slump. This advice was not acted upon. 
* A useful illuminating exercise is to compare Schedvin's account of economists ' activities in the early thirties with 
the more uplifting, albeit self - interested account, given by Holder in his history of the Bank of New South Wales. 
Both books were published in 1970. 
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To understand why this was, some background upon the formation of, and 
interests behind, the Lyons Government is appropriate. This is covered in section 6.2. 
Section 6.3 discusses the revival of economic revisionism with the Commonwealth 
Bank reasserting its authority over economic policy by ordering a currency appreciation. 
As the economy continued to stagnate Lyons commissioned a review of economic 
policy. The subsequent report~ discussed in section 6.4, focused upon the contemporary 
dilemma between exchange rate stability and price stability. The report was brought to 
the attention of Keynes and his assessment of it is discussed in section 6.5. The last 
parts of the chapter, namely sections 6.6 and 6.7, span the debate between economists 
and the central bank over the appropriate exchange rate. 
6.2 The Economic Policy of the Lyons Government 
Economists welcomed the election of the Lyons Government. It heralded the 
return, not just of business confidence that would allow the Premiers' Plan to start 
yielding results, but also a Prime Minister prepared sometimes to act upon academic 
economic expertise. In contrast with the boost in business confidence that marked 
election of the United Australia Party (UAP) to power there was only a lukewarm 
response in the stock market when the Premiers' Plan was first announced. 203 This was 
partly because Scullin and Theodore had alJowed themselves to become, as Casey put it, 
'political charlatans' .204 Pushing through the Premiers' Plan, in any event, merely 
hastened the self-destruction of the Scullin Government and allowed its successor to 
appropriate the electoral credit for pulling Australia out of the economic mire (Lloyd, 
1986, 164). 
Economists were aware of Lyons' backers, particularly a Melbourne-based cabal 
known as 'The Group', and held some fears that economic policy might revert to 
outright deflation (Hart, 1967). With Britain off the Gold Standard from September 
1931 concern focused upon a Commonwealth Bank Board asserting its independence 
and moving to 'rehabilitate' the exchange. Sterling had begun to appreciate in any case 
meaning that Australia lost the benefit of the second de facto devaluation when sterling 
203 A few years afte_r losing office Scullin was still bitter that his Government were not given the credit due to it for 
putting in place the measures that saved Australia (Molony, 149, 2000). 
204 R. G. Casey to M. Hankey, 6/7/1931, Hankey Papers, Churchill College. 
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first came off the gold standard. To safeguard the linchpin of intelligent economic 
policy, that is, an exchange rate that took account of domestic economic conditions, 
economists engaged in persuading higher authority about taking the correct approach. 
Whatever the growing unease by economists over the policy settings set in place 
by the Premiers' Plan there were two binding constraints upon any other feasible 
alternative. First, the Plan was a three-year program and it was on that platform that 
Lyons, as the titular head of the conservative forces that crystallised around the UAP 
won at the polls; Lyons, whose appeal to the electorate was deeper and wider than any 
political party, had asked - and overwhelmingly received - a 'doctor's mandate' from 
electors.205 His manifesto was built around the three broad themes: a restoration of 
business confidence, the balancing of budgets and the reduction of unemployment 
through the stimulation of private enterprise. The UAP election manifesto was drawn 
from Lyons's predecessor, Latham, who, even in the dark days of early 1931, saw 
nothing explicitly wrong with the economic system other than a marked lack of business 
confidence caused by the dithering of the Scullin Government. In that light, Latham, 
along with 'The Group', cast a shadow over Lyons's economic views. One consolation 
was the return of Bruce, as Assistant -Treasurer, though Giblin felt he was hamstrung 
having to 'live down' his reputation for reckless expansion.206 
The second constraint binding upon alternative economic policy was that 
Australia's external obligations to British bondholders dictated sound finance and a 
stable exchange rate. Apart from choking off imports with tariffs, Australia, on the 
other side of the ledger, had to muster a large enough export push to meet its foreign 
debt requirements. This was no easy task. For instance, in 1930/31, the surplus of 
exports over imports amounted to £28,300,000, while the total interest payments on the 
external debt of Australian Government authorities amounted to £36,000,000. In the 
succeeding year, 1931/32, Australia recorded a trade surplus that allowed some 
accumulation in its London funds. The management and servicing of Australia's debt 
portfolio assumed even greater weight once Bruce was dispatched to London to begin 
the difficult task of converting maturing Australian Government securities to a lower 
205 That te1m was a.~aken from Ramsay Macdonald's successful re-election campaign in Britain in 1931. It was little 
wonder Lyons used the slogan 'Tune in with Britain' in the UAP'S election campaign. 206 L.F. Giblin to E. Giblin, 9/3/1932, Giblin Papers, NLA. 
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rate (Attard, 2000). Apart from Australian tariff levels injuring British exports and the 
repudiation rhetoric of Lang, London financial opinion was shocked at how voluntary 
conversion of the National Debt had become coercive for dissentients. 207 Melville 
subsequently told Niemeyer of his concern that the process might give impetus for Lang 
to push for the compulsory conversion of Australia's external debt since the outstanding 
Australian loans on the London market exacted a heavy interest burden upon 
Government budgets. 208 Even though Britain had a cheap money policy from 1932 
onwards the British Treasury initially opposed the Commonwealth conversion 
operations on the pretext that the London market could not accommodate the scale of 
the conversions at hand. London only acceded to the Australian request by July 1933 
having, by then, sorely tried Lyons' patience (Cain, 1985). In a cable to Bruce, Lyons 
vented not only his own frustration at London's 'callousness or thoughtless indifference 
to our difficulties' but also what the riddance of the Scullin government had meant; 'It 
must not be forgotten', Lyons intoned, 'that in approaching consideration of this matter 
that the Australian people voted us .... into power in the belief that London would 
react. ... and that, with a Government pledged to pay its way, lower rates would 
inevitably and willingly follow' .209 The explicit threat to London was that such 
recalcitrance would result in the return to power of the Labor Party that would set about 
reducing the country's external interest rate obligations in a much more 'brutal and 
direct fashion'. 210 
Some three years later, Bruce informed Giblin of the economic realpolitik 
behind the conversion program that had, by then, been successfully executed. It was, he 
said, not just to give Australia the maximum relief with regard to her interest burden 
'but possibly more importantly, to convince Australian public opinion that the policy of 
respectability is more profitable for Australia's point of view'. 211 Just how far this 
policy of 'respectability' went would soon present economists with their first challenge. 
Lyons's commission, as both Prime Minister and Treasurer, was to carry out the 
Premiers' Plan to the letter. The electoral call for orthodoxy and respectability had 
207 
'Toreador column', New Statesman and Nation 12/9/1931, p. 322. 
208 L.G. Melville to Sir 0. Niemeyer, 6/6/1931, BE: OV9/289. 
209 J. Lyons to S.M .. Bruce, 11/3/1933, Cablegram : AA 1970/559 Bruce Correspondence to Lyons 1933. 210 Staniforth Ricketson diary extract, 20/6/1932. 
211 S.M. Bruce to L.F. Giblin, 11/711936, AA: Ml04/4, Miscellaneous Papers Bruce 1936. 
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resonance since Latham delighted in exposing the fact that Theodore and Scullin had 
not totally forsaken the 'policy of inflation .... and printing bank notes to make the 
credits effective' .212 Scullin and Theodore, annoyed at the banks' reluctance in 
honouring their commitment to cut interest rates, explored new expedients (Holder, 
1970, 705-7). Melville feared that Theodore would use the findings of the British 
Macmillan Report to revive the extension of credit idea: In a letter to the South 
Australian politician, Charles Hawker, Melville suggested that Theodore's thunder be 
stolen by the UAP adopting the Macmillan doctrine urging an international reflation of 
prices, inter alia, and dismissing domestic inflation as an expedient. 213 The three 
English banks based in Melbourne were delighted, then, at the electoral demise of 
Theodore because it had removed from circulation notions of inflationary schemes. 214 
Or so they hoped. 
Elected in December 1931 the new Lyons Government, with a majority in both 
chambers of parliament, commanded a powerful leverage over economic policy. At 
first, Giblin sensed that Lyons and Bruce were keen upon a new economic plan but this 
was only electioneering.215 It had, of course, been Lyons's overwhelming popularity 
with the electorate that brought this coalition of conservative interests to power (Lloyd 
1984). Lyons' biographer, Philip Hart (1967), got to the nub of Lyons's intrinsic appeal 
to the electorate; it was his essential 'ordinariness,' his folksy 'homely style' that won 
over the people. 'Ordinary men', perplexed by the monetary schemes of Lang and 
Theodore ' ... knowing little of economics, turned gladly to Joseph Lyons whose honesty 
and belief in economy they could easily understand'. Lyons expediently played on his 
unfamiliarity with finance. Such professed innocence and timidity would, as Labor 
politicians pointed out, cost Australia dear. 
Buoyed by the victory of Ramsay MacDonald in the British General Election of 
October 1931, Lyons offered the same sanctuary to the Australian electorate. In similar 
212 The Age 7/11/1931. 
• The Wales put out a circular on the findings of the Macmillan Committee which, in it, taken at face value, did not 
readily accord with Australia's economic readjustment measures. For instance, the Macmillan Committee dismissed 
'the resort to competition in wage cutting [as] a counsel for despair, especially for debtor nations'. It did however 
urge financial reflation and international monetary reform to lift price levels back to 1929 levels in a bid to eliminate the discrepancy between manufactured and commodity prices. 213 L.G. Melville to C.A.S. Hawker, 31/9/1931, Shann Papers, NLA. 214 G.D. Healy to E: Godward, D/O Letters, 24/12/1931, Bank of Australasia, ANZ Group Archive. 215 L.F. Giblin to E. Giblin, 17/1/1932, Giblin Papers, NLA. 
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circumstances to MacDonald, Lyons had also been traduced by conservative interests to 
be at the head of a motley coalition of conservative groups (Hart, 1967; Lloyd, 1984). 
As mentioned, the most outstanding of these interests was the Melbourne Group (Lloyd 
1984, 292; Hart, 1967). The Group revolved around the aspiring Victorian politician, R. 
G. Menzies, and the Tasmanian-born stockbroker, Staniforth (Murray and White, 1988). 
It had been Ricketson who marshaled financial opinion behind Lyons' s conversion loan 
campaign of 1930, which proved the making of his electoral appeal. As his diary 
entries reveal, Ricketson shared the confidences of Sir Robert Gibson, B. S. B. Stevens, 
the N.S.W. Opposition Leader, and R. G. Casey, a future Federal Treasurer. Other 
members of the Group were Sir John Higgins, head of the British and Australian Wool 
Realisation Association, Charles Norris, an insurance magnate, and Ambrose Pratt,* a 
businessman and former journalist with strong links to Keith Murdoch, the Managing 
Editor of the Melbourne Herald. Murdoch's newspapers played a critical part in Lyons's 
elevation, presenting him as Australia's saviour. Pratt felt the Group would be the 
channel to meet the 'desire to influence public opinion for the public good' (Cited in 
Martin, 1999, 94). A later recruit, the architect Kingsley Henderson, who Lyons was 
· especially friendly with, was an intimate of Sir Robert Gibson (Hart, 1967; Martin, 
1993, 83). Lloyd (1984) considers that, 'in terms of access to power and influence, the 
Group's presence could not be surpassed.' However, Ricketson' s diary reveals this 
applied, perhaps, only to the early days of the Lyons Government. Once into his term of 
office and facing bleak economic times and a divided cabinet, Lyons gently resisted the 
overtures of the Group, telling its spokesman, Sir Kingsley Henderson, that he was 
reluctant to call upon them for fear that they would think he was 'imposing on their 
good nature' .216 Nonetheless the Group reassured Lyons that they had a duty to support 
him at a difficult time of economic adjustment with Ricketson informing him that 
'Capital has a very definite responsibility at the present time to aid people like yourself 
who are fighting for the preservation of contracts and the honouring of our 
obligations.' 217 
* Pratt also dabbled in political economy with some reasonably cognate analysis of Australia's economic ills. In 
'Disequilibrium - the measure of Depression' Pratt identified an overproduction of staples as a besetting global problem necessitating lower production costs for secondary industry to restore the balance. In a weightier offering -
'Elements of Constructive Economics' - Pratt argued that banking policy should be brought under closer partnership 
with the State. That is, the banking system should be deprived of the power to start cyclic movements, which it 
cannot stop. However, Pratt was adamant the banks should not engage in financing budget deficits (Ambrose Pratt Papers, SL V Box _327 /6, MSS 654 7 and MSS 6546). 
216 Ricketson Diary 23/4/1932. 
217 S. Ricketson to J.A. Lyons, n.d. Lyons Papers, NLA. 
134 
Apart from opposing the policies of inflation and repudiation, the Group had 
earlier struck a discordant note with mainstream Australia by resisting the clause that 
domestic bondholders partake in the equality of sacrifice. Indeed their trenchant 
opposition to what Menzies called 'the breaking of contracts' initially hindered 
acceptance of the Premiers' Plan (Martin, 1993, 106). However, Lyons, in a rare show 
of strength, broke from his backers and Deputy Leader Latham and pushed for cuts in 
interest rates as part of the package (Hart, 1979, 134). That is, he sided with the 
economists on the issue of equal sacrifice. Lower interest rates, forthwith, took their 
rightful place as an integral part of economic rehabilitation process. Despite this partial 
reverse, the Group continued to lobby for balanced budgets, the funding (retiring) of 
Treasury bills and the return to sterling. 
Meanwhile Lyons had to give thought to the formation of his Cabinet. Apart 
from Bruce and Latham, the only other 'brain' in his Cabinet was Hawker. 218 While 
Lyons took the portfolio of Treasurer it was merely to lend an air of psychological 
assurance; Bruce, as Assistant-Treasurer, carried that portfolio's duties. Bruce laid the 
foundations of the UAP's economic policy till replaced by Massy-Greene in July 1932. 
With his genial personality and political acumen, Lyons's leadership was about 
reconciling conflicting requests from different interests. Rarely, however, did he have 
the stomach for a fight within Cabinet. His biographer, Philip Hart, has described 
Lyons's modus operandi in policy-making as basically to rely upon expert advice that 
met his philosophical framework and then, in tum, emphasise the non-partisan nature of 
the path taken. His main role appeared, to many, as merely to occupy office and let the 
private sector, coupled with the strictures of the Premiers' Plan, bring about recovery. 
In some ways this interpretation was correct; as Coombs intimated to Shann, what 
Australia required after 1931 was not a Bruce or Theodore but a 'steady unimaginative 
soul' .219 Lyons was their man; he was, as the leading businessman, C. L. Baillieu, put 
it 'the man Australia had been waiting for' .220 Lyons disavowed any gift for economics, 
'I know little about finance' he frequently intoned, inferring perhaps that he would 
218 Ricketson diary .extract, 23/4/1932. 
219 Shann Papers, Box 4, NLA. 
220 Ricketson diary extract, 17/3/1932. 
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solicit the wisdom of economists and others before making policy decisions. 221 He 
entertained a fetchingly simple view that equated government debt with personal debt. 
To be fair, Lyons had been broad-minded enough to accept the Melbourne school's plan 
of constructive deflation in September 1930. Nor was Lyons content to leave economic 
salvation purely to market forces even if his Government was ostensibly a 'private 
enterprise' one (Hart, 1967, 243). Indeed with Giblin and Brigden having his ear, and 
Bruce 'happy to be back in harness', Lyons began his administration by letting slip the 
comment that 'the credit of the Commonwealth would be utilised' to pursue public 
works. 222 The Group, along with a 'hard-shelled minority' in Cabinet led by George 
Pearce, the Minister for Defence, feared Lyons coming under the influence of 'the 
economists' (cited in Hart, 1967, 264).223 Sir John Higgins, too, was 'apprehensive' 
that Lyons would, if not be overwhelmed by Bruce and Latham, become entangled by 
his 'close association [ with] economists and Treasury officials [with] ... the latter' falling 
for 'the line of least resistance' .224 This, perhaps, was a veiled reference to the liberally-
inclined Sheehan who was years later to become Governor of the Commonwealth Bank. 
A consummate chairman of the board, Lyons was, at the last resort, never 
prepared to breach Cabinet solidarity nor disappoint his backers by pandering to the 
advice of experts; nor for that matter was he prepared to leave the comforting confines 
of the Premiers' Plan or, just as importantly, brook the independence of the 
Commonwealth Bank on monetary and exchange matters. Upon assuming office, 
Lyons' first brief was to hold a Premiers' Conference, the first of many, to audit the 
progress of the State Governments in winding back their budgetary deficits. They were 
struggling to rein in their deficits as the full force of the depression hit. Lyons was, 
however, intent upon placing the Commonwealth in a fiscally strong position from 
which it could browbeat State governments into submission. 225 In that regard, Shann 
and Copland might have triggered the new Government's attention with a report entitled 
The Australian Positionj_ exposing how some States had still not yet co1nplied with the 
Arbitration Court's wage cut. Consequently, the Gibson-led revaluation of the currency 
221 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates Vol. 128, pg. 238, 13/3/1931. 222 Ricketson diary extract, 23/1/1932. 
223 Senator Pearce had been instrumental in the destruction of Theodore's proposed Commonwealth Bank Act by 
coming up with the idea of inviting the 'grand old man' of Australian finance, Sir Robert Gibson, to be a witness 
before the bar of the Senate wherein tum, a consummate performance dammed the proposed legislation (Pearce, 
1951, 188; Margare_t Gibson draft Memoir of her father, Gibson Papers, Mss.10823 SLV). 224 Ricketson diary extract, 28/1/1932. 
225 L.F. Giblin to E. Giblin, 17/1/1932, Giblin Papers, NLA. 
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made the burden of domestic costs upon the export sector more onerous. Melville, in a 
delicate but nonetheless influential position at the Commonwealth Bank, summarised 
the report for Gibson's edification, agreeing with the authors that a policy to restore 
parity, irrespective of the prices of Australian exports, would have disastrous 
consequences (Booth, 1988). · To placate Gibson, Melville tactfully added that too much 
tampering with the exchange rate to adjust costs and prices would not compensate for a 
d. ct· . d . 226 irect a JUstment 1n omestlc costs. 
6.3 The Battle over the Exchange Rate 
'The Bourbons, it would appear, were not unique in learning nothing and 
forgetting nothing by their days of adversity' (E.O.G. Shann in The Statist 
10/12/1931). 
Nearing the end of 1931 a slight rise in export prices, together with a hefty 
increase in export production, replenished the London funds. This, in turn, sparked fears 
among economists that the economic bourbons were in the ascendant. It was, as this 
section will show, another call to arms for the economists as unemployment reached 28 
per cent by December. In an attempt to pre-empt efforts to restore parity with sterling, 
the economists issued a manifesto in November 1931 fortifying the case for further 
devaluation (Shann and Copland, 1933, 29-34). The signatories to the statement -
basically the whole Australian economics fraternity bar Melville who was Economic 
Advisor to the Commonwealth Bank - warned that a return to par with sterling 'would, 
on present and prospective prices, gravely imperil the chances of economic recovery in 
the near future' (Shann and Copland, 1933, 86). The economists, together with 
Davidson, urged the Commonwealth Bank to fulfil its central bank duties by assuming 
responsibility for the exchange rate. As if upon cue, the Commonwealth Bank, in one 
fell swoop, took responsibility for the exchange rate free from any sectional interest 
other than what preoccupied the Bank Board. While economists welcomed the 
sentiment and principle they were horrified by the Board's decision to revalue the 
currency. 
226 
'Notes on the Australian position December 31 ', 8/2/1932, Gibson Papers, SL V. 
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Gibson's action may have been partly swayed by advice from Niemeyer. He 
had cabled Gibson in September 1931 'offering some thoughts and observations for 
reflection only' about Australia's exchange rate. An appreciation of the exchange, 
Niemeyer held, would 'liberate some of your finances now earmarked to meet budget 
deficits' .227 Niemeyer had already advised the New Zealand Government against 
devaluation on the basis that it would widen the budget deficit. This would, in turn, 
necessitate higher taxation falling upon exporters or, even worse, the use of Treasury 
bills to bridge the shortfall in finances. 228 
In their campaign to prevent any further appreciation, the economists* had been 
vindicated in their arguments by the findings of the Macmillan Committee in Britain 
that problems caused by fluctuations in the price level were now 'transcending in 
importance of any others of our time' (cited in Shann and Copland, 1933, 32). 
Davidson, with Shann' s help, in a Bank of NSW Circular analysed the Macmillan 
Committee's findings. It focused upon the key problem facing Australia which was not 
the exchange rate per se, but globally depressed price levels. Revaluation would 
intensify the burden of rural indebtedness and drive debtors to despair. Moreover, the 
safer option of keeping the exchange rate steady would, if export prices fell, spell 
further deflation and more adjustment of domestic costs. The logic did not convince 
Gibson even with Melville's protests within earshot. Nor, tragically, did it register with 
Lyons or Latham till much later. 
The economists - correctly as it turned out - held fears that Lyons would fall 
craven to the weight of Melbourne banking and financial interests. The Prime Minister 
had already stated that governments 'should not be entitled to dictate to those who are 
controlling the exchange what the rate should be' (Cited in Learning, 1934, 407). Shann 
identified a Melbourne-Sydhey rivalry over whom had primacy in setting the exchange. 
Melbourne, then the financial and business hub of Australia, waged a tug-of-war with 
the Sydney banks and exporting interests over the setting of the exchange rate. Shann, 
who felt that the 1931 devaluation saved the country from a 'collapse of the whole 
227 Sir 0. Niemeyer to Sir R. G. Gibson, Coded Telegram, 21/9/1931, GRG-33-3, RBA). 228 
'The Premiers' Economy Plan; Further Report by Special Committee' April 1932, National Bank of Australia Circular pp .11-12. 
* Signatories to the/v1emorandum on the Exchange Position were Copland, Giblin, Shann and R.C. Mills from the University of Sydney. Melville did not sign because of his position with the Commonwealth Bank but helped in its drafting. 
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financial system' (cited in Cain, 1985, 63), appealed to Hawker to do his utmost in 
maintaining the 'great improvement' in exchange rate management: 'Don't let the 
respectabilians and importers in Melbourne stampede you into an impossible attempt at 
deflation of prices by a further 20 per cent' .229 
** Just after the November 1931 statement was issued Copland told Latham that 
the build-up in London funds was the end result of a bumper season and would be · 
further augmented by a renewal of private capital flowing back to Australia with the 
return of a conservative government. Copland asked Latham to encourage the 
Commonwealth Bank to exercise its role as a central bank and purchase the surplus 
funds of the Australian banks held in London. With export prices subdued, revaluation 
would have farmers in despair over the Board's decision. Copland asked Latham to 
make a statement that his party was against 'unnecessary deflation', that is, it would not 
allow the exchange to appreciate. If this were done it would enshrine the new exchange 
rate policy until overseas prices intervened.230 It was to no avail. This, and subsequent 
behaviour by Latham, drew Copland's lasting bile that 'He has never been prepared to 
admit that economic policy as such can do very much' .231 Nor did Davidson get much 
purchase from Latham when he enclosed an article by Keynes that spoke of the 
precipice of outright deflation the world economy was perched upon. 232 Somewhat 
sinisterly, the article 'The Consequences to the Banks of the Collapse of Money 
Values', published in London newspapers in August 1931, had not been reproduced in 
the local press because of the political climate (Cain, 1985, 63) (Keynes, 1931, 150-
158). Davidson also made sure that Lyons received Keynes's article with the 
accompanying plea not to 'press high-handed and thoughtless measures of restoring 
parity'. 233 His bank released a statement on the dangers of revaluation. 234 Despite the 
lobbying, the economists' advice went unheeded and the prospects for enlightened 
229 E.O.G. Shann to C. Hawker, 3/12/1931, Hawker Papers, NLA. 
** Melville, at this stage, part broke rank with the other economists, not just because of his position at the 
Commonwealth Bank, but because he felt there was danger of a lop-sided boom in the exportable industries riding on 
a depreciated exchange rate and recovering prices. This fear rightly struck Shann as 'absurdly thin and pedantic' (E.O.G. Shann to C.A.S. Hawker, 18/1/1932, Hawker Papers, NLA). Despite Melville' s rather premature prophecy, 
Shann reminded the Adelaide businessman, W. Young, that Melville's command of his brief and, in particular, the 
most appropriate setting for Australia' s exchange was vastly superior to anything London opinion had to offer (E.O.G. Shann to W.G. Young 17/2/1932, BNSW: A-53-409). 
230 D 
. B. Copland to J. Latham, 30/11/1931, Latham Papers, NLA. 231D. B. Copland to H. Gepp, 5/11/1934, UMA FECC, Box 23. 232 A. C. Davidson to J. Latham, 23/12/1931, Latham Papers, NLA. 233 A. C. Davidson to J. Lyons, 23/12/1931 , Lyons Papers, NLA. 234 
'Statement on the Exchange', 11/11/1931 , BNSW: A.C. Davidson papers N2/71. 
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economic policy receded. Another opportunity presented itself when Lyons established 
an expert committee to deal with the worsening economic climate. After the rebuff upon 
the exchange rate only months earlier economists must have felt heartened that their 
expertise and input were still in demand. Indeed, with Copland and Wickens 
incapacitated from overwork Wood mused, 'I wonder whether Governments will ever 
realise the necessity of keeping a sufficient staff of scientific advisers against the day 
when adversity cometh.' 235* It was a salient point. 
At the official level the Commonwealth Bank had Melville on its staff while the 
Treasury had its first graduate economist even if Wilson was employed as an assistant 
to Giblin, the Acting Commonwealth Statistician. This internalisation of economic 
expertise was barely enough for Casey, a new and energetic member of the 
Government, who told his London confidante and mentor, Maurice Hankey, that 
Australia needed a body similar to Britain's Economic Advisory Council. 236 Such a 
body was better than having to 'depend upon sporadic and occasional advice by 
financial and economic experts hurriedly drawn together'. 237 Casey envisaged the body 
independently advising upon the exchange rate. The idea of an agency of independent 
economic advice became a hobbyhorse of Casey's though he was joined in it by an 
assortment of identities ranging from R.F. Irvine to Herbert Gepp. In Niemeyer-like 
tones, Casey went on and bemoaned to Hankey that 'Our Parliament .. .is a totally 
inadequate body to discuss economic problems, and our Government Departments are 
much less able than yours to express themselves on this type of subject'. Casey went on 
to talk about the magnitude of Australia's problems then extant, including 'our most 
inadequate civil service', 'our out of balance economy as between town and country', 
and 'our queer economic ideas about tariffs and bounties'. He closed, inimitably 
capturing the Australian economic predicament, 'We are swung about, like a tractor 
after a motor car, at the tail of the world's price levels ' .238 It is this to which we tum. 
235 G.L. Wood to M. H. Baillieu, 10/3/1932, UMA FECC, Box 13. 
* Three young promising economists - J.K. Gifford, E.R. Walker and H.C. Coombs - had gone abroad to undertake 
theses with some policy bearing upon the Depression ' s impact upon Australia. Two Tasmanian-born economists, 
Arthur Smithies (Oxford) and Keith Isles (LSE) were already overseas. 236 CPD Hansard 1255 13/10/1932. ?~7 . 
_.) The Caim,s Post 28/10/1932. 
238 R.G. Casey to M. Hankey, 30/3/1932, Hankey Papers, Churchill College. 
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6.4 The Wallace Bruce Report 
An air of economic desperation hung around the new Lyons Government. It 
impelled Giblin to think it time for a 'bold - perhaps desperate - policy to kick things 
together'. He sounded out Lyons whose Cabinet was already showing signs of division 
about the direction of economic policy.239 Possibly swayed by Giblin's advice to do 
'something' about the mounting unemployment, Lyons commissioned a group of 
businessmen and economists in March 1932 to hurriedly make a preliminary survey of 
the economic problem and, in doing so, review the appropriateness of the Premiers' 
Plan. This part of the chapter discusses the intellectual makings of the subsequent report 
and its reception. 
Melville, Shann and Giblin, in that order and weight, drew up the terms of 
reference for the inquiry. 240 They were: 'to formulate a long run policy with the aim of 
maintaining and expanding both the primary and secondary industries; and to explore 
the possibility of immediate action to tide over the period which must elapse before 
results can be expected from the long range policy.' The terms of reference were similar 
to the tasks set before the short-lived Secretariat on Employment and Production set up 
by Scullin and the Premiers in August 1931. The Secretariat's mission had been to 
formulate ways of increasing employment - something the Premiers' Plan was never 
intended to address. 241 At that forum Giblin and Dyason, arguing without much 
theoretical conviction other than pragmatism, pressed the authorities with the need for 
more public works, or reflation, to stem the alarming rise in unemployment (Wilson, 
1951, 198). 
The other economist appointed to the Wallace Bruce Committee was Mills who 
replaced Copland who had fallen ill in New Zealand. An apprehensive Giblin told his 
wife, that, with Mills' s 'conservative instincts', the prospects of a 'positive policy', that 
is, public works and credit expansion were decidedly poor. Copland's absence, 
however, did not significantly affect the bearing of the Committee's findings and he 
supported their recommendations (Cain, 1985, 2-3). Cain (1985, 4) suggests, in fact, 
239 L.F. Giblin to E. Giblin, 9/3/1932, Giblin Papers, NLA. 2
4D E.O.G. Shann to,J. La Nauze, 11/4/1932, La Nauze Papers, NLA. 241 
'Employment and Production: Report to the Premiers' Conference by the Secretariat Committee' 3 September 
1931 (cited in Cain, 1983, 209). 
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that Copland's report on New Zealand economic adjustment exerted a strong impact 
upon the Wallace Bruce Report. Giblin, while more idiosyncratic than the rest of his 
colleagues, was adamant that its findings be strong and unanimous to help Lyons 
overcome the 'hard-shelled' Cabinet minority demanding orthodox finance. 242 
While the Chairman of the Committee, Sir Wallace Bruce, was along with G. S. 
Colmen, a businessman sympathetic to economic discourse the report was, as Melville 
recalls, 'very much an economist's show' .243 Shann, who laboured tirelessly over the 
Committee's drafts, optimistically told a university colleague 'We economists - an 
inveterately hopeful band - are doing our best to push the governments into a sound 
monetary policy' (cited in Alexander, 1963, 153). He told his protege, John La Nauze, 
that he hoped the report would convince the thinking public, adding that ' ... the Treasury 
officials whom we have to use as a medium of transmission to Premiers are as snake-
headed deflationists as the bankers'. 244 Despite Shann drafting much of the report its 
genus was largely concocted by Melville. Giblin, Melville and Shann gave an in 
camera briefing of their findings to leading members of the Government at Keith 
Murdoch's house (Hart, 1967). It made for sombre listening. 
Analysis 
With primary product prices on international markets falling a further 15 per 
cent since November 1931 Australia's fundamental economic problem - export prices 
falling below the costs of production - had become acute. Australia was just 'hanging 
on' even with good seasons and efficiencies in production. 245 Since a general recovery 
of employment could, given the nature of the economy, come only by way of net 
exports, the long-term plan had to focus upon a reduction of costs since a recovery in 
export prices was now a will o' the wisp proposition. To expedite this, the Committee 
settled for a triple-folded strategy that embraced a further devaluation, compensatory 
tariff cuts and enforcing the 1931 wage cut. Copland (1937, 409) labeled it 'the middle 
course' between continued deflation and devaluation of the currency. Attracted by the 
idea of exchange rate manipulation Melville felt devaluation contained its 'own 
242 L.F. Giblin to E. Giblin, 24/3/1931, Giblin Papers, NLA. 
243 Melville Trc pg }5, NLA 
244 0 E. .G. Shann to J. La Nauze, 14/4/1932, La Nauze Papers, NLA. 
245 G.L. Wood to W.S. Robinson, 21/4/1932, UMA FECC, Box 14. 
142 
safeguards' since by penalising governments and importers by for going revenue it 
prevented the mechanism from being overly abused. 246 Melville also wanted the 
devaluation executed at a time when the London balances were healthy; to do otherwise 
would be perceived as a sign of weakness. Their recommendations came also with the 
reminder that budgetary deficits still be reduced in accordance with the Premiers' Plan. 
Indeed the Committee reiterated that there could be no plan to relieve unemployment 
until deficits, in the name of business confidence, were progressively reduced. In a key 
paragraph the Committee assimilated Theodore's line that budgetary improvement was, 
however, as much a function, as a condition of recovery (Cain, 1985, 11). 
The blended formula was, in short, a reprise of the Premiers' Plan strategy with 
the three measures deemed interdependent and inseparable.* The stress was to further 
improve Australia's relative cost structure so that the nation would be well placed to 
ride any recovery in export prices (Cain, 1985, 9). The Report also recommended that 
state parliaments make the necessary amendments to allow Arbitration Courts and wage 
boards to fix wages in line with economic circumstances. However, the economists 
generally eschewed bridging the gap between export costs and prices by solely resorting 
to cutting cost levels since this would impair financial stability and, in turn, prevent 
budgetary equilibrium from being realised. Likewise, electing to let the exchange rate 
carry the whole burden of adjustment might trigger capital flight. The most 
revolutionary proposal was not just devaluation but having the Commonwealth Bank 
Board manage the exchange rate according to economic circumstances and thereby 
making it an instrument of economic policy. For Melville this was a calculated risk 
since he hitherto felt that rational management of the exchange rate required authorities 
to be not only omniscient, but omnipotent.247 
Informed by the analytical framework of Keynes's Treatise there was also an 
underlying macroeconomic rationale behind the Committee's thinking on devaluation. 
It would allow more domestic reflation to be contemplated but only after the relative 
246 · L. G. Melville to C.A.S. Hawker, 9/5/1932, GCM-35-1, RBA. 
* An assured Copland, having just recovered from a bed-ridden bout of illness told the editor of a news magazine that 
'The Experts' report is curiously enough a restatement of Chapter 6 of my book on Credit and Currency control. 
When this Chapter was first written in 1930 it caused rather a stir among the good folk of Melbourne and the inner 
councils of the UAP. - the middle course is the very one I recommend Australia should take' (D.B. Copland to E. 
Knox, 16/4/1932, UMA, FECC, Box 17). 
247 LG. Melville to E.O.G. Shann, 30/11/1931, Shann Papers, NLA. 
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cost adjustment had been undertaken (Cain, 1985, 12; Cornish, 1993, 12). That is, more 
public investment or public works would be attempted to counter the drag of excess 
savings lying idle in bank vaults. This proposal was similar to one of the expedients 
Keynes presented before the Macmillan Committee in March 1930 to pull Britain out of 
the slump. The higher activity and devaluation would prevent the price level from 
slipping due to lower wage levels. The Australian economy would emerge, then, with 
steadier prices together with a lower real wages and restored profit margins. It was 
Melville who articulated this strategy. Shann saw some hope of cranking up capital 
expenditure which would augment, in turn, the spending power of consumers and 
thereby stabilise business confidence. It would also allow the orderly retirement of the 
formidable total of Treasury bills then extant. Giblin wanted an increase in public works 
irrespective of devaluation. His colleagues felt this might reignite Australia's trade 
deficit and bring back the spectre of default that had only just been faced down.** 
Reaction 
Within days of the Report being released the economists came under fire from 
many quarters. As Giblin intimated to Keynes there had to be something in the Experts' 
Report since 'Banks, Chambers of Commerce, Trades Hall and Mr. Lang abuse it in 
terms of equal intensity'. 248 A month before the Report's release, Giblin working 
behind the scenes, tried to solicit favourable press treatment for the report by getting 
Keith Murdoch on side, who, while equivocal, agreed that 'something' was needed and 
that the Experts' Report was the 'only plan in the field' .249 
Much criticism revolved around the clause to lower money wages to give effect 
to the 10 per cent real wage initially prescribed by the Arbitration Court. At the 
Premiers Conference to discuss the report both Premier Lang and the Acting Premier of 
Victoria, Tom Tunnecliffe, denounced it as an attack upon the working man. The West 
** There were other staunch defenders of the parity besides Gibson and the Commonwealth Bank Board. Mr. B. 
Latham, the Actuary of the Commonwealth Bank, and a confidant of Ricketson's, told the stockbroker that he was 
'distrustful of the professional economist' with his belief that the only cure for Australia 'is to live within her income' 
(Ricketson Diary extract 28/1/1932). Melville's act of wanting to tread carefully within the Bank came unstuck with 
the release of the Experts' Report. Gibson disallowed Melville from going to the Imperial Conference until the 
Governor of the Bank, Riddle, specifically requested Melville accompany him to Ottawa. Casey informed Sir Henry 
Battersbee of the Dominion's Office to keep an eye out for Melville who was 'as near a real winner in the way of an 
economist as we have produced' (R.G. Casey to Sir H. Battersbee, 10/6/1932, Hankey Papers, Churchill College). 248 L .F. Giblin to J.M. Keynes, 19/4/1932, CO/2/188, KPKC. 
249 L.F. Giblin to E. Giblin, 18/4/1932, Giblin Papers, NLA. 
144 
Australian Labor Opposition Leader, Mr. Collier, chanced his arm against the 
economists 'and all their works' even before a copy of the report reached Perth. 250* 
Even the Acting Vice-Chancellor of the University of Wes tern Australia, reproached 
him and the other economists' 'obsession' with wages: 'Why not lift your nose from its 
persistent sniffing at wages and let us know what you think of the money root of our 
problems?' (Alexander, 1963, 153). A mortified Shann, already acutely sensitive about 
uninformed attacks upon the economists, gave a riposte " ... you are a little unjust to the 
economists concerning interest. We did have the 'guts' - your phrase - to press the 
proposal of a cut in fixed money charges in the teeth of the fiercest opposition from 
Tories and 'mugwumps' ... The Australian economists are not 'concentrating on wages' 
and have not done so in any conference I have attended" (cited in Alexander, 1963, 
154). 
More effective censure of the Committee's report came from a statement issued 
by Gibson on 20 April 1932 which quelled speculation about the exchange by stating 
that the Board would not be swayed by 'sectional interests' in its decision-making; by 
sectional interests Gibson intended economists and the self-seeking Davidson. In a 
sense the Wallace Bruce report had merely intensified the exchange rate struggle 
between Davidson who ' ... talks too much,' and Gibson, 'who understands little and 
talks less' .251 Gibson did 'talk' but to bankers more than anyone. The Bank Board, 
moreover, rather disingenuously eschewed any notion of directing economic policy 
even though Gibson had told Lyons in January 1932 that the exchange rate was 'more 
than a mere banking question and indeed impinges on national policy' ( cited in Cain, 
1985, 144). 
A week before Gibson's statement, H.T. Armitage, Deputy Governor of the 
Cormnonwealth Bank, assured Ricketson that 'their people' would not be rushed into a 
quick decision about devaluation. Echoing the sentiments of private bankers, Armitage 
reminded Ricketson that the views of the 'professors' were 'academic,' in the sense that 
250 
'Blind Critics, and Worse', Adelaide Advertiser 22/4/1932. 
*Amore higher-pitched critique of the report came from Senator Sir Hal Colebatch who assailed the economists for their penchant to 'fi~' wages, the exchange rate and other economic variables as distinct from letting the market rule ('Economists' Plan; A Criticism: Currency, Wages and Trade' S.M.H. 26/4/1932). 251 G. Wood to W.S. Robinson, 21/4/1932, UMA FECC, Box 14. 
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their ideas are put forward without any notion of profit on the matter. 252 Nonetheless, 
Gibson did not take the economists' recommendations lightly. On the day the report 
was released he cabled to Montagu Norman the Committee's findings warning that if 
the economists' views prevailed there would be devaluation irrespective of Australia's 
foreign reserves. 253 While economists were surprised by Gibson's intransigence they did 
not help their cause by invoking the convention that the Bank Board remain free 'from 
both the fact and the fear of political control' in its deliberations (Shann and Copland, 
1933, 97-98). Davidson alluded to this likely problem in a cable to Robinson detailing 
the Committee's recommendations but doubting whether the Bank Board had the 
'knowledge and grasp of situation' sufficient to enable them to act wisely. 254 Perhaps 
the truth was that Davidson and the economists were, given the institutional and 
constitutional constraints facing them, seeking a Deus ex cathedra to undermine 
Gibson's campaign for revaluation. The higher authority sought was the opinion of the 
City. 
Lyons and Bruce initially welcomed the report (Shann and Copland, 1933, 96; 
Hart, 1967, 268). Bruce, in particular, facing the prospect of half a million unemployed 
before him was, according·to Bertram Stevens 'greatly influenced by the 
recommendations of the Theorists. ' 255 Lyons, the one man who had the power to direct 
Gibson upon the exchange rate, elected to sit on his hands for fear of antagonising his 
Cabinet; the experts' vision proved larger than his own ambition. Bruce, too, cooled in 
his support for the economists' argument as he looked forward to commencing duties as 
the High Commissioner in London. 
The Committee's report was a 'political Godsend' for Lyons. It was critical of 
Lang for not reducing wages in NSW and reaffirmed faith in private enterprise and 
abrogated the federal government from taking responsibility for economic policy; that 
should lie with the State wage tribunals, the Loan Council and the Commonwealth Bank 
(Cain, 1985, 13-14). The Lyons Government had, in any case, an escape clause from 
the Committee's findings by supinely upholding the convention that matters of 
252 Ricketson diary extract, 13/4/1932. 
253 R. Gibson to Sir M. Norman, Cable 20/4/1932 :BE Gl/276. 254 A.C. Davidson to D. Geddie, Cablegram 16/4/1932, BNSW: GM 302/569. 255 Ricketson diary extract, 11/4/1932. 
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exchange deliberation remain with the Bank Board. However, the Board was asked to 
take into consideration the effect upon the economy, both internally and externally, of 
their policy deliberations. Upon reflection it appears that Gibson had persuaded Lyons 
that preserving Australia's financial architecture and international standing was a 
greater concern than domestic economic activity. Another key consideration was that 
the economy was beginning to recover, in any case, from the mixture of unintentional 
inflation from the floating debt coupled with the stimulus of reduced money costs 
(Walker 1933, 209). Nonetheless, as Schedvin pointed out the failure to devalue was a 
major policy error and lengthened Australia's tenure within depression. As it was, the 
Premiers' Conference summoned to discuss the Committee's report quickly fell into 
stalemate because Lyons refused to arrange a loan program until the recalcitrant States 
committed themselves to the report, particularly the need to contain deficits and 
enforcing the 1931 wage cut. The conference afforded Lang a last opportunity to attack 
the 'professors' and 'experts' for being inconsistent in having reversed their views 
about the relationship between the budget and the economy (Cain, 1985, 35-36). There 
was a general consensus at the Conference that 'economy alone is not the solution' .256 
That is, bearing down upon expenditure would merely worsen the prospects of 
achieving budgetary balance. Lang, together with Acting Premier Tunnecliffe from 
Victoria, took the economists to task for excluding overseas rentiers from making any 
sacrifice. Despite the political stalemate Gibson had, in fact, made up the Government's 
mind for them. It was a major setback for the economists, but one they were not readily 
prepared to accept. Their greatest surprise, though, was to find the Empire's most 
eminent economist, J.M. Keynes, playing a key role in undermining their case. 
6.5 Keynes and Australia 
Keynes had always taken an abiding interest in Australia's fortunes, triggered by 
both intellectual curiosity and his private financial portfolio advice. This part of the 
chapter discusses the episode where Keynes turned his attention to the Australian 
economy and the line economists were taking to stimulate activity. In 1929 he observed 
how Australia was 'gravely embarrassed by the fall in the price of their staple exports 
and was craven to borrow at 'whatever rate lenders demand of them ( cited in Markwell, 
256 CPD Hansard, 1422, 20/10/1932. 
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1985, 13; Cornish, 1993, 17). At one stage Keynes even advised against subscribing to 
Australian loan issues (Gilbert, 1973, 79). * 
Having a pecuniary interest in Australian securities, Keynes was in regular 
contact with two of its leading businessmen, C.L. Baillieu and W.S. Robinson and the 
two economists Giblin and Copland on academic and economic policy matters. There 
was, in addition, an abiding interest in how a semi-industrialised, rural-based economy 
could extricate itself from serious economic and financial difficulties. In 1930 Lyons 
had urged the London-bound Scullin to contact Keynes as he had correctly predicted 
that the storm centre of the early stages of the depression would fall upon primary good 
exporting, debt-laden countries like Australia. Like other British economists, it struck 
Keynes that Australian counterparts had been uncommonly influential in the running of 
their country's economic affairs (Goodwin, 1974, 235). 
Such was Keynes's prestige in Australia that, at one point, Baillieu, Robinson 
and Keith Murdoch hatched an extraordinary plan to bring him out to Australia for a 
study tour; writing exclusively for the latter's newspapers - for the princely fee of 
£2500. Oswald Falk, one of Keynes's business associates, relayed the proposal to 
him. 257 It drew an immediate response. He told his wife Lydia Lopokova 'I have an 
invitation to go to Australia for six months for a fee of £2,500 and all expenses. I shall 
refuse'. 258 
The counterfactual 'what if'? aspect to this issue would prove intriguing. One 
could safely argue that Keynes's advice - the tenor of which we know - would have 
given him a less frosty reception than that meted out to Niemeyer. Perhaps, too, a 
greater appreciation of the local facts might have led Keynes to alter his, at times, rather 
patronising view of Australia's economic options in 1932. In a sense Keynes did 'come' 
to Australia, albeit in the form of an incisive, though lopsided, review of the Wallace 
Bruce Report. It came, too, at a tenth of the cost to the Murdoch chain of 
newspapers.259 Apart from also receiving a handwritten summary of the Committee's 
* It might be argued that Keynes's views of Australian economic policy was coloured by his advice to friends upon 
the holding of Australian bonds. The equivalent to that line of thought was that since Sir Robert Gibson banked with 
the National Bank of Australasia he was attendant to the trading banks' views upon monetary policy. 
257 0 
. Falk to J.M. K~ynes, 17/3/1932, KPKC. 
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259 C. L. Baillieu to J.M. Keynes, 7/4/1932, KPKC. 
148 
findings from Robinson26° Keynes also received Davidson's version of the Committee's 
findings 261 which he found 'very useful'.* 262 
The Report of the Australian Experts 
Keynes, as always, wrote his draft quickly but this commission caused him 
uncharacteristic unease. In enclosing a draft for comment, Keynes admitted to Baillieu 
that it was 'a responsible task writing it' and that it was a struggle 'to strike just the 
right note' .263 Keynes's review was dispatched on the 25 May 1932 and splashed over 
the front pages of the Melbourne Herald on 27 June when the Wallace Bruce Report 
was released. 
The Report of the Experts' Committee, as Keynes's precis became known, was 
an enigmatic account that drew many reviews, the most incisive being Cain (1985), 
Markwell (1985) and Turnell (1999). While in some ways the memorandum had an 'all 
things to all men' quality, the general tenor was unmistakably clear, nan1ely, that the 
Australian (and New Zealand) economists 'are all disposed to be a little too drastic and 
to attempt to cure troubles that are really incurable so long as the existing international 
environment persists. The object should be rather to hold the situation than to try and 
force through impracticable adjustments upon wages and the exchange rate and run the 
risk in the process of social upheaval'. 264 Keynes ( 1982, 95) was therefore extremely 
reluctant to support the Committee's recommendation for a further devaluation because 
he felt that the level of prices countenanced was not 'a practical working hypothesis,' 
that is, it was too pessimistic and quite unsustainable given the structure of national and 
international indebtedness. Australia would be guilty, moreover, of exchange dumping. 
Keynes felt that the proposed action would be the act, the ref ore, of a bad neighbour and 
instead of promoting international co-operation would engender more competitive 
devaluations. The only devaluation Keynes (1982, 83) was prepared to accept was 
sterling which would lighten Australia's debt and give the global economy a fillip. 
260 · W.S. Robinson to J.M. Keynes, 16/4/1932, KPKC. 
261A.C. Davidson to J.M. Keynes, Cablegram, 16/4/1932, KPKC. 
* The visiting J.G. Latham dined with Keynes and others on the evening of 12/4/1932. Latham might have informed 
Keynes about Australian political developments including the Lang factor. 
262 Summary of Wall~ce Bruce report in A32/l/244, KPKC. 
263 J.M. Keynes to C.L. Baillieu, A/32/1, KPKC. 
264 J.M. Keynes to H. Belshaw, 24/5/1932, L/32/113, KPKC. 
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Keynes also derided the option of further reducing money wages on both practical and 
theoretic grounds. He ( 1982, 99) suggested that further resort to cutting money wages 
would, in the absence of a new source of fresh purchasing power, be the case where 
'prices are related to costs after the same fashion as her tail to a cat'. Devaluation, in 
any case would achieve the same outcome. As Colin Clark ( 1979, 5) later recalled this 
observation on wage cuts led Keynes to make the only reference to Australia in The 
General Theory, citing that attempts to adjust wages to prices over the business cycle 
would prove futile. In concluding, Keynes delicately chided his Australian colleagues: 
"If, therefore, I were an Australian economist advising Mr. Lyons today, I 
should be decidedly moderate in my view. I should recommend him to ride his 
difficult and suffering steed with as light a rein as he dare. I should not press for 
heroic measures. It is a time to chastise gently. Moreover, I should have 
sufficient confidence to take this line, precisely because Australia has done so 
much already, and has been relatively so successful in her programme of 
necessary adjustment - if only, in spite of disappointments, she could, by 
comparison with the state of others, know it! There is more chance of 
improving the profitableness of business by fostering enterprise and by such 
measures as public works than by a further pressure on money-wages or further 
forcing of exports. The problems of the Budget and of Unemployment are more 
pressing than that of the Balance of Trade" (Shann and Copland, 1933 ). 
While Copland strangely likened Keynes's words to 'a breath of warm, fresh 
air', the latter was urging his Australian colleagues to lobby for more domestic 
stimulation regardless of the external account (Markwell, 1985, 18-20). Copland and 
Shann (1933, xiii) issued a statement defending the position of the economists on the 
Wallace Bruce committee, declaring that: 
' ... we are already doing all the things Mr. Keynes recommends as much as 
courage and prudence allows. But they form parts of a policy the central 
principle of which is and must be the restoration of balanced budgets as the chief 
test of our success in retaining economic control'. 
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Giblin begged to publicly differ with Keynes on the devaluation option. 265 He 
argued that Keynes would be unaware that Australia's trade surplus came by dint of 
exports having risen due to two exceptionally favourable seasons. In more normal 
times, however, Australia would need the insurance of a devaluation to generate the 
trade surplus necessary to meet her external obligations. 
In private correspondence with Keynes, Giblin advised that his main grievance 
with the committee was not over the exchange rate but over their reluctance to 
unequivocally sanction public works. 266 On this, of course, Giblin shared the same 
view as Keynes though his theoretic case was not as well grounded. Feeling isolated 
alongside his three colleagues, Giblin intimated to Keynes the inner agenda of the 
Committee. Like the Premiers' Plan, it had been 'too pre-occupied with the narrowness 
of the bank and financial people' to the extent that the case for immediate public works 
to stem the growing rates of unemployment was deemed secondary to that of restoring 
business confidence. Like Keynes, Giblin felt that the danger of social dislocation from 
high unemployment should have been given equal billing. Consequently upon signing 
the Report, albeit, 'with some hesitation', Giblin issued a private letter to Lyons urging 
some 'immediate action ... be taken to relieve the strain, until the long term policy bears 
fruit'. 267 His ideas had antecedents in the Scullin-appointed Secretariat of 
Unemployment, which had been commissioned with identifying feasible, remunerative 
public works to alleviate unemployment (Hytten, 1971, 64). Giblin's report concluded 
that 'artificial methods of creating credit' to the tune of 18 million pounds, a la 
Theodore, be raised to maintain employment on public works (Hytten, 1971 , 65. 
Predictably, the Secretariat's report released in September 1931 was criticised for 
embracing the twenties' philosophy of spending for development. 
While the Wallace Bruce Committee, for its part, could not identify any 
'profitable' short-term public works, Giblin, using a modification of his own multiplier 
analysis - not Kahn's which he was unaware of - estimated that a £20m public works 
program, financed by Treasury bills, would generate employment for 100,000 workers 
265 The Herald 27/6/1932. 
266 L.F. Giblin to J.M. Keynes, 19/4/1932, Co/2/187-8, KPKC. 267 L.F. Giblin to I.A. Lyons, 13/4/1932, Co/2/189, KPKC. 
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provided the original expenditure continued (Cain, 1985, 26).* The proposed spending, 
Giblin reminded Lyons, would not only be for 'tiding over a limited period' till export 
prices recovered but also not so large as to endanger business confidence, nor invoke 
the wrath of the Commonwealth Bank Board over its method of financing and 
disbursement (Cain, 1985, 27). In signing off his missive Giblin would have known 
that his proposal was in vain since Lyon's Cabinet was increasingly becoming 
unreceptive to unorthodox advice. 268 Keynes signaled his approval of Giblin' s proposal 
and reminded him that trying to get a commercial return on the projects should be 
relaxed in the circumstances (Cain 1985, 28). 
Apart from Gibson's intransigence on the exchange rate, and Lyons's refusal to 
have the Commonwealth Government instruct the Bank Board, Melville recalls that 
what also helped to sink the Committee's report was Keynes's refusal to support a 
further devaluation (Melville, 1992, 671). Melville recalls that the Commonwealth 
Government was denied, therefore, the latitude to practise public sector stimulation by 
Keynes's reluctance to support devaluation. 269 Keynes's qualified support elsewhere for 
an increase in public expenditure - a second best solution in the Australian case -
proved of little consolation. While Schedvin (1970) and Clark (1974b; 1981) point out 
that Australian economists were deflationary in their advice during this period, they 
rarely point out that Keynes's one and only profound intervention in interwar Australian 
economic affairs helped Gibson face down the economists. The Bank Board's trenchant 
opposition to both palliative public works schemes, and devaluation meant that the 
Wallace Bruce Report 'fell between two stools' (Melville, 1992, 672). 
While Keynes agreed with Giblin that public works be pushed 'to the limits of 
prudence', neither Giblin's correspondence, nor the full, unabridged.report he 
subsequently received, enticed Keynes to revise the pitch of his original article. In 
correspondence with Giblin, Keynes, while acknowledging that there were anomalies 
between the States in wage levels, took the opportunity to demonstrate, as he had told 
Horace Belshaw, the New Zealand economist, that they were inclined 'to be too drastic 
* Giblin's stance might have been contemporaneously fortified by a memorandum on unemployment prepared for the 
Cabinet of the Victorian Government by former DMC officials, Gunn and Gepp, which posited that the problem 
would get markedly worse since business enterprise was unprofitable and economic despair widespread (UMA 
FECC, Box 15 'Me.morandum on Unemployment' H. Gepp and J. Gunn, 30/3/1932). 268 L.F. Giblin to E. Giblin, Giblin Papers, 9/3/1932, 24/3/1932, NLA. 
269 Melville Trc, pg. 25, NLA. 
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and to attempt what may be socially impossible' .270 Mulling over this afterwards, 
Keynes became even more adamant, telling Baillieu that the Wallace Bruce committee 
' .. .is inclined to be too drastic and is aiming at adjustments which are humanly 
impossible for Australia' (Keynes, 1982, 100-1). Keynes now also disputed the 
Commission's figure-work over export costs and prices thereby undermining - again -
the arguments for devaluation. Keynes felt that artificially restoring prosperity to wool 
exporters in the then abnormal conditions was 'unnecessary and altogether 
impracticable. ' 271 272 Before Giblin had a chance to reply, Keynes recycled his doubts 
about both the Committee's statistics and recommendations upon further relative 
adjustment telling Baillieu he found them 'too simpliste' .273 The letter was reproduced 
in the Melbourne Herald. 274 
If economists were disappointed by Keynes's foray into Australian economic 
policy making they did not readily show it. They had every right, because as Cain 
(1985, 17-20) cogently demonstrates, Keynes had overlooked certain key policy 
aspects, dismissed further relative cost improvements and been selective and sometimes 
self-serving in his arguments. He had, moreover, been disarmingly glib about 
Australia's economic problems, arguing that in some respects Australia was in better 
shape than other countries and could therefore spend more upon public works (Cain, 
1985, 29). In private correspondence Giblin pursued Keynes on this, pointing out the 
truly marginal existence of many rural exporters (Cain, 1985, 31). Nonetheless the 
thrust of Keynes's remarks stuck. In this respect, several authors besides Schedvin, 
namely Clark (1976), Colin Clark (1958), Sinclair (1971) and Hancock (1972), have 
condemned Australian economists for their position at this time. 
As discussed in section 2.4 in Chapter Two, however, these reviewers tend to 
overlook, as Keynes did, the delicate and problematic circumstances confronting the 
Australian economy. First and foremost there was the direct relationship between public 
spending and the deficit on the external account (Cain, 1985, 17-18). Secondly, the guilt 
270 J.M. Keynes to L.F. Giblin, 2/6/1932, CO/2/195, KPKC. 
27 1 Ibid. 
272 Meanwhile, Shann and Melville, heading home from the Ottawa conference via London, were to be sorely disappointed when told by Keynes and Hawtrey, inter alia, the same advice, namely, that Australia should focus upon 
achieving internal ~quilibrium rather than fussing over exchange rates (Holder, 1970, 744). 273 J.M. Keynes to C. Baillieu 24/5/1932, and C Baillieu to J.M. Keynes, 2/6/1932, A/32/1/293, KPKC. 274 
'Production costs: Mr. Keynes doubts 20 per cent gap ' The Herald 5/7/1932. 
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and waste of a prodigal past hung in the air. Copland felt that 'Australian governments 
had ... shot their bolts before 1930 and so were in no position for bold initiatives' (Cain, 
1980, 17). That is, Australian governments had exhausted their credit of public 
borrowing to exercise what Keynes in the Treatise called 'nature's remedy' to prevent 
business losses in a slump (Bland and Mills, 1931, 162). Thirdly, greater public 
spending at this stage would have upset the deficit reduction strategy enshrined in the 
Premiers' Plan which was, in tum, fostering business confidence. Keynes completely 
overlooked this aspect, whereas the Australian economists, already mindful of the 
concern the huge amount of Treasury bills was causing the authorities, did not (Cain, 
1985, 20). Nor do latter-day critics of Australian economists seem aware of Keynes's 
earlier praise of their predecessors' involvement in public policy, especially the line 
Copland and Giblin took. 275 Keynes (1982), for instance, spoke of being 'intensely 
sympathetic' to the Report's 'general method of approach'. By that he meant the 
strategy of relative cost adjustment to improve Australia's competitive position. He 
praised Australian efforts in that regard and acknowledged the use of the 'National 
Treaty' expedient of an across-the-board cut in costs and debts which he had raised 
before the Macmillan Cormnittee. 
Nonetheless Keynes's review of the Wallace Bruce Report must have 
exasperated and puzzled the Australian economists. They would have agreed with 
Keynes's confession at the start of his comrnentary that 'It is a rash thing to write from a 
great distance on a matter which demands practical judgement more than theory' (1982, 
94). While he would not have concurred, Keynes was barging in on an applied and 
specific economic problem which Australian economists probably knew best to deal 
with. However it was a different matter on theory. As Caimcross (1996, 88) notes, 
Keynes's infllliating genius was that he would modify his ideas with changing 
circumstances. Keynes's review of the Expert's Report was a classic case, therefore, of 
having to discern and identify the changing nature of his ideas as he shifted position on 
theory and policy. And here the Australian economists were lagging behind. Keynes 
felt that the relying upon monetary measures like interest rates and exchange rates to 
drive a wedge between costs and prices in a bid to revive economic activity were 
becoming ineffective and outmoded~ something bolder, like public expenditure was 
275 J.M. Keynes to C.L. Baillieu, 14/7/1932, A/32/1/307, KCKP. 
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-needed to jolt the economy into expansion. In terms of theoretical development Keynes 
was at a crossroads, moving in early 1932 from one Marshallian analysis of an 
economic system where the quaesitium was price changes to one where it was the 
change in quantities (Turnell, 1999, 400). 
Aftermath 
In subsequent correspondence with Giblin, Keynes returned to the vexed issue 
of devaluation, arguing that it would 'not be very material' and, in any case, would 
merely compound the downward pressure on Australia's export prices. This translated 
into diminishing the sterling or gold equivalent of Australia's exports. In any case, too 
much rural production for export was hindering the longed-for recovery in export 
prices. Keynes went on to concede that if Giblin' s 'rather pessimistic prognostications' 
about Australian export prices in the future came to pass, 'it will in effect be impossible 
for Australia to meet her London charges in a season of only normal productivity. It is 
no good attempting the hopeless task of reaching adjustment on the basis of meeting 
your London charges without any rise in the price of your exports' .276 In other words, 
under those trying circumstances Keynes saw no other option but for Australia to 
default on her overseas commitments. This startling admission by Keynes was kept 
from public consumption; Bruce, however, would use the threat of default to force 
London to embark upon a more expansionary monetary policy to the benefit of the 
Dominions (Turnell, 1996, 17). Even Giblin was taken aback by Keynes's talk of 
default. Later, however, after drafting a document, 'The Burden of External Debt,' for 
official edification, he assimilated Keynes's global view of the problem at hand, namely 
that 'the effect of the Australian effort to preserve external solvency must have been to 
intensify and prolong the depression.' By that Giblin referred to Australia cutting its 
imports by half and physically increasing its rural exports by one third. 277 By the end of 
1932 Giblin told Melville: 
"If every debtor nation strives to meet its foreign obligations and succeeds -
whether by exchange or tariffs, or by reducing internal costs and expanding 
exports - then the result is going to be the further drying up of trade, further falls 
276 J.M. Keynes t~ L.F. Giblin, 31/8/1932, Co/2/214, KCKP. 277 
'Memorandum No 6, The Burden of External Debt, N.D, UMA FECC, Box 213, Giblin Collection,. 
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---
in price and general intensification of the depression. I fancy a condition 
precendent to recovery is a scaling down of all internal debt. .. so I should be 
inclined to use the higher exchange rate as an argument for debt readjustment in 
the first place - and I'm not sure that I would not default rather than raise the 
exchange in the last resort". 278 
Melville would tend to agree with this prognosis following the lack of resolve by 
Britain at the Ottawa talks to activate a concerted monetary expansion that would assist 
indebted commodity exporting countries like Australia. He told Senator Colebatch that 
Britain's refusal to engage in such action forced Australia to reconsider devaluation or 
'a more direct method of cutting debts' (cited in Turnell, 1999, 65). 
Bruce's departure to London removed a player receptive to expansionist 
thinking, though Davidson had noticed that he was more interested 'with the body of 
London opinion which takes a deflationary view of the economic problems confronting 
Australia' ( cited in Cain, 1985, 59). His replacement as Assistant-Treasurer, Senator 
Massy-Greene, was a hard-nosed believer in orthodoxy with a 'great natural gift' for 
finance (Kemp, 1964 ). Giblin felt the new appointee was a good man with an 
intelligence to match, 'but with a deflationary bias also a little hampered by the 
invariable Treasury complex with its preoccupation over Government receipts and 
expenditure' .279 For his part, Massy-Greene was distrustful of high officialdom and he 
did not entertain a high opinion of economists (Kemp, 1_964, 135). He was, for 
instance, scathing of Giblin's paper upon 'Exchange and Tariffs' prepared for the July 
1932 Premiers' Conference (Cain, 1985, 54). Giblin had modelled the economic effects 
of a massive devaluation before settling for one of lower magnitude. The dilemma 
Giblin faced was how to sustain the level of Australian rural exports without resorting 
to devaluation. That, he thought, would almost certainly invite retaliation. Massy-
Greene felt that 'arbitrary' exchange rate movements did little to elicit any further 
export gains of either commodities or manufactures but would rather merely reignite a 
capital flight problem at a most injudicious time. 280 With that rebuttal, and most of the 
278 L.F. Giblin to ~.G. Melville, 3/12/1932, UMA FECC, Box 15. 279 L.F. Giblin to E. Giblin, 29/6/1932, Giblin Papers, NLA. 280 Sir W. Massy-Greene to L.F.Giblin, 11/7/1932, Giblin Papers, NLA. 
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-Wallace Bruce Report, economic policy took a deflationist tum, something which the 
next part of the chapter will focus upon. 
6.6 Orthodoxy Regained 
The Premiers' Conference of July 1932 was to prove a setback insofar as 
enlightened economic policy was concerned. Budgetary, monetary and exchange policy 
was now, with Lyons' connivance, in Gibson's lap. Perversely, the Australian 
economists' monetary reform proposals for the Imperial Trade Conference at Ottawa, 
which met with Government approval, helped Lyons fudge the Wallace Bruce Report 
on the premise that the conference would deliver the export bonanza economists were 
trying to engineer. That is, if successful, Ottawa would deliver an increase in the 
velocity of trade within the British Empire that, when coupled with cheap money, would 
allow world prices to rise. While the delegations voted in favour of the monetary 
resolutions put forward by Shann and Melville, there was little multilateral action to 
follow up the good intentions. Meanwhile, the approach of the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, to raising prices - restricting production rather than by 
monetary expansion in the locomotive economies - was anathema to the Australian 
economists (Turnell, 1999). 
Besides the promise of greater inter-imperial trade represented by Ottawa, 
Giblin attributed Lyons' volte-face over the Wallace Bruce Report to tiredness and the 
loss of Bruce.281 Lyons spoke of feeling 'isolated' in Cabinet. 282 His isolation was 
accentuated in September with the departures in quick succession of Fenton, over tariff 
levels, and Hawker, who resigned over politicians' salaries (Sawer, 1963, 43). It was 
difficult, however, to ascertain whether there were more sinister forces at play behind 
Lyons' back down, other than to tailor a policy that curried favour with a conservative 
Cabinet. In this critical instance, Lyons' decision to defer to Gibson's wishes was 
ultimately borne of the conventional belief that the Commonwealth Bank should 
exercise full, untrammeled authority over money and banking matters - a position he 
spelt out in detail while responding to Country Party calls for a more expert 
281 L.F. Giblin to E. Giblin, 6/7/1932, Giblin Papers, NLA. 282 Ricketson diary 23/4/1932 
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management of the exchange rate (Cain, 1985, 56-57; Giblin, 1951, 142).283 Lyons 
would later declare that no one had been closer to Gibson than himself and that no one 
knew the problems confronting the Bank Board better than its Chairman did. 284 The 
Wallace Bruce Report had not helped matters by agreeing that the exchange rate be 
managed by the Commonwealth Bank 'free from both the fact and the fear of political 
control'(cited in Cain 1985, 9). The caveat here was that the Committee wanted the 
Bank Board to take into account economic considerations in their brief. 
The necessity of having an independent monetary authority was reinforced by 
the repudiation antics of Lang. Lang held up the rehabilitation process simply because 
no constructive economic policy was possible whilst the strongest state, NSW, was out 
of kilter with the rest of Australia. The removal of Lang from office in May 1932 
steeled Gibson and Lyons to apply the Plan to the letter on the pretext that economic 
spring would now be in the offing. 
Neither, however, had reckoned upon the feisty, independent mind of the newly 
elected Premier of New South Wales. Bertram Stevens would prove just as big a thorn 
in the side of the Federal Government as Lang (Cain, 1985, 61). Stevens used his 
accounting background to circumvent the Federal Government's Financial Agreement 
Act which limited loan expenditure. State authorities by-passed that legislation to spend 
money upon public works (McFarlane and Healey, 1990, 8). The NSW electorate had 
elected Stevens because they wanted a 'strong man' who 'would get things done' 
(McCarthy, 1979, 155). Lyons complained to Bruce that with Stevens 'one is 
continually sabotaged from behind' .285 First signs of this appeared when Stevens briefed 
and egged on by Copland and Davidson, put the Wallace Bruce Report back on the 
agenda at the July 1932 Premiers' Conference.286 The NSW Assistant Treasurer, E. 
Spooner, was equally adamant that Australia 'must blaze a new trail', and that 'deflation 
had gone too far' in terms of economic reconstruction. Before the NSW Branch of the 
Economic Society, Spooner sang the praises of the Wallace Bruce Committee as 'the 
first really comprehensive proposal for reconstruction that had been placed before the 
283 
'Overseas exchange: Government's policy defended by Mr. Lyons', SMH 16/7/1932. 284 SlvfH 27/8/1934. 
285 J. Lyons to S. M. Bruce, 2/11/1932, Lyons Papers, NLA. 286 D.B. Copland to B. Stevens, 13/7/1932, UMA FECC, Box 32. 
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Premiers'. 287 There was good cause for this position since rural export prices had 
tumbled 30 per cent since July 1931, spelling further blowouts to budget deficits. 
Furthermore, with a huge State deficit to wind back, Stevens told Gibson that cutting 
back public expenditure was 'counterproductive', besides being undertaken within a 
completely unrealistic timeframe. 288 Earlier, Davidson had briefed Stevens that 'while 
the balancing of budgets is essential to economic recovery it cannot itself promote such 
a recovery. The budget situation is indeed as much an effect as a cause of existing 
economic difficulties' .289 Duly enlightened, Stevens held that the Wallace Bruce Report 
'pointed the way' with its hydra-headed emphasis upon wages, exchange and tariff 
revision. It was 'a sound economic policy of reconstruction' (cited in Cain, 1985, 43). 
Lyons relented, issuing a resolution that, while adhering to the Premiers' Plan 
the federal government would thereupon 'conduct public policy with a view to reviving 
industry so as to restore normal employment'. 290 This was an admission that there 
would be more public works. Brigden feared the effect upon business confidence of the 
confusion of opinion over the exchange rate, public spending and funding (1932, 1). 
The issue of the extent of Treasury bills in circulation was hard to reconcile since there 
were no standards for judgement with the emergency being faced. The Commonwealth 
Bank Board wanted to 'play for safety' and reduce their circulation.291 Backstage the 
economists were waging a campaign, via the press, to again bring the spotlight back on 
the exchange rate. Copland reminded Davidson and Premier Stevens that 'The exchange 
problem is a matter of public policy on which the bank must have a direction from 
parliament'. 292 293 
Getting to the nub of the issue, Davidson lamented to Lyons that there had been 
clear signs of a marked 'reorientation towards a policy of deflation' commensurate with 
'dangerous tendencies of financial thought' circulating (Holder, 1970, 737). In his 1932 
Crawford oration, Davidson argued that the Commonwealth Bank does everything in its 
287 
'Reconstruction: Mr. Spooner view's', SMH 6/8/1932. 288 B. Stevens to Sir R .Gibson, 11/10/1932, UT 21/4-6. 289 A.C. Davidson to B.S.B . Stevens 2/7/1932, Lyons Papers, NLA. 290 W.C. Hankinson to Sir H. Batterbee, 12/7/1932, PRO: Tl60/808/l 1935/7. 291 L.G. Melville to R. Kershaw, 21/12/1932, BE: OV13/2. 292 
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powers to keep prices up as it was 'the most hopeful expedient of relief from the 
torment of depression in the midst of abundance' (Copland and Shann, 1933, 206). 
Deaf to such sentiment, Lyons spoke optimistically about how the upcoming 
international conference upon imperial trade and monetary reform would bide Australia 
well if only she maintained an even keel in domestic economic policy.# The new Labor 
Premier of Queensland, W.S.Forgan-Smith, argued that the Premiers' Plan was 
insufficient to generate recovery. 294 Nor did waiting for international co-operation 
console him. Citing Brigden and Keynes, Forgan Smith, a Theodore protege, rejected 
fears of crowding-out if the Commonwealth should open its purse strings and begin 
spending (Thompson, 1965, 136; Cain 1985, 45). Unlike Stevens, Forgan Smith 
actually agreed with Keynes's conclusions about the Wallace Bruce Report and looked 
instead for the government to take the lead. Stevens, impatient with Lyons' preference 
for leaving the exchange rate issue lie until after Ottawa, accused him of 'fiddling while 
Rome bums'. 295 
As a consequence, Lyons asked Giblin, as Acting Statistician, to model the 
necessary exchange rate alteration in lieu of a wage cut, which would give Australia a 
competitive advantage (Cain, 1985, 47). Giblin and Copland had already accepted 
Keynes's point that relative cost adjustment was in the circumstances best expedited by 
devaluation than wage cuts (Copland, 1932, 118). Meanwhile, the Commonwealth 
Bank became nervous about the growth in the floating debt and was increasingly 
critical about using Treasury bills to finance public works. Even Shann warned that the 
'the swelling tallies' of Treasury bills could result in a distorted, public sector-led 
economy; it was a curious admission given his position as economic adviser to 
Davidson's bank which had been instrumental in taking them up. 296 The trading banks 
had been at first reluctant to hold the bills as part of their cash reserves till Davidson, 
realising their generous returns, led the way and absorbed then as bank reserves 
(Holder, 1970). 297 The purchase of the bills by banks involved no reduction of their 
# Nor did Keynes entertain high hopes of the Ottawa conference since proceedings would be in the hands of the 
'ultra-conservative' Neville Chamberlain and Montagu Norman and, as he told Clive Baillieu, 'they can be relied on 
to nip anything constructive in the bud, and no one else will have sufficient knowledge and energy to force them 
along the right lines' ( J.M. Keynes to C. Baillieu, A/32/1/302, KPKC). 294 W.C. Hankinson to Sir H. Batterrbee, 12/7/1932, PRO: Tl60/808/11935/7. 295 SMH 2/7/1932 . 
296 
. E.O.G. Shann to C.A.S. Hawker, 18/1/1932, Shann Papers, NLA. 297 R.N. Kershaw to L.F. Giblin, 29/5/1947, BE: Gl/288. 
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reserves but rather they grew as the credit provided to Governments gave rise, in turn, 
to new deposits. 
The issue of funding, that is, retiring short-term government debt by raising 
public loans, was to prove the next testing ground over which the economists waged 
battle with the Bank Board. The issue revolved around the tendency to inflation as 
against deflation. In the debate Casey (1933, 62) commented upon how some of the 
'most orthodox economists in Australia' were now in favour of the former expedient. 
Not denying the palpable benefit Treasury bills had upon his bank's balance sheet, 
Davidson argued that reducing their volume in circulation would not just tighten credit 
generally but also prevent a much-needed reduction in interest rates. 298 
Since trading banks regarded Treasury bills as part of their reserves the fear of 
the Bank Board, articulated by Melville's input, was that as the economy improved 
these reserves could form the basis of a massive and inflationary expansion of bank 
lending. Alarmed at this prospect Gibson 'put a pistol' to the heads of the Premiers by 
insisting upon a speedier reduction in budget deficits before he would allow credits for 
public works. 299 One English observer at the July 1932 Premiers Conference, W. 
Hankinson, likened the spendthrift States to recalcitrant children, who, having refused 
their breakfast, would face the same bow 1 of 'cold porridge' later before something 
more palatable was served up.300 
Meanwhile Stevens's advocacy for devaluation saw him perceived as being 
under the sway of Davidson. However, it was Copland that supplied the arguments to 
Stevens, demonstrating how a revaluation would be disastrous for the country.301 
Stevens had brought Copland up to Sydney to brief him upon finance and economic 
matters overlooking therefore the economics expertise at the University of Sydney. 302 
Stevens and Forgan Smith's refusal to toe the line exasperated Gibson. The 
sniping attacks by economists, and Davidson, upon the exchange rate, and now funding, 
298 A.C. Davidson to J. Lyons, Telegram 21/10/1931, Lyons Papers, NLA. 299 R.G. Casey to Sir H. Batterbee, 13/7/1932, Hankey Papers, Churchill College. 300 W. Hankinson to Sir H. Batterbee, 12/7/1932, PRO: Tl60/808/11935/7. 301 D.B. Copland to B.S.B. Stevens, 25/8/1932, UMA FECC, Box 32. 302 P.A. Bland to E.R. Walker, 20/11/1932, Bland Papers, University of Sydney Archives. 
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together with the States stonewalling on their deficits, brought Gibson to the end of his 
tether. 303 Feeling his authority slipping away, Gibson wanted a public loan of some 
twenty million floated with over half of the proceeds intended for funding. Stevens 
accused Gibson at the October 1932 Loan Council meeting of behaving like a banker to 
borrowers caught short and imposing humiliating conditions upon them. Intending to 
put Stevens in his place, Gibson, in a bravura performance, thundered that he was 'the 
horse and cart and the dog under the cart' as far as the Australian financial system was 
concerned. 304 The truth was that he was not and it was the economists, including 
Mel ville, that were undermining him. 
303 Sir Robert Gibsc;m's daughter movingly records in her unfinished memoir of him the strain the contretemps was having upon him (Gibson papers SLY). 304 Ricketson diary, 26/10/1932. 
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6. 7 'Deflationists in the bag' - Orthodoxy challenged 
Apart from the States' resistance to funding, Gibson's outburst was probably 
sparked by frustration at having been unable to press on with returning the Australian 
pound to parity with sterling. When Gibson announced his intention to regain parity in 
late 1932, economists, in league with exporters and the Country Party, engaged in a 
campaign to prevent it. Copland and Giblin met with the Sheehan over the matter but 
both were wary that Gibson might see this as undue interference. 305 After another 
meeting with Sheehan, Copland told his Sydney-based colleague, Claude Janes, that it 
had been 'a great comfort' to talk to the Treasury official who, fearing too much 
deflationary impulses were being unleashed upon the economy, wanted the Board to 
take a 'reasonable view' of things with respect to the exchange rate and funding. 306 
In the gathering light of the mixed outcomes from the Imperial Trade 
Conference, economists felt that conventional opinion had to be made more exchange 
rate conscious than hitherto. Economists, therefore, eagerly lent their support to Senator 
Hardy of the Country Party who called for a Royal Commission upon the exchange rate 
matter. To further that end, Janes, Head of the Economics Section at the Wales, liaised 
with the leader of the Country Party, Earle Page, over the likely personnel for the 
Commission as well as drafting a ten ta ti ve terms of reference. Janes told Copland that 
it was his impression Lyons might welcome the opportunity of shifting the 
responsibility of exchange rate policy to a body of experts. 307 Copland, happy to lend 
his support, informed Janes of the Realpolitik behind the issue: 
'My feeling is that you must persuade the people in London and the Government 
to do this by a little well-organised propaganda there as to the meaning of the 
exchange rate to Australia. Moreover it should not hesitate to deal with the 
attitude of shareholders of the London banks operating in Australia. They are 
the real devils in the piece' . 308 
To that end, Copland, spurred on by Davidson, engaged in an attempt to educate 
high opinion in the City and, no doubt, financial interests in Australia by penning a 
305 D.B. Copland to L.G. Giblin, 2/9/1932, UMA FECC, Box 15. 306 D.B. Copland to C. Janes, 12/10/1932, UMA FECC, Box 15. 
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piece for the Economic Journal attacking Niemeyer and Gregory's recommendations 
that New Zealand neither devalue its exchange nor engage in Treasury bill finance as 
Australia had done (Copland, 1932b, 378-9). While the article was ostensibly about 
New Zealand's likely economic course it had resonance with the policies Australia was 
pursuing. Although Copland had completed the article as early as April 1932 it only 
appeared in the September issue of the journal. Davidson actually expressed his 
annoyance to Keynes that the article had not appeared earlier, stressing 'Time is the 
essence of the contract and September may be too late. Criticism of such deflationary 
policy is urgently needed on this side and you should lend support to opponents of 
deflation on your side'. 309 
Towards the end of the year, Copland (1932c) penned another piece for the same 
journal, further extolling the anti-deflationary virtues of Treasury bill finance, the rapid 
issue of which concerned not just the Bank Board but also the City. In a reprise of his 
earlier article, Copland warned that the zealous pursuit of funding and rehabilitating the 
exchange rate would be detrimental to the Australia' s financial system by intensifying 
the real debt burden. He closed by noting how the Bank Board seemed oblivious of the 
dangers of falling back int9 deflation, nor did it 'realise the enormous powers it now 
possesses for guiding Australia along the present course of credit creation to avoid 
unnecessary deflation' (Copland, 1932c, 587). 
At the academic level Copland told the University of Yale economist, Irving 
Fisher, that he believed he had basically anticipated his debt deflation theory which 
predicted that orthodox economic policy efforts to work off debt actually intensified it. 
Australian banks, he told Fisher, quickly found that they have fixed money claims to 
meet but with assets that would shrink as deflation proceeds. While he did not pursue 
the matter, Copland drew Fisher' s attention to a series of press articles he had written in 
1930, later consolidated in his Credit and Currency Control, upon the dangers of 
following deflationary policies.310 
While Copland and Janes doubted the ability of Page to get the exchange rate on 
the agenda it all became academic when Reading, informed by Melville and Shann, 
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reported about London opinion concerning the future for the global economy, alerted 
the Board to the likely precariousness of export prices in the near future (Turnell, 1999, 
49; Cornish, 1993, 443). This persuaded the Bank Board to override Gibson's wishes 
and keep the exchange rate steady. The Bank of England decreed moreover that it had 
no objection to the Australian exchange rate moving in accordance with internal 
conditions (Schedvin, 1970, 363). Giblin sought out his bete noire, Sir Otto Niemeyer, 
to confirm the change of heart. He received a letter from Niemeyer, full of English 
understatement, precisely to that effect. 311 This was enough for Copland to tell his 
colleague at the Wales 'I think at the moment we have the deflationists in the bag, but 
how long we can hold them there is another matter'. 312 
Apart from Gibson wanting to 'rehabilitate' the exchange rate, Lyons knew that 
devaluation would have a detrimental impact upon Bruce's brief in London of 
converting Australia's loan portfolio. Australia continued to import more than what her 
export income could warrant and this, in Copland's view, could only be checked by 
devaluation. Theodore felt more tariff protection was the answer. Giblin disparaged this 
line of thought believing it would only make Gibson 'an even greater menace to 
Australia than he is' (Cited in Cain 1985, 56-57). Copland told Stevens that the Bank 
Board was 'acting imprudently' over the matter and that the Bank should be brought to 
account over it just as any other recalcitrant was for not playing their part in the 
economic rehabilitation of Australia. 313 At last official and academic opinion had 
penetrated through to the Bank Board that Australia could ill-afford the revaluation 
Gibson dearly wanted to impose. 
Copland's (1932, 113-117) temperate optimism about the deflationists 'being in 
the bag' was also based upon how Gibson had been checked about raising a huge public 
loan purely intended for retiring short term public debt. Lyons complained to Bruce that 
Stevens should be treated warily since he 'is persistently advocating a policy on 
monetary matters directly opposed to our own' 314 But Gibson's public loan proposal 
also met with the disapproval of the Assistant-Treasurer, Massy-Greene, who told his 
predecessor Bruce 'He (Gibson) is very strong for carrying through a big funding 
311 Sir 0. Niemeyer to L.F. Giblin, 19/10/1932, B.E.: OV13/2. 312 D.B. Copland tq C. Janes, 16/9/1932, UMA FECC, Box 15. 313 
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operation only. Personally I regard this as a mistake. I think that it would be considered 
in many quarters as a further deflationary move'. Massy-Greene was further of the mind 
that the Bank Board should have much less say in determining the extent of the States' 
loan programs. He felt a more liberal view of financing State deficits with Treasury 
Bills was in order since these deficits were bound to continue for some time. 315 
Even the arch conservative Latham could now see how the subtle use of 
Treasury bills to finance deficits was keeping prices buoyant. In a public speech 
Latham noted that 'The greatest menace to our economy is not to be found in any 
incipient boom or expansion of the note issue but rather, if I may speak frankly, in a 
certain indifference on the part of the Commonwealth Bank to the effects on public 
opinion of a 'stand - pat' policy and of a falling price level. ' 316 
With Gibson under fire from several quarters Copland reported that 'The general 
feeling .. .is that the Old Man of the Bank ... cuts a sorry figure' .317 Yet Copland later paid 
tribute to Gibson for his financial stewardship (1936, 16). It was Gibson's reassuring 
presence with the capital market that also allowed Australia to resort to the use of 
Treasury bills from July 1931 onwards (Copland, 1937, 418). Almost incapacitated, 
and to succumb to his infirmities not long after, Gibson's influence would continue to 
exert a conservative bearing upon the making of Commonwealth economic policy. 
315 W. Massy-Greepe to S. M. Bruce 4/10/1932, AA, Ml04 item 1, 1932. 316 Speech given at the Constitutional Club, 6/3/1933, Latham papers, NLA. 317 D.B. Copland to C. Janes, 2/11/1932, UMA FECC, Box 15. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The Australian Recovery 1933-36 
7.1 Introduction 
In September 1932, a year in which unemployment peaked at 28 per cent of the 
workforce, Lyons told Parliament of a growing return to business confidence now that 
the Premiers' Plan was being implemented. Lyons relentlessly played upon the 
psychological comfort of having a conservative Government in power (Lloyd, 1984). It 
was, as the economists knew, barely enough At one point Lyons was reduced to 
enumerating the number of new telephone connections as some proof of the first green 
shoots of recovery. 318 In another instance he made an appeal reminiscent of Keynes's 
public broadcasts: 
'What we need now is not to button up our waistcoats tight but to be in a mood 
of expansion, of activity ... to do things, to buy things, to make things. Activity of 
one kind or another is the only means of making the wheels of economic 
progress and all the production of wealth go round again' (Cited in Lloyd, 1984, 
240-1). 
While MacLaurin ( 1936) dates the economic recovery from the last months of 
1932 it was to take another three years before unemployment rates fell below 10 per 
cent - the rate it had been during the twenties (Copland and Janes, 1936). 
The primary focus of the chapter centres upon the public or policy advocacy of 
economists, whether calling for expansion, or by the mid thirties, mild restraint. The 
chapter discusses the nature of the Australian economic recovery and how economists 
reacted and adjusted to it both in thought and advice. In terms of theoretical 
development, some economists were groping along proto-Keynesian lines and stressing 
the case for both public spending and exchange rate flexibility. Others, however, were 
more beholden to Hayekian themes and insights. By 1935/36 Australia's economic 
318 CPD Budget speech 1934/35. 
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recovery had become so robust that the foreign exchange reserves were judged 
inadequate to meet overseas obligations. Copland ( 1936) marvelled at both the nature of 
recovery and the unique novelty of having actually to check spending in the mid-
thirties. Academic economists, whose advice had been neglected for some time, were 
consulted before remedial action was taken. That advice sprang from the latest views 
upon the art of monetary management. Initially the academic economists were in favour 
of keeping the expansion going but it was the 'inside' economists - those within the 
policy-making agencies - that won the day. 
The chapter is composed into eight parts. The following section provides some 
backdrop on the conventional economic policy at the time and the policy-making 
process into which the various players were involved. Issues of public works, funding 
and the exchange rate predominated. The thinking of academic economists was to 
advocate strengthening the recovery with public spending and this is discussed 1n 
sections 7 .3 and 7 .6. Economists still had to contend with the view of the 
Commonwealth Bank Board which wanted short-term debt quickly retired. The debate 
over funding is dealt with in section 7.4. As section 7.7 shows, sometimes economists 
found their perspectives shared by the new Federal Treasurer, R.G .Casey. This step 
forward was tempered by the schism within the economic fraternity that came to the 
fore over curbing public sector spending and funding. This is discussed in section 7. 7 
and 7. 8 of the chapter. 
7.2 Conventional economic policy 
In 1934 Lyons proclaimed that the Australian economic recovery was 'one of 
the most spectacular. .. the world has known'. 319 He asserted that the unemployment due 
to the depression had been cut in half. By 1935-36 Australia regained the peak of pre-
depression output achieved in 1927-28. Certainly the business and financial 
constituencies, having had their fill of economic experiment, were, like high opinion in 
London, comforted by the fiscal consolidation and the marked lack of adventure in 
economic policy. To help ensure this, the Lyons Government gained notoriety for its 
lack of parliamentary sessions and the frequent use of the guillotine to suspend debate 
319 
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upon economic policy. 320 In 1934, for instance, the federal parliament sat for just four 
weeks. This was done in the name of fostering business confidence. Scullin, now 
Opposition Leader saw it, however, as representative of an intellectual torpor gripping 
the Government's thinking. Newspaper proprietors assisted the Government by not 
publishing the attacks of its critics or by censuring them such that their impact was 
dissipated. Lyons returned the favour by giving editors advance notification of Cabinet 
decisions to forestall any criticism (Hart, 1967). The Lyons Government won electoral 
support by not taking risks with the currency or exchange rate. In close cahoots with its 
financial backers, the Government's faith in supply-side policies to deliver economic 
salvation did attract criticism from some backbenchers. One former minister, Charles 
Hawker, complained of the 'flabbiness' and 'flapdoodle' within Cabinet, its outlook 
'bounded by Collins Street' (Pike, 1968, 21). Labor politicians echoed this, attacking 
the government for its 'shillyshallying' over policy. 321 
While the patchy economic recovery was seen as vindicating the Premiers' Plan 
the truth was that recovery, as Walker (1933) recounted, was probably as much to do 
with rising commodity prices and propitious climactic conditions as it was to policy. 
Nonetheless the recovery was protracted, punctuated by dissension emanating from 
within and outside the Government. One source of that dissent, of course, was from 
academic economists and this chapter charts how they attempted, admittedly with little 
success, to influence economic policy in the mid-thirties. Their frustration, as seen in 
the last chapter, became all the more evident as monetary policy became markedly 
deflationary from 1932 onwards. In the mid thirties their frustration turned to the pace 
of the recovery. The key policy question revolved around the funding debate and the 
ambit given to public works. Given that a private sector recovery was vital to reduce the 
country's external debt it meant that the diversion of credit resources into public 
consumption expenditure - represented by Treasury bills - could be ill-afforded unless, 
of course, there was an excess of savings. Apart from upholding the Premiers' Plan, 
official policy enshrined external balance and exchange stability as priorities certainly 
for first half of the decade (Reddaway, 1960, 192). 
320 
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Academic economists noted too, with some dismay, that the more the economy 
recovered, the less their advice was heeded. A document drawn up by Copland and 
Wood in early 1933 suggested that the improvement in the business climate was quite 
precarious, in part, because the causes of the improvement were not clearly recognised 
in financial circles and partly because some of it was, as Walker noted, due to good 
fortune. 322 Another fly in the ointment, identified in the report, was the low level of 
private investment. Yet other perennial concerns were the disparity between farm prices 
and industrial prices, high long-term interest rates and the Bank Board's desire to 
revalue the exchange rate as soon as export prices recovered. Moreover, as recovery 
began to take hold, the Commonwealth Bank became insistent upon funding 
irrespective of interest rates. As prosperity gradually returned, the Bank Board, in 
league with the Federal Treasury, suppressed notions that there was more opportunity to 
finance public works (Cain, 1988a). Recovery was made conditional upon the 
Government not doing anything rash in policy. As Lyons told Parliament after 
presenting the 1932/33 Budget, 'Confidence has in a large measure been restored. All 
that is necessary now to enable us to reach the haven of complete recovery is an 
increase in world commodity prices' .323 The Ottawa Trade Agreement, despite its early 
promise, prevented Austr~lia from increasing its export revenue to match the rise in 
imports that came with the improvement in business confidence. 324 The London 
balances were already under strain meaning those calling for more internal economic 
stimulation would remain voices in the wilderness. As we shall see in section 7 .3, this 
would never appear more evident than in 1933. 
At the political level Lyons was lumbered by a hostile and unimaginative 
cabinet. With Lang removed the mindset was to merely await the return of business 
confidence. This squared with the view of Latham who considered wise governance was 
not just the good one did but also the evil one prevented others from committing. Casey 
was not happy to settle for such lassitude. He told his London friend, Maurice Hankey, 
that he was agitating for 'the dirty work' to begin. He went on: 'If it becomes apparent 
in the next couple of years that our side is not prepared to risk its hide to save the show 
then my present feeling is that I will chuck it in and try some other form of 
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entertainment'. Casey would have his chance with his elevation to Assistant Treasurer 
in late 1933. For the moment, however, he could only agree with Keynes that high 
interest rates were the 'villain in the piece' and that 'a great reduction in long term 
interest rates ... may even be a necessary condition for the survival of the existing 
financial structure of society' (Shann and Copland, 1933). Casey pinned the blame for 
stubborn rates upon the local banks being run by 'such hidebound old conservatives and 
rather ignorant money grubbers' ( cited in Hudson, 1986, 102). · For their part the 
Melbourne banks looked upon Casey with suspicion with G.D. Healy telling his London 
overseer, Edmund Godward, that he was inexperienced and inclined to be 'too 
academic'. 325 326 
A floating debt of 50 million pounds maintained spending and liquidity, while 
the devalued Australian pound anchored the price level ensuring that the real burden of 
the internal debt did not worsen. However, as detailed in the last chapter, the Bank 
Board feared that the Treasury bills portended a massive and highly inflationary 
expansion of bank lending if the trading banks choose to 'unload' them on to the central 
bank (Brigden, 1932, 4). If, on the other hand, full-scale funding of short-term debt was 
vigorously pursued it would, by being intrinsically deflationary, intensify the internal 
debt, and thereby endanger the whole banking and financial structure. Casey showed 
his colours by writing against the practice of using Treasury bills to finance deficits and 
public works though he did not believe their retirement was as yet practically possible. 
In the same article he dismissed devaluation as an option pref erring instead cheap 
money as the way out of depression (Cain, 1988a, 5). In a parliamentary exchange in 
1932 he opposed wrestling control of the exchange rate away from the central bank 
because it would then merely become 'a shuttlecock of party politics' .327 
The first federal budgets brought down by the Lyons Government added to the 
deflationary pressures placed on the economy. When Lyons discovered, for instance, 
that the projected budgetary outcome for 1932-33 was likely to be a deficit of some 3 
million pounds he quickly moved to cut industry bounties, aged pensions and 
325 G. Healy to E. Godward, 8/12/1933 , D/O Correspondence, ANZ Archive. 326 It was an accurate assessment. Casey, an engineer by training, had written to Hawtrey inquiring whether the 
attached summary of his work, The Trade Depression and the Way Out was accurate. He mentioned to Hawtrey that it was his intention t_o keep abreast all the contemporary works on economic affairs (R. G. Casey to R. Hawtrey, 19/6/1933, Hawtrey Papers, Churchill College). 327 Budget Debate: Control of the exchange rate; Mr. Casey's views ' SMH 14/10/1932. 
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politicians' salaries; measures supplementary to those already taken under the Premiers' 
Plan. In seeking these economies, he rejected the idea of levying more taxes, preferring 
to cut outlays instead. 328 Correspondingly, budgetary surpluses in subsequent years 
were dissipated in the form of tax remissions to rural producers and the propertied. 
Academic economists were, by this stage, pushing for something different. 
7 .3 First Stirrings of Expansionist Economics 
As Chapter 6 discussed most economists had begun to express doubts that the 
measures taken within the Premiers ' Plan were entirely appropriate. Keynes's critical 
comments upon the Wallace Bruce Report swayed minds towards new expedients. 
Meanwhile the Treatise won over more converts. Some Australian economists, it was 
true, had their concerns about the Premiers' Plan before Keynes did. It was Giblin who 
was the first to recognise just ' ... how deep and abiding ... the stagnation in investment' 
really was. 329 That revelation came as early as August 1931. In his 1933 Marshall 
lectures Copland ( 1934, 145) conceded that not allowing more monetary stimulation at 
that time was a 'serious lapse' on the part of the economists. Loan expenditure on 
public works in 1931 was 9 million pounds from 40 million the year before. More 
public spending and liquidity would have checked the deflation caused by falling wages 
and costs. While deflation was a wonderful tonic for the export and import-competing 
industries its general effect was income-depressing. This did not mean, however, that 
Copland accepted public works as the means to a higher level of economic activity. 
That realisation only came sometime in 1934 even though Copland had been in 
Cambridge during 1933 when the firmament of the General Theory was being discussed 
by Keynes and his circus (Cain 1988a). 
It was Giblin and Dyason that developed the line that businessmen were too 
demoralised by deflation to be revived by cheap money and fiscal balance. In terms of 
the framework of the Treatise , savings was vastly in disproportion to investment. Both 
argued in a supplementary report to the Premiers and Scullin in September 1931 that 
public spending be undertaken to mop up the liquidity in the banking system (Cain, 
1983, 206; Wilson 1951). Public works , however, were regarded as only a palliative 
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with the central strategy being a long-term one of restoring relative competitiveness. By 
March 1932, Shann (1932, 100-101) after reviewing the British Macmillan Report was 
saying the same thing; that is, accumulating savings in bank vaults were hardly to the 
common good. Neither did it, as monetary policy should, ensure stability in purchasing 
power. Ten months later, Shann (1933, 11) wrote a more forthright piece lamenting 
'the cancer of hoarding', particularly in the United States with savers reluctant to 
deposit their funds in the banking system. Perceiving 'consumers' outlay as the crux of 
the problem of recovery', Shann (1933, 12) embraced Keynes's expedient of public 
works, together with a rudimentary notion of the multiplier, as the way out of the 
muddle. It was, as Turnell (1999, 64) identifies 'an extraordinary journey' for Shann 
given his polemical outbursts against public works in 1930. 
Brigden, Head of Queensland's Bureau of Industry, was also becoming more 
receptive to the idea of more public spending and relaxing the campaign to cut costs. 
Deflation and cost cutting, taken too far, could extirpate business confidence. While 
concerned about unwise borrowing by the government he saw how 'the motive power 
of industry - the aggregate of individual willingness' did not respond quickly enough to 
lower costs. It was a case, Brigden concluded, of not of 'what ought to be done' but 
'what can be done'; if the private sector would not spend then Governments must 
(Brigden, 1932, 1). Four months later, Brigden, seeing no end in sight to depression, 
was now having doubts about Australia's economic strategy of fiscal consolidation. 
Brigden wondered whether Australia should continue to pursue the policy of balanced 
budgets. He was concerned that the taxation required to fulfil that objective might 
impair the possibilities of recovery (Brigden, 1933, 1). The 'awkward dilemma' was 
that the means to insure balanced budgets and, in tum, business confidence, may 
dampen the spirit of enterprise. That is, employment and production were speculative, 
driven by net profit, yet the burden of taxation meant that the surplus was diminished. 
Should taxes be lowered then there would have to be recourse to more Treasury bills 
and their portent for inflation. It was a choice, Brigden concluded, 'between evils'. 
The next shot in the expansionist campaign came from Davidson's bank in the 
form of circulars. Copland was commissioned to write a commentary showing how 
Treasury bills kept the domestic price level up. This was followed by another circular 
that focused upon price levels and economic activity. Davidson wanted what Australian 
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economists had been advocating at Ottawa applied domestically. That is, the price level 
should be raised by devaluation and Treasury bill finance, which would give a stimulus 
to local enterprise. Devaluation gave exporters, of course, a higher local price for their 
produce. Another Circular entitled 'Towards Recovery', issued in May 1933, put the 
case for a major sea-change in economic policy (Cain, 1985, 65-68). Instead of trying to 
equalise savings and investment with deflation and cheap money the article suggested 
that falling prices destroyed business optimism. The alternative, as Keynes had recently 
spelt out in his Harris Foundation lectures, was to increase demand by greater public 
spending. This, in turn, would lift the domestic price level and close the gap between 
producers' costs and receipts. Public works, financed by Treasury bills, would not 
crowd-out private expenditure simply because the banks had plenty of idle balances on 
their books.330 By the same token insisting that public works projects yield a positive or 
commercial rate of return was silly when the opportunity cost of using what were idle 
resources was set at zero. 
Melville was wary about the wisdom of further public spending, feeling that 
devaluation alone rather than 'playing about' with Treasury bills and the note issue was 
the answer. He told a federal senator: 'My only position is that of 'wait and see'. But 
then I cannot see how the tail can wag the dog. I do think that by management of the 
exchange and a suitable credit policy, we should keep the tail well up. No more than 
that is possible. If the dog is ill the tail cannot but feel the effect'. 331 That said, there was 
no suggestion of restoring the bold developmental policy of the 1920s since Australia 
had learnt its lesson about unremunerative public works and reckless borrowing. 
Proposals to increase public works were, of course, what Keynes was then 
advocating for the British economy. In Australia's case, further government borrowing, 
executed by Treasury bills, would make it easier for banks to lower their rates to the 
private sector by giving them an increased return on their investments through the 
placement of surplus funds. 332 Strictures, therefore, about always balancing the budget 
should not come at the price of unbalancing the economy. Scullin was an active 
proponent for public works, though only in the sense of alleviating unemployment 
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rather than a means to recovery. He did, however, echo economists' views that cheap 
money, by itself, would not trigger recovery (Robinson, 1986, 121). 
Copland, meanwhile, was heading overseas for a sabbatical, part of which would 
be spent at the University of Cambridge giving some lectures on Australia's economic 
experience at the express invitation of Keynes. 333 Ultimately that proposed set of talks 
would transform into the Marshall lectures for 1933. While Copland would speak on 
Australia's economic rehabilitation he was not to know that E.R. Walker, who was 
undertaking doctoral work at Cambridge, had already given a lecture on that subject 
before the Marshall Society in 1931. 334 Casey felt the sojourn would do Copland a 'lot 
of good', explaining that he 'had been going to the left a great deal lately and is much 
too sure of himself. London and the rest will affect a little bloodletting' .335 By that, 
Casey meant Copland's involvement with the expansionist cause, especially his 
dealings with Davidson and Stevens. The Melbourne man had been intermittently 
advising Stevens since mid 1932 and helped articulate the case against funding and 
strict budgetary economy. Casey's prophecy of Copland being brought to earth by 
sharper minds abroad did not materialise. Indeed, it was to prove the contrary and 
Herbert Gepp' s appreciation of Copland and his policy work that appeared in The 
Herald on the day of his departure portended even greater recognition abroad. 336 
Keynes's invitation to Copland was, in some way, representative of the standing 
of Australian economists in the world. Australia's attempt at economic rehabilitation 
and the role of economists in bringing it about had not escaped the notice of London. 
Nigel Davenport, who penned the weekly Toreador column in the New Statesman and 
Nation, felt that the Commonwealth government was unique in heeding the advice of 
their economists.337 It augured well for the country's further adjustment, he held, should 
the external account deteriorate. 338 Such an exigency would certainly arise if the run of 
good export seasons came to an end. For the moment Australia was managing to meet 
the annual interest on its external debt - some 36 million pounds - with comfort. In that 
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'Professor and Premiers ' Plan: An appreciation of D.B. Copland', The Herald 13/4/1933. 337 In his autobiogrc;phy Davenport (1974, 18) recalls being given a brief by Montagu Norman to secretly write a pamphlet critical of the inflationary nature of Australian Government financial policies under the Theodore period. 338 New Statesman and Nation 12/12/1932, pg. 866 and New Statesman and Nation 16/9/1933. 
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regard, The Spectator warned that, whatever the plaudits of Australia's econonuc 
readjustment, she had been doubly fortunate, not just with the generous trade 
concessions extracted from Britain at Ottawa but also by the fact that global interest 
rates were subdued. 
While the Lyons government had more latitude concerning the repayment of 
imperial debts than was commonly realised an apparent visit by a Bank of England 
officer to appraise the Australian economy guarded against any laxity (Hart, 1967).339 
The officer apparently asked Melville for briefings upon the budget, banking, 
employment and exchange rate. 340 On this score E.G. Theodore would later raise the 
spectre that perhaps the Lyons government's monetary policies were somewhat under 
the dictate of Threadneedle Street. 341 While this claim of interference could never be 
proved London was certainly appeased by Gibson's insistence upon containing the 
growth in floating debt and operating monetary policy to reduce further the risk of 
devaluation. 342 Davidson took up the baton telling the London-based Robinson: "There 
are repeated rumours that 'friend Gibson', as you call him, and the Commonwealth 
Bank are more influenced by a certain influential section of London opinion than their 
duties to and responsibilities for the welfare of Australia". 343 Davidson's remark was 
also prompted by his and others' annoyance at the tardiness of London in passing 
interest rate relief upon Australia's debts to the City but, more importantly, that 
Gibson's fixation to restore parity with sterling might be at the behest of English 
financial interests in Australia. 344 In an earlier letter, Davidson bemoaned to Robinson 
that Gibson ' ... was unable to grasp the big disparity between prices and costs'. If the 
pressure from London continued Davidson warned that Australia would not just default 
but it would see extremists back in power. 345 
339 Sir M. Norman to Sir R.G. Gibson, 7/7/1933, GRG-33-5, RBA. 340 M. McGrath to Skinner, 8/2/1934, B.E: OV13/3. 341 
'Commonwealth Bank: Alleged control by the Bank of England', SMH 3/10/1932. 342 In his book of speeches upon current events The World We Live In Casey disputed the contention that Gibson was influenced by the views of Montagu Norman. He went on, 'As a matter of fact, it is fairly well known to many that Mr. N01man has been of the opinion for many years that he has not been taken sufficiently into the confidence of the Commonwealth Government' (1933, 66). Casey also took opportunity in the book to renew his call for a permanent 
economics body along the lines of Britain's Economic Advisory Council (1933, 68). That body, he hoped, would help the Commonwealth Bank in its deliberations upon exchange rate policy. 343 A. C. Davidson to W.S. Robinson, 12/8/1933, BNSW: GM 302/574. 344 Writing about the controversy, Copland told a Canadian economist that he had asked 'some of his friends in the Commonwealth Ba.r:ik about the influence exercised upon them by the Bank of England. Melville says that the influence is precisely nil' (D.B. Copland to A.F. W. Plumptre, 6/5/1934, UMA FECC, Box 36). 345 A. C. Davidson to W.S. Robinson, 26/9/1932, BNSW: GM 302/574. 
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Shann concurred with Davidson, noting that he had observed from Gibson's 
'own lips' that he seemed more impressed with London opinion regarding Australian 
monetary problems than that of local commentators. In Shann' s mind here was the 
views of Commonwealth Bank's own economist, Melville, whom the Bank Board 
greatly 'underestimated' primarily due to his youth. Shann felt that relying upon 
London financial opinion was risky since, 'Such people, no matter who they may be, 
cannot be as well informed as Melville is, both in a general and statistical way, upon 
Australia and its very complicated politics and finance'. That said, Shann advised his 
London-bound friend and businessman, Sir Walter Young, to tell those in the City that 
before expressing any opinion about Australia's financial position they might seek out 
Melville first. 346 Perhaps, by that conduit, the Bank Board might just realise what a 
'find' they had in Melville. The Commonwealth Bank's resident economist would soon 
come into his own (Cain, 1988a, 4 ). 
Theodore took up the expansionist cause in 193 3 with an address to the New 
South Wales Branch of the Economic Society upon the matter of monetary management 
with a proposal for a more scientific, less doctrinaire basis in which to conduct 
monetary policy. Giblin ensured that the lecture was published in the Economic 
Record. However, Giblin told Theodore that the country would be hard put finding 
enough suitable men to sit upon the proposed National Credit Commission that would 
deliberate upon monetary policy. 347 By this time the Labor party was fancifully 
consumed with the notion of bank nationalisation and the socialisation of credit 
(Robinson, 1986; Kuhn, 1988). It had little interest for what economists, like Giblin, 
were saying. His enthusiastic review of Keynes's (1933) 'The Means to Prosperity' in 
the Economic Record, for example, went unnoticed because the Labour party shunned 
university-educated men and 'experts' just as much as bankers did (Giblin, 1933). 
According to Giblin (1951, 120) Keynes's pamphlet popularized the notion of 
using 'credit expansion in a depression' though Australian economists had already 
advocated it in a minor way. The pamphlet used Kahn's employment multiplier 
showing how a public stimulus was almost self-financing in the tax revenue generated. 
Giblin (1933, 141-2) drew strength from the pamphlet stating that Australia had already 
346 E. 0. G. Shann t~ Sir W. Young, 17/2/1932, BNSW; A-53-409. 347 L.F. Giblin to E.G. Theodore, 6/10/1933, Giblin collection, UMA FECC, Box 1 A-J 
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been practicing what Keynes was urging but only, alas, in a 'piecemeal' fashion and 
'without any general acceptance of principle' . Giblin corresponded with Keynes over 
the figure work behind Kahn' s multiplier (Coleman and Hagger, 2003; Markwell, 1985, 
29-30). 
Having returned to Melbourne, Giblin gave a lecture at the Shillings Club, a 
political economy club which he had founded for University staff and students. Giblin 
spoke, again, of the need for expansionist policy (Downing, 1960, 46). Inspired by 
Keynes ' s pamphlet, Giblin used Kahn' s multiplier analysis to show how a net increase 
in public spending could trigger a bountiful jump in employment. Giblin made his 
proposals in the light of an expected substantial federal budgetary surplus. Judging from 
the notes of the minute-taker, the reception from staff and graduate students was hardly 
welcoming, perhaps because Hayek' s Prices and Production was then more in favour 
than Keynes ' s Treatise. Roland Wilson, down from Canberra, believed that the added 
expenditure would put pressure on the exchange rate. Horsfall, a graduate student, said 
that the expenditure would not compensate for the cessation of overseas loans together 
with the adverse terms of trade. Another critic maintained that the expansion would 
pander to the greed and avaiice of trade unionists - a problem Giblin felt, like Keynes, 
would be allayed by a sense of community mindedness. Another questioned the 
elasticity of supply assumptions behind Giblin' s figure work. Lastly, Frank Mauldon, a 
departmental colleague, felt the plan was 'too easy ... as economists we could not be 
satisfied with any simple means of recovery' . 348 Apart from the stigma of public sector 
borrowing going to wasteful ends Mauldon' s reservation reflected the concern of his 
colleagues that Giblin ' s expedient was all too similar to proposals bubbling up from the 
econo1nic underworld. One economist, not there, who would have appreciated Giblin 's 
line of thinking, was Walker. He had compared the anti-depression policy prescriptions 
of Keynes with Hayek and found the latter 's approach 'not relevant to the problem of 
recovery from a slump ' (\Valker, 1933, 201 ). 
Politically, 1933 was to prove an 'annus horribilis ' for Lyons with questions 
raised in the press about his leadership. Bruce 's departure to take up loan conversion 
duties in London left the front bench, as Casey put it, 'tragically weak' (Hudson, 1986, 
348 
'Minutes of Shillings meeting', July 1933, author unknown, UMA FECC, Box 219. 
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83). Casey kept Bruce informed about the condition of the Government and pandered 
to the notion of him staging a return to Australia to assume the Prime Ministership. 
After some thought, Bruce thought a return to the leadership would reignite 'the old 
prejudices and passions' held against him and that he was better off serving his country 
in London. 349 Meanwhile, Latham's 'grandstanding,' in driving policy together with 
Gibson's refusal to budge on financing more public works tested Lyons' patience.350 
The Prime Minister's hands were tied since he had promised in the 1931 election 
campaign that the UAP would not interfere with the decisions of the Commonwealth 
Bank (MacLaurin, 1936, 103). 
In addition to moving towards budgetary equilibrium, Gibson wanted a 
considerable fraction of the public loans raised put towards retiring debt (Tsokhas, 
1993, 109; Cain, 1988a). Initially, Gibson, in what Davidson called a 'diabolical 
scheme', wanted all the proceeds from the public loan to be used to fund short term debt 
rather than to finance public works. Gibson was forced to back down by the united 
opposition of Lyons and the Loan Council. 351 Davidson told Shann that Gibson's 
gambit was the exact opposite of what 'the rest of us' had been about for some years 
(Holder, 1970, 795). Premature funding of Treasury bills would have starved industry of 
funds. It came at a time when there were repeated calls from both Labor and the 
Country Party for an inquiry into the banking system. Lyons decided to wrestle both the 
political initiative and meet the call for economic expansionism by putting pressure on 
the banks to further cut their rates. With the rural sector unhappy with bank overdraft 
rates, Lyons reasoned that cutting interest rates might nip the problem of an inquiry in 
the bud.352 Lyons browbeat the trading banks by predicting that if they did not cut 
advance rates the 1934 federal election would be fought on the issue of bank 
nationalisation. 
Davidson told Lyons that the rate on advances was 'now lower than it has ever 
been'. He took the opportunity to point out the 'logical results' of the Bank Board's 
decision to reduce the amount of Treasury bills in circulation. It would, he claimed, 
spell higher rates in the future since the bills were a key part of a trading bank's cash 
349 S. M. Bruce to R.G. Casey, 13/9/1933, AA; A1421/1 Casey - Bruce Correspondence. 350 S. M. Bruce to R.G. Casey, 19/1/1933, AA: A1421/1 Casey - Bruce Correspondence. ~I . A.C. Davidson to E.O.G. Shann, 24/10/1933, BNSW: GM 302/590. 352 E. R. Riddle to Sir M. Norman, 24/8/1933, BE: OV13/3/ 454/1. 
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reserves. Nor would interest rate relief come from the Commonwealth Bank taking the 
lead and cutting the rate on Fixed Deposits. Davidson reminded Lyons that when it 
came to the issue of bank nationalisation 'a show of excessive nervousness' by the 
central bank merely played into the hands of 'the forces working towards this end' .353 
Stevens also felt lower rates would be an 'insurance' against moves towards controls 
over interest rates. 354 
The prevailing mindset in government and banking circles was that economic 
prosperity would tamely follow as world commodity prices recovered. 355 In 1933 Lyons 
presented his 'prosperity' or 'restoration' budget. The budgetary surplus was dissipated 
in the form of tax relief rather than dispensing it to the States. This, Lyons figured, was 
the best way to cut producers' costs. The stock market boomed the day after the budget 
with press reaction, local and abroad, giving it a chorus of approval. 356 The London 
Times hailed the budget as 'the nearest approximation to a prosperity budget anywhere 
since the beginning of the depression'. It went on to record how it was 'fitting' that the 
first country to go into depression would 'also be the first to be able, in a national 
budget, to take account of the definite signs of improvement'. 357 
Notwithstanding the exchange rate issue, the cautious budget strategy facilitated 
the task of converting Australia's huge stock of debt on the London capital market. In 
that respect the collateral for Australian securities in London lay solely with Lyons. 
Another plaudit for Australia's economic achievement came from the English financial 
expert, Sir Henry Strakosch. He attributed it not to favourable wool prices, as some now 
did, including Toreador, but the Premiers' Plan. It struck him as 'a daring one, yet 
logical, comprehensive and wholly consistent with accepted economic theory' .358 
Strakosch' s utterance might have been prompted after reading press reports of 
Copland's Marshall Lectures at Cambridge University. Copland had warned that 
Australia could ill-afford to return to a policy of 'forced economic development' with 
heavy overseas borrowing, public works and immigration but he praised both 
devaluation and cheap money and suggested that the large internal debt might well 
353 A. C. Davidson to J. Lyons, 4/12/1933, BNSW: G. M. /5/46. 354 B.S.B. Stevens to Sir R. Gibson, 25/3/1933, GRG-33-33, RBA. 355 Recovering: Australia's achievements: Premiers ' Plan result', SMH 24/6/1933. 356 SMH 6/10/1933 . . 
357 
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remain a 'permanent' feature of the money market. Should the expansion of credit prove 
troublesome in the future by overstimulating activity it could be checked by devaluation 
and open market operations. With economic nationalism resurgent Copland felt 
Australia would have to rely upon its internal market and that, in tum, could be 
harnessed by cheap money and tariff protection so long as it did not penalise the export 
sector. 359 
When Copland's lectures were published in 1934 they drew the attention of 
Montagu Norman. In a confidential never disclosed review, Norman believed Copland 
was about '90 per cent right' in claiming that the remedies applied were suitable to the 
Australian economic situation and national character. However the 'ambitious, 
dogmatic' Copland had a 'marked tendency "to rationalise" Australian experience' in 
order to make it fit 'a monetary pre-conception of a Keynesian - or more probably 
Hawtreyan - cast.' Like most commentators, Norman praised Australian economists for 
their ingenuity in saving their country from economic disaster though full recovery was 
ultimately dependent upon the revival in the creditor and industrial countries. 360 There 
was no word from Niemeyer. 
As wool prices recovered and the psychological stakes improved in 1933 Gibson 
took the opportunity to put the exchange issue back on the agenda. 361 It was to be 
Gibson's last piece of executive action. 362 A Commonwealth Bank briefing backed it 
up, with Melville positing the thesis that the economy was more in danger of boom than 
deflation. This surprised Shann. 363 Melville had, in fact, raised the same concern a year 
earlier fearing the 'risk' of an inflationary boom in the exporting industries due to the 
combination of devaluation and rising commodity prices. 364 
The Secretary of the Federal Treasury, Harry Sheehan, who was also a director 
on the Commonwealth Bank Board, told Bank of England officials that there were not 
enough grounds to warrant the revaluation Gibson wanted. Kershaw felt that Australia 
359 
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could only practically appreciate its exchange if there was a recovery in the 
industrialised countries in tandem with her diversifying her export markets. Melville on 
the way home after the Ottawa trade conference sounded out London high opinion on 
the Australian pound's preferred value. He was told, unequivocally, that the Australian 
currency should not be realigned with sterling at parity (Markwell, 1985, 22-23). 
7.4 Economists and the Funding Debate 
While Gibson's death put an end to thoughts of revaluation it did not dispel the 
Bank Board's concern about the floating debt which was approaching 50 million 
pounds by the end of 1933. It was a matter that was to unite academic economists 
against the Commonwealth Bank. Indeed, with Melville articulating the reasoning, the 
Bank came out, stronger than ever, for retiring them. Melville found support from the 
Treasury where Wilson was becoming a key source of advice. Brigden ( 1932a), too, 
expressed public alarm at the build-up in Treasury bills believing their number 
undermined business confidence. Brigden (1932b, 4) reiterated his warnings about the 
'latent' inflationary potential of this borrowing, especially when business confidence 
revives. Yet Brigden (1932b, 1) could also see the other side of the ledger, that is, the 
'motive power of industry' needed more than reduced costs to become stimulated. 
The Bank Board informed the Loan Council that public works projects, 
henceforth, must be financed by public loans in a bid to rein in Government spending, 
particularly the spendthrift habits of Queensland and NSW (Tsokhas, 1993, 108-109). 
The other fiscally weaker States became what Colin Clark later called 'mendicant' 
states and joined the Federal Government in opposing the expansionist policies of NSW 
and Queensland at Loan Council meetings (Higgins, 1989, 301). The Bank Board and 
the Loan Council agreed to reduce the amount of Treasury bills in circulation and also 
to reduce the rate of discount, or return, upon them. This, Davidson feared, would put 
upward pressure upon interest rates at a time when there was a clamour, from the Prime 
Minister down, for lower rates. Davidson also felt this deflationary policy would place 
an obstacle upon achieving balanced budgets. The more enlightened approach, he 
argued, would be to continue with more central bank credit, which, with lower rates, 
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would help revive business activity and, in turn, restore Government budgets. 365 As 
recovery proceeded it might have been thought the controversy over short-term debt 
would diminish since public works could be financed by public loans hand-in-hand with 
piecemeal funding. The Bank Board, however, remained vigilant. Besides its 
philosophical reservations about public works, the Board was wary that borrowing for 
public works was a greater drain on Australia's credit resources than before the 
depression. Melville felt that the level of internal debt was too large for the economy to 
cope with. Public deficits had to be wound back, as the Prime Minister put it, to 'free 
+ · , 366 money 1or investment purposes . 
This debate over Government finances and funding highlighted the differences 
between Melville representing the Bank Board's view of things and that of academic 
economists (Cain, 1988a, 10-11). By 1934 Melville had shifted position, not just on 
funding and public spending, but also the related issue of the flexibility of the exchange 
rate which he felt was an invitation to overexpansion. He insisted that devaluation not 
be triggered by over-stimulation of the economy. There had been enough of the latter in 
any case with the amount of Treasury bills extant already making monetary 
management difficult (Cain, 1988a, 9). Instead of exchange flexibility, Melville 
suggested a managed exchange rate as the best means of ensuring economic progress. 
As he later told La Nauze 'My conclusions ... are so fundamentally different from that of 
my economic brethren in Australia that I am anxious to get as much criticism as 
possible.' 367 Reflecting upon it a decade later, Roland Wilson felt it was Melville's 
'rigidity rather than the essential substance of his views which made us regard him at 
the time as a pain-in-the-neck'. 368 
When someone, therefore, under the pseudonym of 'Bystander' penned a piece 
in the Australian Quarterly outlining economic arguments for funding Treasury bills 
suspicion fell on Melville as the author. Baillieu sent a copy to Keynes suggesting that 
he could easily 'divine' the authorship of the article. 369 Keynes was puzzled why the 
author was so keen upon funding. He added that while Treasury bills did make it easier 
365 A. C. Davidson to W.S. Robinson, 20/2/1933, BNSW: GM. Files 302/574. 366 CPD Vol 145 pg. 99, 1/11/1934. 
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for governments to spend Keynes felt the author's claim that a large volume of bills 
impeded credit control was somewhat 'exaggerated'. The main thing, according to 
Keynes, was whether Treasury bills afforded a cheap form of government borrowing. 
He did, however, agree with the author's contention that there are dangers in over-
borrowing but Keynes did not feel that the article demonstrated that the 'limits of 
prudence' had been yet reached. Moreover, Keynes felt that while the author had set out 
to show why funding would not do much harm he had not established whether it would 
do much good either. 370 
Fresh from his sabbatical abroad where he had taken note of how other countries 
were promoting recovery, Copland marked his re-entry into domestic public affairs by 
calling for lower interest rates. In a speech before the NSW Branch of the Economic 
Society in April 1935, Copland stressed that: 
'We must revise our ideas about rates of interest'. Investment, which had been 
stagnant for four years, could only be restored by cheap money and if that meant 
more public debt it had to be faced: 'The world cannot get richer unless its debts 
are greater. The modem capitalist world must feed on its own fat or it will be 
destroyed'. 371 
Copland may have been reading at this stage the doctrines of the early 
Australian economist, William Hearn. An invitation to deliver the Macrossan Lectures 
at the University of Queensland in May 1935 presented an opportunity to deliver a 
timely lesson and also shed light upon a neglected Australian economist. Heam had 
emphasized that with depression economy was not the key to economic recovery. To 
wit: 'The world which refuses to increase its debt must increase the impoverishment; it 
will grow richer by increasing its debts and not by reducing them'. Hearn' s premise, 
identified by Copland, was that 'We have much that we may expend more. The World 
that refuses to expend more because it has much will very soon have less, until it 
reaches the stage where it will have nothing at all.' Copland's lectures, later published, 
caught the ire of Hayek. He lamented that the expedient attempt by Copland to use 
Heam 'as a peg on which to hang an exposition of the views of a particular group of 
370 J.M. Keynes to ci. Baillieu, 6/4/1934, KPKC. 371 
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modem Australian economists will do little to enhance Ream's reputation'(Hayek, 
1936, 101). 
Copland dismissed the policy, put forward by some, including a federal 
parliamentary secretary, Frederick Stewart, of the Franklin Roosevelt's strategy in the 
United States of increasing wages as a means of generating recovery. Wages, Copland 
felt, would rise as recovery proceeded which could only be sustained by a prior increase 
in investment spending.372 Brigden and Shann publicly backed Copland's call for lower 
interest rates. 373 Shann reasoned that lower interest rates would encourage internal 
spending without impairing the export surplus. 374 Lower interest rates would also 
alleviate rural indebtedness375 especially since a scheme drawn up by Copland and 
others to write down farmers' debt had been received by banks as if it were 'marking 
the beginnings of the end of Australian capitalism' (Hart, 1971 , 131).376 An angry 
Copland pinned the government's U-turn on rural debt relief to the reaction from 
Melbourne financial interests (Hart, 1971, 131). 377 
Copland now detected a lack of leadership within the Commonwealth 
Government especially upon matters of economic policy. According to Copland, 
Lyons's only really hope was Stevens who, as he later put it 'can understand the 
economic position better than most economists'. 378 In a memorandum written for a 
business associate, Copland noted an inconsistency in economic policy with the 
government lamely pushing for lower rates yet happy to indulge the Bank Board with 
thoughts of more funding. Copland, too, detected that Casey for all his energy and 
promise, was captive to the Bank Board's view of things (Tsokhas, 1993, 109).379 
As the economic recovery gathered momentum the Board, along with Melville, 
was still nervous of the possibilities of inflation if the trading banks presented the bills 
372 D. B. Copland to E. Harding, 16/10/1934, UMA FECC, Box 24. 373 
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for rediscount and the note issue expansion that would subsequently ensue. The Board 
took the view that the bills were issued only as an emergency measure to finance 
Governments when loan markets were closed and it was never contemplated that they 
would reach such a high level. Expansionist economists, like Giblin and Walker, 
however, dismissed such concerns, adopting the Keynes-Kahn view that with so much 
supply potential available there was little chance of inflation as expenditure rose (Cain, 
1988a, 10). Any move, therefore, to curtail the issue of Treasury bills met with the 
opposition of Stevens, the Wales and, as Casey noted 'the majority of economists of 
consequence in Australia' (Copland and Janes, 1936, 318). The odd economist out, was 
Melville who, as Wilson noted had 'views on these matters ... not shared in government 
or Treasury circles'. 380 Actually Wilson was being a little disingenuous since the 
Federal Treasury also took a hard line against public spending (Cain, 1988a, 11-12). 
The Assistant and Acting Treasurer Casey would moderate his views on 
funding, arguing later that the issue of Treasury bills was defensible 'so long as it 
roughly does no more than is necessary to offset the reluctance of the community to use 
its savings' .381 However, the new Chairman of the Commonwealth Bank Board, Claude 
Reading, relentlessly hammered home the message over the next few years that there 
was too much short-term debt for the Australian financial system to carry and that 
public loans be raised to reduce the number of Treasury bills in circulation. Casey was 
convinced by Reading's argument that it left the central bank with no margin for 
emergencies such as adverse seasonal conditions or the 'recrudescence of 
depression' .382 Reading informed Norman at the Bank of England of the 'carefully 
considered and energetic propaganda in favour of expansion' being peddled by certain 
political and financial interests. Reading noted that the campaign was directly aimed at 
changing public opinion away from the allegedly 'short-sighted' policy of the 
Commonwealth Bank which was being painted as the scapegoat. Reading said this 
alternative view was 'warped' with the correct policy being some damping down in the 
rate of recovery. 383 
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In a switch in policy consistent with Melville's new outlook, the Bank Board 
adopted a more cautious attitude to public works emphasising the psychological and 
open economy repercussions of too much loan expenditure (Cain, 1988a, 11). Funding 
would deliver an appropriate check to economic activity which was being fuelled by 
public spending, deficit budgets and good export prices (Cain 1988a, 12). The Bank 
held that a paucity of savings, not investment, was the problem. It criticised the 
expansionists on their 'primrose path' for having no sense of proportion or limitation 
about the carrying capacity of the Australian economy (Cain, 1988a, 12). 
H. T. Armitage, a London-based officer of the Commonwealth Bank, relayed 
news of the contest of ideas between the economic expansionists and restrictionists to 
Montagu Norman: 'The desire of the States to spend money on public works continues, 
whether or not, the money can be raised from the public. Indeed a preference exists in 
some influential quarters for continuing to finance deficits and public works by 
Treasury Bills. This view is not held by this Bank' .384 
Emboldened by news of a turnaround in the global economy, the Bank Board 
informed State Governments that central bank credit would be no longer available for 
either deficits or loan expenditure except as a temporary measure. Treasury bills, it held, 
were only a form of emergency finance. 385 Stressing the integrity of Premiers' Plan, the 
Bank Board served notice that it would not finance deficits from 1934/35 onwards 
(Copland and Janes, 1936). The Bank Board had become impatient with the States' 
tardiness in balancing their budgets. Budgets had to be balanced first before further 
expenditure would be considered. This view was in stark contrast to what expansionist 
economists and Davidson believed, namely that the sporadic signs of recovery should 
not be mistaken for the return of general prosperity and that stimulatory measures must 
continue (Holder, 1970, 795). 
When the mercurial Davidson visited London Niemeyer thought it would be 
good if Montagu Norman saw him soon before he got up to mischief. 386 Kershaw's brief 
on the Governor's visitor noted that Davidson was 'strong and brutal, a good banker ... 
384 H. T. Armitage to Sir M. Norman, 24/1/1933, BE: OV 13/2, 453/3. 385 
'Financing of deficits', SMH 21/6/1934. 386 Davidson also met Keynes in London (A.C. Davidson to J.M. Keynes, 18/6/1934 L 34/62 and J.M. Keynes to A.C. Davidson 28/6/1934, OC/2/171, KPKC) 
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not instinctively theoretical. .. impressionable with all' .387 388 Norman, alas, was not 
impressed by the Australian, finding that he put 'self and profit' before country.389 
Davidson wanted to raise a number of matters with Norman, including Treasury bills, 
Australia's exchange rate and rebuilding her sterling reserves. Apart from quizzing 
Davidson upon his opinion upon state budgets, Kershaw suggested Norman might 'shift 
your ground' by asking the visitor whether it might not be wise for 'Australia to go slow 
for a little while' .390 That rather puzzling concern, at a time when Australia still had 20 
per cent unemployment, invites a closer look at the peculiarities behind Australia's 
ongoing economic recovery and the role economists, both inside and outside, played in 
sustaining it. 
7.5 'On the side of the Angels': Economists and Recovery 
'This bleeding country seems to impose severe exertions upon the nervous 
energy of economists. We are about to have an election and the banks are 
showing a little disenchantment to proceed with further reductions in interest 
rates and to encourage the Government to spend a reasonable amount on public 
works ... when one ·sees the light so clearly it is difficult to keep one's patience 
with nit-wits. ' 391 
Lyons had won the federal election of spring 1934 promising nothing other than 
continuing economic recovery. 392 In the election campaign he reminded the electorate of 
the ALP' s policy on bank nationalisation before declaring that the trading banks had 
been the country's 'sheet anchor' and had 'saved the country from complete failure' .393 
This was a direct riposte to the Labor party's campaign, which focussed almost entirely 
upon the reform of the banking and monetary system, including giving Parliament the 
authority to direct the central bank (Sutherlin, 1980, 12-13).394 The private banks gave 
387 E Skinner, Secretary to the Governor, memorandum, 13/4/1934, BE: OV 13/3 454/1. 388 
'McKennaish' was a reference to the chairman of the Midlands bank and former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Reginald McKenna, who was of expansionist bent. McKenna had incidentally praised Copland's efforts at economic 
reconstruction contained in his Marshall lectures. 389 A.T. Lewis to L.G. Melville, 27/3/1937, Melville Papers, NLA. 390 Memorandum to Sir 0. Niemeyer from R. Kershaw, 18/4/1934, BE: OV13/3. 391 D. B. Copland to H. Innis, 1/6/1934, UMA FECC, Box 24. 392 
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Lyons election material to wage an 'essentially negative' campaign focusing upon the 
disunity within the Labor camp, together with its unorthodox economic policies (Sawer, 
1963, 72). Despite their grumbles about the professionalism of the Government, both 
Davidson and Copland drafted a series of briefs for the Lyons' s election campaign 
highlighting the positive role the banking system played. 395 Shann penned articles for 
the press depicting the Australian banking system in a favourable light against those 
operating abroad. During the campaign Lyons pledged to spend more upon welfare and 
reproductive development work like the unification of railway gauges. That came with 
assurances to State governments that the Commonwealth would work closely with them 
upon major developmental and welfare projects. These plans for greater public spending 
were later shelved, being too much for the financial backers of the federal government 
to stomach (Lloyd, 1984, 241). 
By this time Australia was, in any case, no longer 'feeling her way' but was 
treading the path towards full recovery (Copland and Janes, 1936, xvii). However, 
Copland and other economists felt that, with the mood of national emergency no longer 
present, a sense of complacency was creeping into the minds of policy-makers. He told 
a Sydney University economics graduate, Ian Potter that economists had to be prepared 
to see their advice thwarted by political pressures. 396 Copland showed some hubris, 
however, when he told his Sydney colleague, Mills, that 'It is always necessary to exert 
constant pressure on the politicians to keep them moving at a satisfactory pace in the 
right direction' . 397 
One national issue was the continuing high level of interest rates which Copland 
attributed to a 'rentier psychology' and 'hard money' view within the Commonwealth 
Bank.398 Copland assured a friend that he was 'on the side of the angels and ... working 
behind the scenes' trying to change it. Economists attributed the nascent recovery to 
improving export prices, favourable business sentiment and rising levels of public and 
private investment (Copland, 1936). Copland told Per Jacobsson of the Bank of 
395 The hand of Copland can be palpably detected in a broadcast Lyons gave on the financial system where he defended the role of the banks in the crisis and recovery and rejected the notion that the Bank of England influenced the Commonwealth Bank Board. ('Banks' Administration', SMH 1/8/1934). This is scarcely surprising because Copland had written to Irvine Douglas, the PM's publicity officer, listing the positive role the banking system played in the economic crisis (D.B. Copland to I. Douglas, 29/5/1934, UMA FECC, Box 27). 396 D. B. Copland to. I. Potter, 26/3/1934, UMA FECC, Box 25. 397 D.B. Copland to R.C. Mills, 24/5/1934, UMA FECC, Box 24. 398 D.B. Copland to E.H. Stinner, 8/6/1934, UMA FECC, Box 27. 
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International Settlements that the key force behind the 'extraordinary improvement' in 
Australian economic activity during 1932 and 1933 had been the combined effect of 
reductions in money costs and credit expansion. 399 
In June 1934 the NSW Branch of the Economic Society conducted a forum on 
'The economics of recovery' with Walker, Melville, Mills and a newcomer, Allan 
Fisher, all contributing. Fisher spoke of how the individual capitalist had been 
prevented from doing his duty due to fear and a lack of confidence. Melville 
complemented this by suggesting that it had to do with expectations that interest rates 
might fall further. Mills made noises about how properly banded action by the 
Government might trigger private investment.400 
With the re-election of the Lyons government one might have expected a steady-
as-you-go approach to economic policy but this was not to be. The UAP was forced into 
a coalition with the Country Party meaning that some inquiry of the monetary and 
banking system was now imminent (Sutherlin, 1980, 18-19).401 The return of the Lyons 
Government quickly brought attention to the state of the recovery, in particular, the 
reluctance of interest rates to fall. By the start of 1935 export prices had begun to slip 
again. 
Besides commissioning an inquiry into the monetary system, Lyons also had to contend 
with younger blood, unhappy with the competency of the Government. The new 
member for Kooyong, R.G. Menzies, found the workings of the Lyons' Cabinet 
amateurish compared to the Victorian State Government he had just left. Casey, too, 
after a year of being Assistant Treasurer felt that "Our methods of giving consideration 
to matters of importance would disgrace a girls ' school. The absence of study and 
research into important matters and the off hand decisions 'on the voices' is a constant 
menace to the best interests of the country".402 403 His friend, Hankey, a former British 
Cabinet Secretary himself, found upon his visit to Canberra that procedure within the 
Lyons's Cabinet quite 'loose and rambling' (Martin, 2000, 124). 
399 D. B. Copland to P. Jacobsson, 27/8/1934, UMA FECC, Box 24. 400 
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Long enamoured with economics expertise, Casey brought in Roland Wilson to 
advise 'on Treasury questions proper' .404 Not long after Wilson -became Casey's key 
economic adviser. 405 The Treasurer had, however, to fight to secure his services by 
matching an enticing offer from his alma mater, the University of Tasmania. Wilson 
elected to stay put because it was 'the bigger job' (Cornish, 2002, 20). Casey told 
Bruce that the young man ' ... had turned out very well' and 'besides knowing all the 
economic nonsense ... has a good head, good judgement and general balance' .406 Casey 
arranged, probably with Giblin' s help, to get a young economist to assist Wilson. It 
came in the form of another Tasmanian, Arthur Smithies, who returned from America 
with commendations from Joseph Schumpeter407 and Copland.408 There was also Ian 
Potter, who was for a brief time Casey's personal secretary.409 Casey also toyed with the 
idea of adding Giblin to the Commonwealth Bank Board in a bid to put monetary policy 
on a more scientific footing. He assured Latham that the idiosyncratic Giblin would not 
be a risky appointment since 'There are sufficient 'practical men of affairs' on the 
Board to dilute and, if necessary, to offset any radical tendencies that he may have' .410 
411 That counsel did not assuage the London manager of the Bank of Australasia who 
felt Casey's appointment was, in itself, unwise since having ' ... had practically no 
business experience to the post he [Casey] now holds lays itself open to a danger of the 
introduction of revolutionary ideas and methods which a more experienced man would 
hesitate to employ' .412 Their fears were misplaced for Casey rarely strayed from the 
Bank Board's economic perspective. 
Apart from the homecoming of Smithies and Copland, three other economists 
returned to Australia after engaging in study overseas. Each would try to enlighten 
404 R 
. G. Casey to S. M. Bruce, 3/11/1934, AA: Al421/l. 405 Copland congratulated Wilson, one of his old students, telling him, somewhat presciently, that 'I hope it will be a further step towards freeing you for consideration of the larger issues of policy' (D.B. Copland to R. Wilson, 1/3/1935, UMA FECC, Box 40) 
406 RG 
. . Casey to S. M. Bruce, 20/2/1935, AA; Al421/2. 407 Schumpeter felt Smithies was an economist of 'unusual force and ability and of a very wide range of possibilities' (J.A. Schumpeter to L. F. Giblin, 18/8/1934, UMA FECC, Giblin collection, 92/141 Box 2 k-t). 408 Smithies told Copland on 22/4/1935, 'I know that it is likely due to your efforts that I got the job in Canberra' UMA FECC, Box 38. 
409 Ian Potter became one of the first graduate economists to become fully engaged in stockbroking. 410 R 
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public opinion using the latest in overseas economic thought. Walker returned with one 
of the first doctorates in economics earned from Cambridge University (Cairncross, 
1998, 43-44). Walker's thesis was later published. Like Syd Butlin, Walker was 
supervised by D.H. Robertson, meaning that he was distant from Keynes's inner 
circle.413 Walker, nonetheless, had invested much of the Treatise's analytical framework 
into his doctorate upon wage cuts and unemployment in Australia and would quickly 
become the most erudite Keynesian of interwar Australian economists. Butlin, who was 
undertaking another degree, fell under the influence of Robertson and was, like his 
mentor, wary of Keynes's doctrines (Butlin, 1978). J.K. Gifford from the University of 
Queensland returned home also having completed a thesis at Kiel in Germany.414 H.C. 
'Nugget' Coombs, too, returned home having completed a doctorate from the LSE upon 
'Dominion Exchanges and Central Bank Proble1ns' (Rowse, 2002, 65). Against the flow 
came a young visiting scholar from Harvard to expressly compare Australia's recovery 
experience with that of the United States. Copland took Rupert Maclaurin under his 
wing and introduced him to the key players in the drama. The American duly 
reciprocated by trotting out the economists ' line that the Australian recovery had not 
been fully effective because of mistakes with both exchange rate policy and the lack of 
a coherent public works program. However, in a lecture, he told his audience that the 
Australian recovery had been a more effective one than the American effort.415 The 
scaling down of interest rates upon internal debt, engineered through a special clause of 
the Premiers' Plan, Maclaurin felt worthy of imitation elsewhere. When Maclaurin' s 
book was published in 1936 it was warmly received by local economists. 
The nature of the Australian recovery had attracted considerable international 
attention which Copland, and less so, Walker appropriated with their accounts. 
Walker's treatment of the issue was, of course, more theoretically-weighted than 
Copland's account. It was also closer in spirit to Keynes's world view of the conundrum 
than Copland's account which had not theoretically developed from his position of 
1931. Copland, for instance, still eschewed public works as the way out of the 
depression. Walker found that the Australian wage cut of 1931 , in terms of purchasing 
413 Apart from a few statistical quibbles Giblin favourably reviewed Walker' s book in the Economic Record. He later confessed that the review did not do Walker full justice. 414 Gifford ' s thesis was also published. Entitled Devaluation and the Pound, it dealt with the general problem of correcting the balanc_e of payments and the deflationary effects of the British pound devaluation and the advisability of returning to the gold standard. 
415 
'Recovery plans: American and Australian' , SMH 9/10/1934. 
192 
power analysis, had actually done little to engineer economic recovery other than to 
give the export trades some breathing space. For a year after the wage cut employment 
had not risen. Facing another burst of deflation entrepreneurs would use the lower costs 
to reduce their overdrafts than to hire more workers. In short, wage cuts would do little 
to stimulate investment and bring it into line with savings. This, of course, was the 
advice Keynes conveyed to Australian economists in 1932. Public works was the 
answer; it would absorb savings and trigger a multiplier effect in consumption spending. 
If this was attempted, entrepreneurs' expectations would focus more upon expansion 
than retiring debts. Walker was insistent that the public works be financed by borrowing 
from the public rather than resorting to bank credit. This was crucial in the name of 
business confidence (Cornish, 1990, 61). Once recovery was under way some wage 
cuts, Walker mooted, might be of advantage though it opened the door to international 
retaliation. On that score, Walker held that the Australian devaluation of 1931 had been 
effective, not by giving a stimulus by way of more net exports, but rather allowed more 
space for domestic stimulation to take place (Comish, 1990, 61). 
Copland's book, too, gave hope for some degree of economic enlightenment. 
The Canadian economist, A.F.W. Plumptre (1935, 131-133) said Copland's account 
demonstrated that Australia was indeed a land where 'the plans of Economic Men have 
been put into practice'. In his own mind Copland was intrigued by Roosevelt's 
'unorthodox' attempts at recovery but complained that he could not 'get any line on the 
point of view of American economists' in tackling the slump. This drew a compliment 
from the polymath, Archibald Grenfell-Price that the lack of progress in the US made 
one realise 'how good has been the job that you and the other Australian economists 
have done' .416 
Copland's account of the crisis, however, sparked a feud in the expansionist 
camp. Davidson was incensed with Copland's account because it omitted mention of 
the Commonwealth Bank Board's doctrinaire position upon funding and the exchange 
rate. Nor did the book mention the role of the Bank of New South Wales in forcing the 
1931 devaluation (Plumptre, 1935, 132). Copland had praised the coordinated, albeit 
improvised, strategy effected by Australia's economic institutions, including the central 
416 D. B. Copland to .A. Grenfell-Price, 6/3/1932, and A. Grenfell-Price to D.B. Copland, 6/4/1932, UMA FECC, Box 204A 
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bank, in leading the country out of the slump. In fact, the local banking system had, by 
creating an amount of credit greater any other country, pulled Australia out of the 
slump. Moreover Copland (1937, 411) also held that Commonwealth Bank's 
appreciation of the currency in December 1931 whilst, at first glance, 'an act of 
deflation turned out to have strong expansionist tendencies'. That is, the action lent 
confidence to local and overseas capital markets that the Commonwealth Bank was 
taking control of matters. Capital inflow piled in. 
Davidson was annoyed at Copland's faint praise of the Commonwealth Bank, 
fearing that 'it played into the hands' of those opposed to the expansionist school. 
Copland tried to mollify Davidson by replying that the Commonwealth Bank did not 
really understand the good they had done by adopting 'unorthodox' financial 
measures.
417 Unmoved, Davidson still felt Copland had made a blunder in making 
benign reference to an institution which was still following a 'dreadful deflationary 
policy' .418 Copland told his contact at the Bank of New South Wales, Claude Janes, that 
while Davidson's charge was 'absurd' he did not want to jeopardise the unity within the 
camp. Knowing his chief's vanity and, indeed, that of his mentor, Janes suggested 
letting the matter rest. Besides placing Janes in an invidious position, the disagreement 
opened a divide between two of the most powerful players within the expansionist 
camp.419 The feud festered into the new year with Copland feeling that the headstrong 
Davidson - 'His Royal Highness' - was, for all his good work in promoting the 
discipline, prone to dismissing the worth of economists especially when their views did 
not match his own.420 One instance of this was when the Melville took the line from late 
1933 onwards of pursuing exchange stability. Davidson warned Kershaw not to take 
the advice too seriously as 'He [Melville] is really an actuary and statistician, and owing 
to that training, finds it extremely difficult to take into consideration the general 
economic, financial and business aspects of the problem' .421 It was also inaccurate. 
417 A. C. Davidson to D. B. Copland, 7/12/1934, and D.B. Copland to A. C. Davidson, 19/7/1934, UMA FECC, Box 22. D. B. Copland to C. Janes, 12/12/1934, and C. Janes to D.B. Copland, 14/12/1934, UMA FECC, Box 24. 418 A. C. Davidson to D.B. Copland, 21/12/1934, UMA FECC, Box 22. 419 Another economist, with an Australian connection not entirely swept along by Copland 's work was F. Benham. Copland told Austin Robinson, the Associate Editor for the Economic Journal , that Benham did not fully understand the point of view of the Australian economists circa the early thirties (D.B. Copland to E.A.G. Robinson, 24/10/1934, UMA FECC, Box 25). 
420 D.B. Copland to C. Janes, 13/3/1935, UMA FECC, Box 34. 421 A.C. Davidson to R. Kershaw, 20/8/1934, BE: OV. 13/3. 
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Melville wanted the exchange rate to move 'in accordance with internal conditions' 
(Schedvin, 1970, 364-5). 
7.6 The Sydney Plan 
When a businessman suggested to Copland that it was time for the Wallace 
Bruce Committee to reconvene to consider the state of the economy, Copland assured 
him that economists already had another plan in the offing. 422 This part of the chapter 
will focus upon the intellectual genesis of a plan that hailed from Sydney. 
Copland was invited by Stevens to contribute towards devising a 'new 
Premiers' Plan', or better still, one that would complement it, by dealing with problems 
of public finance, unemployment, trade and marketing. 423 With unemployment still at 
20 per cent and national income at 500 million pounds against the pre-depression level 
of 650 million pounds, and world export prices sliding again, Stevens had a point. 
Impatient with the pace of recovery, Stevens commissioned a group of Sydney 
University economists in May 1934 to devise major changes to economic policy. The 
resulting submission was presented to a Loan Council meeting. 
Led by Mills, the committee comprised Walker, Copland and Hermann Black 
with William Wentworth from the Premier's office assisting (Cain, 1988a, 7). In the 
press Walker had called for more public works with the economy still in depression. 
The committee's report was full of expansionist precepts and policies, meaning that 
Sydney and Melbourne academic economists were now of the same ilk. Actually, there 
had been some undercurrent of antipathy between the two schools with Mills and Butlin 
having 'limited sympathy' for the public activities of the Melbourne school (Butlin, 
1978, 104). Walker's arrival on the stage helped to bridge the divide. 
The Sydney plan or 'forward policy' was one of controlled inflation achieved 
through a concerted plan through increased public works expenditure. The plan was 
'forward' in the sense that the slow rate of world recovery made pre-emptive, 
422 H. V. Howe, (NS'w Chamber of Manufactures), to D.B. Copland, 6/7/1934, UMA FECC, Box 24. 423 B. S. Stevens to D. B. Copland, 21/5/1934, UMA FECC, Box 27. 
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constructive policy imperative. Some fundamental changes in the economy were 
necessary even if export prices continued to hold up. Interestingly, the preamble upon 
public works expenditure was regarded primarily as a means of generating consumption 
demand. Copland claimed the rise in income from the public spending would generate 
the savings to fund the operation (Cain, 1988a, 8-9). The plan, as presented to Stevens, 
bore the imprint of Walker's latest research in establishing that the two principal 
economic problems were unemployment and the transference of workers from 
uncompetitive industries. The final polished version sounded almost like Keynes in his 
public writings. It commenced with the words: 'In times of depression the resources of a 
country are not fully employed but men and equipment are idle. This idleness arises 
from a failure of consumers' demand and can only be overcome by an expansion of that 
demand' . 424 
Its premise was that the slower and more uncertain the world recovery, the more 
necessary it was to revive consumption spending. The Sydney plan also envisaged 
reducing interest rates while suspending funding operations, if not actually increasing 
the . amount of Treasury bills in circulation. There were also clauses upon debt reduction, 
the exchange rate, wages policy and trade preferences. Copland was so heartened by it 
that he told Stevens that he must make a serious play to enter Federal politics. Only he 
truly understood and had the technical ability to push the expansionist cause. If Stevens 
chose to remain where he was he would be driving policy 'from the back seat'. It was 
better and indeed far easier, Copland assured him, to be driving from the box seat, and 
that meant the position of Federal Treasurer. 425 If Stevens entered the federal arena it 
would buttress Lyons' position, which, while partial to the philosophy of the plan, was 
neutralised by a cautious cabinet. 
Despite the memorandum raising the hopes of the economists this remarkable 
Proto-Keynesian document registered little impact at the inter-Government level. 
However, Stevens did extract from Lyons the promise to authorise more public works 
after the election.426 While Copland bemoaned to Robinson that things would be much 
easier 'if the forces of conservative finance were a little less strong', London was told a 
424 
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different story. 427 Dalton, the British trade representative, told his superiors in London 
that there was 'a strong tendency to indulge in expansionist policies', entailing 
borrowing 'for public works and the like'. There was also the suspicion that the 
Commonwealth Bank was not exercising the same degree of restraint since State 
Government deficits persisted with the total public sector borrowing nearly 25 million 
pounds per annum. Dalton pondered whether the resort to public works might lead to 
'conditions of artificial prosperity' which had triggered Australia's financial crisis in the 
first place. While he thought this recurrence unlikely, he was still anxious about whether 
Australia could meet her liabilities without assistance. 428 
In his rmss1ves to powerful business associates like Robinson and Baillieu, 
Copland fathomed the layers of the psychological mindset financial circles held against 
expansionary policies. Most business and finance houses were, quite simply, unaware 
and unappreciative of the fact that Australia had extricated itself from the slump by a 
policy that was no less unorthodox as it was inflationary. Sir Robert Gibson, for 
instance, had always interpreted the rehabilitation of Australia's finances as 'something 
in the nature of a fairy tale' .429 Despite Australia's heavy resort to credit most bankers 
were still unable to see how Treasury bill finance had helped them and were now 
resisting cutting rates which would 'only require a small effort on their part' .430 When 
the unorthodox policies of economists failed to generate a full-bodied recovery it merely 
confirmed bankers' doubts about the efficacy and worth of experts' plans. This, as 
Copland told Jacobsson at the Bank of International Settlement, led to 'a greater 
agitation than ever for deflationary policies'. Moreover, even when the economic 
situation did improve conservatives were just as likely to attack not just the heretical 
measures which were found necessary during the crisis but also prevent other 
progressive changes from occurring lest they disturb the equilibrium.431 
Copland closed his letter to Jacobssen with the hope that 'a counsel of 
moderation' would prevail and allow Australia to tread further along the path of mild 
inflation.432 They would face, however, the unremitting and quite uninformed 
427 D.B . Copland to W.S. Robinson, 18/6/1934, UMA FECC, Box 24. 428 R.W. Dalton to Sir E. Crowe, Dept of Trade, 6/11/1934, PRO: Tl60/808/l 1935/7, File No 8. 429 The Argus 19/12/1934. 
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opposition of the rentier class. The opposition from Collins Street mounted against 
Copland was particularly galling since the Trades Hall frequently charged him as being 
in the pay of the banks. For their part, bankers, as one had half-jokingly told Copland, 
would like to see him and his doctrines 'floating down the Y arra' .433 Nonetheless, 
Copland was happy to foresee the day when the Commonwealth would assume greater 
responsibility for the relief of unemployment by more loan expenditure. He was joined 
in this wish by Sydney economists. Walker gave an address before the NSW Branch of 
the Economic Society in March 1935 contesting the view that once public works slowed 
the economy would slip back into depression. Rather, if undertaken correctly it would 
trigger private investment spending that would use up idle savings thus allowing public 
expenditure to gradually taper off.434 
Copland astutely read the prevailing psychological mood as one of having 
reached a position of security such that business and finance were impatient with further 
experiment. The consequence was that, like 1932, Australia faced a re-occurrence 'a 
somewhat reactionary phase' with the danger of undoing the good already done.435 This 
manifested, as we have seen, in the advocates of funding raising the cry of over-
borrowing and the Commonwealth Bank insisting that all deficits be financed by public 
loans. Copland felt the Federal Government might cave in to the Board's demand since 
' .. .it is not a government with great convictions about anything and it has very few 
strong Ministers'. Despite this, Copland was optimistic that 'the pressure of public 
influence in favour of spending is so great' that the Commonwealth would abide with 
its program of public works even if it meant a hardening of interest rates in the future. 436 
Giblin also attacked the Government's lassitude and deference to the 
Commonwealth Bank by sending a memorandum to Casey in late 1934 warning that 
falling export prices again compelled the need for a more pro-active policy stance. 
Calling for a new Premiers' Plan 'to meet known tendencies and prepare for the 
unknown,' Giblin felt the only way of preventing an economic relapse was more public 
expenditure financed by Treasury bills (Cain, 1988a,7-8). He took the opportunity to 
wage upon Casey the augmentative power of the multiplier. Should the Commonwealth 
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Bank prove recalcitrant Giblin encouraged the re-elected Lyons Government to take 
charge and not 'shelter behind a Bank Board of their own creating'. In closing, Giblin 
warned Casey that if the Federal Government failed to act an alternative government 
would, with consequences as disastrous as the present administration's complacency. 437 
The calls made, therefore, by both Melbourne and Sydney economists for more 
boldness and adventure in policy settings during 1933/34 gives the lie to Schedvin's 
claim that they were still bound to the Premiers' Plan framework (1970, 375). In the 
light, too, of Schedvin' s thesis about the leading, if accidental role of manufacturing in 
generating recovery, the Melbourne and Sydney economists had also focussed their 
minds upon generating internal recovery rather than relying upon exports to deliver 
salvation. The former Assistant Treasurer Massy-Greene drew attention to this after 
receiving a copy of the Sydney plan. 438 Primary production for export was, in any case, 
not as employment intensive as manufacturing. Massy-Greene told Copland that the 
development of secondary industry was the only means to absorb the unemployed. 
Moreover, with the drying up of foreign loans, Massy-Greene felt Australia would be 
stretched accumulating foreign balances sufficient to pay her way in the world. 439 On 
this point, Copland admitted his concern that any upturn in economic activity would, 
with rising imports, jeopardise the external account. 440 Those fears were soon to 
materialise. 
Before then Massy-Greene informed Copland that he had asked Casey to 
reconvene the committee of experts who had drafted the Premiers' Plan to make some 
reappraisal of economic strategy. This was something the economists welcomed. Like 
Giblin, Copland felt that with the election over, it was time for the government 'to take 
a risk', even if both sides of politics would object to 'the Government calling in wicked 
economists again' for advice. 441 Copland believed that a strong report from a competent 
committee would allow the Government to disengage itself from the fetters of 
437 Untitled manuscript, November 1934, UMA FECC, Box 23. 438 Working alongside Copland within the Austral Development Company in an advisory capacity, Massy Greene changed his tune on the worth of economists. He had even begun to appreciate the outpouring s of Keynes, particularly upon public sector stimulus. At the same time he grew warily of 'The Hard Money School' who trenchantly opposed a more liberal central bank policy (W. Massy Greene to D.B. Copland, 2/9/1935, UMA FECC, Box 45). 
439 W. Massy-Greene to D.B. Copland, 27/6/1934, UMA FECC, Box 34. 440 D.B. Copland to W. Massy-Greene, 28/6/1934, UMA FECC, Box 34. Ml 
. D.B. Copland to W. Massy-Greene, 19/11/1934, and W. Massy Greene to D.B . Copland 17/11/1934, UMA FECC, Box 34. 
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Melbourne high finance - a sentiment Massy Greene agreed with. 442 That hope 
depended upon the advocacy powers of Casey, a matter to which we now tum. 
7.7 Casey at the Helm 
'We are all 'expansionists' - it is only a matter of degree'. R.G. Casey, 1936. 
This part of the chapter assesses federal economic policy under Casey while 
serving as firstly Assistant Treasurer (1933-1935) then as Treasurer (1935-39) in his 
own right. One thing in favour of enlightened policy was Casey's interest in the promise 
of economics expertise. It was, however, not to the degree desired by some of his 
detractors. 
While he would not fully assume the mantle of Federal Treasurer till October 
1935 Casey had effectively been in command of the portfolio since 1934. He was a ball 
of energy, matched by an equal intensity 'to be in the limelight'; but whether his 
proposals would win over: Cabinet was another matter entirely (Hudson, 1986, 93).443 
There was no doubting Casey's industry and mental versatility, but his biographer, W.J. 
Hudson, argues his subject did not have the forbearance to overcome the cut and thrust 
of Cabinet. Casey's own view on pushing matters through Parliament showed a lack of 
combativeness (Hudson, 1986, 92-93); he told Bruce 'I never look for a fight in the 
house as I can find I can get business through much easier and quicker by a reasonable 
degree of courtesy and without bombast. This may or may not be the way to get on in 
the show' .444 Casey was quite happy to placate Lyons' wish to invite Bruce back and 
even prepared, just days after becoming Federal Treasurer, to step aside and allow him 
to take his place (White, 1987, 175). Equally disarming was that while Casey always 
made a good early impression upon his Cabinet colleagues the second impression of his 
knowledge and depth was never as flattering (Hasluck, 1997, 85; Spender, 1972, 32-33). 
Colleagues and opponents quickly sensed Casey's irresolution behind the confident 
facade. 
442 Ibid. 
443 E. Godward to G ... Healy, 13/12/1934, D/O Correspondence, ANZ Archive. 444 R.G. Casey to S. M. Bruce 9/12/1934, AA: A 1421/2. 
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Economists, too, starting with Copland, would quickly appreciate W.S. 
Robinson's observation that Casey 'lacked understanding' and was 'timid' when it 
came to confronting the Bank Board.445 Copland, for instance, had to remind Casey that 
there was no relationship between Australia's level of imports and her level of exports. 
Rather, the level of spending determined imports.446 Casey had energetically marked his 
first year in the job by personally drafting a stream of memoranda upon a whole series 
of economic policy issues.447 It met with a lukewarm response from a Cabinet 
convinced that their orientation was too radical (Hudson, 1986, 93). Casey had already 
been unhappy with the nature of Cabinet decision-making, intimating to Bruce that 
' ... we amble along as a collection of individuals doing the obvious things that come to 
mind - but doing no forward thinking - and generally managing to avoid or sidestep the 
difficult problems until they are on our doorstep - then we make a snap, line - of - least 
- resistance decision which is usually costly, in which we merely always sacrifice 
principle. Heaven knows how we have kept out of real trouble' .448 By drawing up a 
series of informative briefs, partly for his own edification, Casey idealistically hoped it 
would improve policy deliberation. 
One of Casey's first memoranda addressed Giblin's call for a more active attack 
upon unemployment (Cain, 1988a, 13). While agreeing that it was the main social and 
political problem facing the country, Casey did not believe the problem could be 
resolved by government action. Rather the problem was attributable to the general 
econormc 'tone' of the community and that it would only diminish when 'things 
improve'. After discussing the two main ways of increasing employment, that is 
stimulating private enterprise and maintaining, if not increasing, loan-financed public 
works, Casey came to the conclusion that 'no major line of attack upon unemployment 
had come to light'(Cain, 1988a,13-14) .. Even the last ditch methods of 'the most radical 
experimentalist' approach of injecting a 'shot' of more public works expenditure into 
the economy, a la Giblin, would be inflationary and jeopardise the jobs of the vast 
majority. Nor, Casey contended, could more funds be found over the amount expended 
upon public works. He concluded that the present ensemble of policies continue with 
445 D.B. Copland to W .S. Robinson, 27/6/1934, UMA FECC, Box 26. 446 D.B. Copland to R.G. Casey, 19/8/1935, UMA FECC, Box 32. 447 By 1934 Casey was, in effect, Federal Treasurer with Lyons having not set foot inside the Treasury building in the last 18 months except for once whilst dodging pressmen. 448 R.G. Casey to S. M. Bruce, 9/12/1934, AA: A 1421/1. 
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cheap money enshrined by making the Commonwealth Bank go easy upon funding. 
This position was, in retrospect, not much of an advance upon the UAP's earlier 
position upon unemployment, as enunciated by Latham, who felt that the problem was 
best tackled by tax relief than commissioning more public works. 449 
In subsequent memoranda, Casey turned his attention to the matter of Australian 
Governments' finance. The deficits of the State Governments, and the Bank Board's 
refusal to accommodate them, were, together with the aggregate public works program, 
putting pressure upon the local capital market. After considering the alternative of an 
open market for bills, which Casey initially favoured, he swung around to a position, 
whereby, if the States cut their deficits the Bank Board would relax its strictures about 
financing deficits. 450 That way the Bank Board would get its way without seeming to 
dictate to the States about their spending levels. Rather, the limits of deficits and the 
public works programs would be ultimately determined by how willing the public was 
to lend. Casey feared that these loan requirements had a tendency to outstrip the means 
to supply them. In this he was proved right, since the Commonwealth Bank, after 
representations from the Loan Council, relented and allowed some Treasury bill 
financing of State deficits for 1934/35.451 Casey told Cabinet that the Government 
should place pressure on the States to trim their public work programs that had soared 
from 6 million pounds in 1931/32 to 22 million pounds by 1934/35. Otherwise the total 
public sector borrowing would amount to 30 million pounds for each of the next two 
years and this would be quite beyond the local market's capacity to control. If it was 
unchecked, it would mean petitioning the Commonwealth Bank to allow further deficit 
finance with bills for 1936/37 and only a modicum of funding. Bruce praised Casey's 
stance as ideally balanced between the ultra expansionists and those who felt that all 
deficits and public works should be sourced from loan finance. 452 Nor was Casey 
initially prepared to advocate the creation of an open market for bills, essentially 
because it would put the Government offside with the trading banks.453 
449 J. Latham to E. A. Kemp, 18/2/1933, Latham Papers, NLA. 
450 AA: CP503/l item 3, 'R.G. Casey Papers dealing with public finance', 15/11/1934. 451 Loan Council Problems: Memorandum for the Consideration of the Subcommittee, 5/12/1934 AA: Al421/l Item 
1. . 
452 S.M. Bruce to R.G. Casey, 9/3/1935, AA: Al421/2. 
453 
'Loan Council Problems', 5/12/1934, AA: A1421/1 Item 1, Pg.24. 
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In his November memorandum earlier referred to, Casey took the opportunity to 
reflect upon the two schools of economic expansionism then in vogue. The Labor or 
Scullin line, which no economist supported, was critical about public works but in 
favour of the nationalisation of credit. The other school of expansionists followed the 
Government line with its ensemble of policies including public works, cheap money and 
Treasury bills. This school believed it was 'the proper function of Governments' to 
authorise public works until both prices and private enterprise recovered. However 
Casey was not prepared to take up the cudgels in persuading the Bank Board to adopt an 
accommodating monetary policy, or even issuing more bills if the recovery faltered. He 
was grateful for what had already been achieved. When, in contrast, it came to 
considering restrictive monetary policy Casey proved more amenable. Such was the 
prospect facing the country by the end of 1935. 
7 .8 A 'sharp cleavage of economic opinion': Containing the econo1nic 
expansion 
After years of dealing with the economics of slump, by late 1935 Australian 
economists found themselves dealing with an economy in apparent semi-boom 
(Copland, 1936, 10). The delineation or 'sharp cleavage of opinion' between inside and 
outside economists over how to rectify the problem was informed by each camp's 
theoretical premises (Copland and Janes, 1936, xvi). The last part of this chapter details 
how the issue was resolved. 
In March 1936 Casey wrote to Maurice Hankey informing him of how he had 
been struggling for the last eight months with the Australian balance of payments and 
'at long last have come to some sort of conclusion in my own mind about it all'. The 
nub of the problem was that, in the absence of overseas borrowing, Australia had to 
generate an export surplus to pay for her imports and maintain debt payments to 
London. With her appetite for imports resurging, and export prices still 30 per cent 
below their pre-depression peak, Casey was hard pressed coming up with a solution 
other than the traditional respite of depreciation or tariffs, both of which he loathed. 
Buttressed by advice from Treasury, Casey told Hankey that 'You can depreciate your 
currency as easily as kiss your hand, but it is almost beyond mortal power to appreciate 
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it again. If your exchange rate slips, it apparently slips for good'. 454 455 Bruce added to 
Casey's fears about devaluation, warning him how dimly London would see it. 456 
The other alternative was to stage-manage an economic slowdown. Put another 
way, the crux of Australia's difficulty was that expansionary policy only applied 
internally; nothing could be done to lift the prices and volume of exports. Eventually 
Casey stumbled upon a long-term structural solution to the perennial problem of the 
external account. It was an idea that Giblin and other economists had come to six years 
earlier, namely, that the country attract British industrial interests to manufacture locally 
behind a tariff wall. Casey said the benefit to Britain was that Australia, at last, would 
neither have to depreciate nor default on her debts (Ross, 1990, 190).457 In the 
meantime, however, some adjustment of macroeconomic policy was imperative. The 
economic circumstances that brought Casey to this revelation are worth examining since 
it was, in a sense, redolent of the crisis of 1931. 
A Cabinet submission written by Casey in March 1936 detailed not just the 
economic policy dilemma facing Australia but also the circumstances leading up to it. 
Since mid 1935 the economy had been recovering too fast and the key issue was 
whether economic activity should be checked to protect the external account (Copland 
and Janes, 1936. i-vii). Merchandise imports had soared from 44 million pounds in 1931 
to almost 83 million pounds by 1935/36. The level of London funds was comparatively 
low as against previous years. Domestically, the rate of interest was tending to rise at a 
time when State Governments were still intent upon securing more central bank credit. 
The increase in public spending, especially by the States, provoked fears of a rerun of 
the twenties. It left Casey horrified at the prospect of devaluation as the London funds 
dwindled due to imports and a speculative outflow of capital. Puzzled by the dilemma, 
Casey noted 'It is a queer thing that you cannot embrace a liberal domestic policy 
without having to accept the probability of unpleasant counter-reactions arising directly 
from that policy. ' 458 Neither could countries with debts and a trade-dependent profile 
454 R.G. Casey to Sir M. Hankey, 30/3/1936 , Hankey Papers, Churchill College. 455 The advice came from a briefing from Smithies. He actually added that there was also a tendency for the exchange rate to have recurring depreciations aka Niemeyer and Gregory 1930 (Cain, 1988a, 26). 456 S.M. Bruce to R.G. Casey, 14/9/1935, Al 1857: The Treasury Secretary Papers 1934-37: Correspondence with S. M. Bruce. 
457 
· . R.G. Casey to M. Hankey, 30/3/1936, Hankey Papers, Churchill College. 458 R G 
. . Casey to S.M. Bruce, 2/9/1935, AA: CP503/l Item Bundle 3. 
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expand the domestic level of activity without due regard for the exchange rate (Cain, 
1983). 
The advice from the official economic advisers - Melville, Smithies and Wilson 
- was to curb domestic expenditure before disaster befell Australia. Systemically, 
investment was racing ahead of savings caused by monetary overextension; if 
unchecked this would result not just in devaluation but also a boom-bust. Against this 
lay the expansionist camp who felt that it would be premature to deflate the economy 
just because of pressures on the external account (Cain, 1988a, 20-21). They contended 
that the point had not yet been reached where public loan expenditure should be wound 
back. Besides Giblin and Copland and their Sydney counterparts, Mills and Walker, the 
expansionist school had political, even financial muscle, with the respective support of 
Stevens and Davidson. Against them ranged the trading banks, the Commonwealth 
Bank, the Federal Treasury and, of course, the Federal Government. 
Lyons, who had been abroad for the last eight months, was aghast at the 
prospect of higher rates as it would signify not just the end of the recovery but a resort 
to deflation. One response was to place his old economic adviser, Giblin, on the 
Commonwealth Bank Board in a bid to defuse the problem. It would also raise the 
technical level of policy deliberation within the Board with Giblin, a monetary 
specialist, peppering his colleagues with statistical data and a review of economic 
conditions - something that Gibson would never have allowed in his heyday (Millmow, 
2000, 61). Giblin was probably as surprised as anyone with his appointment since 
months earlier he had given another address at the Shillings club warning of dire 
consequences if public spending contracted (Millmow, 2001). He followed this up with 
a memorandum full of grim foreboding if the Commonwealth Bank fell craven 'to the 
primitive deflationary instincts of the less intelligent sections of the business world' .459 
With unemployment still at eighteen per cent, Australia could fall into recession if 
deflationary policies were pursued. To forestall this , and having to undergo what he 
now considered the futility of cost cutting, Giblin proposed public works with some 
monetary accommodation to prevent interest rates rising. 
459 
'The Progress of recovery ', 1935 UMA FECC, Box 214. 
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Copland detected that Giblin's appointment had to do with Lyons' fear that the 
banks would, with Casey apparently seduced by the virtues of deflation, take the 
opportunity to increase their rates. 460 461 Adverse publicity of that spectre came when 
the Melbourne Herald ran an editorial querying the wisdom of raising interest rates with 
unemployment still widespread. The same newspaper had warmly welcomed Giblin' s 
appointment to the Bank Board.462 Copland believed his contacts with Sir Keith 
Murdoch, and his editorial staff, had pre-empted - so far - the rise in interest rates. In 
this instance, he reminded Brigden 'There is no doubt that occasional statements from 
one or other of us ... has a considerable influence at critical times' .463 Since coming to 
Melbourne Copland had assiduously built up relations with newspaper editors, 
especially Murdoch (Younger, 2003 140-2). An overlooked factor in the influence and 
ideas of economists in this whole period was having powerful players interested in what 
enlightened economic policy could achieve. 464 
Perplexed by the issue of whether it was possible to keep the recovery going 
without jeopardising the current account Casey turned to his personal economic adviser. 
Wilson penned a long, philosophical letter, poignantly written from Chicago, outlining 
the two contending schoo~s of economic thought about the depression. While relaxed 
about the short Term debt, Wilson echoed Melville's advice that extensive resort to 
public works would indeed result in a boom-bust scenario, together, with incipient 
devaluation. In Hayekian tones, Wilson spoke of the economy's 'natural and 
recuperative tendency' being hamstrung by an 'unfortunate combination of 
circumstances' coupled by the endemic feature of cyclical instability. Given this, 
Wilson settled for policies that would keep industry profitable including tariff reform, 
low interest rates and keeping public works to 'a reasonable level' .465 Cain (1988a, 26) 
finds Wilson's letter bereft of any awareness of what Keynes and Kahn were saying 
460 D.B. Copland to J. Burton, 21/10/1935, UMA FECC, Box 30. 461 The trading bank community, still unrepentantly dismissive of the worth of economists, was delighted that Copland was not the appointee to the Board since he was perceived as 'thick' with Davidson and a 'credit expansion man' (G. Healy to E. Godward, 27/11/1935, D/O correspondence, Bank of Australasia, ANZ Archive) . 462 The Herald 26/9/1935 and 'The Best Man for the Job' The Herald, 21/10/1935. 463 D.B. Copland to J.B. Brigden, 28/11/1935, UMA FECC, Box 31. 464 Copland gave letters of introduction to Murdoch to several influential economists including Keynes for his visit to England in 1936. He described Murdoch as someone who 'has given quite valuable assistance to the economists in Australia in their pub~ic work during the last six years .. . and has taken a very active interest in the economic policy of Australia over the past six or seven years' (D.B. Copland to Prof. Daniel, 14/4/1936, UMA FECC, Box 44). 465 R. Wilson to R.G. Casey, 11/9/1935, AA: CP503/l Item Bundle 3. 
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about the economy's ability to deliver supply and was purely focused upon monetary, 
not expenditure, flows. 
At the same time Copland, in a conversation with Smithies, argued for 
continuing the expansion on the premise that the exchange rate be flexible (Cain, 1988a, 
19). Deploying Giblin's multiplier, Copland was prepared to go as far as having 
employment return to normal levels and budgets brought into balance. Smithies took 
issue with this view (Cain, 1988a, 25). If anything, public works, taken too far, would 
leave the economy distorted with rising costs, inappropriate real wage levels and a 
bloated public sector. The purgative would be both depreciation and, ultimately, 
deflation - the resort expansionist economists had all along wished to avoid. Moreover, 
real wages would have to be adjusted downwards. Smithies (1935) would also cross 
swords with Walker on the matter of wage cuts. 
As the London funds fell Melville hurriedly organised an informal committee 
involving Mills, Copland, Giblin and Smithies to discuss what to do.466 Melville 
dismissed the idea that the central bank stand ready to inject liquidity into the economy 
to allow unemployment to return to normal levels; instead, the role of monetary policy 
was to allow 'voluntary' savings and investment to find balance (Cain, 1988a, 22). 
Initially Copland was sceptical of the Melville line that private investment would take 
up the slack created by cutting back upon public loan expenditure. Robinson kept 
Keynes informed of the debate and would have also recycled the latter's views to 
Copland. 467 While the three academic economists were ardent expansionists and came 
to the September meeting armed with memoranda, a compromise was reached whereby 
it was agreed that only a moderate expansion of public spending was now deemed 
desirable in order to safeguard the external account (Cain 1988a, 15-20).468 Devaluation 
was apparently ruled out. Keynes was happy to hear of it. 469 A week earlier, Keynes had 
told Robinson that after reading memoranda on the matter he remained unconvinced 
that devaluation was desirable. Keynes volunteered the view that the 'relief' from 
devaluation was exaggerated, but more importantly, frequent resort to this expedient, 
466D.B. Copland to W.S. Robinson, 14/9/1935, UMA FECC, Box 37. 467 W.S. Robinson to J.M. Keynes, 8/10/1935, KPKC. 468 Memorandum on.Conference of Economists, October, 1935, AA: A 1968/391 Item 48. 469 J.M. Keynes to W.S. Robinson, 22/10/1935, KPKC. 
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even discussion of it, would establish a precedent that capital movements could exploit 
resulting, therefore, in 'an indefinite progression of devaluation' .470 
Besides this insight from afar, Cain (1988a, 18-21) has adroitly covered the 
reasons why the expansionists did a remarkable volte-face in their position. Melville 
exploited a 'hesitance' within his opponents and persuaded, perhaps reminded them, of 
the immediate past. Probably apprised of Keynes's disposition, Copland lost interest in 
devaluation. This was besides the fact that the Commonwealth Bank would do all in its 
powers to preserve the rate. In explaining Walker's conversion to the official line, Cain 
(1988a, 21) speculates that he was perhaps satisfied that public expenditure be tapered 
as unemployment drew close to its pre-depression rate. Walker had not timidly fallen 
prey to the monetary overinvestment thesis that an unchecked boom will lead to bust. 
Rather he was confident that the tapering off process could be proportionate to the 
recovery in employment in the private sector provided there was also no sharp 
contraction in public spending.471 Nonetheless it had not dawned upon Walker, or his 
opponents, that a rising level of investment would generate more savings via a higher 
income level (Cain, 1988a, 23). Lastly, Walker was well aware of the negative business 
senti1nent being sown by an inappropriately high level of public works. 
Giblin's view of things was only really revealed six months later when he issued 
a press statement or memorandum justifying the Commonwealth Bank Board's decision 
to further dampen economic activity by raising interest rates in March 1936.472 
Australia, he said, was close to 'normal' unemployment and had to 'mark time' by 
slowing down the rate of expansion. This was the consequence, of course, of expanding 
faster than Australia's trading partners and the need to protect her external account. 
Giblin' s statement, as we shall see, was a double-edged sword. 
At the policy level Casey invoked the authority of these 'outside' experts in 
warranting the cut back in public works that occurred in November. He went on to 
articulate his ideal of a 'forward' monetary policy holding that credit should not 
continue to the point where all the unemployed are absorbed but rather only till private 
470 J.M. Keynes to W.S. Robinson, 16/10/1935, KPKC. 471 
'Loan expenditure facilitates general recovery', SMH, 12/2/1936. 472 Giblin sent Keynes a copy of the untitled memorandum dated 6/3/1936, L36-46, KPKC. 
208 
investment picks up. Only when that process began was recovery assured. Pure 
expansionism, on the other hand, would merely end in an inflationary boom. This was a 
rebuttal of the Davidson - Stevens's line. They had, with Copland's help, been debating 
- later feuding - with Casey alleging that the Commonwealth Bank had deliberately, and 
quite unnecessarily, engaged in monetary tightening to protect the London funds. This 
portended higher interest rates and renewed agitation to write down debts. 473 Claude 
Janes told Smithies that the trading banks were restricting credit 'to the point of 
curtailment' and that they would soon be unable to accommodate overdrafts requests 
unless relieving action was taken by the central bank.474 Davidson wrote to Casey 
warning him of an imminent rise in rates unless monetary stringency was eased. 475 In an 
internal note to Sheehan, Casey, echoing the Reading interpretation of events, vented 
his anger at Davidson's impertinence at blaming the Commonwealth Bank and 
'inferentially' the Government for the Wales's liquidity problems. Casey blustered 'The 
business of the General Manager of a Bank is presumably to manage his Bank - not to 
direct the monetary policy of the country, nor to run the Commonwealth Bank' .476 
Melville investigated the Wales' liquidity problems and concluded that its 
embaiTassment was mostly due to aggressive lending rather than monetary policy per 
477 
se. 
At first Stevens contested Casey's view that any check to imports, other than 
currency depreciation would retard recovery. Should the need to curb imports be 
necessary it was best expedited by devaluation, not, as Casey favoured, by credit 
restriction.478 Consequently, when Casey's memorandum was circulated, William 
Wentworth wrote an incisive critique of it. Apart from attacking Casey's 'childish view 
of the processes of savings and investment', Wentworth argued that credit restriction 
inevitably raised the prospect of Australia defaulting upon its foreign debts.479 The key 
criticism of the Casey memorandum was its failure to recognise the link between the 
London funds and the liquid resources of the trading banks. 
473 A.C. Davidson to R.G. Casey, 14/8/1935, BNSW: G. M. 302. 474 C. Janes to A. Smithies, 16/9/1935, BNSW, A53/451, Janes Correspondence. 475 A.C. Davidson to R.G. Casey, AA: Al 1857, 26/9/1935. 
476 RG 
. . Casey to H. Sheehan, 26/9/1935, AA: AA 1968/39 Item 1. 477 C. Reading to R.Q. Casey, 17/9/1935. AA: A 11857. 
~8 
. B.S.B. Stevens to R.G. Casey, 1/10/1935, UMA FECC, Box 37. 479 
'First Criticisms of Memorandum', n.d, UMA FECC, Box 32. 
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Copland informed Stevens of the economists' findings, advising that the Premier 
should be sympathetic to a general plan of 'tapering off' in expenditure, provided 
recovery and cheap money continued. The agreement also promised no funding 
operations together with the acceptance of an open market for bills.480 In a letter to 
Casey, Stevens flagged his qualified acceptance of the economists' findings. 481 The 
letter was accompanied by a lengthy dissection of the memorandum that he, in concert 
with Wentworth, had written. Its main concern was that 'because recovery is rapid, it 
therefore has elements of instability in it'. Stevens traced this sentiment to the 
economists' supposition that 'It was boom times which precipitated the depression, and 
that, if we are to avoid a future depression, we must avoid boom times' .482 Instead of 
extrapolating from past experience, Stevens suggested that perhaps a rapid recovery 
might just be as 'sounder' as a slow one. Nonetheless, despite the tensions between the 
camps, Stevens was happy to fall into line with Lyons, Reading and Casey that recovery 
. lb . 1 483 continue, a e1t at s ower tempo. 
Copland felt confident that the Commonwealth Bank would be committed to a 
more sane policy than hitherto. He told the Cambridge economist, Austin Robinson, that 
getting State Governments to take a more moderate view of their position would be 'the 
chief difficulty' in tapering off expenditure. 484 
The odd man out was Davidson. Upon hearing of Copland's U-tum over 
monetary policy, Davidson felt that Copland had again compromised his integrity.485 In 
truth, Copland was, as he put it, carrying out '[a] Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde trick of 
establishing a via media between the Commonwealth Bank and Stevens' .486 
Davidson's idea of a 'forward' policy was one that allowed more monetary liquidity 
even if that spelt depreciation (Cain, 1988a, 31). A sense of animus between the 
Treasurer and Davidson had already set in since the former had, in his memorandum 
and elsewhere, basically accused the Wales of being the force majeure behind the 
upward pressure upon rates. The Wales' bond-selling had also frustrated the 
480 D.B . Copland to B.S.B. Stevens, 10/10/1935, UMA FECC, Box 37. 481 B.S.B . Stevens to R.G. Casey, 12/10/1935, AA: CP503/1 Item Bundle 3. 482 Comments by B.S.B. Stevens on memorandum, 12/10/1935, AA: CP 503/1 Item Bundle 3, 29A. 483 D.B. Copland to W.S . Robinson, 21/10/1935, UMA FECC Box 37. 484 D.B . Copland to E.A.G. Robinson, 8/10/1935, UMA FECC, Box 37. 485 A.C. Davidson to b. B. Copland, 8/10/1935, UMA FECC, Box 33. 486 D.B. Copland to W.S. Robinson, 7/10/1935 UMA FECC, Box 37. 
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Commonwealth Bank's ability to curb liquidity. The fact that Casey saw Stevens as a 
mooted challenger to his position only added to the animosity since Davidson had been 
in cahoots with the Premier. As Casey intimated to Bruce, with Stevens 'breaking his 
neck' to get into federal politics, it would be a 'national calamity' if he succeeded since 
his mind 'does not work as yours and mine does' .487 As for Davidson, Casey felt that 
he palpably suffered from an 'aggressive form of personal megalomania' .488 
A reluctant Bank of England was brought into the problem of Australia's over-
expansion because Casey and Reading wanted to shore up Australia's foreign reserves 
to pre-empt a capital flight problem. In couching his argument, Reading told Norman 
that 'active deflation' as distinct from funding was 'politically impossible'. 489 A brief, 
written by Melville, put the view that a loan, in tandem with comprehensive credit 
restriction at home, would be the best means of addressing the problem than resorting to 
devaluation or trade restrictions. Only that resort would stamp out the 'strong 
inflationary sentiment' in Australia. 490 A memorandum written by Bank of England 
officers concluded that, ultimately, the remedy lay with Australia. If she adhered to 
restraint at home she would probably not need the assistance being sought.491 Liquidity 
was mopped up by selling Treasury bills at a higher interest rate. Casey warned Bruce 
that if the representations to London failed trade restrictions were in the offing.492 A 
loan would, moreover, facilitate a more sophisticated method of credit restraint to be put 
in place with trading banks cooperation. 
Norman lectured Bruce that a debtor nation must always ensure a trade surplus 
to meet its external obligations before assuring him that 'You can rely upon me that I 
will not let the Commonwealth Bank down' .493 Meanwhile Giblin, in the memorandum 
explaining the Commonwealth Bank's decision to raise rates, refloated the devaluation 
option, not just to shore up the London funds , but also allow more domestic 
expansion.494 He pursued the matter with Keynes and Bruce.495 Up till now, Giblin 
487 R.G. Casey to S. M. Bruce, 17/2/1936, AA: A 1421/3. 488 R.G. Casey to S. M. Bruce, 30/9/1935, AA: Al421/2. 489 C. Reading to Sir M. Norman 2/12/1935 cablegram BE OV181/7. 490 R.G. Casey to S. M. Bruce, 15/2/1936, and attachment, 'A Loan in London', AA: A 1421/3. 491 
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reflected, Australian economic policy had rejected the 'suicide club of competitive 
devaluation or sadistic deflation', settling for something more moderate. Devaluation 
should be undertaken only when the business sector was resigned itself to some check 
upon the rate of domestic expansion. This was necessary because of the absence of an 
effective apparatus to control trading banks' lending, together with the Commonwealth 
Bank's ineffective control over the London funds. Like other economists, Giblin wanted 
a more effective mechanism that would insulate the lending activity of the banks when 
the London Funds fell. Keynes replied that with Australia's London balances falling 
away she did indeed face pressures for devaluation though he was 'sceptical' there were 
adequate grounds. He suggested Australia consider capital controls to protect the 
pegged rate. 496 
Given a copy of Giblin' s memorandum, Melville rejected this advice arguing 
that funding, or passive deflation, was still the best means to check the boom. 
Devaluation, moreover, would not work because of international retaliation and the 
likelihood of rising wages and prices at home.497 In his reply to Giblin, Bruce, reflecting 
City opinion, warned that were Australia to 'break the truce' upon exchange rate pegs it 
would result in a loss of international goodwill. It would, moreover, make difficult his 
task of loan conversions.498 Bruce also re1ninded Giblin that devaluation would impede 
the flow of British investment capital flowing into Australia. In any case, all such 
deliberations were unnecessary since, first, the Bank of England agreed to make a loan 
to Australia to buttress its London funds. And secondly, revised figures for the balance 
of payments showed that the feared deterioration in Australia trading performance did 
not materialise.499 Meanwhile concern about the level of London funds abated a little 
with export prices improving amidst new forecasts that the external account would now 
balance for 1935/36 (Copland, 1936, 18). Giblin was thereupon content to settle for a 
stable rate unless there was a change in economic fundamentals. 500 
The delicate negotiations with London had little impact upon Stevens who gave 
Lyons a copy of his economic plan for 'militant expansionism'. He asked the Prime 
496 J.M. Keynes to L.F. Giblin, 22/4/1936, L/ 36/46-7, KPKC. 497 L.G. Melville to L.F. Giblin 3/4/1936, AA: M104/3. 498 S.M. Bruce to R.G. Casey, 14/9/1935, AA; AA1968/391 Item 50. 499 
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Minister, who had been warmly received in London as Australia's saviour, to petition 
Norman for double the level of loan assistance so that domestic economic activity 
would not have to be checked. Further adding to Casey's consternation, was the rise in 
interest rates in March 1936 that signified not just the end of cheap money, but a 
political controversy. There was a witch-hunt as to the party responsible. Davidson's 
bank, hitherto the champion of low interest rates, had pushed up deposit interest rates by 
half of one per cent in response to, and in conformity with, the Commonwealth Bank's 
experimental selling of Treasury bills in the open market. While Stevens publicly 
labelled the Commonwealth Bank's action as 'extraordinary', Davidson sheeted the 
blame for the rise in rates squarely upon the Commonwealth Bank Board. 501 The 
matter embroiled Lyons and Casey in a controversy about who ran monetary policy 
with the Government uninformed about the Bank Board's initiative502. Lyons lamely 
issued a statement stating that his Government was not responsible for the rise in 
interest rates. 503 Apart from patently demonstrating the independence of the Bank 
Board, it also showed a manifest lack of coordination between it, the Loan Council, and 
Treasury. 
Casey, invoking Copland, admitted that the rise in rates was not due to selling 
Treasury bills, per se, but rather the increasing tempo of economic activity. 504 Behind 
the scenes a flustered Casey confessed to Bruce that 'If there was more than one A.C. 
Davidson in the banking system' he would come close to being an advocate for bank 
nationalisation. 505 Casey had, in fact, already come to that conclusion, following the 
Wales' precipitate actions in 1935 of selling its bills on the market, to achieve more 
liquidity which put pressure upon interest rates. Davidson's encore actions in March 
1936, with the Royal Commission on Banking and Monetary Systems in session, could 
not, therefore, have been more ill-timed. As the General Manager of the National Bank, 
L.J. McConnan put it, 'The action of the Wales has done more in a month to bring 
about some form of control of the trading banks than the yelping of the Socialistic 
501 
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Douglas Creditites and the like over the past years'. 506 McConnan' s gumption was 
correct; Casey intimated to a banker that Davidson's precipitate actions meant that the 
banks would have to be 'fettered' in the near future. 507Moreover, the Government's 
visibly limp response to the Commonwealth Bank's actions meant that the issue of 
ultimate control over monetary policy would have to be reconsidered. 
The political debate over monetary policy, especially interest rates, would flare 
again and involve the same combatants. Casey was apprehensive about what mischief 
Stevens would get up to once he reached London on official business. 508 One such 
appointment was with Keynes, which Copland had helped to arrange (Clark, 1983, 
38).509 Copland, in fact, felt that Stevens was capable enough to give a paper before the 
Political Economy Club. He told Keynes that no other Australian politician had 
practised expansionist economics so consistent! y, nor 'taken economists so much to his 
heart' as Stevens had. 510 Keynes did. not accede to this request but he did meet Stevens 
in Cambridge and found him 'a very sound man' .511 Colin Clark, who attended the 
meeting, recalled that Keynes was 'interested in this very earthy politician' (McFarlane 
and Healey, 1990, 7). 
In a confidential memorandum drawn up for Stevens, Copland, using themes 
from an important address, outlined a program of progressive social legislation which 
the Premier could use for his possible entry into federal politics.512 Copland kept 
Stevens informed about political developments and the agenda facing Lyons and his 
Cabinet: 'Nothing ambitious is being done or contemplated in making policy, and the 
Government is sure to lose ground because it is not tackling problems with any 
imagination. More and more it becomes clear that the real problems that will confront 
us during the next five years are national insurance, the 40-hour week, increased 
provision for social services, the adjustment of Commonwealth and State financial 
relations, and the improvement of money wages' .513 Strangely, Copland omitted any 
506 L.J. McConnan to Lord Inverforth, 1/4/1936, from 'A Selection of Letters of Leslie McConnan, 1935-52' , National Bank Archive. 
507 R.G. Casey to G. Healy, 9/4/1936, D/O Letters, Bank of Australasia ANZ Archive. 508 Liesching to Sir H. Batterbee, 14/4/1936, BE: OV13/4. 509 D.B. Copland to B.S.B . Stevens, 29/2/1936, UMA FECC, Box 47. 510 D.B. Copland to J.M. Keynes, 24/2/1936, UMA FECC, Box 44. 511 Keynes to L. Lqpokova, 18/5/1936, PP/45/190/7/126 KPKC. 512 
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word of the ongoing hearings of the Royal Commission in Banking and Monetary 
Systems. 
7 .9 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how Australian economists in the middle thirties had engaged in 
considerable rethinking of their theoretical positions about macroeconomic 1natters. 
They recorded some success in the funding debate but bold and radical policy initiatives 
like the proto-Keynesian 'Sydney Plan' were stillborn partly because economic 
recovery made the federal government complacent. Events were turning, however, in 
the economists' favour especially the forthcoming inquiry into banking and monetary 
policy. 
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PART THREE 
THE MARCH OF KEYNESIAN IDEAS 
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CHAPTERS 
The Royal Commission on Monetary and Banking Systems 
8.1 Introduction 
One of the ironies of the 1936/37 Royal Commission on Banking and Monetary 
Systems was that while the input of professional economists dominated the 
Commission's findings they were barely influential in pushing for the inquiry in the first 
place. Not perhaps since the 1930 Macmillan Committee on Finance and Industry in 
Britain, had a gallery of economists been afforded a public forum to express their views 
on economic policy. The evidence given by economists advanced the key issues upon 
which the Commission would deliberate. That evidence, amongst a sea of words, was 
impressive, representing the state of the art of central banking and also economic 
theory. 514 Furthermore, it exhibited the latest in contemporary economic wisdom that 
sprang from Keynes's General Theory which was published just as the Commission 
began sitting. The arrival of that book in Australia is discussed along with an outline of 
its main theoretical and policy themes. 
While the inquiry had been brought to fruition by political pressures upon the 
Lyons government there was also, as Casey put it, 'the cry of the monetary reformer' 
shooting through the air. 515 The prospect of an inquiry into Australia's financial system 
filled Commonwealth Bank officials with dread. Their apprehension was at odds with 
what one of the Commissioners, Professor R.C. Mills, told a Sydney bank-manager, 
namely, that ' ... the Commission was superfluous except for giving some people a 
chance to blow off steam and giving him the opportunity to improve his own 
education' .516 Casey was more equivocal, telling a church congregation that the inquiry 
would be useful even if it only showed how the present system could be better 
improved.517 Privately he told Bruce that, while initially 'horrified' by the prospect, 
some good might nevertheless come out of the exercise (Sutherlin, 1980, 41). 
514 
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As this chapter will show, Mills ' pessimism about the worth of the Commission 
was to be completely dispelled, not just by the evidence given by economists , but also 
by the findings which heralded new milestones in effective monetary management. The 
actual proceedings, dutifully reported upon in the press , were useful in clearing minds 
upon the ait of central banking (Giblin, 1951). Under examination, therefore, will be the 
evidence put before the Commission by economists. Apart from drawing upon hithe1to 
unused archival and newspaper material pertaining to the Commission, this chapter will 
also draw upon three relatively neglected studies of the Royal Commission by Cain 
(1988) , Booth (1988) and Sutherlin (1980). 
For the first ti1ne, macroeconomic goals were enunciated in a public forum. The 
contribution from economists revolved around the priority that should be given to the 
competing goals of exchange rate stability and economic activity. That debate, apart 
from causing a minor schism in the economics fraternity, still crystallised the advance 
1nade in economic understanding by policy-making authorities. Before examining that 
debate in some detail in section 8.5, some background upon aspects of the 
Commission' s raison d 'etre and membership is in order. This will be discussed in 
section 8. 3. There is no doubt that the establishment of the inquiry, taken in the scheme 
of things , formed part of the push towards greater control and regulation of the 
economy. The economists had, of course, been predisposed in that direction for some 
time and sections 8.2 and 8.4 of this chapter underscore that shift in their economic 
outlook. 
8.2 The Embrace of Planning and Control 
Among Australian economists there had been a growing reaction against the 
market as a fonn of coordination. Two depressions in forty years meant Australia was 
'swept up ' in the global tide against capitalism (Schedvin, 1992, 54). Mauldon (1933) 
had first raised the issue of 'planning' and an advisory council consisting of expe1ts to 
help the federal government. As a precursor to the future, the Australian Institute of 
Political Science in early 1934 conducted a summer school upon 'Economic Planning ' . 
A number of economists, including Walker, Wilson, Giblin, Melville and Shann 
contributed papers on this 'blessed' issue of planning (Melville, 1934, 96). In his 
address, Walker linked planning with self-sufficiency arguing that, in Australia' s case, 
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self-sufficiency had been pressed upon her by the trading policies of others (Melville, 
1934).518 Wilson gave a more forthright address, arguing 'that the competitive system, 
neither in its operation nor in its results was justifying the faith of its votaries'. He went 
on to lament that there were un-coordinated schemes of planning extant but 'with no 
integrating purpose', so that there were no 'body of principles that could be used as a 
criterion in perfecting a system of economic planning'. He was pessimistic whether, in 
fact, the capitalist order could be preserved (Whitwell, 1985, 2-5). For him the choice 
was between wise and unwise control. 
Giblin defined economic planning as 'applying foresight and reason to economic 
activities', but he agreed with Wilson that, at that time, there 'no such agreed aim for 
Australian development' .519 It was all at this stage still 'an attitude of the mind' (cited in 
Whitwell, 1986, 5). In a radio talk aired in 1935 Giblin asked his countrymen to 
'experiment boldly' with new models of economic coordination. 520 Like their 
counterparts in Britain, Australian economists had swung to a marked acceptance of 
supplementing the market with more 'planning'. As Whitwell amply shows, the 
depression brought about an unequivocal shift to the left among local economists 
insofar as it entailed more regulation and control over economic activity (1985, 14). 
Brigden conveyed these sentiments in an ANZAAS Presidential Conference speech 
given in 1935. He was prepared to recognize that the profit motive was not enough a 
guide and rationale for economic life. Instead, he spoke of an economists' utopia where 
social responsibility and public accountability would prevail amongst business leaders 
and bankers (Whitwell, 1985, 150). Brigden's utopia also encompassed a better 
technical knowledge of economic management. Like Wilson, he envisaged a central 
thinking agency that would exhibit technical proficiency and thereby inspire public 
confidence that events like the depression would not re-occur. Finally, he made the very 
apposite point that catastrophes like the depression 'bring about a very radical reform' 
in, say, central banking or economic management (Whitwell, 1985, 15). Much later, 
Kershaw told Giblin the same thing in discussing the speedy evolution of central 
banking in Australia during the interwar years. 521 
518 
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Even before Brigden's landmark speech in 1935 he had enthusiastically given a 
series of six radio talks upon the subject of economic planning in October 1933.522 To 
Brigden, planning meant economic stability. As Director of the Queensland 
Government's Bureau of Industry, his duties, apart from matters of economic 
investigation, were to recommend how loan moneys were allocated. It formed part of 
Premier Forgan Smith's idea of 'orderly planning' (Molesworth, 1933, 107). The only 
drawback in Brigden's mind was that he could not always 'speak his mind ... on matters 
of economic policy', lest he become 'an enemy of the people' .523 
In Western Australia, Shann invited one of his former students, H.C. 'Nugget' 
Coombs, on to a radio program and asked him to 'say what impresses you most ... about 
our situation?' Coombs bemoaned the penchant for 'palliatives' and the 'evasion of 
positive action towards recovery'. He felt that Australia had done well since 1931 but 
complacency was now creeping back. 524 On a higher methodological plane, Melville 
could see how ignorance, uncertainty and irrationality reduced the neoclassical concept 
of a self-regulating economist to fiction (Whitwell 1985, 8). 
In the rest of this section we will focus upon two major economists of the period 
and how they did, or did not adjust to, changing political climes. The economist that 
perhaps personalised the shift to planning and intervention was Copland. Radicalised by 
the events of the thirties, the Melbourne man confessed to a friend that he was 
impressed with the need for a change in the control of investment and production to 
endow the economic system with some stability. Even the Lyons Government had, 
against conservative financial opinion, embarked upon expanding investment under 
government control. Copland predicted that there would be a steady movement to the 
left and he was more than happy to encourage that movement. 525 This allegiance had, of 
course, already been well noted by colleagues and detractors alike. Many would have 
felt that surrendering the economic levers to politicians would result in the return of 
twenties-style waste. At times, Copland despaired of convincing some of his associates 
that the political ground had shifted. He told the Canadian economist, Harold Innis 'It's 
522 Brigden Papers, folio 34, NLA. 523 J.B. Brigden to F. Mauldon, 26/3/1935, and F. Mauldon to J.B. Brigden, 5/4/1935, UMA FECC, Box 138. 
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no use arguing with people who have built up dream pictures about the workings of the 
economic system. They are like young people in love, and it is only the hard fact of the 
depression that would shake them out of their state of infatuation'. 526 
In September 1936 Copland along with Denis Robertson and Wesley Mitchell 
was invited to give an address at Harvard University as part of its Tercentenary 
celebrations. Copland's address, which he proudly distributed afterwards, was entitled 
'The State and the Entrepreneur'. Thematically, it was about injecting greater social 
control into the economic mechanism and touched upon the 'old problem' of the 
relationship of State control to private enterprise. 527 He told Premier Stevens that his 
address would find him 'moving still further to the left'. 528 Copland reported back to his 
colleagues that all three contributions had independently arrived at the same theme, 
namely, that 'unfettered enterprise would not produce an economic and social order that 
would satisfy the aspirations of the common man' .529 Robertson introduced Copland to 
the podium saluting him as 'that skilful designer of cunningly mixed cordials for 
depressed economic systems' (1940, 118). This was high praise from whom Copland 
regarded as one of the 'ablest economists in Britain' .530 
Copland was delighted with Robertson's comment that there was now general 
agree1nent among economists as to the cause of the crisis and even the remedy, though 
there was still debate as to how far the remedy should be applied (Robertson 1940, 126-
7). In passing, Copland noted, among his hosts, 'quite a cult' over Swedish economic 
policy with its 'middle way' between individualist capitalism and extensive state 
control. That philosophy was, of course, nothing new to Australian economists, though 
Copland raised no complaint at the neglect of Australia. He did, however, express 
bemusement at how resistant American economists were to the idea of state control: 'To 
a visitor from a country which had long ago gone far in this direction the controversies 
about state control in the US appear a little unreal'. 531 
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All Australian economists did not welcome the orientation towards planning and 
an extensive public sector. The ideologically conservative pair, Shann and Melville, for 
instance, were loathe to be swept along by the collectivist tide. For Shann, the 
encroachment of Government into economic affairs went against his elliptical embrace 
of neo-liberal political philosophy. It also made for tragedy. Shann's aforementioned 
discourses into Australian economic history raged against tariff protection and industrial 
regulation, both of which were perceived as conspiracies against the public (Schedvin 
and Carr, 1998). Yet in 1933, as aforementioned, he had turned to Keynes's popular 
writings to lament the waste of excess fixed deposits in bank vaults as the economy 
stagnated. While he was wary of economic interventionism, Shann has some faith in a 
'wider planning, a monetary policy that would permit the recovery of equilibrium and 
an expansion of consumers' demand' (Duncan, 1934, 167). 
Later, with economic recovery in prospect, Shann shifted ground and re-
embraced his earlier philosophy. His antipathy to public works, and presumably, the 
extent of debt to finance them, resurfaced. Melville agreed, consoling Shann with the 
thought that 'Can we really expect a democracy in a hurry to spend its way out of 
depression, to exercise any discrimination in the works on which it spends its money? 
To encourage Governments to spend money on public works is, I think, to encourage 
them to spend it more or less indiscriminately'. 532 Shann conveyed his complaint of 
wasteful public expenditure to Davidson, explaining how loan expenditure was futile in 
'priming the pump' of private enterprise. It was akin to having money 'poured down a 
rat-hole'. He believed such borrowing kept up interest rates and gave the economy a 
distorted or 'false' structure.533 In an unsent reply, Davidson defended public works 
programs, stating that they were remunerative and, in the last resolve, were an 
'. . h lf ' 534 investment 1n uman we are . 
As the world retreated into protectionism and regulation Shann became 
increasingly pessimistic about the prospects of a return to a market-driven order of 
liberal internationalism. The truth, too, was that Shann had also become unsettled since 
he returned to university life. University colleagues in Perth noted his newly-found 
532 L.G. Melville to E.O.G. Shann, 27/11/1934, GGM-35-2 RBA. 533 E.O.G. Shann fo A.C. Davidson, 23/4/1935, BNSW, 302/590/1. 534 Draft of A.C. Davidson letter to E.O.G. Shann, n.d. BNSW 303/590/1. 
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intolerance of criticism (Alexander, 1963, 156). In the interim, he secured the chair at 
the University of Adelaide vacated by Melville and left unfilled due to the effect of the 
depression upon university finances. It was a position that involved a tradition in 
teaching theoretical economics when he was, first and foremost, an economic historian 
(Alexander, 1963, 178). Nor did he have a good grasp of economic theory, particularly 
its mathematical aspect (La Nauze, 1939, 227). Nonetheless the prospect of a 'fresh 
start' at Adelaide excited him.535 Shann's last letter to Davidson, together, with his 
commentaries for The Statist magazine, for which he was the Australian contributor, 
struck Davidson as an astonishing return to old patterns of thought. He blustered to 
Hytten that 'Poor old Shann has gone over to the sentimental Economists for the 
present. .. I am afraid that he is suffering from ... an idea that almost every thing in [the] 
Australian past and present policy is weakened or endangered by wrongful spending, 
uneconomic propositions etc. I am afraid he, too, has gone up a side street for the 
present' .536 Davidson was cruelly accurate. However, like the economists, he was 
shocked when Shann died in rather mysterious circumstances. 
Schedvin and Carr (1998, 69) speculate that his death, which the coroner found 
to be suicide, could be attributable to the sea change in political philosophy as the 
'pendulum swung to the economics of J.M. Keynes'. The introspective Shann probably 
felt he was a spent force. Another authority on Shann, Graeme Snooks, also links his 
death to personal depression brought on by the move to intervention. In short, Shann 
could not fathom how more regulation could help when too much intervention in 
markets had caused the problem in the first case (Snooks, 1993, 28). In contrast, 
Melville felt there was nothing sinister in Shann' s death other than the stress of 
overwork. 537 
At the memorial service for him, G.V. Portus, a professor of Political Science at 
Adelaide, alluded to the mental torment Shann had been undergoing by remarking how 
he had begun in the last three months 'to relearn his economics' (Snooks 1993, 28). On 
the day of his death Shann wrote to Copland regarding commissioning another in the 
series of anthologies upon Australian economic documents. He agreed with Copland's 
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earlier missive that it will 'do me a deal of good to sort out my ideas with you again' .538 
While he was later to pedantically note that Shann was not really an economist, Copland 
ensured that he was honoured by a memoir of him penned by Mel ville. Copland was 
happy with the tribute because it emphasised the 'mutual dependence of each of us on 
the others who cooperated in influencing economic policy during the depression' .539 
Shann' s demise meant, of course, that his leavening influence would be absent 
from the forthcoming Royal Commission on Banking. More surprising, however, was 
the omission of any form of evidence from the loquacious Copland who had been the 
first economist to call for an inquiry into the monetary system (Sutherlin, 1980, 9). 
Before turning to the giving of evidence by economists some remarks upon the 
constitution of the Commission are in order. 
8.3 An Enquiry into Monetary Policy 
The political origins of why the Commission came to be have been exhaustively 
covered by Sutherlin (1980) and need not unduly concern us here. However, in her 
discussion of the genesis of the inquiry, Sutherlin made no mention of early Country 
Party efforts to push for a Royal Commission into the setting of the exchange rate. That 
said, the terms of reference and, more especially, the selection of the officials who 
would sit on the Commission, are of palpable interest because, ultimately, they would 
have a bearing upon the inquiry's findings. It is, for instance, sometimes assumed that 
Copland did not appear before the inquiry or submit written evidence because he was 
disappointed not to be one of the presiding Commissioners. This is quite false. Copland 
did not present any evidence because, as he told Jock Phillips, the secretary to the 
Commission, he was preoccupied being Acting Vice-Chancellor at Melbourne 
University and, after that, would be abroad visiting Harvard and Cambridge while the 
Commission sat.540 In any case, Copland had some indirect input into the Commission. 
Melville, for instance, sent him the Statement he was to place before the inquiry. 
Copland would also write articles upon the key findings of the Commission. Copland 
told Melville, nonetheless, that it was 'a thousand pities' that university administration 
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prevented him from taking part in the inquiry. He went on to say that 'the enforced 
absence from controversy would help in a small way to repair my damaged 
reputation' .541 By that, Copland presumably meant his poor standing with the authorities 
over his philosophical views and, perhaps, his association with Stevens. On the key 
issue of the political interference in banking Copland considered that it was nonsense to 
suggest that banking could be quarantined from politics. He told a friend that 'Banking 
has far too powerful a social influence to be ignored in politics'. 542 On this issue, 
Copland would have been heartened by his colleague Gordon Wood's submission 
which was dedicated to arguing the case for greater supervision of the financial sector. 
After a year or more of backsliding, Lyons announced in October 1935 both the 
terms of reference for the Royal Commission and the personnel to preside upon it. 543 
The terms of reference, drawn up by Casey and Treasury Secretary, Harry Sheehan, 
were suitably broad (Sutherlin, 1980, 37). They were: - 'To inquire into the monetary 
and banking systems at present in operation in Australia, and to report whether any, and 
if so what, alterations are desirable in the interests of the people of Australia a whole, 
and the manner in which any such alterations should be effected'. 
Apart from inveterate opposition to the inquiry from elements like 'The Group', 
the private banks, and even the top echelons within the Commonwealth Bank, delay was 
also caused by finding suitably qualified Commissioners (Sutherlin, 1980, 20-31). 
Initially, the Federal Government was in favour of appointing a foreign-born chairman. 
Names like Lord Macmillan, Denis Robertson, Bertil Ohlin and Per J acobsson were put 
forward (Sutherlin, 1980, 32-33). Political and logistic factors swung the choice towards 
an Australian chairman. Casey was, at one stage, initially inclined to offer the 
chairmanship to Giblin (Sutherlin, 1980, 38). However, like Copland, Giblin had once 
too often aired his views upon monetary reform in public and was, as discussed above, 
placed upon the Commonwealth Bank Board. Eventually Justice Napier from South 
Australia was given the job of Chairman of the Commission. While some of the six 
Commissioners were specialists in some of the fields pertaining to the inquiry it came as 
some surprise that only one economist was selected. After screening all the likely 
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'Banking Royal Commission', SMH 4/10/1935. 
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candidates, Casey chose Mills because he was the only one 'who has not nailed his 
opinions to the mast in the press, as practically all the others have done' (Cited in 
Sutherlin, 1980, 41). Apart from being, therefore, a 'safe' choice, Mills was selected 
because he had some expertise in the field of inquiry having written textbooks, with 
Walker, upon the monetary system (Groenewegen, 2003, 7). In the academic sphere 
Mills had neglected his research to build, as he put it, a 'factory' of overseas-trained 
economics ability (Randerson, 1953, 43; Butlin, 1953, 181).544 
Mills' position as the sole economist upon the Commission drew Janes to 
comment that 'Mills should have our deepest sympathy. It looks as though he will have 
to do a lot of carrying for the others'. 545 Janes, however, overlooked the fact that one of 
the Commissioners chosen was H.A. Pitt, a Victorian Treasury official who had served 
upon the Copland Committee in 1931. He was also President of the Victorian Branch of 
the Economic Society. The other commissioners were J.P. Abbott, a pastoralist and 
federal politician, E.V. Nixon a Melbourne accountant and J.B. Chifley, a junior 
Minister in the Scullin Government who professed an interest in economics and 
banking. While Janes' comment was , therefore, unfair it was prescient in another sense. 
Mills was to have a considerable influence upon the Commission, including drafting the 
final report (Butlin 1953, 182; Markwell, 1985, 39). Later, his fellow commissioners 
would praise Mills' s diplomatic skills in getting six opinionated men to agree upon the 
path to take. It was Mills's intention, however, to bring down a unanimous report even 
if it needed his active stewardship. Having missed the excitement and ferment of the 
Premiers' Plan, Mills now had an opportunity to make his mark. When the report was 
published Copland congratulated him for his work, stating that 'it will take its place' 
with other reports in other countries on central banking. 546 S.J. Butlin, an economist 
from Mills's department, said the inquiry was 'worth the money' (1937, 40). 
At the start of the inquiry, Mills was charged with drawing up, with Chifley, a 
detailed questionnaire which all witnesses would have to complete (Sutherlin, 1980, 
49). Framing the questions being addressed to bankers and economists allowed Mills 
544 Among the key personnel in the economics department during the mid-thirties and their place of higher study were E.R. Walker (Cambridge), S.J. Butlin (Cambridge), Hermann Black (Harvard) and R. 
Madb0 wick (Oxford). 545 
. C. Janes to D.B. Copland, 9/10/1935, UMA FECC, Box 34. 546 D.B. Copland to R.C. Mills , 24/7/1937, UMA FECC, Box 54. 
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and Chifley to have some bearing on the agenda. Belying the tag that they were both 
politically 'safe', Chifley and Mills were, along with their assistant, Phillips, an 
economics graduate from Sydney, quite predisposed, in fact, to strengthening central 
bank powers in the name of sane economic management (Sutherlin, 1980, 49). It was a 
view not initially shared by Napier, Nixon and Abbott. After questioning one witness 
Napier commented that after six months of taking evidence it was not clear to him what 
more the government could have done to meet the situation created by the depression 
other than to expand the supply of treasury bills which was undertaken. That said, 
Napier was open to hearing whether there were other 'measures that might have been 
adopted that would have had a more beneficial result'. 547 
Before examining the contributions of economists to the inquiry and how they 
shaped the final report it will be necessary to gauge the early reception that Keynes's 
General Theory received in Australia. This is necessary since several economists, 
without any attempt at grandstanding, referred to it or, indeed, based a considerable part 
of their evidence upon this new revolutionary book. 
8.4 The Arrival of the General Theory in Australia 
Looking back over the Post Second World War period 'Nugget' Coombs 
recalled it as a time of being guided by 'the star' of Keynes (1970, 4). It was, however, 
a more daunting experience in the pre-war years. Australian economists, while not 
totally opposed to Keynes, were hardly swept along by a tide of new economic thinking. 
The diffusion and assimilation of the new paradigm in economic thought would 
preoccupy Australian economists up to the outbreak of the Second World War. This 
part of the chapter undertakes a brief assessment of the early impact of Keynes's 
General Theory amongst Australian economists. Unlike Keynes's Treatise, which was 
introduced into Australia's Federal Parliament with a dramatic flourish by Theodore in 
1930, the General Theory had a more prosaic entry into Australia. 
547 
'Judge's Cornment: at the Inquiry' SMH 18/7/1936, pg.13. 
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Keynes's Envoy to Australia 
A former King's College student now working with the Bank of England, W.B. 
Reddaway came to Australia in March 1936 with the 'oven-hot' galley proofs in his 
suitcase (Arndt, 1976, 282).548 Reddaway had read them on the voyage, and, as this 
section of the chapter will show, played a leading part in disseminating its contents to 
his hosts, even using the Royal Commission as a forum. Reddaway had expressly come 
out to Australia as the first research fellow at the University of Melbourne, a position 
sourced entirely - and somewhat controversially - from Giblin' s directorship fees from 
the Commonwealth Bank Board (Ridley, 2002, 135). Given the shortage of economists 
in Australia the fellowship was designed to invite a scholar to come to Melbourne and 
perhaps shed new light upon contemporary economic problems.549 It would also keep 
Melbourne abreast of the latest economic debates in Britain and America. Keynes had 
recommended Reddaway as 'the best King's College trained economist in recent 
years'. 550 While Copland had wanted Austin Robinson as the first research fellow -
much to Keynes's consternation - Reddaway would live up to his commendation. 551 
H.V. Hodson, editor of the Roundtable magazine, briefed La Nauze about the visitor: 
'He was Keynes's star pupil. .. and is strikingly intelligent to talk to. He hasn't, I think, 
got the rarefied intellectual atmosphere of the set-apart genius of any science but he has 
common sense and intelligent perception raised to a very high power'. 552 Copland 
greeted the young economist with the remark: 'You will not find Australia as interesting 
as Russia, but I think it has many things to interest anyone who has the blood of the 
pioneer in them'. 553 It was to prove a prophetic challenge and one that Reddaway 
accepted with alacrity. 
548 Interestingly Reddaway was not the only Bank of England officer to arrive in Australia at that time. A month before, two officers - Kershaw and Jackson - arrived. It was a prospect that so concerned Reading that he cabled Montagu about the visit with his worry that it might be somehow be linked with the Royal Commission. Montagu cabled back that Kershaw was in Australia to primarily to visit his family while Jackson was here to take an appraisal of the Australian economy and also to consider Australia' s case for a loan from the Bank of England to strengthen its London funds. Kershaw further mollified Reading by assuring him that if news of the visit caused the Commonwealth Bank any embarrassment Jackson would immediately return to England (C. Reading to Sir M. Norman, 28/32/1936, BE: GI/287). Both officers did meet important personages, including Casey, while here. News of the visit did not leak out. 549 
'Conditions of the Research Job,' Giblin Papers, NLA. 550 D. B. Copland to Vice-Chancellor R.E. Priestley, 2/12/1935, UMA FECC, Box 37. 551 L.F. Giblin to J.M. Keynes, l 7/9/1935, UMA FECC, Box 34, and D.B. Copland to J.M. Keynes, 13/9/1935, L/35, KPKC. 
552 
· H. Hodson to J: La Nauze, 16/1/1936, La Nauze Papers, NLA. 553 D.B. Copland to W.B. Reddaway, N.D. 1935, UMA FECC, Box 37. 
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Indeed, even upon landing upon Australian shores, Reddaway found himself in 
the unexpected position of having to recommend a gentle braking of economic activity 
since her London balances were threatened.554 In reply Keynes admitted to being 
somewhat 'perplexed' by the Australian problem, attributing it to capital flight on the 
premise that the Royal Commission might recommend another devaluation. 555 
Reddaway presented his findings and summary of Keynes's work to a Shillings 
meeting held on April 28, 1936. So momentous was the arrival of Keynes's book that it 
was agreed that the book be the focus of attention at further meetings. Reddaway's 
attempt to convey the meaning of the General Theory to the gathering, which included 
Copland and Giblin, was obliquely entitled, 'Is the idea of a fair rate of interest a mere 
convention?' (Brown, 2001, 54-5). 556 The review, which reduced Keynes's system 
down to a system of simultaneous equations, was the progenitor of John Hicks' IS/LM 
framework of analysis. The savings-investment dichotomy of the Treatise was retained 
but now the difference between the two aggregates determined output, not the price 
level. The policy import was much clearer; with resources unemployed, it was 
investment that determined savings, not the converse, and more importantly, they 
equalised not through variations in the price level but by changes in output. 
Unemployment could be reduced by increasing aggregate demand up to a point until 
supply constraints came into play. 
Cain felt that Reddaway' s interpretation of Keynes was excellent and gave a 
'flying start' to the technical discussion that followed (Cain, 1984, 367). The paper was 
rushed into print and became the first published academic review of the General Theory 
(Reddaway, 1995, 6). It also met with Keynes's approval even though Reddaway had 
been critical that his mentor over-simplified discussion of several matters. Interestingly 
for our purposes, Reddaway felt that Keynes tended to underplay 'the dangers of 
expansionism' (1936, 35-36). 
The economists in Sydney were not to be outdone by Melbourne having an 
'envoy' from Keynes within their midst (Millmow, 2003). Walker and S.J. Butlin had 
554 W.B. Reddaway to J.M. Keynes, n.d., L/36/48, KPKC. 555 J.M. Keynes to·W.B. Reddaway, 11/4/1936, L/36/50, KPKC. 556 
'Minutes of the Shillings meeting', April 28 1936, Giblin collection, UMA FECC, Box 219. 
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both undertaken higher studies at Cambridge while Keynes was cogitating upon the 
General Theory. Both were supervised by Denis Robertson and were, therefore, more 
observers than participants in the 'Keynesian ferment of the early 1930s' (Schedvin, 
1978, 243). Butlin (1946, 9), though, actually attended Keynes's lectures at Mill Lane 
during 1933 and 1934 when the central themes of the General Theory were being laid 
out. Walker adapted a proto-Keynesian view that deficit budgets and public outlays 
were quite defensible when private spending was lagging (Whitwell, 1985, 11; Cain, 
1984, 83).557 Before Reddaway had delivered his lecture Walker wrote a lucid precis of 
Keynes's new book in the Sydney Morning Herald on March 14, 1936.558 Walker used 
the opportunity to damn the deflationary policies of the Commonwealth Bank of selling 
Treasury bills to the public in a bid to further slacken the pace of economic activity. 
Walker stated that the central bank's actions were wrong-headed and that the 'right 
remedy' was, in fact, to lower interest rates to keep the economy at a highest level of 
activity possible. He followed it up by giving a lecture on the General Theory on June 
9 to the NSW Branch of the Economic Society.559 That address would be good 
preparation for his evidence before the Commission where he outlined the new wisdom. 
While the first green shoots of the Keynesian 'revolution' in Australia were ,, 
appearing not all were swept up by it. It certainly did not conquer Australia with 'a 
speed and a thoroughness' akin to the 'Spanish Inquisition' as King (1997, 298) claims. 
Copland, for instance, informed Keynes that being Acting Vice-Chancellor left him 
little time to absorb his new book. 560 561 Two months later, R.B. Lemmon, a member of 
the Economic Society, asked Copland when he would outline Keynes's new book 
Copland could only reply that he had 'not read more than 150 pages' .562 It was a marked 
difference from the past when Copland had been Australia's leading monetary theorist 
and the first to digest Keynes's latest work. 
557 Financial; a Sound Policy; Public Works and Recovery', SMH 2/2/1935. 558 
'Employment; Interest and Money; Mr Keynes; Again' SMH 14/3/1936. Walker's review is surprisingly not listed in a recent anthology of newspaper reviews of Keynes' great work probably because the Australian press was never surveyed. See Backhouse R.E. (1999) Keynes: Contemporary Responses to the General Theory Bristol: Thoemmes Press. 559 There is no material evidence of what Walker said in that address since the archival records of the NSW Branch of the Economic Society appear to have been lost. 560 D.B. Copland to J.M. Keynes, 9/3/1936, UMA FECC, Box 44. 561 D.B. Copland to W.S. Robinson, 14/4/1936, UMA FECC, Box 48. 562 D.B. Copland to R.B . Lemmon, 16/5/1936, UMA Economic Society of Australia, Victoria Branch files, Box 140. 
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A 'worried' Copland told Sir Keith Murdoch that university administration was 
consuming his time, meaning that he had to neglect 'a good deal of economic literature 
that I ought to be reading. Any reputation I have will quickly dissipate if this goes on 
for much longer'. 563 As Australia's most prolific economist of the interwar era, Copland 
must have felt his professional standing amongst his peers, or at least keeping abreast of 
new developments in theory, was beginning to suffer. He told an American academic 'If 
we could only make a resolution that we would completely abandon the world and its 
... affairs periodically for a year or two, I believe we would greatly enrich our science. 
The ideal is to spend some time in dealing with economic policy and handling practical 
affairs and then to live the life of a recluse so that there is ample time to think it all over. 
Once the job of thinking has been done, we should then sally forth again and become 
embroiled to some extent in practical affairs'. 564 This was, of course, precisely what 
Keynes had done in order to conceptualise and compose his Magnus opus. 
Hytten recalled that Giblin had 'being bitten' by Keynes's prophecy of the 
euthanasia of the rentier. 565 Yet for all his Proto-Keynesian leanings, however, Giblin 
struggled with swallowing whole Keynes's new theoretical schema. One such incidence 
was on his voyage to England in December 1937 where Giblin still confessed to 
lingering doubts about the sweep of Keynes's theoretical schema (Downing, 1960, 45). 
A sabbatical spent at King's College, Cambridge researching the latest developments in 
monetary theory would clear away conceptual doubts. Copland, knowing how Giblin 
only wrote under pressure, suggested to D.H. Robertson that he should encourage 
Giblin to compose, especially if he saw 'virtue in his ideas' especially where they might 
, . h h . , 566 strr up t e monetary t eonsts . 
While Copland had to diffident! y translate the meaning of Keynes's new 
theoretical framework to his honours students, in Sydney Mills 'kept away from 
Keynes'. According to one of his old students, Noel Butlin, Mills did so because he felt 
'it was beyond him' (cited in Snooks, 1991 , 8). All this flies in the face of Mills and 
Chifley being exposed to the meaning of Keynes's revolution to the extent that the 
563 D.B. Copland to K. Murdoch, 14/4/1936, UMA FECC, Box 44. 564 D.B. Copland to Prof. Williams, 1/7/1936, UMA FECC, Box 50. 565 Hytten autobiography UT pg. 87. 
566D.B. Copland to D. H. Robertson, 24/12/1937, UMA FECC, Box 55 
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latter, allegedly, become a 'Keynesian-of-the-first-hour' (Crisp, 1961, 169; Battin, 
1997, 34 ). 
Like other studies looking at the transmission of Keynesian ideas in the interwar 
era Markwell (1985, 26) observed that in Australia the process generally 'declined with 
age and increased with the extent and recentness of direct contact with ... Cambridge 
economics'. This rule of thumb could help explain Walker, Copland, Melville and 
Giblin rapid conversion to the economics of Keynes. Yet Melville felt that his two 
Melbourne colleagues were, even in 1939, 'not altogether convinced' of Keynes's new 
schema though strongly beholden to his policy prescriptions (Cornish, 1993, 18-19). 
Similar sounding sentiments about public works and contra-cyclical monetary policy 
had been 'floating around' for some time before Keynes 'generalised them in his 
general theory' (Melville, 1971, 21). For his own part while he 'accepted Keynes's 
general conclusions', Melville remained 'very unconvinced by a lot of the theory in his 
General Theory and it didn't seem to me to be very rigorously thought out but I didn't 
think his conclusions were not generally correct'. 567 Unlike his colleagues Giblin and 
Copland, Melville later developed upon some of Keynes's concepts like expectations, 
equilibrium shifts and uncertainty. 
'Nugget' Coombs was an even greater puzzle (Rowse, 1999). While often 
regarded as the greatest local convert to Keynesian economics, deeming it the 'most 
seminal intellectual event of his life', Coombs' early days of exposure to the General 
Theory were days of frustration (1981, 30). 568 At first, he was not 'impressed' by the 
new book though he felt Keynes's 'practical implications' were important. 569 Now 
working under Melville as an Assistant-Economist at the Commonwealth Bank,570 
Coombs had the advantage of a study group with Black, Mills, Madgwick, Walker and 
567 . Melville Trc. pg.158, NLA. 
568 Following in Coombs' footsteps in undertaking higher study at the LSE was D.H. Merry, a Melbourne 
economics graduate and now working with the Wales. Davidson financed his studies in London. Merry 
who found The General Theory a difficult book recalled one occasion when Keynes came to give a lecture at the LSE: 'I marvelled at how a man that could talk so simply, clearly and correctly would write 
something like .that. I put it down to the fact that he was something of a mathematician'. Author's Interview with D.H. Merry 1998. 
569 H.C. Coombs to J. La Nauze, 22/6/1936, La Nauze Papers, NLA. 57° Coombs' thesis had been on a study of public works as a stabilisation policy. Upon returning to Perth he rejoined the education department. He sought a position with the Wales bank in 1935 but Shann acting 
as his referee was .'quite abusive' about his old student and thus dissuaded Davidson from recruiting him (Hytten, UT 127, 172). 
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Butlin meeting in a Sydney coffee house once a week to discuss Keynes (Cornish, 1990, 
62). This was, of course, the nucleus that had supported the expansionary efforts of 
Premier Stevens. Despite this arrangement, Coombs could still empathise with La 
Nauze, who found assimilating Keynes on his own 'a pain-in-the-neck. I am struggling 
with him too'. 571 
By September, Coombs was getting to the nub of Keynes: 'I have been trying to 
make sense out of the theory of the rate of interest. Keynes's work I found 
unsatisfactory and yet it seems to me to have one aspect of truth and that interest is 
predominantly a monetary phenomenon' .572 The New Zealand-born economist, Allan 
Fisher, who now held Shann' s old job at Perth, also confessed to have problems 
'digesting' the import of Keynes. Fisher held out hope that Keynes would soon 
'provide a text for some general reference upon the conditions for a moving 
equilibrium' .573 Fisher later admitted that, like Giblin, he had reservations about 
accepting the precepts and assumptions underpinning Keynes's theoretical 
framework. 574 
The import of the General Theory 
The message implicit within the General Theory was that aggregate demand, 
that is consumption and investment spending, governed the level of output and 
economic activity. The level of that expenditure, supplemented by public works , could 
be either too much or too deficient a level in terms of employing resources. The 
powerhouse variable of investment spending, determined by the interplay of marginal 
efficiency of capital and interest rates, was also subject to rank uncertainty. Interest 
rates were determined by the interaction of liquidity preference and the supply of 
money. The economy's self-corrective properties were not as effective as classical 
economists believed: full employment was rarely the natural state for market capitalism. 
Therefore, aggregate demand had to be manipulated to ensure full employment and 
price stability. This could be achieved, not by planning or arbitrary controls but by the 
discrete but subtle use of fiscal and monetary policy by the authorities. These 
571 NLA J. La Nauze to H.C. Coombs, n.d, La Nauze Papers, . 57? 
- H.C. Coombs to J. La Nauze, 9/9/1936, La Nauze Papers, NLA. 573 
· . A.G.B. Fisher to J. La Nauze, 19/11/1936, La Nauze Papers, NLA. 574 A.G.B. Fisher to J. La Nauze, 26/3/1937, La Nauze Papers, NLA. 
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instruments could be used not just to rectify economic disturbances but also to maintain 
equilibrium and economic stability. That said Keynes had a fairly modest definition of 
what actually constituted full employment. He was equally conservative too about 
budget deficits believing budgetary balance should prevail at the end of the business 
cycle. From his earlier work Keynes knew all about the perils of inflation just as much 
as he abhorred the hellfire of dear money. Much of these insights, alas, did not 
immediately spring out from his book. 
The difficulty for policy-focused economists in absorbing the General Theory 
was that, while it was a transcendental work upon a new theoretical vision, it was hardly 
a handbook on counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy-making. Keynes reminded his 
fellow travellers that his suggestions for economies in semi-slump 'are not worked out 
completely; they are subject to all sorts of special assumptions and are necessarily 
related to the particular conditions of the time' (1937, 121-2). Moreover, the General 
Theory was sparing in how to apply this new \Visdom to policy. Keynes openly 
acknowledged this; his book was intended for economists, not mandarins. He admitted 
'It would need a volume of a different character from this one to indicate even outline 
the practical measures in which they might gradually be clothed' (Keynes, 1936, 383). 
In a letter to Joan Robinson in late 1936 Keynes indicated that he did not want his mind 
to crystallise on the 'precise lines' of the General Theory just yet. He went on, 'There is 
a considerable difference between more or less formal theory, which my existing book 
purports to be, and something which is meant to be applied to current events without too 
much qualification by people who do not fully comprehend the theory. So I am against 
hurry and in favour of gestation' (Keynes, 1982b, 185-6). 
In another place, Keynes insisted upon debate, trusting that 'time, experience 
and the collaboration of many minds will discover the best way of expressing the ideas' 
(Keynes, 1973, 111) - ideas which Keynes held to be 'extremely simple and .... obvious' 
(1936, xxxii). These qualifications did not console Copland who voiced, with others, 
his impatience at what Keynes was really saying 'It is not an easy book .. .later on, when 
his ideas are clearer, Keynes may be able to set out the problem in simpler language. 
This however cannot be done until the theory is more clearly defined' .575 
575 D. B. Copland to Sir W. Leitch, 22/7/1936, UMA FECC, Box 44. 
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Keynes himself felt the need for a simpler statement but only after he had 
absorbed the criticisms of others and had become clearer in his own mind about the 
sweep of his theoretical system (Keynes, 1973a, 47).* His heart-attack in 1937 and 
convalescence prevented this, resulting, as Hyman Minsky (1976, 14) noted, with 
Keynes having 'never fully participated in the hammering out of a polished version of 
Keynesian doctrine'. There was, then, to be considerable delay in working out the 
policy implications of Keynes's great book. According to the historian Peter Clarke, 
Keynes was well aware of the process by which his ideas would become more 
politically telling, 'would undergo a selective process of simplification and distortion' 
(1998, 50). To have, for instance, his radical ideas on war finance accepted Keynes 
wanted them to be 'dressed up' in familiar terms so as not to alienate officialdom 
(Skidelsky, 2000, 476). Keynes delivered the modus operandi of the General Theory in 
* the pamphlet, How to Pay for the War (1940) where the problem, of course, was not an 
economy in slump but supply-constrained. 
Most Australian economists, bar Fisher, would eventually accept Keynes's 
theoretical framework, but some like Melville (1939) and Smithies (1937) put their 
qualifications and reservations into the public domain. Their respective concerns 
revolved around the theory of interest rates and expectations, the marginal efficiency of 
capital construct and, in Smithies' case, the marginal propensity to consume and the 
alleged futility of money wage cutting. To that end Smithies, who fancied himself more 
an economic theorist than Treasury economist, told Copland that after reading Keynes 
he felt 'there were some pretty serious weaknesses in his argument'. 576 Copland tended 
to agree, responding that the Australian experience of 1931 showed that, apart from 
reducing real wages, it was indeed possible to get some benefit from the expedient. 577 
*Apolitical economist of the highest order, Keynes was always well aware of the practicality of economic ideas, of what was possible and advisable within the prevailing political and administrative system. 
* Earlier of course Keynes had, along with many other economists, spoken in favour of counter-cyclical public works to counter the slump. His most famous effort in that regard was 'Can Lloyd George do it?' (1928) and 'The Means to Prosperity' (1933). Unlike the classical economists Keynes call for these programs had some theoretical underpinnings, sourced from the Treatise on Money, prompting him to say in 1929 that 'I know of no British economist of reputation who supports the proposition that schemes of National Development are incapable of curing unemployment' (Keynes,1973c, 813). 576 A. Smithies to b .B. Copland, l 7/4/1936, UMA FECC, Box 48. 577 D.B. Copland to A. Smithies, 23/4/1936, UMA FECC, Box 48. 
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One step in that journey would be to convince authorities of the need for a sound 
monetary policy that took macroeconomic balance into account before exchange 
stability. It is to that which we now turn. 
8.5 The Intellectual Contribution of Economists to the Inquiry 
The Tabling of Evidence 
'A central bank sets out upon an uncharted sea when it adventures forth to 
control credit.' J.B. Brigden before the Royal Commission 1936. 
Acting in their private capacity, eleven economists - Mauldon, Melville, 
Brigden, Gifford, Fisher, Hytten, Walker, Reddaway, Giblin, Wood and Wilson -
presented evidence before the Commission. It also included each giving a written 
Statement addressing the issues posed in the questionnaire. Some of these submissions 
and the discourse through them ran to exorbitant length. Hytten's lengthy submission, 
for instance, meant he was in the witness box for five days. 578 Melville, too, took one 
,. 
day of proceedings just to read his Statement. 
The remarkable thing about the evidence presented by the economists was that it 
was, barring idiosyncrasies and nuances, fairly uniform. It was, moreover, more 
coherent and better informed and thought out than the evidence put forward by the other 
witnesses, including in particular Commonwealth Bank officials. Giblin found the 
evidence by Riddle, Bell and Reading to be technically poor with their answers safe 
rather than instructive (1951, 215).579 It was also discordant. Riddle, the first witness to 
be called before the Commission, placed the 'utmost importance' upon exchange rate 
stability.580 He also stated that, unlike the immediate past, the Bank had little anxiety 
578 Hytten appeared in his own right not representing the Wales Bank. His superior, A.C. Davidson presented his own submission and testimony. His submission was prepared by the bank's research and intelligence section. Claude Janes had the task of putting the submission together and to the satisfaction of Davidson. He suffered a nervous breakdown from the stress of doing so and was sent off on a tour of 
Europe to recuperate. 
579 The exception here was the submission by A.F. Bell, a member of the Bank Board, who felt the 
existing powers were inadequate. Bell wanted more banking powers including the liquidity controls 
mooted by Giblin and Melville. 'Central Bank: Views of the Acting Chairman' SMH 31/7/1936. 580 
'Bank Royal Commission Sir Claude Reading gives Evidence', SMH 16/1/1936 
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over the Treasury bills issue. Sutherlin (1985, 96) indicates however that the Governor 
was insistent that the bank's primary aim was to prevent fluctuations in the price level. 
Reading, the Chairman of the Bank Board, was emphatic about exchange rate stability 
(Sutherlin, 1985, 118). For Commonwealth Bank officials preserving the exchange rate 
was a shibboleth but for others it was a means to a greater end. In this respect Melville 
felt the Commission's task was to 'select one factor in the economy and attempt to fix 
it, at the same time endeavouring, as far as possible, to make every other factor in the 
economy adapt itself to the fixed factor' .581 
Melville saw the exchange rate and the level of foreign reserves underpinning it 
as fulfilling that role. It was an appropriate marker for a small, open economy dependent 
upon foreign capital. It would serve as a 'compass' which authorities could steer the 
economy. This meant pegging the exchange rate and then guiding the economy along 
that course with appropriate domestic policies (Booth, 1988, 26). As we shall see, it was 
the import of Melville's independently crafted and cleverly systematic submission that 
provoked the most comment from his colleagues (Cornish, 1999, 122-134: Scott, 1992). 
The economists plumbed for achieving economic stability and, to varying degrees, 
pursuing full employment. Most economists advocated preventing economic 
fluctuations through counter-cyclical monetary and, in some cases, fiscal policy. To 
that extent most would have welcomed the Report's key finding that: 
'The Commonwealth Bank should make its chief consideration the reduction of 
fluctuations in general economic activity in Australia, thereby maintaining such 
stability of internal conditions as is consistent with the change which is 
necessary if economic progress is to take place' (RCMB, 1937, 204). 
That is, the Commission decided that exchange rate stability should play second 
fiddle to overall economic stability. This was the general view of the economists in their 
evidence to the Commission. What, however, was of revolutionary change stemming 
from the proceedings was that domestic economic activity no longer had to dance to the 
tune set by the exchange rate. Rather, the exchange rate would only be kept stable so 
long as domestic economic activity was being maintained. The Commission's 
581 Cited In Comish, 1999. 
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preference was for the prevention of domestic economic instability and the maintenance 
of as near as possible to full employment (Sutherlin, 1985, 97). While the Commission 
conceded therefore that 'reducing fluctuations in general economic activity' was not as 
precise as exchange rate stability it felt it was a stance of 'fundamentally greater 
importance'. The same paragraph went on to say that this entailed expanding credit 
when the economy was in need of stimulus and the reverse when the economy was 
over-heating with the exchange rate generally kept stable. 
In his evidence Melville had expressed doubt whether one could truly use this 
criterion, rather than the exchange rate, as the compass to steer economic policy by 
(Cornish, 1999). In fact, Melville was never impressed by the Commission's final report 
commenting that: 
'If you went with domestic policies and just let the market decide the exchange 
rate, you would not get good value. The movements in the rate would be very 
volatile with no management, and the market would just be motivated by waves 
of optimism and pessimism ... That is not a practicable way of running an 
economy' (Cited in Booth, 1988, 38). 
Following the approach of Sutherlin (1980), we will delineate the evidence of 
economists between the objectives of internal economic stability and exchange rate 
stability. 
What the Economists were saying: 
Internal Stability 
The issue of internal balance came to the fore not just in the evidence of the 
witnesses but also in the Commission's final report which recommended institutional 
changes to the banking system, either by direct means or establishing an open market 
for Treasury bills to manipulate liquidity levels within the economy. Brought down in 
July 1937 the Commission emphasised that: 
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'The general objective of an economic system for Australia should be to achieve 
the best use of our productive resources, ... This means the fullest possible 
employment of people and resources under conditions that will provide the 
highest standard of living. It means, too, the reduction of fluctuations in the 
general level of economic activity'. 
These desiderata required that an intelligently managed central bank, under 
Government direction, regulating the volume of credit and currency in the light of the 
'general objective of the monetary and banking system'. The exchange rate, together 
with foreign reserves, had to be brought under the ambit of the central bank (Sutherlin 
1980, 156-8). By placing the central bank under Government supervision, or to be more 
exact, under the Federal Treasurer's ambit, monetary policy would become better 
integrated with other arms of economic policy (Butlin, 1937, 47). Monetary policy was 
to be placed subordinate to the general objectives of the economy. The Commission 
also conceded recourse to public works as an effective remedy for economic depression. 
Melville, Giblin, Reddaway and Hytten all reminded the Commission that 
monetary policy had a limited effectiveness when taken in isolation from other 
measures (Sutherlin, 1980, 160). Among one of its bolder recommendations was that 
the Commonwealth Bank should have the power to confiscate a percentage of each the 
trading banks deposits that could be varied according to economic conditions. This was 
advanced because the Commission felt that the central bank's power to restrict credit 
was circumscribed. Both Melville and Giblin proposed this idea to the Commission 
which was, to be fair, also supported by a member of the Bank Board, A.F. Bell in his 
evidence. 582 
Looking over the conduct of economic policy the Commission was critical of 
the shibboleth of exchange stability that the Commonwealth Bank Board had upheld 
since 193l(Butlin, 1937, 44). It felt that the internal level of economic activity should 
take priority. This meant manipulating money supply, or credit, in inverse proportion to 
the level of economic activity. The Commonwealth Bank, in contrast, by engaging in 
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funding had inappropriate! y contracted credit during 1931-34 and failed to take the lead 
in setting interest rates (Butlin 1937, 44). 
It was a finding, perhaps, that mirrored what Keynes was saying in the General 
Theory. However, apart from the Commission's reference to full employment, the 
principal of regulating the level of credit to prevent fluctuations in economic activity 
was probably of mixed vintage involving elements of old and new economic thought 
and a fair degree of pragmatism. A Royal Commission investigating Canada's monetary 
system in 1933, for instance, had already concluded that management of credit, 
including the use of liquidity controls imposed upon banks, would ensure a more · 
effective economic policy. Most economists agreed that it was the interest rate which 
was the most important regulator of borrowing. The Commission's enlightened 
approach to economic policy was not just derivative then of new economic wisdom but, 
more importantly, the hard lessons of policy mismanagement stemming from the early 
thirties, including the embarrassment over interest rates between the Commonwealth 
Bank and the federal government in March 1936. These errors, catalogued by several 
witnesses, included not devaluing quickly enough, the failure of the Commonwealth 
Bank to take the lead upon interest rates and its relentless pursuit of funding. Apart from 
allowing the depression to develop more rapidly than was actually necessary, the 
Commonwealth Bank compounded errors by retarding the recovery process. 583 The 
consensus from the economists was that the Commonwealth Bank had been too 
preoccupied about taking precautions to avoid a boom, thereby making the economy 
more vulnerable to recession. In other words, the Bank saw little virtue in expansion 
always figuring that it meant increased imports, not increased exports or import 
substitution (Giblin, 1951, 217). The Commonwealth Bank's fixation with funding was 
indicted, with one witness drawing attention to the tangible lack of inflation even with 
so much Treasury bills extant. 
In his damning evidence, Walker exorcised some commonly held falsehoods by 
demonstrating that the trading banks' credit squeeze of 1931 was the outcome of 
pressure upon the London Funds. He was critical, moreover, of the Commonwealth 
Bank for its failure to act to alleviate the situation by increasing credit at the time. 584 
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Certainly some of the economists presented evidence articulating the new 1 y minted 
wisdom of Keynes. Older economists, like Giblin and Brigden, did not make direct 
reference to full employment but rather stressed maintaining a steady level of economic 
activity. 
It was a testing time for sorpe. A few days before he was due to give evidence 
before the Commission Hytten disarmingly told Giblin: 
"The more I think of monetary theories and evidence for our ills the less I see in 
them. I suppose most parties will regard my conclusions as hopelessly muddled 
but I can't see any really clear-cut issue. To my mind 'a stable price level' 'a 
stable exchange rate' are just as much catchcries as 'the single tax' and 'social 
credit". 585 
Hytten, however, backed up with technical support from the Wales' economic research 
department, mounted an articulate, if overlong, case for credit management but opposed 
the idea of liquidity controls. 586 Along with Davidson's submission, Hytten felt the 
contributions from the Wales were the 'most comprehensive evidence' presented. 
(Hytten, UT, 136). Hytten enunciated the Keynesian resort of deploying fiscal policy in 
a slump. 587 However his exposition upon how that expenditure would fall between 
output, income, prices and employment displayed some confusion. 588 It was tinged with 
Hayekian overtones since Hytten believed, like many of his contemporaries, that 'every 
expansion ... carries with it the seeds of another crisis and depression'. 589 Like other 
economists, Hytten agreed that the main purpose of economic policy, all things 
considered, should be to achieve the 'maximum employment of men and natural 
resources consistent with long term stability'. 590 The exchange rate should be kept 
stable but not for stability's sake but be subservient to domestic economic activity. 
Allan Fisher, H ytten' s predecessor at the Wales, stressed the more 
microeconomic role of the central bank, namely, to ensure an efficient distribution of 
585 T. Hytten to L.F. Giblin 15/7/1936, Giblin Collection, 92/141 Box 2 K-T, UMA FECC. 586 Evidence, RCMB, 1228. 
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the nation's savings. This, together with avoidance of inflation, would lead to the 
optimum use of economic resources. Elsewhere Fisher, in passages reminiscent of 
Shann, argued that the depression in Australia was the consequence of overexpansion of 
credit in the wrong areas, especially primary industry. 591 Fisher was sceptical of the 
using credit to achieve full employment. 592 With that outlook it could well be 
understood why Fisher had differences with Davidson and returned to academe. 593 
Giblin' s submission was, like his character, idiosyncratic, ranging over issues 
like income distribution, population policy and the need for the Commonwealth Bank to 
formulate economic policy that would have a bipartisan grounding. Giblin emphasised 
that discussion of monetary policy was, in a sense, too technical a matter for the 
Commission to handle. It also had to be understood that monetary policy could only 
ease the pain of any external shocks upon the economy and prevent the secondary 
effects of that first loss in real income. 594 Unlike Copland, Giblin was in favour of an 
independent central bank. His colleague, Wood, argued that the chief function of the 
financial system ' ... was to keep capital accumulation and purchasing power in 
balance ... and there is justified impatience with a system which fails to assume the 
1 d . . d . , 595 power to corre ate pro uctlon, consumption, an saving . 
The submissions by the younger economists, particularly Walker, Reddaway and 
Gifford confidently displayed an appreciation of Keynes's new vision. Walker, of all the 
young Keynesians, was probably the most astute in urging the prevention of the 
recurrence of deflation, but also inflation, though mitigation of the first should take 
priority. He also showed the greatest technical command of Keynes's theoretical system 
by invoking a number of key constructs (Cornish, 1990, 62). Interestingly, neither he 
nor Gifford favoured the idea of liquidity controls, believing that the Commonwealth 
Bank had enough power to manipulate credit efficaciously. Walker favoured the use of 
both monetary and fiscal policy working in tandem, though he felt only the latter would 
be effective in tackling a slump. Monetary policy would play an accommodating role in 
easing the financial constraint. More importantly, it would assist in the mitigation of 
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depressions and 'the stabilization of the purchasing power of money' ( cited in Cornish, 
1990, 61 ). Walker was the consummate Keynesian, emphasising the extreme 
importance of business confidence when resorting to fiscal policy action. Like Keynes 
he felt that only the persuasion of elected officials would lead to better policy and better 
outcomes. Cooperation between the Commonwealth Bank, the Federal Treasury and the 
Arbitration Court was ultimately required for economic stability (Cornish, 1990, 62). 
Price stability could be partly addressed by enshrining money wage stability with due 
allowances for skill differentials. 596 
The University of Queensland economist, J.K. Gifford, burst into the public 
limelight with an accessible presentation on the meaning of Keynes. Despite his Kiel 
school background, Gifford confessed to being a devotee of Keynes and 'was very 
pleased to see the recent development of his theory in his last book'. 597 In his Statement 
Gifford swept aside the boom-bust trade-cycle views of Hayek and Von Mises and 
articulated a hydraulic version of Keynes's new schema and policy implications. 
Consequently, Gifford was bolder than both Walker and Reddaway in taking the line 
that the central bank should keep the economy in semi-boom without fomenting 
inflation. He was, in short, an ardent expansionist. He attracted Chifley' s attention by 
advocating massive credit creation to counter a slump (Robinson, 1986, 133).598 The 
year before, Gifford (1935) had written an article in the Economic Record calling for a 
'moderate credit expansion to stimulate industry and cause the absorption of the 
unemployed' even if it meant devaluation. 
Reddaway presented an equally synthetic account of the 'new' economics. He 
rejected price stability as a policy objective because it was the symptom of domestic and 
international turbulence. 599 Rather, monetary policy should be targeted at maintaining a 
high level of employment and income. Public works was an effective antidote to a 
depression while a budgetary surplus was apposite in boom conditions. Reddaway felt 
that Treasury bills were an unmitigated blessing and did not impede management of the 
credit base so long as there was an open market for them. Fears, too, of an excessive 
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amount of bills in circulation had been exaggerated by Melville. 600 An improvement in 
the London funds would, however, warrant some funding to counter the threat of a 
boom.601 Melville's view, in contrast, was that it was hard to build up London funds 
without some degree of funding beforehand. Reddaway likened it to being fearful that 
low interest rates whilst in the midst of depression might ultimately induce a boom. The 
two young protagonists came closer upon the matter of exchange stability to which we 
now turn. 
External Stability 
Melville was insistent that the stability of the exchange rate was not the 
objective of monetary policy but rather the means to make that policy and its objectives 
more effective (Cornish, 1999). Hytten, to name one, became confused about what 
actually were the ends and means in Melville's scheme. Melville felt that the objective 
of monetary policy was, like the other economists, to achieve economic stability, price 
stability and as near full employment as practicable.602 Melville despaired, however, of 
conducting an intelligent monetary policy by using a raft of monetary indicators. The 
conduct of monetary policy would become ' ... so complex as to be capable of solution 
only by supermen with absolute power' (cited in Johnston, 1993, 213). 
After reviewing the possibilities Melville opted for pegging the exchange rate as 
the datum point for monetary policy. There would be one target and one instrument. 
Moreover the target chosen would focus continual attention upon the nation's economic 
bugbear, the external account. This was, of course, the channel through which Australia 
endured losses and gains in real income from her dealings with other nations. It would 
be necessary to monitor economic activity to keep the exchange rate steady. The central 
bank would smooth out any undershooting or overshooting of credit creation by having 
liquidity controls and an open market for bills. This would ensure 'a sensible sort of 
discipline' in operating monetary policy. There would still be, however, conflict about 
achieving the three objectives of full employment, stability in general business activity 
and a maximum output of production. Indeed Mel ville suggested that full employment 
600 Evidence, RCMB, 1334. 
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would, more or less, follow as a consequence of achieving the other two objectives. The 
implication, then, was that pursuing full employment in its own right was likely to 
jeopardise attaining the other two objectives (Cornish, 1999, 135). 
In his schema Melville wanted the exchange rate to have an element of 
'elasticity' and it was this aspect that separated him from the views of senior bank 
officials and kept him more within the orbit of the economists (Sutherlin, 1980, 104-
105). Melville's view was that the exchange rate could be changed in exceptional 
circumstances or cases of fundamental disequilibrium. In that sense his stance was not 
so removed from the other economists. Reddaway, for instance, sounded almost like 
Melville in stating that Australia needed agreed a fixed point of reference or a stable 
exchange rate since it was 'a dependent economy'. That fact alone set limits upon 
furthering Australia's prosperity no matter how adroit monetary policy was. 
As an experienced exponent of exchange rate policy, Melville reminded the 
Commission there was 'no glow of prosperity when the currency is overvalued'. 603 
However he did not think the rate should vary with seasonal movements in the London 
Funds otherwise the currency would tend to oscillate. Implicit within Melville's 
analysis, as Cain points out, was the notion that money wages and domestic prices 
might have to adjust in times of economic duress to preserve the exchange rate (1988, 
9). However Melville would not brook deflationary policies just to preserve the 
exchange rate. He also conceded here that money wage rigidity - one of 'the 
consequences of Mr Keynes'- might throw a spanner in the works. Nor did he envisage 
in his schema that domestic expansion could ever pose a threat to the stability of the 
exchange rate - only deep-seated external factors could portend that. 
Giblin was struck by the degree of uniformity there was among economists upon 
the exchange rate question. It was really all a matter of degree. 604 That is, there was 
general agreement among economists that the rate could not be sustained if it was 
impairing domestic economic stability. For the short run, all of them suggested 
exchange rate stability and, in the longer run, any conflict between upholding the 
pegged rate and achieving near full employment should resolve in favour of the latter. 
603 RCMB, Evidence, 1143. 
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Cain (1988b) suggests, however, that for Melville these circumstances would have to be 
quite special given his general philosophy that ultimately Governments could do little 
about alleviating the economic cycle. It was better, therefore, to make the management 
of the money supply knave-proof by regulating it through pegged exchange rates than 
surrender it to government authority. To have his system operate effectively Melville 
plumbed for liquidity controls on the banks. They were a necessary evil. Melville felt 
the liquidity controls were 'a cause for worry' as the accounts could interfere and 
jeopardise private banking operations.605 
Giblin was one of the few witnesses to bring out the political and partisan aspect 
of exchange rate setting.606 His view, shared by other economists, was that exchange 
rate stability should be welcomed since it would encourage more inflow of private 
investment (Sutherlin, 1980, 107). Like the other economists, Giblin eschewed 
Australia resorting to competitive devaluation because it ' ... would be fatal to world 
prospects and in the long run to her own interests'. 607 That said, all the economists 
praised the 1931 devaluation as a proper, if belated, response to countering Australia's 
economic difficulties. Reddaway felt that with normalcy returning devaluation should 
only be used only as an emergency measure. 608 Walker was not so dogmatic insisting 
that the trauma of further devaluation was less onerous than the alternative of credit 
contraction. 609 He was, like Gifford, prepared to swap exchange rate flexibility to gain 
more employment (Sutherlin, 1980, 112). 
What the other Witnesses were saying: 
Apart from Davidson's lengthy submission, the evidence tendered by the trading 
banks was predictably antediluvian. Their evidence was more focused upon matters of 
banking and the allocation of capital than national economic policy (Sutherlin, 1980, 
89). Like all the bankers, Davidson wanted exchange stability but he solely aligned 
himself with the economists when it came to the debate between internal stability and 
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the exchange rate.610 His colleagues hardly stirred themselves on that policy dilemma 
(Sutherlin, 1980, 114). Reflective of the contretemps of March 1936 Davidson 
eschewed the notion that the Commonwealth Bank did not have the power to set interest 
rates. Like other trading bank representatives, Davidson dismissed the notion that banks 
had deliberately restricted their advances during the depression except, of course, to 
speculators or those purchasing luxuries.611 In fact Davidson said his bank had directed 
loans to import competing and export industries. Darvell, General Manager of the 
Commercial Bank of Sydney, correctly attributed any decline in loans and advances 
during the depression to economic factors. 612 This view was backed up by G.D. Healy 
of the Bank of Australasia who denied there was a consensus amongst the banks to 
restrict credit during the depression.613 
The proposal to establish a compulsory deposit deposits scheme for the trading 
banks drew the bile of private bankers. Edmund Godward of the Bank of Australasia 
felt the measure would fit a 'communistic government'. As for its key proponent, 
Melville, 'He is like all the other economists - evolves an ideal and will not see the 
dangers of his proposals'. Earlier, Healy had noted that allowing the Commonwealth 
Bank to have more control over banks' credit creation raised the question 'Quis 
custodiet custodes ?' 614 Healy told Mills at the hearings that the scheme would directly 
impinge upon the private banks business.615 The enlightened Davidson agreed, but in 
his technically sophisticated submission which ranged over twelve days of testimony, 
argued that the art of central banking was better practised by influence rather than 
decree (Holder, 1970, 818). 
In his submission McConnan stated that the private banks had also taken their 
fair share of sacrifice in the depression and that they had def erred to the last moment 
any credit restriction. 616 WA. Leitch, General Manager of the Union Bank, related the 
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then contemporaneous decline in the trading banks deposits to excessive government 
borrowing in the market together with rising import consumption. 617 
8.6 Aftermath 
Most commentators, including all the economists, held that the Commission's 
hearings and findings contributed to the dissemination and improvement of modern 
central bank practices. Reviewing the legacy of the Royal Commission, Melville 
believed, many years later, that though nothing much was achieved it did get people 
accustomed to the idea of some regulation of the banking system (Cornish, 1993, 16). 
These powers, alas, due to political and institutional resistance, only became operational 
with the outbreak of war (Sutherlin, 1980). Before that, economists remained hopeful 
that the era of a more effective and coordinated monetary policy was not far off. 
Certainly all the reviews of the Commission's findings suggested that the age of 
enlightened central banking had arrived (Sutherlin, 1980, 178). 
In a letter to Mills, Copland was blithely hopeful that, with prosperous economic 
conditions extant and the trading banks quite liquid, the Lyons Government would 
quickly implement the Commission's findings so as to remove the problem of banking 
and monetary policy from political controversy.618 It was, in truth, a vain hope with 
another general election about to be fought and the banks already up in arms over the 
Commission's findings. 
As Sutherlin' s study shows the Lyons Government prevaricated even after the 
1937 general election was over; and by that time, the banks' liquidity levels suffered as 
export prices faltered. This made the prospect of monetary control more untenable. 
Once again, then, the aspirations of economists in promoting the idea of an enlightened 
economic policy were nipped in the bud. Massy-Greene informed Copland that Lyons 
was 'a tired man' and while eager to adopt a 'more progressive policy', Page, Menzies 
and Casey were not of the same ilk. 619 It was Casey, alas, who had the odious task of 
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implementing the Commission's findings and having to win over the Melbourne trading 
banks' support. He later told Bruce how he had 'sweated blood' to devise measures that 
'will do most good and least harm'. He anticipated, however, that the reforms would be 
greeted by alarm from bankers who were 'really a most unintelligent crowd' .620 The 
technical and political negotiations over the drafting of the proposed legislation would 
prove both a complicated and protracted exercise (Sutherlin, 1980). 
The trading banks arrogantly held the view that the Commonwealth Bank Board 
did not have the professional competence or vision to have greater monetary powers 
invested within it. In that regard Davidson issued a Wales' bank circular highly critical 
of the Commission's findings. Interestingly, it was written by a visiting English 
economist, Noel Hall, upon lines suggested by Hytten.621 It was imbued with 
Davidson's fears about surrendering monetary policy to the whims of the Treasurer - a 
figure who showed a penchant for deflationary policy (Holder, 1970, 826-7). He was 
joined in this by McConnan who resented the proposed changes as undue coercion.622 
Both exchanged correspondence on this aspect of control and how they would be at the 
mercy of the Federal Treasurer. McConnan doubted whether the Commissioners could 
appreciate the 'serious danger' of their recommendation that the Auditor-General be 
authorised to investigate the affairs of any bank at the whim of the Treasurer.623 
Davidson's and McConnan' s dissent also applied to the other Commission's key 
recommendation that the Commonwealth Bank have greater leverage over the London 
Funds to ensure that Australia's reserves were at the appropriate level. 
Copland was annoyed with the mischievous nature of the Wales' Circular, 
believing that its views upon banking practice were neither sound in theory nor practice. 
The Circular caused him to 'revise my ideas a good deal about the place of economists 
in business life' .624 This was a direct reference to the activities of Hytten and Hall who 
provided intellectual support to Davidson in opposing the banking sector reforms. 
Copland was also incensed at how Hytten was appropriating the title of 'Professor' in 
his public utterances when he now worked exclusively for the Wales and was, 
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moreover, speaking on matters upon which he had apparently little expertise.625 Behind 
this pedantry lay perhaps Copland's annoyance that the Wales was reducing its support 
for the Economic Society. That aside, Copland decided to counter the Wales' Circular 
by penning two favourable articles on the Commission's report for the press. He also 
promised Keynes a brief review of the Commission's report for the Economic Journal. 
The resulting article was to Keynes's taste who had, incidentally, read the Wales 
material. 626 
The thrust of these commentaries by Copland, as he told one banker, was to 
regard the report as forming the basis for building better relations between the banks 
and the central bank and, more generally, the relations between the banking system and 
the federal government. It represented an opportunity to institute the safeguards the 
Commission recommended in order to underline the public responsibility of the banking 
system but to do so in an inoffensive way to the banks. 627 Copland, however, did not 
think that the Commission recommendations upon liquidity controls went far enough. 
As currently proposed the controls could be sidestepped by the trading banks resorting 
to keeping part of their mandatory liquid reserves in the form of Treasury bills and 
London funds (Sutherlin, 1980, 190). 
In his review of the Commission report, Butlin (1937) welcomed the finding 
about placing the central bank under political control of the incumbent government as 
was now the case in New Zealand. This would allow economic policy to be integrated 
with other arms of policy, not least, public expenditure - something that had been 
sometimes lacking in the past. B utlin mused about how little the idea of bank 
nationalisation had been considered except for Chifley' s three page addendum to the 
final report (1937, 73). Chifley wrote the addendum only to give mandatory voice to 
Labor party policy, especially its new platform upon monetary policy that had been 
incidentally released as the Commission sat (Weller, 1975, 140-1; Kuhn, 1988, 62). The 
objectives set out in the ALP' s new monetary policy sounded similar to the 
Commission's goals but there was ominous mention of having a 'national control of 
(the Commonwealth's) credit resources'. Chifley wrote the addendum without reference 
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to any of the evidence presented before the Commission. By the same token, Chifley 
admitted that none of the evidence he had heard led him to accept the continuation of 
private banking (Crisp, 1960, 169). 
Budin also praised the idea of a variable minimum liquidity controls believing it 
would be effective in reining in lending during a boom. Walker and Reddaway, who, in 
their evidence had not supported the idea of liquidity controls, changed their tune upon 
the Report's release. Both agreed with Butlin in regarding the minimum deposits option 
as arming the central bank with the power to check a boom (Sutherlin, 1980, 181). Only 
Fisher voiced some apprehension about the 'radical' and somewhat vague powers the 
central bank now had to compel trading banks to hold minimum deposits (Sutherlin 
1980, 182-3). More perhaps was made of it than it really deserved. Mills later pointed 
out that the power to call up deposits from the banks - the percentage of which had 
never been stipulated - would only be likely to be used in periods of acute crisis or when 
trading banks were proving recalcitrant. Even then, the action had to meet with the 
consent of the Treasurer. Mills reminded his detractors that the whole spilit of the report 
was to allow the Commonwealth Bank to continue to regulate the monetary system 
through the exercise of its existing powers and with the cooperation of the trading 
banks.628 
The clause that Federal Parliament, and through it the Government, be 
ultimately responsible for monetary policy would only arise if there were irreconcilable 
differences between the Government and the Bank. In that event the Government would 
give an assurance to the Bank that it took responsibility for the policy and its 
implementation. In short, there would be no repeats of March 1936. 
The operative question was whether the delay in arming the Commonwealth Bank with 
the powers recommended to it by the Commission would make the passage through 
future economic seas more difficult. That concern will be examined in the following 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER9 
Australia 1936-1938: The First Keynesian State? 
9.1 Introduction 
The two grand themes of this dissertation are, to repeat, the influence of 
economists' ideas upon Australian public policy in the thirties and whether their 
assimilation of Keynesian economics made any imprint upon official policy. In this, and 
the following chapter, these two themes coalesce as we inquire whether there is any 
indication of what might be called a 'Keynesian revolution' in Australian economic 
policy before and just after the outbreak of the Second World War. It is not an 
unrealistic prospect since Australian economists had already assumed a position of 
considerable influence by the late thirties. On the other hand the growth of knowledge 
in economics, and its infiltration into the corridors of power, is rarely linear and orderly 
(Coats, 1992, 426). 
In the history of economic ideas it was the case that most capitalist countries 
adopted - more by accident than design - Keynesianism in order to effectively wage 
war. Keynes had despaired of seeing the central policy contribution of The General 
Theory implemented except under dire emergency. Total war would allow the scale of 
public sector expenditure to give life to his 'grand experiment' in economic 
coordination (Winch, 1969, 266). However, the British historian, Patrick Renshaw, has 
suggested that war was hardly 'a true test bed for Keynesian economics' (1999, 359). 
That is, mobilisation, conscription, rationing and planning might be the stuff of war but 
they do not intrinsically amount to a conversion to Keynesian economics, per se. 
Cornish (1992) has argued along similar lines in examining the Australian experience. 
Other tests of a conversion to Keynesianism might include assimilating Keynes's 
theoretical constructs, language and, of course, his policy precepts. 
This and the following chapter will argue that the lack of a Keynesian 
consciousness at the higher levels of the Lyons Government meant that, even with a 
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prosperous economy, it still had to confront a daunting policy dilemma between 
financing civilian as against war needs (Ross, 1995). Resolving that dilemma not only 
jeopardised the Government' s supply-side economic strategy of low interest rates and 
low taxes but also flung it into political turbulence. The federal government discovered 
to its dismay that the 'recovery of prosperity' seemed to be the signal for more, not less , 
controversy over monetary policy especially central bank credit. 629 
While Gilbert (1973) has claimed that the Commonwealth Bank Board, in the 
late thirties, exuded a Keynesian vision in its monetary policy settings, the conventional 
view was that official economic policy was still decidedly pre-Keynesian up till the 
outbreak of war. In contrast with official policy, Melville has claimed that most of the 
Australian economists had, more or less, adopted a Keynesian outlook by 1939. This 
division in outlook between economists and policy-makers will be examined against the 
backdrop of a number of episodes. While some, like Brigden and Melville, held 
positions of some influence they could not penetrate through the philosophical mindset 
gripping policy-makers and office-holders in Canberra. To be fair, the constitutional 
constraints meant that the Commonwealth Government was ill-suited to undertake the 
scale of spending expansionists urged upon it. By the same token, however, State 
governments could embark, with Loan Council approval, upon some modest attempts at 
pump priming. In that regard, three State Premiers continued to criticise the prevailing 
policy of restrictive expansion. Keynesian voices, therefore, were not just confined to 
the cloisters. Moreover, as shown in section 9.2.3, the Arbitration Court, guided by 
academic expertise, issued a national wages decision seemingly imbued with Keynesian 
logic. 
The period examined in this chapter was not one therefore of repose but one 
punctuated by difficult policy choice. Yet, remarkably, it is a period of Australia's 
economic and political history often overlooked in the literature with more attention 
given to the threatening international environment and the country's response to it. 
While the threat of war, together, with a leadership crisis overshadowed domestic 
politics , there were still discernible controversies over the direction and bearing of 
Commonwealth economic policy. Of particular concern was the recurrent matter of 
managing the economic boom that gave Australia near full employment in 1937/38. 
629 This observation was made in a speech prepared fo r Casey by Treasury officials in November 1938. AA: Al 1857 /1 Treasury Secretary Papers. 
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Issues, too, like the National Insurance scheme, preparing legislation from the findings 
from Royal Commission on Money and Banking and defence preparedness pre-
occupied policymakers. The period would end with the economists, as in 1931, being 
'called-in' to help with the war effort and imparting Keynes's precepts into budgetary 
policy in late 1939. This was · sometime before Britain did likewise with the Kingsley 
Wood's wartime budget of 1941 (Cornish, 2004). 
While the march of events swung in the economists' favour it was a struggle, as 
we shall see, to have their services recognised by the Federal Government. There was 
also the problem of the public perception of economics. An Age editorial, for instance, 
had the temerity to lambast the profession for its opaqueness, stating that it had 
delivered a 'singularly meagre service' to the public good.630 It was ironic that three of 
Australia's most powerful voices railing against the timid economic policies of the 
Lyons Government would find their reputations and authority diminished by 1939. 
Davidson was undermined by a new manager who had the Wales' board 'clip his 
wings' with his beloved kindergarten of economists 'scattered to the winds' 
(Randerson, 1953, 51).631 Premier Stevens, openly regarded as a Keynesian by at least 
one economist, was still pitching to become the next Federal Treasurer. He was soon, 
alas, to be toppled from power, ironically, on the grounds of being unable to balance 
NSW's budget (McCarthy, 1979, 155). Copland, too, would suffer a humiliating rebuff 
with his aspirations to become Vice-Chancellor of Melbourne University. Yet it was 
these three figures that gave the Lyons Government a hard time in 1936/37 over its 
monetary policy settings. It is this to which we first tum. 
9.2 Managing the Boom 
The remarkable thing about 1937 was how the internally-generated upswing in 
economic activity showed little sign of abatement. Private capital expenditure, rather 
than government spending, led the recovery (Brigden, 1938, 1). It placed pressure upon 
interest rates with the local money market 'being milked dry'. 632 Since 1931, 
construction had increased sixfold, iron and steel production fourfold, while imports, 
630 
'The importance of being intelligible', The Age 15/8/1936. 631 
· L. Bury, Trc 121/70, pg 8, NLA. 
632 R.G. Casey to S.M. Bruce, 2/2/1937, AA: A1421 Casey-Bruce correspondence. 
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mostly comprising capital goods, trebled. The latter were matched by a corresponding 
rise in export revenue along with an infusion of foreign investment meaning that the 
London Funds were augmented considerably. Unemployment fell below the pre-
depression level of 10 per cent. Giblin wondered just how long the rate of expansion 
could continue. 633 He noted how it was due more to internal factors than exports, though 
any economic expansion was ultimately circumscribed by the amount of London funds. 
Nonetheless, the recovery was almost in defiance of the policy maxim of ensuring that 
the primary producer was given the utmost assistance. While prices were now healthy, 
export production had not risen markedly in volume terms since 1932/33. 
In a pre-election speech before the Australian Chamber of Manufactures in 
August 1937, Lyons deemed the ris~ in the manufacturing sector and manifested by the 
establishment of new factories, as 'unprecedented in the industrial history of the 
Commonwealth' .634 Unlike Britain moreover, all of Australia's manufacturing output 
was for consumption, not armaments. 
In a commentary in 1937 Copland reminded his readership how economists had 
been instrumental in laying the plans for that sector to develop and prosper. He stressed 
how changed international economic circumstances had given those plans further ambit. 
Manufacturing helped, too, in absorbing the unemployed and gave Australia a defensive 
capacity in terms of self-sufficiency.635 Manufacturing, Copland informed Fisher, 
allowed Australia to achieve full employment without lower public investment than 
hitherto.636 Indeed by the end of 1937 public works had returned to their traditional role 
of promoting economic development than as tool for stabilisation (Brigden, 1938, 1). 
Copland felt Australia had little choice but to expand manufacturing following the 
widespread restrictions upon international trade. Besides employing 500,000 workers, 
manufacturing added to the expansion of national income just as effectively as 
exports:637 
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'Australia in 1937', UMA FECC, Box 220. 
634 
'Bright times had come again', SMH 20/8/1937. 
635 
'Expansion of Manufactures in Australia: How It Helped Recovery ', Smith's Weekly 1937, UMA 
FECC, Box 56. 
636 D.B. Copland to A.G.B. Fisher, 27/1/1939, UMA FECC, Box 77. 
637 
'Commodity Prices and Australian Exports', Smith's Weekly Dec 1937, UMA FECC, Box 56. 
255 
The height of the boom was 1937 /38 with Australia reaching, and then 
surpassing, the pre-depression level of output, the remaining unemployment being 
solely attributable to structural factors. There was a very strong rise in loan advances 
from June 1937 to June 1938 with the Bank of New South Wales leading the charge. 
Moreover, the Federal Government recorded another budgetary surplus, while the 
accounts of all the State Governments, bar drought- ridden Queensland and Western 
Australia, also showed for the first time, a net surplus. 638 This economic largesse 
induced Casey in the 1937/38 Federal Budget to fully restore the pension and to embark 
upon an ambitious scheme of National Insurance. These developments were meant to 
answer criticism of the Government's lack of constructive legislation. Nor did the 
Government oppose the trade unions' submission before the Arbitration Court for a 
wage rise premised upon the gathering prosperity. Casey also had to increase the 
outlays upon defence spending, some of which was financed by a loan from the Bank of 
England. The debate over Australian economic policy was reduced to the Labor Party 
trying to establish that it was it, not the UAP Government, which had put the Premiers' 
Plan in place. Not to be outdone, the UAP, in its 1937 federal election campaign, 
focussed on what had been achieved in economic terms. Bruce told Lyons to stress how 
Australia had become 'the social laboratory for the rest of the world' .639 Copland, 
however, felt that Australia had, in recent years, been overtaken in progressive social 
legislation by other countries, a view shared by the politically ambitious Stevens whom 
Copland advised.640 This was one reason why Casey set out, almost single-handedly, to 
introduce National Insurance after the election (Richards, 1975, 1) 
The Stevens Controversy 
As Casey had predicted when Stevens returned from Britain there was renewed 
agitation over the direction of economic policy. Armed with more justification for 
hastening economic expansion, Stevens wanted, and indeed conspired, to have semi-
governmental authorities sidestep Loan Council restraints by borrowing directly from 
abroad. Both the Federal Government and the Commonwealth Bank already had some 
difficulty in restraining NSW, Tasmania and Queensland from wanting to borrow 
locally or offshore. Casey had become 'fed up with the shouting match' between the 
638 
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Bank Board and the Premiers serving on the Loan Council over the matter.641 
According to Melville, dissidents were targeting the Commonwealth Bank for allegedly 
falling under the influence of London and exceeding its powers with respect to other 
authorities. 642 
The controversy started when Stevens penned three widely publicised articles 
focussing upon Britain's supposedly innovative policy of cheap money and insinuated 
that Australia, in contrast, had abandoned its expansionist policies.643 When Copland 
had visited Cambridge - 'his second home' - in late 1936 he would have noted Britain's 
cheap money policy and may have played some part here in encouraging Stevens.644 
Davidson was the other antagonist, certainly in Casey's eyes. Stevens and Casey 
clashed over the issue in the Sydney press. The former was annoyed that Australian 
interest rates were likely to rise against world trends and that action by the 
Commonwealth Bank could pre-empt this if it were not so timid. Casey responded by 
stating that this was the 'argument of an inflationist' and that 'You cannot get a quart 
out of a pint pot'. Stevens correctly replied that it was central bank action upon liquidity 
and credit which ultimately 'decides the capacity of the pot' .645 It was an interesting 
metaphor that captured the debate between the Keynesians and the Hayekians. 
The Commonwealth Bank and Casey, were, as always, extremely sensitive to 
charges that it was following a deflationary policy. Casey went to the length of asking 
the former Treasury official, S.G. Macfarlane, now Official Secretary and Financial 
Adviser to Bruce at Australia House, to prepare a brief repudiating Stevens' argument 
that Britain was practising a cheap money policy. He, in tum, approached the Bank of 
England to help repudiate Stevens' claims.646 So seriously did Casey consider the matter 
that he prepared a Cabinet Memorandum upon monetary policy repudiating the 
legitimacy of Steven's claims. Apart from stating that the Cabinet was satisfied with 
the current arrangements with the Commonwealth Bank there was a further decree 
opposing new borrowing in London for public works. Further, the Federal Government 
was to attempt to vacate the local loan market as soon as possible. It was, however, to 
641 R.G. Casey to S.M. Bruce, 6/2/1937, AA:A 1421 Casey-Bruce correspondence. 642 L.G. Melville to G.E. Jackson, 8/2/1937, BE: OV13/4. 643 SMH, 18/11/1936, SMH 19/11/1936, SMH, 20/11/1936. 644 
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continue to encourage the migration of capital to Australia. Stevens' idea of pumping 
more credit into the economy would, in Casey's eyes, see it 'spill out in London' .647 
Reddaway also came to the Commonwealth Bank's defence by a forceful 
rebuttal of Stevens' argument for more credit-based finance. 648 Stressing that he, too, 
was a 'whole-hearted believer' in economic expansion, Reddaway stated that the 
Australian economy did not need a stimulus, which, if it occurred, would certainly spell 
devaluation and, therefore, damage the continuance of capital flows. Much of the rise in 
manufacturing industry was underpinned by this investment. In his own three article 
riposte to Stevens, Reddaway pointed out that comparing Australia's monetary 
outcomes with Britain's was wrong-headed since the latter was a creditor nation and 
could expand the money supply without fear of devaluation. Reddaway expressed 
bemusement that Stevens was upholding the timid economic policies of the 
Chamberlain Government in stark contrast to the relatively enlightened economic 
policies instigated by Australia. 649 Having, as we shall see, just played a part in altering 
Australian wage levels, one could see Reddaway' s point. The Englishman did concede 
that low interest rates had their place in maintaining economic momentum but the main 
lesson Australia could draw from Britain was its establishment of efficient labour 
exchanges. 650 
Stevens also seemed quite unaware of just how dimly the Bank of England 
would regard his proposals. One of Stevens' articles, for instance, pushed the case for 
more public expenditure with another article visualising overseas borrowing as the 
means to facilitate it. This idea would have horrified the Bank of England, including 
R.N. Kershaw and G.E. Jackson, who, in an apparently secret visit to Australia in 1936, 
briefed cabinet ministers over the matter of renewed borrowing from London.651 That 
resort, the two argued, would lead to a flurry of imports. They also cautioned their hosts 
that renewed borrowing by Australia might also undermine her credibility unless the 
loan was put to remunerative ends. Kershaw took the opportunity to pour cold water 
over Casey's idea of establishing more manufacturing industry in Australia. He warned 
647 
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Casey that it was not a medium term solution and that it was still 'possible to become 
inflated even in a closed economy' .652 With the prospect of active deflation 'politically 
impossible' with a federal election due, Kershaw felt a better way to solve Australia's 
recurrent external account problem was to develop better means of monetary control. 
That idea would not become part of the economic policy machinery for some time. As 
for Stevens, his crusade for more expansionism was, as we shall see in the next chapter, 
far from over. 
Copland and 'The Coming Boom' 
For the economists, a booming economy spelt just as much a challenge as did 
depression. This part of the chapter looks at how Australian economists dealt with this 
emerging problem. The preconception held by most economists at the time, even 
Keynes, was that booms were usually followed by a bust. Giblin had already gathered 
notes in January 1937 ominously entitled 'The Next Depression' precisely because he 
and his colleagues were concerned at that prospect. Much of his note taking sprang from 
a lecture given by Keynes at the LSE.:. 653 Giblin deduced that, hitherto, there had been 
no 'obvious, cut and dried' technique of checking a boom without precipitating a slump. 
Keynes wanted to devise the means by which it might be possible to do so. For Britain 
this would involve a 'rightly distributed' aggregate demand, increasing taxes and 
restricting credit. Britain's unemployment rate at the time was 12 per cent. Keynes felt 
that using high interest rates to temper a boom was unnecessary (Keynes, 1936, 323). 
Nor would it stamp out speculative behaviour. Credit rationing was preferable. Keynes, 
in fact, suggested that the remedy for a boom was to persist with low rates. Another 
lesson from Keynes was that the longer the life of the boom the greater time to prepare 
the economy for the bust. The trick of economic policy was to avoid this by keeping the 
economy in semi-boom. 
In the Australian context the problem was compounded, in Copland's 
estimation, by the forecast that export prices would reach the heights they had attained 
in 1928.654 Fixated by the problem Copland drew up a memorandum discussing policy 
652 BE: OV13/4, Memorandum by Kershaw, 11/5/1936. 653 GLG-43-1: REA. 
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responses to it.655 He and fellow colleagues met in Melbourne over a few days in March 
1937 to discuss expedients that might be adopted by the authorities. Interestingly, the 
unofficial meeting was held immediately after the Commonwealth Bank Board meeting. 
The timing was not accidental; Reading had specifically requested it. Melville believed 
the arrangement 'would be a useful precedent'. 656 
The gathering of 'concentrated wisdom,' as Copland put it, included Melville, 
Giblin, Coombs, Reddaway, Mills and Hytten. 657 Melville, whose views on policy had 
usually been discordant with that of his colleagues, reported that 'There was a 
remarkable unanimity of opinion about practical measures although there were some 
differences of opinion on matters of theory'. 658 The discussion was expressed not in 
terms of monetary aggregates but almost wording akin to aggregate demand. 659 
One section of the memorandum, entitled 'Mr. Keynes and Australian Policy', 
envisaged what Keynes might recommend for Australia which was at about the same 
stage of the economic cycle as Britain. The operative strategy agreed upon was that the 
general aim of policy should be to conserve public works projects to help cushion the 
economy against the inevitable downturn. It entailed postponing public works with a 
firm promise to recommence them when private investment spending turned down; in 
short, the tap of public works was now an essential part of stabilisation policy. The 
economists also favoured some funding of Treasury bills. Lastly, they aimed for a 70-80 
million pounds levelling of London Funds to forestall any fears of devaluation. In 
contrast to Keynes, the Australian economists suggested that another way to moderate 
the boom was to increase award wages (Cain, 1988, 14). This was to prove, as we shall 
see, very prescient. 
For the first time, even private bankers found the cautionary deliberations of the 
economists tolerable though God ward could not resist a jibe: 'What an opportunity for a 
wholesale destruction of the pest! But ... I agree with the conclusions arrived at' .660 
Bank of England officials, too, were 'staggered' at the unanimous nature of the 
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economists meeting as they 'seemed rather impressed by the strength of the 
expansionist folk in Australia' .661 
The economic situation was complicated by the fact that the Government had 
shortly to go before the polls. Copland speculated that if the Lyons Government was 
returned 'we may anticipate a rather interesting experiment on methods of controlling 
an expansionist movement'. 662 On that prospect, Copland gave a lecture entitled the 
'The Coming Boom' before the annual meeting of the Victorian Branch of the 
Economic Society. Copland knew that what he would now have to say would be 
unfamiliar and invite hostility. He told Smithies that ' ... after the lecture no one will be 
able to call me an inflationist'. 663 In short, he was parting company from the militant 
expansionism of Stevens and Davidson and aligning himself with the official policy 
line. The switch in direction would have done him no harm in attracting University 
Council support in a bid to become the next Vice-Chancellor at Melbourne. It would 
also restore his reputation as one of Australia's leading economists. 
He sought solace in Keynes's famous propensity to change his mind when 
things had changed; Copland asked Smithies 'Is it not said that a snake changes its skin 
seasonally? I think a good economist, not to be likened to a snake, should change his 
skin cyclically' .664 Copland outlined the objectives of economic policy during boom 
conditions. They included maintaining cheap money and securing full employment at 
rising standards of living. To achieve this, the government had to reduce loan 
expenditure with the Commonwealth Bank mopping up excess liquidity by funding. 
Also there had to be some qualitative control over bank lending to control the rate of 
expansion in investment. In that context, Copland would welcome the Arbitration 
Court's decision, a few months later, to increase the basic wage as consistent with the 
economists' advice of moderating but not extinguishing expansion. The wage rise 
would distribute the prosperity and trigger more consumption. More importantly, it 
would dampen employers' expectations of further profits. Copland felt that Australia 
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now only had 'residual unemployment' and that the economy could have a boom with a 
higher rate of unemployment than it had in the twenties. 665 
In his lecture Copland expressly wanted to expose 'the folly of the argument that 
we prophesy a depression because we talk of a possible boom' .666 In this, he expressly 
failed. While he agreed with Janes that a boom need not necessarily be followed by a 
depression, Copland was pessimistic enough to think that 'the avoidance of depression 
under modem conditions is about as far off as the settlement of international disputes'. 
He gamely predicted, therefore, a boom and depression within the next five years. His 
despair, here, sprang from economists being unable to convince bankers, businessmen 
and politicians about resolving the problem. 667 Indeed by the end of 1937, with some 
slackening both in economic activity and export prices evident, Casey began speaking 
of a coming depression. To Melville, this was premature; his view was that 'we should 
be ready for a depression without believing in its inevitability'. 668 
Copland's pessimism provoked a public reproach from Reddaway who argued 
that a boom need not be followed by a depression. In the community there was 
unwarranted pessimism because parallels were drawn with the situation in 1928/29 and 
what came after. Janes, too, informed Copland that his 'John the Baptist' sermonising 
was making people actually fearful of prosperity. 669 This was hardly Copland's 
intention; rather it was to control expansion so as to avoid the economy falling into a 
crisis. Davidson tried to counter the prosperous but unsettled business climate by 
asserting that Australia need not pass into another depression because of the 'fear of 
prosperity'. 670 
Things were not helped when the Cambridge statistician and Fabian economist, 
Colin Clark, who had arrived to take up a visiting lectureship at Melbourne, predicted in 
a publlc lecture that Australia had reached her economic peak and a slowdown was now 
inevitable.671 Melville was annoyed at this prediction telling a colleague that Clark 'was 
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talking us into depression' .672+ Clark did qualify his remarks by stating that the decline 
would be mild and that, in any case, the authorities were now cognisant enough to 
increase expenditure when things turned sour.673 In a bank circular at the time, Clark 
said that public sector spending in times of boom was likely to be more damaging than 
an excess of private spending.674 The sentiment was echoed by the editorial in the same 
circular warning that Australia needed to wind back public expenditure. Casey rebuked 
Clark's prophecy, declaring that it was not time to 'batten down the hatches' because 
the economic storm was not yet upon Australia and 'might not be on us as soon as Mr. 
Clark assumed' .675 
Clark's public lecture, with its emphasis upon the purposefulness of fiscal 
policy, would have been music to the ears of Queensland Premier Forgan Smith 
(Higgins, 1989). It did not, however, impress the ardent expansionist Gifford, who, in a 
remarkable outburst, accused some of his colleagues of being economic Jeremiahs. 
Gifford was annoyed that a 'boom control' policy, elements of which were apparent in 
both Australia and America, drove down share prices and made business confidence 
precarious. The motivation behind this form of economic 'wowserism', Gifford held, 
was the fear that some sectors of the economy would over-develop if the boom 
persisted.676 Consequently the boom had to be checked because of the inherent 
imbalances in the economy. Doing this, however, would throw the economy back into 
depression. Forestalling that bleak scenario was the fact that Australian workers had 
received an officially sanctioned real wage rise, a matter to which we briefly tum. 
The Reddawage 
There has been much folklore written about the wage decision reached by the 
Arbitration Court in June 1937. This section briefly recounts the circumstances behind 
that finding, highlighting the role of the 'Melbourne school' in telling how this historic 
wage decision came about. With Richard Downing' s help, Reddaway was appointed as 
672 L.G. Melville to A.H. Lewis, 1/12/1937, NLA. 
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the assessor of the wage case, launched by the trade unions, because on the surface, at 
least, he appeared to be independent and less celebrated than either Copland or Giblin 
(Reddaway, 1995, 7; Arndt, 1976, 282). Copland, of course, had achieved infamy with 
the trade unions by giving expert evidence in late 1930 that helped the Arbitration Court 
justify its decision to implement the emergency clause and cut wages in January 1931. 
Copland was unrepentant about it six years later. 677 Copland also held that the 
Arbitration Court's refusal to restore the level of the basic wage until _1933/34 aided the 
process of recovery (Groenwegen and Mcfarlane, 1990, 128). Now Copland told 
Stevens that 'the next step' in economic policy was to increase wages and improve the 
provision of social services as a means of making the economic system more 
tolerable. 678 Reddaway' s submission reflected the wishes of most economists, bar 
Walker, who, in his evidence before the Royal Commission on Money and Banking, 
subscribed to Keynes's view that the level of money wages should be not be tampered 
with. 679 In an earlier incarnation, Walker had opposed rescinding the 1931 emergency 
adjustment to wages before the Arbitration Court in 1934 because business expectations 
and business psychology were still too fragile (Louis and Turner, 1968, 89). 
By 1937 economic conditions were, by all accounts, much better. Copland and 
Giblin discussed the submission Reddaway would put before the Full Bench of the 
Arbitration Court. Copland advised Reddaway, in his draft submission, that there was 
no need to refer to the views of other economists. It was a strange remark given what 
Melville had elsewhere said about the purgative benefit of high wages. 68° Copland 
suggested that the economic argument, advanced in 1930, that costs be shifted away 
from the export sector could be reversed.681 Copland agreed with Reddaway's 
-
submission that real wages be restored to the 1929 level though he went on to suggest a 
form of words: 'In view, however, of the desirability of checking investment and 
encouraging consumption so that the present level of prosperity may be long lived, the 
case for raising wages a little above the 1929 level is very strong' .682 The idea, then, of 
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'Basic Wage: Stabilisation Encouraged' SMH 24/7/1936. 680 In writing a damning critique of the New Zealand Labour Government's economic platform Melville defended the role of high wages; 'High wages may prevent profit from getting too large in the imminent boom and help to_ check the orgies of speculation and unwise investment that usually occur at this time' 681 
'Memo from c ·opland to Mr W.B. Reddaway', 19/4/1937, UMA FECC, Box 55. 682 Ibid. 
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attaching an increment to the award to restrain investment optimism to temper the 
boom, was not strictly Reddaway' s, even if the subsequent award was christened 'The 
Reddawage'. 
In brief, three arguments were put forward to justify a higher real wage. First, 
there was greater productivity per person. Second, there had been an increase in 
efficiency since firms were working close to capacity, meaning that overheads were 
now spread over a larger output. Lastly, there had been an increase in export prices. In 
short there had been an increase in real national income greater than in proportion to the 
numbers employed. Following Copland's lead, Reddaway argued that the real wage 
increase was justified not just on social justice grounds but also upon economic ones. 
Increasing real wages meant that capitalists' profits would not remain inflated and 
thereby stem the capacity of 'entrepreneurs to start superfluous enterprises' (cited in 
Brown, 1997, 248). Instead consumption would rise and underpin the profitability of 
recent investment spending. The Australian economy would have, therefore, a self-
sustaining growth path. While Reddaway subsequently went on national radio to 
explain his submission, certain employer groups seethed about his 'prosperity 
loading' .683 Reddaway was in the witness box for a whole day facing cross-examination 
by employers' advocates. Reddaway recalled not just being protected by Justice 
Dethridge from some of the employers' more inane questions but also how he found his 
submission useful in coming to a determination. 684** It resulted in the Arbitration Court 
restoring its 'living wage' maxim and also giving a prosperity loading to award wages. 
Contrary to Colin Clark's s statement that Reddaway was the only economist 
prepared to give evidence on the subject of wages, it seems clear that Giblin worked 
behind the scenes to ensure that the Englishman was called to provide expert opinion. 685 
Reddaway appeared as an expert witness who 'identified with neither side' (Hancock, 
1984, 77). Copland would, however, have been annoyed when Vice-Chancellor 
Priestley informed him that some Melbourne business houses were revising their 
683 
'Higher Wages and Higher Prices', ABC Radio Broadcast, 22/7/1937, Typescript courtesy of W.B. Reddaway. 
684 Author's Interview with Reddaway, 21/1/1997 
** The other justice in the case, Justice Beeby, asked Reddaway to come and see him in his rooms. Beeby had in mind a dual wage structure where the eastern states would get a bigger wage rise than W estem Australia which ~as ravaged by drought at the time (Reddaway interview, 21/1/1997). 685 Author's Interview with Reddaway, 21/1/1997. 
265 
donations to the university because they had been 'incensed' and were 'hurt and sore' at 
Reddaway' s evidence before the Arbitration Court (Priestley, 2002, 332 and 353). 
Relations between Copland and Reddaway became more strained after the Englishman 
ridiculed Copland's predictions of a boom-bust. Copland felt that the younger man 
needed some deflating from the likes of Davidson because: 'Just at this stage of his 
career, he requires deflation more than anything else. Whether I shall have to do the 
sticky business again or not I cannot say, but it is a pity to see an able man have his 
head turned so early in his life' .686* Copland did not follow up on the threat. Reddaway 
was, in any case, soon to be heading back to Cambridge. 
The wages decision proved a safety valve not just in terms of redistributing 
aggregate demand but also pre-empted Labor orchestrating a campaign to lift wages 
beyond the rise in the cost of living. Copland sung the Arbitration Court praises to W.A. 
Robson, a LSE academic, and also to Rupert MacLaurin for bringing down a judgement 
that not only reflected the economic situation but also gave a valuable lead in economic 
policy.687 Just as in 1931, when the Arbitration Court took the lead in making the 
adjustments that Australia had to take, so, too, in 1937 was the Court vigilant in noting 
underlying economic conditions - and the evidence of economists - before coming down 
with a judgement.688 Moreover, the decision by the Court was congruent with the 
decision of the Loan Council to moderate the amount of public borrowing, meaning that 
economic policy was now pulling in the same direction. 
While the economic recovery had another year to run, the wage rise was the 
crowning glory in Australia's economic rehabilitation. In a land said to despise 
scientific economists all these good tidings might have led to some acclaim for the 
profession (Hancock, 1930). Certainly those in the Labor movement undertook some 
revision in their views about the worth of economists (Kuhn, 1988). In the wider 
community, too, there might have been little affirmation but within policy-making 
circles economists continued to make some inroads. The public-minded businessman, 
Sir Herbert Gepp, again called for the creation of a specialist economic research staff to 
686 D.B. Copland to C. Janes, 23/6/1937, UMA FECC, Box 51. 
* Much later when reflecting upon his two year stint in Australia Reddaway recalled that the level of economics teaching at Copland's beloved faculty was fairly 'low level'. As for Copland, Reddaway felt that 'he was not a great economist' (Tribe, 1997). 687 D.B. Copland to W.A. Robson, 3/12/1937, UMA FECC, Box 55. 688 D.B. Copland to R. MacLaurin, 1/10/1937, UMA FECC, Box 55. 
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advise the Federal Government upon economic problems, an idea, of course, first 
mooted by Bruce and Casey. 689 It was an idea slowly, but surely, becoming accepted by 
both tiers of government. 
The Yellow Brick Road to Utopia 
'There is now an army of economists confident that, given sufficient bricks of 
the right type and quality, a way can be cleared to heaven. It is the Statistician's 
job to provide the bricks'. E.T. McPhee, Commonwealth Statistician, 1937.690 
True to the Commonwealth Statistician McPhee' s boast, economists had by their 
advice helped get Australia's unemployment rate down to 9 per cent by the end of 1937; 
it was even lower in NSW and Queensland. Having just spent an instructive six month 
sabbatical with Keynes's Circus at Cambridge researching monetary policy Giblin 
would later deem that, by 1937/8, Australia was at 'normal full employment'. That is, 
any additional spending would raise prices and incomes leaving real income unchanged. 
Giblin told a leading businessman that full employment could range between 4 per cent 
and 10 per cent and was, therefore, '[a] matter of practical judgement on a mass of 
relevant data' .691 Quoting Colin Clark, Giblin went to say that, symmetrically, when not 
at normal full employment, there was justification for 'unprofitable' public works that 
would prevent the secondary effects of unemployment from unfolding. 
As discussed, Australian economists were already held in some renown in 
government circles for their anti-depression policies but the later 1930's brought a burst 
of renewed praise from several quarters. It also brought, as this section will show, an 
increase in the demand for their services. The Indian economist, B.P. Adarkar, 
unwittingly validated Brigden's earlier wish by nominating Australia as 'the practical 
utopia of economists' (cited in Goodwin, 1974, 236). When the British Labour 
politician, Hugh Dalton, visited Australia in 1938 he expressed a desire to meet some of 
689 
'Economic Research: Sir Herbett Gepp Address' SMH 10/10/1936, and 'Gepp Proposals: An Advisory 
Council' SMH 28/8/1935. 
690Transcript of speech given at the Conference of Economists 1996 by Dennis Trewin, Deputy 
AustraJian Statistician. 
691 L.F. Giblin to Haynes, President, Victorian Chamber of Commerce, 9/2/1939, UMA FECC, Giblin 
collection 92/141 Box 1 A-J 
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the economists whom he had once criticised for being behind the Premiers' Plan.692 
More reserved in his praise, Montagu Norman felt his peers at the Commonwealth Bank 
Board were coming too much under the 'economistical' influence of Melville and 
Giblin.693 Walker, meanwhile, was tutoring a coterie of NSW Government UAP 
politicians upon the nuances of economics.694 Copland could rightfully claim to a 
colleague that 'The economist is going to be more important rather than less important 
in public affairs during the next 10 to 15 years'. 695 Concurrent with his work for 
Stevens, Copland was appointed Chairman of the Victorian State Economic Committee. 
It prompted him to comment that 'at long last the Victorian Government has noted and 
recognised the official work of economists' .696 Copland's job was to advise the 
Victorian Government upon long term patterns of public finance with a view to 
avoiding economic fluctuations. 
'The white light of publicity', as Mills called it, continued to fall on the 
economist and no more so than upon Copland.697 In 1938 he used his public profile, 
somewhat controversially, in a bid to become the next Vice-Chancellor at Melbourne. 
He failed in this quest though in quite remarkable circumstances. Unbeknown to him, 
perhaps, was the fact that Mills and Brigden were among the list of early contenders 
sounded out by the University Council. Both names came with flattering references. In 
Mills's case, the referee was Justice Napier who had, of course, worked alongside him 
with the Royal Commission on Money and Banking. 698 A university colleague reported 
that Copland's unpopularity with the Melbourne business establishment, some of whom 
served upon the University Council, was 'cruelly damaging' his candidature (Selleck, 
2003, 694).699 Copland was too 'commercially minded' and 'lacked the cultural 
background' to become Vice-Chancellor (Cited in Selleck, 2003, 694). Herbert Brookes 
suggested that it was this, together, with the 'rough angles' of Copland's personality 
that led him to being overlooked for the position.700 Bailey told Giblin that the 
692 F.L. McDougall to D.B Copland, 3/12/1937, UMA FECC, Box 54. 693 A.H. Lewis to L.G. Melville, 27/3/1937, Melville Papers, NLA. 694 
'MPs At University: Improving Knowledge of Economics', SMH_l 7/8/1936. 695 D. B. Copland to K. Isles, 6/6/1937, UMA FECC, Box 53. 696 D. B. Copland to H. Brookes, 3/10/1938, Brookes Papers, NLA. 697 Cited in Brown, 2001, 80 
698 Justice J.M. Napier to Sir J. Barrett, Chancellor of Melbourne University referee letter on Mills, 2/1/1938 and J.L. Gibson to Sir J. Barrett, 31/12/1937 referee letter on J.B. Brigden, 31/12/1937, MSS 1924/27/362, Brookes papers, NLA. 699 K.H. Bailey to ·L. F. Giblin, 4/6/1938, UMA FECC, Box 220. 700 H. Brookes, Notes on vice chancellorship, MSS. 1924/27/1341, NLA. 
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University Council did not favour Copland because he did not have the 'culture' and 
might be liable to 'phobias' .701 The popularity of Copland's faculty with students and 
the fact that he was an internationally renowned economist was more a hindrance than a 
help given the conservative nature of the University Council which shared views with 
the Melbourne Club (Selleck, 2003, 693-697). 
While it was to Australian economics gain that he failed to win the post it was 
not to Melbourne. An aggrieved Copland solicited for jobs elsewhere. He asked Giblin, 
in residence at King's College, whether Cambridge might offer him an academic post in 
'statistical economics' with a college fellowship. 702 This request apparently came after 
Copland had declined an offer, for family reasons, to become a full-time economic 
adviser to the Stevens' Government. Copland also wrote to Menzies asking if he could 
be made Chairman of the Interstate Commission, an economic agency yet to become 
established in Canberra. 703 Only a position like that, Giblin believed, would keep 
Copland's talents within Australia. 704 After regaining his composure Copland told his 
friend Brookes ' ... that I am finding my real interest in the work of the School. It is 
astonishing how much has to be done in advanced economic theory' .705 Copland wanted 
to establish a study of business fluctuations and the control of economic activity. 706 
Giblin and Jean Polglaze, along with Melville, were the personnel Copland had in mind 
for the project. The political bickering at Melbourne University still unsettled Copland 
leading him to apply for his old job back at the University of Tasmania.707 Walker beat 
him to the post but there was no acrimony from Copland. 708 Indeed Copland felt the 
move would do Walker good as it also involved giving detailed economic advice to the 
Tasmanian Government. 'Economists, like doctors should be GPs for a while', he told a 
young colleague. 709 
701 K. H. Bailey to L. F. Giblin 4/6/1938, UMA FECC, Box 220. 702 D. B. Copland to L.F. Giblin, 7/4/1938, UMA FECC, Box 220. 703 D.B. Copland to R.G. Menzies, 17/5/1938, UMA FECC, Box 60. 704 D.B. Copland to J. Lyons, 5/6/1938, The Interstate Commission, AA: 1972/341. 705 D.B. Copland to H. Brookes, 23/6/1938, Brookes papers, NLA. 706 D.B. Copland to H. Brookes, 20/4/1938, Brookes Papers, NLA. 707 D.B. Copland to E. M. Miller, Vice-Chancellor University of Tasmania, 16/1/1939, UMA FECC, Box 66. 
708 Walker's referees were probably D.H. Robertson and A.C Pigou who wrote flattering references for him in 1935. Robertson had a high opinion of his 'power of analysis ... mature judgement' and predicted that Walker woulc;l 'occupy a position of authority with wisdom and success' (D.H. Robertson statement 3/7/1935, E.R. W~lker Papers, Canberra). 709 D.B. Copland to J Crawford 12/4/1939, UMA FECC, Economic Society files, Box 143. 
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There was still a paucity of economists within Australia. Despite healthy 
numbers at undergraduate level, there were still few research scholars coming forward 
in economics. Copland would have agreed with Keynes's lament: 'If only we could 
produce competent economists in greater number!' 710 Interestingly, too, membership in 
all eleven branches of the Economic Society within Australia and New Zealand had, 
with the passing of the crisis, fallen from 846 in 1932 to 737 in 1938. The Melbourne 
Branch remained, by far, the largest. 711 
Given the fact that professorships and public service positions in Australia 
frequently fell vacant any economist likely to settle in this country from overseas would 
have had an assured future. To that end, universities like Melbourne, and even the Bank 
of New South Wales tried to entice English economists to come to Australia and redress 
the shortage. Gerald Firth, for example, who came out to replace Reddaway, as a 
Ritchie Research Fellow in 1938 did not return home. Another English economist, W.A. 
Prest, was appointed to fill the senior lectureship at Melbourne after Mauldon took the 
chair at Tasmania. Prest' s appointment came about only after Copland wrote to several 
English universities telling them of the desirability of getting 'a new overseas man' to 
fill the post. 712 Copland soon discovered that he had chosen 'the right man for 
Melbourne' (Polglaze and Soper, 1977, xiv). Leslie Bury, a Cambridge graduate, was 
recruited for the Wales' economic section by Hytten whilst attending a conference in 
Europe. Hytten's brief whilst abroad was to recruit young economists of 'open, liberal 
thought' .713 Janes went to England in 1938 and visited Cambridge in August 1938 to 
attend an economics conference. He came away a little 'disappointed' because the 
economists and the papers presented were of no higher quality than he had been 
exposed to in Australia.714 Janes apparently criticised 'with some nervousness 'a paper 
written by, but not presented by, Keynes upon buffer stocks. 
710 J.M. Keynes to D.B . Copland, 24/7/1937, UMA FECC, Box 53. 711 Economic Society of Australia and New Zealand Files, UMA FECC, Box 141. 712 D.B. Copland to E.A.G. Robinson, 29/4/1937, UMA FECC, Box 53. 71 3 A.C. Davidson to T. Hytten, 27/5/1935, BNSW: A53 /446. 714 C. Janes to A.C. Davidson, 26/8/1938, BNSW: GM 302/412. 
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Meanwhile, Colin Clark was offered the chair at Adelaide but declined it. 715+ 
Like Keynes, Copland quickly appreciated the worth of Clark: 'He is a rare find in that 
he has an unerring instinct for the right figure. Apart from his knowledge of economic 
theory, he is one of the most ingenious persons with statistics I have ever come 
across ' .7 16 Giblin equated Clark' s statistical genius as turning 'straws into bricks' (Cited 
in Groenewegen, 1994, 9). In collaboration with another Australian economist J.G 
Crawford, Clark had made early attempts to estimate the size of Australia' s national 
income, and also to quantify the size of the expenditure multiplier. 
Keynes feared that the Australians would wrestle Clark away from Cambridge: 
'I hope very much you will fail in taking away Colin Clark from us. He is much too 
needed here ' .7 17 It is mindful to recall that, as late as 1939, Britain did not have official 
national income statistics (Moggridge, 1992, 631). Keynes ' s hope that Clark would 
return to help establish 'a proper department of statistical realistic economics at 
Cambridge', implying that Clark would head it, was to be dashed (Castles, 1998, 
146).718 When Brigden was recruited by Casey in 1938 to spearhead the National 
Insurance Commission a suitable replacement had to be found for his post at 
Queensland' s Bureau of Industry. While Hugh Dalton suggested Clark as its next 
Director, Premier Forgan Smith already had him in mind (Higgins, 1989, 300-1).The 
Queensland Premier wanted Clark's services to prepare Queensland 's case for increased 
public borrowing allocations from the Loan Council. Clark used his statistical prowess 
to suppo1i the Keynesian case for more funds (Kenv1ood, 1988, 108). The post came 
vvith positions of Government Statistician and advisor to the Treasury. Later Clark 
dedicated his book The Conditions of Econo,nic Progress (1940) to Forgan Smith, 
citing him as 'A far seeing patron of economic science' (Crossman, 1997, 1). Clark told 
Keynes \vhy he found life in Australia increasingly attractive: 'economics ranks after 
c1icket as a topic of public interest .... People have minds which are not closed to new 
truths, as the minds of so many Englishmen are and with all the mistakes Australia has 
71
- D .B. Copland to J.M . Keynes , 14/9/1937 , UM.A. FECC, Box 53 . 
+ ~ alker and Smithies, probably the two most gifted theoreticians in Australia at the time, applied for the position but it fell to Keith Isles , another Tasmanian born economist (Coombs to J. La T auze, 14/12/1937 La auze Papers , IT.,A) . 716 D.B. Copland to T . ~ aites, Govemn1ent Stati tician for 1 s~ r, 13/10/1937 1A FECC, Box 56 . 717 J .lvf. Keynes to D.B. Copland, 28/10/1937 , UM.A,. FECC, Box 53. 71 Cited in M arkwell 1985, 36. 
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made in the past, I still think she may show the world, in economics .. .in the next twenty 
years' .719 
While those telling words dismayed Keynes, he was not altogether surprised by 
them; Australia was the place for economists to put their science into practice. 
Australian economists would find the demand for their services increasing as the re-
elected Lyons Government introduced unemployment insurance and other social 
reforms. There was, however, an even greater challenge about to confront Australian 
economists - the spectre of another depression. 
9.3 The Coming Recession 
'We, out here, read of these great doings with anxious eyes. We can't affect 
these major movements - and we get swung along at the tail of the world cart. 
Depressions don't start in Australia ( except temporary ones arising from bad 
seasons) - they come to us from overseas - and we are quite unable to make 
financial provision from the effects of important depressions or recessions' 720 
While Casey's concerns to Montagu Norman reflected that of economists, the 
intriguing thing about the international recession of 1937/38 was that, for the most part, 
the Australian economy had, 'in some miraculous fashion', withstood any adverse 
affects from it until 1939.721 In America the recession had rekindled fears of another 
depression. The impact from the recession in Australia took some time to register upon 
domestic economic activity. Amazed that the severe recession in America had not 
affected Australia in any way, Casey believed that it would once the slowdown reached 
Britain. 722 For the moment, then, Australia was riding her luck. He repeated his mantra 
that depressions do not start in Australia and 'we get swung along at the tail of the 
world cart' .723 Australia was relying upon what Melville called the 'natural optimism of 
Australians' which outweighed the pessimism abroad.724 Copland conveyed to a 
Victorian Treasury official that what kept the local business climate buoyant was that 
719 Cited in Castles, 1998, 146. 
720 R.G. Casey to S.M. Bruce, 3/5/1938, AA: A1421 Casey correspondence. 721 R.G. Casey to Sir M. Norman, 7/3/1938, AA: Al421 Casey correspondence. 722 Ibid. 
723 Ibid. 
724 L.G. Melville to A.H. Lewis, 19/11/1937, Melville Papers, NLA. 
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few opinion-makers dare speak of depression lest it might induce the very conditions 
everyone wished to avoid.725 In that vein, Melville, too, recorded that the 'Pessimism of 
our Colin Clarks seems to have singularly little effect upon business activity' .726 
Melville felt that so long as Australian export prices did not continue to fall there was 
no reason why the recession abroad would check domestic economic activity, 
particularly when businessmen chose to ignore it. In that regard, Melville speculated 
that what would bring the boom to an end was the construction of factories on the 
assumption that the rate of economic expansion would continue. 
Up to August 1938 the international recession registered little impact upon 
domestic activity. The economists, however, were clearly worried by the portents. Four 
months earlier, Copland undertook an audit of the economy for a corporate client. 
Australia, Copland found, was in a condition of full employment with real income per 
capita having risen by 10 per cent since 1936/37. He attributed this resounding process 
to six factors: an increase in primary production, gold production, a favourable terms-
of-trade, the greater level of defence spending, the continuing revival of business 
investment and, lastly, a greater amount of import replacement in manufacturing 
capacity. With the last aspect Copland -cited work by Melville showing that, between 
1927 /28 and 1935/36, there had been an expansion of import-replacing manufacturing 
of some 30 million pounds per annum. This meant considerable relief for the external 
account, which benefited further from lower servicing costs upon Australia's foreign 
debt. Despite the rise in manufacturing industry, Australia was still, however, at the 
mercy of the global economy. Copland felt that any further fall in export prices would 
have Australia 'skating on thin ice' .727 
Besides that prospect directly reducing national income, it would cause 
stringency in the 1noney market. Montagu Norman laid down the challenge squarely 
facing Casey: 'If you can make it possible to build up a volume of London Funds, 
adequate to the needs of Australia, without at the same time permitting an over 
expansion of domestic credit ( and hence at the same time a dangerous increase of 
imports) you will have solved one of the most thorny problems and rendered a great 
725 D.B. Copland to A.T. Smithers, 17/8/1938, UMA FECC, Box 61. 726 L. G. Melville to A.H. Lewis, 29/12/1937, Melville Papers, Mss. 8671 , NLA. 727 
'The Economic Situation in Australia ', April 1938, p.4, UMA FECC, Box 63. 
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service to the Commonwealth' .728 That in mind, Casey and Reading ensured that central 
banking techniques were improved such that the Commonwealth Bank would, even in 
the face off alling export prices, start purchasing securities and bills to sustain the 
reserves of the trading banks.729 Copland called this new policy one of 'insulation' .730 
He reminded his business associates that the policy did not however off er much relief 
for the export sector which also had to contend with rising domestic costs. The Bank 
Board, briefed upon the 1937 Roosevelt recession in America, now appreciated the 
ephemeral aspect of the decline in export prices. With the external account adverse the 
central bank engaged in monetary operations to prevent a credit squeeze unfolding 
(Copland, 1946, 116-7). There was, furthermore, a defence program and a conversion 
loan to be financed. The Board, still smarting after the criticism aired in Royal 
Commission on Money and Banking, was prepared, therefore, to take remedial 
monetary action at the first sign of international-borne recession. Indeed, Reading put 
out a public statement to that effect. This was an assurance to the trading banks that the 
Commonwealth Bank would no longer allow a fall in the London funds to axiomatically 
trigger a credit crisis. There was also a political motive behind this preparation. Curtin, 
the new Leader of the Opposition, predicted that depression would soon engulf 
Australia. Casey challenged Curtin to nominate his sources before admonishing him 
about how economic depression could actually ensue from 'a state of mind'. Casey was 
squarely of the opinion that recessions did not actually originate in Australia but from 
overseas.731 
Gilbert perceived the readiness to take pro-active policy action as a sign that the 
Bank had adopted a Keynesian world-view. It went hand-in-hand with the appointment 
of the Secretary of the Treasury, Harry Sheehan, now becoming Governor of the Bank 
and, in turn, the Board's apparent willingness to integrate monetary policy with that of 
the Treasury (1973, 208-9).+ This is congruent with Gilbert's more encompassing thesis 
showing how the steady rise of the Loan Council gave the Commonwealth a greater 
voice in economic policy formation. It came at the expense of the Commonwealth 
Bank's independence. Politically, this development was matched by a greater show of 
728 Sir M. Norman to R.G. Casey, 29/3/1938, BE: G 1/288. 729 
'The Economic Situation in Australia' April 1938, p. 8, UMA FECC, Box 63. 730 
'Australian Economic Conditions: Report No.2', 27/3/1939, UMA FECC, Box 64. 731 
'Mr. Curtin Rebuked' The Argus 15/8/1938. 
+ There was critid.sm of Sheehan's appointment since it meant the Commonwealth Bank Board had no 
members with banking experience upon it. 'Bank appointment criticised', The Sydney Sun 18/5/1938. 
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resolution from the Federal Government in its dealings with the trading banks. Lyons, 
for instance, informed Davidson that if the trading banks did not curtail their campaign 
against 'government control of banking' his government would consider legislative 
action to bring that prospect to bear (Gilbert, 1973, 208). Casey, too, in October 1938 
reportedly dismissed the notion that the Commonwealth Bank would oppose the 
financing of greater defence spending. It would, he is alleged to have said, be 'swept out 
of the way' if it did. 732 He later disowned making such remarks. In the next year the 
central bank subscribed to a loan issue from the federal government, ensuring that the 
cash reserves of the trading banks were maintained and rates did not have to rise 
(Copland, 1946, 119). 
Despite these developments, Gilbert draws a long bow in arguing that the 
Bank's pro-active monetary stance in 1938 was a Keynesian one. It was more a case of 
improvisation and pragmatism than any act of revelatory Keynesianism. Reddaway is 
probably more correct in stating that, after 1936, the Commonwealth Bank Board was 
more prepared to address economic stabilisation issues rather than just uphold external 
balance and debt repayment (1960, 192). Apart from smoothing the conversion loan 
process the defence program required an expansion in public investment. Given 
Australia's good record in not defaulting on her debts, London was favourably disposed 
towards giving the Commonwealth short-term finance to bolster the level of London 
funds. The trading banks, meanwhile, were mischievously circulating literature against 
the proposed system of minimum deposits which when operational would result in a 
credit squeeze (Sutherlin 1980, 227-9). This fear had particular resonance in 1938 with 
trading banks' liquidity suffering due to the combined effect of drought and falling 
export prices (Sutherlin, 1980, 209). Even if the Federal Treasury had more input in 
determining economic policy its new Secretary, S.G. MacFarlane, did not comprehend 
the new doctrines of Keynes (Cornish, 2000, 211). Indeed MacFarlane's almost 
arithmetic approach in preparing the Federal Budget astounded one Federal Treasurer 
for the lack of any doctrine other than merely balancing the 'sums' (Whitwell, 1986, 
54). This was also apparently Casey's approach towards preparing budgets (Spender, 
1972). 
732 Fred Coleman column in The Sydney Sun, 30/10/1938. 
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Moreover, Copland still expressed concern that a recession could arise if 
investor sentiment turned negative, timidity on the part of the central bank or a drastic 
scaling down in public works. 733 Countering that last contingency was the fact that 
economists were now agreed on the principle of contra-cyclical spending. In that vein, 
Colin Clark, in a lecture before the Economic Society in Melbourne in August 1938, 
warned that internal loan expenditure should be expanded at the same rate as the decline 
in export income. Clark told his audience that while the prospect of deficit budgets 
might be 'repugnant' to those with 'preconceived ideas', there was no other expedient to 
prevent unemployment and falling wages. 734 
Davidson was also fearful that the forces behind the slowdown could, if left 
unchecked, leave the economy in a weakened position which would take years to 
regain. In a memorandum, shown to Hytten and apparently requested by a New South 
Wales Treasury official, Davidson advised that governments should not increase 
taxation but instead have the Loan Council authorise more public works financed by 
Treasury bills. While acknowledging that budgets must be balanced, this could be 
achieved over a number of years. He confidently referred to how the economic and 
financial know ledge now available would allow 'an intelligent handling of the 
variations of the trade cycle ... to iron out many problems of the past' .735 The trick was 
to act now to avert a worsening situation. 
Copland's forecast for the 1938-39 balance of payments warned of a net loss in 
London Funds if export prices remain subdued and the volume of imports did not abate. 
Giblin, in a speech to the Carlton Club in London which Claude Janes attended, 
expressed extremely pessimistic long-term prognosis upon Australia's future export 
prices. 736 Clark may have a hand in the projections. Janes was sceptical about whether 
one could, in fact, make such long-term forecasts. As Chairman of the State Economic 
Committee, Copland advised a Victorian Treasury official, as Davidson had, of the 
importance of bringing these grim tidings to the attention of the Loan Council. 737 With 
recession, and now war imminent, the economists reconvened to discuss matters. 
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9.4 The Economists Reconvene 
An unofficial two-day meeting of economists was held in Sydney in December 
193 8 to discuss the state of the Australian economy and propose measures to prepare for 
the onset of an internationally-transmitted recession. They would have noted the success 
of the Roosevelt administration's large scale spending program in dragging the 
American economy out of recession. Certainly Butlin noticed it.738 Janes informed 
Davidson of a similar tale in Britain where the government was assuming a larger 
responsibility within the economy.739 In Australia it was common knowledge that 
economic activity was slackening and only a matter of time before unemployment rose. 
There was, in truth, still a hard core of structurally unemployed which could only be 
overcome by training programs.740 There was, moreover, a rise in the price level, which 
Butlin attributed to the interaction between resource bottlenecks, and monopolistic 
• • 741 competition. 
Mills, Hytten, Copland, Walker, Clark, Melville and Wilson attended the 
meeting, all in a private capacity. The participants were each given an aspect of the 
economy to report on so that an accurate audit could be formed. Each came armed with 
memoranda upon their assigned brief. Colin Clark's submission, which Giblin had 
suggested Clark should contribute, warned of a sustained fall in Australian export prices 
with the world recession and the possibility of British trade controls.742 Countering this 
were domestic sources of expenditure, namely, investment, public spending and 
consumption. Clark displayed a familiarity with the Keynesian multiplier. Economic 
activity could be kept buoyant by resorting to devaluation, import restrictions, easy 
credit, budget deficits and public works. Clark preferred easy money as the more 
palatable expedient. It was a stance shared by his colleagues. Not only would an 
expansionist monetary policy keep trading banks liquid, it would also forestall a rise in 
interest rates. This view found its way into a summary of policy conclusions prepared 
738 
'The Oversea Recession: Sign of Recovery Appear' (S. J. Butlin) SMH, 15/7/1938. 739 C. Janes to A.C. Davidson, 25/8/1938, BNSW: GM 302/412. 740 
'Extending Employment: Training Plan in Australia', SMH 13/9/1938. 741 
'Rising Retaif°Prices', SMH, 21/9/1938. 
742 C. Clark to D.B. Copland, 25/11/1938, UMA FECC, Box 200. 
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by Copland. 743 When it came to public expenditure the economists, while admitting that 
unemployment would probably rise, considered fiscal prudence was the safest course. 
This stance was explicable in the sense that existing public works were already putting a 
strain upon the money market. As it was, the increased expenditure on defence, 
together, with borrowing by state and local authorities, would offset some of the decline 
in export income. On that matter Copland felt the mooted rise in defence spending 
required a huge effort in co-ordination. It also spelt diverting resources from peacetime 
ends and it was doubtful whether state and local works could now be undertaken at the 
same time. Copland had, in fact, reached this position in April 1938, arguing that with 
full employment, public works expenditure by the states had to give way to the priority 
of defence spending.744 There were other concerns articulated at the congress: issues 
like high domestic costs, especially wages, affecting exports, the psychological fears 
engendered by both monetary expansion and budget deficits and, finally, whether 
standards of living could be maintained in the face of a fall in export income and 
additional defence spending. 745 
When it came to reviewing 1938/39, Copland was relieved to report that his 
prophecy of a recession had not materialised. It was, he found 'something of a triumph 
that we lost so little ground' when other economies had fallen by the wayside.746 
Normally Australia would have suffered the same fate, especially with export prices 
falling but extenuating factors, including pro-active monetary policy, had averted it. 
Indeed the expansion in loan advances when export prices were falling was 
unprecedented in Australia's history. 747 It would be a 'mistake', Copland added, to 
ascribe too much to credit policy. There had been other factors at play. Among these 
were an outstanding level of import replacement and a high level of export production. 
These two factors, in tandem, promised to improve Australia's balance of payments 
problem. The outlook was favourable, too, for the pursuit of a liberal credit policy and, 
equally, for the raising of funds for defence and public works. These expenditures came 
at a time when private capital spending was lagging, so Copland predicted that 
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employment would hold steady, if not rise slightly.748 As we shall see in the next 
chapter his prognosis was to prove accurate. 
9.5 Conclusion 
There seemed little doubt that Australian economists from 1937 onwards exhibited a 
growing understanding of Keynes's new theoretical outlook. It allowed them to engage 
in policy advice that allowed Australia in 1938 to enjoy, a little fortuitously perhaps, 
normal full employment. Moreover, the Commonwealth Bank policy of 'insulation' or 
modest monetary stimulus, whether informed by Keynes or not, kept the Australian 
economy immune from the Roosevelt recession. The fact that it did must have caught 
the attention of the senior bank officials. They, and even some of the economists, still 
laboured under the notion that a boom-bust phenomenon was the lot of a market 
economy. Practice at keeping the economy buoyant, despite falling export prices, 
engendered confidence in monetary management. However the real test of an authentic 
Keynesian approach to demand management, using both the monetary and fiscal taps 
lay just around the corner. 
748 Ib .d 8 1 . pg . 
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CHAPTERlO 
The Economics of Near War 
10.1 Introduction 
The last year of peacetime in Australia was marked by difficult economic 
choices and political turbulence. The necessity to divert resources into defence as the 
security environment grew darker was jeopardized by the system of political federation 
and traditional ideas about public finance. By the end of 1939 there came, however, a 
moment of economic revelation. As Copland styled it ' ... The lesson of the war is 
unmistakable in its demonstration that, given a clear and generally accepted objective, 
we can erect an economic structure far superior to that which we knew during the dark 
days of the thirties' (1945, 8). True to Keynes's prophecy, the urgency of mobilising 
resources for the prosecution of war marked the light of reason for politicians. 
This last chapter of this dissertation focuses, then, upon when and how 
policymakers assimilated the General Theory's framework of matching the country's 
real resources with claims upon them. There were two stages to this process. The first 
step, the easier one, was an awareness of transferring idle resources into employment 
allowing defence outlays to take place which were essentially costless. The second, 
more involved step was a transfer problem. Once full employment was reached, policy 
makers would have to check civilian consumption to enable output to be transferred to 
the war effort. Economists played a critical part in both conceptualizing and 
broadcasting the approach to war finance. At the official policy level there was initially 
little recognition of expanding economic activity by bringing idle resources into 
circulation. As we shall see this conceptual blind spot would ultimately force a policy 
crisis upon the Lyons Government. It revolved around the necessity of how quickly, and 
the means by which, to increase military spending. 
With a deteriorating international environment, the Commonwealth faced a 
resource funding problem in its desire to augment national defence even if it was 
modest compared to Britain or Germany. Raising taxes, issuing public loans or 
recourse to credit finance, that is, budget deficits, would disrupt economic activity. The 
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difficulties were further complicated by falling export prices. There was also Casey's 
prized piece of social legislation, a comprehensive national insurance scheme, to 
finance. Budgetary balance, of course, gave way to the exigencies of defence. This 
spelt sacrifices not just to programs but also political reputations. Ultimately, the 
blinkered economic outlook led to a political crisis when Menzies resigned ostensibly 
over the abandonment of the National Insurance scheme arguing, as Copland did, that 
defence and National Insurance could both be accommodated. The conventional view 
was that social welfare and defence were mutually exclusive. Indeed the 
Commonwealth Bank recycled a version of the UK Treasury's view; namely that using 
resources for defence needs, even amidst 10 per cent unemployment, would reduce the 
amount of consumer goods that could be produced when the economy recovered 
(Peden, 1996). 
Consequently the budget brought down a few days after the outbreak of war 
adhered to the traditional pattern of fiscal rectitude. The Federal Treasury, like its 
British counterpart, did not enunciate any new financial doctrine or idea or show the 
slightest inclination to Keynesian thinking till well into the war years (Spender, 1972, 
42-43). Australia was, in short, 'singularly innocent of war economics' (Walker, 1947, 
110). The gaping lack of progress at the surface did, however, belie some institutional 
change in the backrooms of policy formulation. How Australian public authorities 
could resist for so long any experimentation in economic policy under circumstances 
that invited, indeed needed, bold initiatives needs elucidation. 
The purpose of this final chapter, the ref ore, is to show how economists in 
November 1939 convinced politicians of that crucial point. It was at that juncture that a 
Keynesian revolution in economic policy 'arrived' in this country (Cornish, 2004, 24). 
It came just as Keynes articulated how to use the conceptual apparatus of the General 
Theory to fight a war. This moment of revelation is discussed in section 10.5. 
Section 10.2 looks at how national insurance scheme was shelved purportedly 
because of resource constraints. The next part of the chapter looks at how the UAP 
Government went about tackling the issue of defence spending amidst political turmoil. 
The cornerstone of the chapter is section 10.4 which discusses the formation of the 
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Giblin-led Financial and Economic Committee and its influence upon the economics of 
defence policy. 
10.2 Casey and National Insurance 
It was Casey, more than anyone else that got Lyons to commit to a national 
insurance scheme as an election campaign promise (Richards, 1975, 34). The venture 
has interest for our study as the scheme had obvious economic ramifications and also 
because it further revealed the limitations of Casey when placed under pressure. More 
importantly, it demonstrated the intellectual straitjacket Casey and the Treasury were 
labouring under over economic policy. Copland welcomed the legislation as it sat well 
with his desire to establish the provision of more social welfare. Casey's rival, Stevens, 
had been making noises over the desirability of such a scheme. The rest of the UAP 
Government, including their coalition partners, the Country Party, was lukewarm to the 
proposal and wary of its cost. Even after the 1937 federal election Lyons asked Treasury 
to draft a statement summarizing the difficulties with the scheme (Richards, 1975, 13). 
The Bill was introduced into Parliament in May 1938. The legislation would provide 
disablement, sickness and medical benefits, together, with the old age and widows 
pensions based on a contribution scheme involving employees, employers and the 
government. 
Brigden left the Queensland Bureau of Industry to become Chairman of the 
proposed National Insurance Commission. It was not long before opposition from the 
doctors and the friendly societies found expression in Parliament through the Country 
Party. In one debate Brigden pleaded with the Prime Minister to urgently attend 
Parliament as Casey had lost control over the House. Lyons refused telling Brigden 'He 
talked us into this. I could see the difficulties. I never wanted it, and now he can get 
himself out of it.' 749 Parliamentary setbacks aside, Casey prepared the legislation and 
necessary changes to the public service to manage the scheme. After procrastinating 
over its introduction, Casey nominated September 4, 1939 as the scheme's first day of 
operation. Brigden felt the timing ideal, with the economy buoyed by greater defence 
spending, likely to be at full employment. 
749 Irvine Douglas (Lyons's press secretary) Trc.121/31, pg.46, NLA. 
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According to W. C. Balmford, the Commonwealth Actuary, Brigden was out of 
his depth in the position and also had doubts about the scheme.75° Cabinet ministers, 
however, regarded Brigden as an 'unqualified success' in his new position.751 No doubt, 
Brigden was flustered by the fact that after initially educating the electorate upon how 
the scheme would operate his office later had to sabotage it (Green, 1969, 114-5). Had 
Lyons persevered with the scheme Brigden felt it would have helped post-war economic 
management by having a huge consolidation of funds to distribute.752 Greatly 
disappointed by its demise, Brigden later took up the post of Secretary to the 
Commonwealth Department of Supply again serving under Casey (Clark, 1950, 3). 
According to the Clerk of the Parliament, Frank Green, Lyons abandoned 
National Insurance because he did not want to antagonize financial circles in Melbourne 
(1969, 114). Richards rejects this claim, citing Menzies's support for the scheme even 
when its creator, Casey, had shelved it in March 1939 for the sake of military 
preparedness (1975, 75). National security came before social security (Hudson, 1986, 
105). Apart from the ramifications stemming from Munich crisis, Casey was taken 
aback at how much the scheme would cost when fully generated. He had already 
warned in late 1938 how the economy was already under strain meeting the huge jump 
in defence spending. The failure of a public loan to become fully subscribed in 
February 1939 fed the anxiety that raising resources for defence meant that taxation 
would have to be considered. 753 
Casey had plainly not assimilated Hankey's point that when it came to 
marshalling resources for defence 'the limiting factor is not money, but the productive 
capacity of the country' .754 The economists irreverently called the Treasurer's 
unyielding fiscal prudence 'Caseyism' (Butlin, 1958, 201). It was, in part, because 
Casey listened exclusively to his departmental advisers. They could not detect, as the 
economists could, that the real problem of war finance "could only be appreciated by 
looking behind 'the veil of money"' (Hytten, 1940, 66). A cursory review of Federal 
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budgets Casey had brought down shows only the merest acquaintance of central 
economic management. His successor, Percy Spender, was, as we shall see, cut from 
different cloth ( 1972, 44). 
While military spending shot up to nearly 30 million pounds, from a figure of 4 
million pounds only a few years earlier, the new outlays still only amounted to 5 per 
cent of GDP. Casey was concerned that the higher defence spending might, for the first 
time in seven years, place the budget into deficit. Apart from Brigden, it was Copland, 
of all the economists, who appeared the most upset at the abandonment of national 
insurance arguing that it was hardly incompatible with greater defence spending. At 
worst, national insurance would add about 3 million pounds annually to existing social 
security expenditure. Copland argued that National Insurance would exert little demand 
upon resources in its first years of operation making the argument that it would impair 
the defence effort a spurious one.755 Indeed, by creating a form of savings, the scheme 
would have facilitated the marshalling of resources for defence purposes. Nor had 
Britain suspended its social security scheme because of the exigency of defence 
spending which amounted to twelve per cent of total government expenditure.756 For the 
Lyons Government to falter at the first hurdle in implementing this piece of social 
legislation was discouraging. Copland felt that the needs of defence could easily have 
been reconciled by diverting resources away from economic development. Social 
security needs, in any case, still had to be faced. Pension payments, as a newspaper 
editorial pointed out, already represented more than 25 per cent of the total provision of 
. 1 . 757 soc1a secunty payments. 
The Cabinet decision to postpone the scheme precipitated a political crisis for 
the Government (Martin, 1993, 261-2). Menzies felt that the government reversing 
measures it had just placed upon the statute books cast it in a dim light. It is not known 
if Copland's public advocacy for National Insurance attracted, or perhaps, even 
reinforced his action in resigning from Cabinet over the issue. Menzies was perhaps 
merely using it as an excuse to mount a bid for the leadership. Months earlier, Menzies 
had requested Copland to arrange an interview for him with Keynes when he was to 
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visit England on official business in late 193 8. 758 Copland told Keynes in confidence 
that he held Menzies in high regard. 759 He was not the only one. The press magnate, Sir 
Keith Murdoch, withdrew his support from Lyons believing that the country needed a 
change in leadership to galvanize the defence effort. He told C.L. Baillieu 'We should 
be forming new industry and forcing industrial development to the utmost of its 
capacity. Lyons sits still' .760 
Menzies was, then, the coming man, but as one informed observer noted, 
finance was not his strong suit (Spender, 1972). Hytten recalled Menzies saying "'I 
don't understand mathematics' and finance was always mathematics to him".761 Indeed, 
upon becoming Prime Minister, Menzies's first federal budget set a completely 
inappropriate message to Australians about preparing to endure the costs of the war. 
This was much to the frustration of economists and Spender (1972, 50). Fortunately, 
Menzies soon delegated the duties of Treasurer to a more financially acute colleague 
who took a more imaginative view of war finance. It was a view exclusively provided 
by economists. Before their vision, however, was allowed to permeate through to higher 
authority constraints upon funding defence spending baulked large. 
10.3 The Burden of Defence 
The rigours and pressures of how to fund even a modest defence effort drew out 
markedly different responses from politicians and economists. It was only when the war 
became more serious that economists persuaded some policymakers, not all, to adopt a 
physical resources perspective of economic capability. 
The views of Politicians 
· The mounting of only a modest defence effort, as we have seen, caused major 
political ructions at both federal and state level. In the 1938/39 Federal Budget Casey 
had ordered a huge increase in defence spending, part of which was financed by new tax 
758 D.B.Copland to R.G. Menzies, 29/3/1938, UMA FECC, Box 60 759 Contained in a note to Keynes contained in a letter by Copland to Giblin, 29/3/1938, UMA FECC, Box 220. 
76° K. Murdoch to· C. L. Baillieu, 4/1/1939, Murdoch Papers, NLA. 761 Hytten autobiography, UT, pg 76. 
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imposts. Defence, he insisted, 'writes its own ticket in matters of finance' .762 Since the 
enlarged outlays absorbed the accumulated budget surplus, loans were arranged 
meaning further Commonwealth borrowing at the expense of the States. When a public 
loan failed to generate the requisite funds Casey hope that his government would realize 
that defence spending could · not be left strictly to the canons of orthodox finance. 763 
The new circumstances - greater defence spending at a time of falling tax revenue -
became acute as econo1nic activity slipped due to drought and falling export prices. 
Economic activity was past its 1937 /38 peak. Armed against its critics, the 
Commonwealth Bank continued to engage in insulating the economy from falling 
export prices by judicious credit expansion. It served, as we shall see, a dual function. 
Greater public works especially by State and semi-governmental authorities, 
together, with the rise of manufacturing sector kept unemployment around 10 per cent. 
However, the growth in semi-government authorities borrowing, which the 'prodigal' 
states of Queensland and NSW had masterminded, impeded the Commonwealth's bid to 
access funds for defence.764 Semi-government borrowings, especially by NSW, were 
frustrating the Loan Council in its task of providing funds for government and keeping 
the money market balanced. Canberra wanted the States to coordinate developmental 
works to give defence capacity the greatest priority. The funding of defence expenditure 
resulted in a renewed spat between Casey and Stevens over the conduct of monetary 
policy, particularly whether State loan expenditure and semi-government authority 
spending should be tapered to the needs for greater Commonwealth spending. Public 
spending by this stage was mostly dedicated towards the pre-depression policy of 
development rather than employment generation. 
Anticipating the economists, Stevens wanted the Loan Council to 'lay aside its 
habitual preoccupation' with each States' claims and focus upon developing a national 
financ1al policy agreed upon by the Commonwealth Bank. This would put men to work 
and also allow a greater defence contribution.765 Stevens did not think that Casey should 
set 'arbitrary financial limits' on the amount of public spending that could be 
undertaken. For Stevens the real limits were set by the number of men available and 
762 8 Letter to The Argus 26/l 0/193 . 
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with still a pool of unemployment that point had not been reached. For his part, Casey 
believed that Stevens' proposed 'policy of inflation' was disrupting Australia's defence 
preparedness. 766 
This dispute between the two figures meant that Australia moved gingerly in its 
defence preparations. The Munich crisis of September 1938 triggered a greater degree 
of cooperation. By March 1939 all the State Premiers expected some resort to credit 
expansion to finance the defence spending rather than a resort to taxation. It also 
sparked rumours that Stevens would soon switch to Federal Parliament and replace 
Casey as Treasurer.767 Ironically it was Percy Spender, Casey's ultimate successor as 
Treasurer, who was being pressured to relinquish his seat in favour of Stevens ( 1972, 
37). 
In 1939 both Casey and Stevens were, in the space of a few months, removed 
from their respective positions. After Menzies became the new Prime Minister in April 
1939 he dispatched Casey to the new federal Ministry of Supply. Stevens lost the 
Premiership in August 1939 following doubts raised over his economic stewardship 
after his promise of a budgetary surplus for NSW for 1938/39 lapsed into deficit 
(McCarthy, 1967, 91). Following two years of balanced budgets Stevens had planned 
for a surplus, regardless of the economic slowdown, to further his credentials for federal 
politics (McCarthy, 1967, 262). A year later, a chastened Stevens professed: 'The 
question of the balance or unbalance of the budget is, within reasonable limits, 
irrelevant so long as output and employment are kept at a maximum' (1940, 77). Before 
then Stevens' stance, so far as federal funding of defence spending was concerned, was 
inspired by a Keynesian understanding. 
The whole issue of war economics rekindled the controversy about the 
possibilities of central bank credit. National credit adherents invoked Clause 504 in the 
Report of the Royal Commission upon Banking and Monetary Systems holding that the 
release of credits or budget deficits could pay for the war (Spender, 1972).The 
Commonwealth Bank strove to stamp out such sentiments and solicited the help of the 
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Treasury. The new Prime Minister also shunned the suggestion, but economists and the 
central bank saw a role for moderate credit expansion. 
Spender, the new Assistant -Treasurer serving under Menzies, also dismissed the 
lopsided argument, circulated by Stevens and Forgan Smith, that restricting loans for 
public works to defray more military spending would automatically create 
unemployment (1972, 61-2). His superior, Menzies, alas, was beset by the same 
blinkers as Lyons. The Commonwealth Treasury advised Menzies that public loans and 
deficit finance of defence expenditure were likely to cause inflation and falling living 
standards even with an underemployed economy. Overall it was a muddled picture in 
need of a clear vision. 
The views of the economists 
Given their early appreciation of Keynesian economics it could be said that the 
economists could, quite early on, see the resource potential where politicians and office 
holders could not. In 1939, as the shadows of war grew darker, Australia had ten per 
cent unemployment. Neither political party, though, had a preconception of how to 
mobilize these idle resources. It could be achieved by additional expenditure upon 
investment and consumption. Credit expansion would also, up to a point, disarm the 
dispute between the States and the Commonwealth about having to restrict public 
works. Giblin and Copland had publicly floated this approach in 1938 but without much 
impact (Copland, 1951 , 24; Walker, 1939, 44-5). 
In London, Kershaw was as pessimistic as Australian politicians were that the 
greater defence expenditure would exhaust her London funds. He felt Australia should 
restrict its public works programmes and tighten its banking system. 768 He concluded 
that 'an econo1ny strained by a fall in export prices and slightly inflated by 
governmental expenditure, will not have an easy task in meeting the financial demands 
of the war, even with some recovery in external balances as a result of better export 
. d l . , 769 pnces an ower imports . 
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The economists, led by Copland, Giblin, Melville and Walker, appreciated and 
were clear-headed about the circumstances confronting Australia. Copland was 
probably the first economist to touch upon the matter. In April 1938 he wrote, with a 
Melbourne commerce student, a briefing on the implications of greater defence 
spending upon the Australian economy.770 At the time the economy was at full 
employment and Copland stressed that military spending meant a diversion of resources 
away from civilian use. This could be achieved by taxation, borrowing or creating 
credit. Copland stressed that the last option was inflationary and offered much less 
equity than a considered plan of raising finance by taxation and loans. 
In reviewing the 1938/39 federal budget Copland argued that the greater amount 
of defence expenditure, representing about 3 per cent of national income, meant that the 
States would have to coordinate plans with the Commonwealth and defer spending upon 
development. 771 In a series of newspaper articles published in 1939, Copland outlined 
the repercussions for the economy of a higher level of military spending and upon the 
need for economic reorganization for defence. He reiterated that preparing for war 
meant Australia could no longer proceed with its nom1al economic development. 
Creating, moreover, a modernized defence capability meant more organisation than was 
the case in 1914, particularly, in developing the industrial ability to wage war. There 
would also have to be a build up of vital materials and supplies.772 Copland welcomed, 
therefore, Menzies's initiative of creating a new Ministry of Supply. Copland suggested 
that with perhaps half of Australia's public investment being diverted away from 
infrastructure towards military ends would not gravely diminish the standard of living. 
The suspension of Australia's normal economic progress would, however, be the 'price' 
of national security.773 Copland told an Economic Society gathering that some degree of 
credit expansion to finance Australia's defence effort was feasible. 774 At the same 
forum, Giblin warned that financing the war effort could not be done by merely 
'soaking the rich'. Rather it would be financed by reducing the standard of living of the 
population though he wondered if that would prove acceptable. 
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Concerned at the lack of coordination in official circles a frustrated Copland 
warned that Australians did not seem to realize the peril they were facing and needed 
another annexation of territory by Hitler to get 'reasonable agreement upon the need for 
the vigorous pursuit of the arts of defence' .775 He noted how Japan had been on a semi-
war footing for some years. 776 There was some cause for optimism. With overseas 
borrowing out of reach Australia had to rely upon its own capital resources. The 
Commonwealth Bank was undertaking credit expansion to finance the loan programme 
and maintain liquidity levels. It had taken this action to support the money market 
because there was a drain on funds due to low export prices and an adverse current 
account. Copland was concerned, though, whether the central bank had the mastery of 
control to tailor the credit injection to boost employment and activity without incurring 
rising cost levels which would have a detrimental impact upon Australia's external 
account. Secondly, Copland was concerned whether the Commonwealth Bank had 
enough control to ensure that the credit tap would be turned off as full employment was 
approached. 777 Reading expressed confidence to a West Australian politician that the 
Bank would pass this test.778 The key question was whether the Commonwealth Bank's 
actions were prompted by improvisation and learning from the past or, in fact, marked a 
new economic doctrine. As shown in the next section it was the latter case with the 
Bank expressly following a Keynesian doctrine laid down by its economic advisors. 
Both Copland and Melville were attracted and responded to articles written by 
Keynes that appeared in The Times in September 1939 upon how to raise defence 
spending without incurring rising interest rates. Both responses demonstrated a 
significant awareness of Keynesian precepts. Copland warned that Australia could only 
partially imitate Britain's cheap money policy as she had more access to funds by 
simply restricting capital exports.779 Australia, in contrast, had to contend with low 
export prices and being a debtor nation. However, a continuance of the central bank' s 
modestly expansionary policy could, with the requisite degree of investor confidence, 
initiate and advance the dual achievement of a rigorous industrial programme for 
defence and full employment. It was essential, Copland added, that Australian 
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Governments agree upon the same economic strategy and that the financing method 
adopted had the support of the money market. A well-conceived liberal credit policy 
meant, therefore, that the Commonwealth Bank issued securities while export prices 
remained subdued and then reversed the process when export prices recovered. Too 
rapid a monetary injection, Copland warned, would spill over into imports, provoke 
inflation and impair Australia's external credit. 
Melville, the President of the Economic Society, gave a lecture on Keynes's 
articles. Six months earlier he had written, perhaps with Giblin' s help, the 
Commonwealth Bank's definitive brief upon the canons of financing defence spending. 
There was a twist of irony in Melville's lecture upon Keynes's views since he had 
earlier disparaged notions of the 'euthanasia of the rentier'. 780 Now, with the exigencies 
of war, Melville was supportive of the tenor of Keynes's suggestions, though he would 
not approve of his use of authoritarian controls to prevent British interest rates from 
rising. He agreed with Keynes that higher interest rates would choke off private capital 
formation and be injurious to the fabric of Australia's finances. There was, as Keynes 
suggested, a better method of finding the resources to wage war whilst the economy was 
at full employment, namely, taxation.781 That expedient would, by suppressing 
consumption and relieving the external account, obviate the need for capital, price and 
investment controls. The advantages of low interest rates were 'obvious' to Melville but 
the real question was whether they could remain subdued. Melville concurred with 
Keynes that central banking techniques, including the postponement of funding, would 
keep rates low so long as taxation was stiffened once full employment was reached. 782 
Amongst the audience were Mills, Madgwick and Janes who all agreed that at 
full employment, taxation should replace borrowing as the most responsible option. 
Borrowing at full employment would only reward the rich and impoverish the poor. 
Contra Melville, Mills and Madgwick felt more and comprehensive economic controls 
were the inevitable price of a war economy. 
780 · Melville Trc. pg 160, NLA. 
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A few months before both Copland and Wood had complained about the 
lassitude of the Federal Government in matching Britain's war preparations. 'Australia', 
Copland found, 'had become the conservative country in economic policy in the world 
in the last six or seven years ... and the last home of an almost undiluted form of 
capitalism' .783 By this Copland meant the reluctance to authorize an extensive array of 
state controls. He had long wanted the same array of economic controls Germany had 
used. It would make Australia impregnable from attack but he was pessimistic of it 
materialising. 784 The growing threat to Australia's security spelt a grave challenge to the 
'apostles of tradition' that encompassed the current government and the Treasury. 
With the outbreak of war Copland had his wishes granted. There was, 
institutionally, a growing resort to direct controls. To forestall interest rate rises, for 
instance, the Government commandeered the States' borrowing rights in the capital 
market since competing with these other borrowers, it was feared, might push up 
interest rates. In line with other developments in public finance the Commonwealth 
also moved to gain greater control over the financial system (Ross, 1995, 98; Butlin, 
1958, 200-201). Copland was asked to come to Canberra to become Commonwealth 
Prices Commissioner. The formation of these direct controls hardly corresponded, 
however, with an embrace of Keynes's new economics; that would come, appropriately 
enough, from the advice of an advisory committee of economists. 
10.4 The F and E Committee 
At the organizational level, Lyons had been astute enough to call again upon the 
economists to help garner the defence effort. The Finance and Economics Committee 
was formed in late 1938. It was, under Giblin's leadership, to make an almighty 
contribution to the war effort. Its primary focus within the first years of operation was to 
integrate Keynesian ideas with traditional public finance and have it successfully 
incorporated into official policy. There has been considerable discussion of the role and 
contribution the Finance and Economics Committee made to Australia's war effort 
(Whitwell, 1985; Maddock and Penny, 1985; Cornish, 2004; Walker, 1947). The 
784 D.B. Copland to Downie Stewart, 17/10/1938 UMA FECC, Box 61 
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following discussion will attempt to visualize the formation of the Finance and 
Economics Committee as the mobilization of economic expertise in the nation's need 
up to November 1939. 
Coombs is adamant that the Committee gave 'economic planning of the war' a 
Keynesian pedigree (1981, 6). The Committee, chaired by Giblin with Wilson and 
Melville assisting, and under the ambit of the Federal Treasury, was initially charged to 
look at the effect upon the economy of a loss of command _at sea and subsequent closing 
of trade routes. Lyons proposed to Giblin that it would be an aspect of national 
economic planning in a near war situation.785 The Secretary of the Defence Department, 
Frank Shedden, told Giblin that the committee would ' ... authoritatively review the 
strong and weak parts our national income under stress, and indicate the direction in 
which planning could strengthen the weaknesses' .786 The idea for the committee came 
from Wilson. It was the realization of his 'central thinking agency' that he had spoken 
of in 1934 (Duncan, 1934). Wilson had in mind a 'small thinking committee to which 
all sorts of problems could be submitted for general advice' (Cornish, 2004, 3; 
Whitwell, 1985, 2). The Committee's primary task would be to advise the Treasurer and 
his department. Eventually this would amount to the Committee challenging the 
Treasury's orthodox canons of war finance. After the outbreak of hostilities Brigden, 
Coombs, Mills and Copland were added to the committee. 
Copland was initially omitted despite having written a comment on an official 
memorandum in 1938 arguing that Australia could make itself reasonably independent 
of overseas supplies in an emergency.787 In that comment, Copland warned that 
Australia had to prepare for the likelihood of war and a trade blockade within the next 
three years, not the seven years mooted in an official report. 788 Copland stressed that the 
imperative for the federal government was not development but defence policy. Apart 
from addressing coastal defence and internal transport needs, Australia had to develop a 
greater defensive capacity in its economic development. This meant diverting resources 
into developing 'unproductive' and 'costly' defence industries and it would inevitably 
785 J.A. Lyons to L.F. Giblin, 27/12/1938, UMA FECC, Box 216 
786 F. Shedden to L.F. Giblin, 18/1/1939, UMA FECC, Box 218 
787 D.B. Copland to R.G. Menzies, 11/10/1938, and Menzies to Copland 12/10/1938, UMA FECC, Box 
60 
788 
'Comment on Memorandum on Financial Problems of Australian Defence and Development' 
16/10/1938, UMA FECC, Box 217. 
293 
spell some incursions upon the standard of living. Copland and Giblin recycled these 
fears at the ANZAAS meeting in January 1939 (Copland, 1951, 24). 
The Committee's main role was to find the means to wage total war. This had to 
be achieved without causing undue disturbance to underlying economic arrangements 
and also to be done equitably and efficiently (Maddock and Penny, 1983, 31). 
Effectively waging a war, Giblin pointed out to MacFarlane, usually meant ensuring 
that first, the economy was at full employment. Secondly, that there be a smooth 
transfer of resources from civilian to war needs and that, lastly, this process be 
undertaken by using financial policies.789 
In that regard the expanded F and E Committee would have found the 
Commonwealth Bank's brief upon defence spending for consideration by the members 
of the Loan Council more congenial than any views coming from the Treasury. 790 The 
document was written in March 1939 by Melville, with Giblin assisting. It was widely 
distributed. It was a short review of the principles which should guide the central bank 
in deciding how much to increase or decrease the money supply in certain hypothetical 
cases involving the necessity to augment defence spending. The Bank took the view that 
when there was unemployment defence spending would not be at the expense of civilian 
goods as it would be at full employment. When it came to creating credit, or public 
loans from the central bank, the government could only apply this method when not at 
full employment. A modest loan by the central bank would go a long way in mopping 
up unemployed resources meaning that it would have to be reduced 'as it does its 
work' .791 The Bank felt that this method would still have an inflationary bias since idle 
savings would quickly transform into funds seeking investment as prosperity and, in 
turn, confidence returned due to the injection of spending. The document stated that the 
'business of the central bank' was to increase or decrease money supply according to 
economic activity and the level of employment. Full employment, or the approach of it, 
was good reason therefore to restrict credit. It pointedly concluded by stating that: 
789 L.F. Giblin to S.G. MacFarlane, 21/10/1939 in AA: Al 1857 Secretary's Papers: Finance-Prof Giblin. 790 
'Commonwealth Bank and Finance for Defence', 17/3/1939, UMA FECC, Box 63. 
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'The needs of defence have nothing to do with determining the proper supply of 
money'; If a central bank loan is made for defence at a time when the money 
supply does not require increasing then the country will pay for it through rising 
prices and general dislocation more heavily than if the money were raised by 
taxation' .792 
After being given a copy of the document Copland told Giblin that apart for a 
few quibbles he had few reservations about it.793 
Menzies's 'business as usual budget' brought down only a few days after the 
outbreak of war was, very much a Treasury-inspired one, with the modest increase in 
defence spending sourced from taxation and public loans (Spender, 1972, 50). In his 
Budget Speech, Menzies criticised those who believed that war expenditure could be 
financed entirely by central bank borrowing or the 'credit of the community' (Cornish, 
2004, 5-6; Butlin, 1958, 197). Giblin was not so dismissive of it, perceiving that the 
whole matter of war finance was one of physically attracting resources to war ends. 
One of Casey's last actions as Treasurer had been to ask Giblin, Wilson and Brigden 
about their views about using credit expansion to finance defence spending. Giblin took 
a mechanical view that credit expansion was justifiable when there was unemployment 
in the economy with the proviso that the credit be withdrawn as the slackness was taken 
up. Wilson, while generally supportive, worried about the effect on interest rates and 
also the external account when credit expansion was exercised (Cornish 2004, 12). 
Brigden's (1939) reaction, later encapsulated in a short and querulous article in the 
Economic Record, noted how credit expansion would result in rising wage costs as full 
employment was approached. The problem was that there was 'no coordination between 
wages policy and finance policy' to prevent wage inflation from occurring (Cited in 
Comish, 2004, 12). Consequently Brigden concluded that if credit expansion and thus, 
full employ1nent, were pursued, there would have to be controls upon labour, foreign 
exchange and investment (Clark, 1950, 3). 
The tendency to over-expansion and therefore the need for controls attracted the 
attention of Macfarlane (Cornish, 2004, 13). His department's view of credit expansion 
792 Ibid. pg 6 .. 
793 D.B. Copland to L.F. Giblin, 29/6/1939, UMA FECC, Box 63. 
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was that it would bring unmitigated inflation; there was no alternative but to raise funds 
by the orthodox methods of taxation and public borrowings (Cornish, 2004, 15). It was 
extraordinary to recall that, just two months later, the Treasury line of thinking was 
overturned by the F and E Committee. It freed the new Treasurer from MacFarlane' s 
dour, arithmetic approach to fiscal policy (Spender, 1972, 42-43). 
As Cornish (2004 ), demonstrates, it was Giblin that led the crusade of imparting 
a Keynesian approach to Australia's war finance. He had a new and more receptive 
federal Treasurer to work with who acknowledged Giblin's mental vision (Spender, 
1972, 44). Giblin was, of course, aided by the other economists, including Walker, who 
had just published a book upon the subject. Giblin had read a draft of the book and it 
would have merely reinforced his disposition for adopting a Keynesian approach to 
defence spending. Giblin felt highly of Walker's account while Copland called it 'a first 
class piece of work' .794 In another place Copland (1939) said the 'great virtue' of 
Walker's book was that it got 'behind the veil of money' and stated the defence problem 
'in real terms'. Melville was of the same persuasion.795 
In January, Walker (1939) had presented a paper at the ANZAAS conference 
arguing that sound finance should give way to unbalanced budgets when conditions 
warrant it. An expansionist policy involving an unbalanced budget was now an 
appropriate one for Australia. Walker had more than his work cut out for him in 
Tasmania where he was economic advisor to the State Government and dealing with 
Premier Dwyer-Grey, a Major Douglas adherent. 796 Whitwell (1985, 11-13) 
convincingly argues that it was Walker who provided the intellectual sustenance for the 
F and E Committee's Keynesian approach to war finance. This is probably correct but it 
must be recalled that Giblin was not long back from Cambridge where he had been 
imbibing Keynes's new economic philosophy. It was Giblin, too, who now held an 
official position of some real influence and authority. 
It was Giblin, then, who encouraged Spender to attempt more with fiscal policy. 
Giblin demonstrated how Australia, with ten per cent unemployment, could painlessly 
794 D.B. Copland to T. Hytten, 28/8/1939, UMA FECC, Box 143. 
795 L.G. Melville to D. B. Copland, 14/8/1939, UMA FECC, Box 144. 
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increase its defence budget without facing resource pressures. Instead of a heavy-
handed resort to economic controls which would intimidate business Giblin felt the 
Government should increase expenditure through credit expansion. The elimination of 
unemployment would remove an embarrassment for the government (Cornish, 2004, 
13). Convinced, Spender took up the matter with Menzies highlighting how the 
financial costs of the war effort could be lightened by putting the unemployed back into 
work. While the unemployed had, hitherto, been a State matter, Spender believed the 
initiative 'would not only be good politics on our part, but sound economics, if we take 
the lead in this matter ' (Cited in Cornish, 2004, 13). 
Despite its intrinsic political appeal, Menzies, labouring under what Copland 
(1945, 10) called 'the myth of insufficient finance', could not fathom how more federal 
spending could solve two economic problems simultaneously (Cornish, 2004, 14). After 
consulting with his committee colleagues, Giblin re-emerged with a new memorandum 
called 'War Finance' . Its precepts were to muster the resources necessary for war, 
maintain civilian production and consumption and spreading the burden fairly over 
society. The increase in defence spending, mooted for a supplementary budget, would 
come from central bank credit. Spender took Giblin's proposal to Cabinet on 13 
November 1939 and announced, in dramatic words, that 'One of the objectives of our 
present policy is to restore and increase the national income. This will enable us to 
divert resources to defence without encroaching unnecessarily on existing standards of 
consumption' (Cited in Cornish, 2004. 16). Spender made it clear in a second 
submission to Cabinet how borrowing for defence would be from the central bank thus 
sparing private enterprise from a greater tax burden. Once capacity and full employment 
were reached, however, taxation would assume its rightful duty and prevent any 
inflation. This 'changeover' point was projected to occur by May 1940. Cabinet 
accepted this revolutionary new approach to economic policy thereby giving the F and 
E Committee an early triumph (Maddock and Penny, 1983, 35). Behind the scenes 
Giblin assured Spender not to be unnerved by the budget failing into deficit as the 
reflationary experiment was unleashed. When the Loan Council met that same month 
the States were delighted to hear that their borrowings were not cut (Walker, 1947, 44). 
Spender brought down his supplementary budget on 30 November. Cornish 
identified this as the moment when a Keynesian revolution in economic policy truely 
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'arrived' in Australia (Cornish, 2004, 17). An English newspaper hailed Spender's 
Budget as 'the answer to an economist's prayer' (Cited in Spender, 1972, 45). At this 
point it could fairly be said that Australia led the world in macroeconomic management. 
CONCLUSION 
'Tangeroa, Clear Away the Clouds that Ru May See the Stars' 
Polynesian prayer inscripted upon a stone memorial to E.O.G. Shann at the 
University of Western Australia campus 
In giving the Joseph Fisher lecture R.G. Menzies (1942) noted that 'In the 
economic history of the last fifteen years nothing will be more notable than the rise to 
influence and authority of the professional economist'. While there had been some 
resentment at the rise of the economists Menzies, quoting Edmund Burke, said that 
society must adjust to new facts and circumstances. In his lecture Menzies recounted 
how the Australian economists, led by L.F. Giblin, allowed Australia to undergo a 
smooth transition to a war economy by channelling idle resources into war preparations. 
The economists' advice was justified by the results. By May 1940, as Giblin had 
projected, unemployment had been absorbed and Australia reverted to the more 
traditional ways of financing war expenditure but equipped with a stronger, more robust 
economy. In his own premiership that followed in 1949 Menzies surrounded himself 
with economic advisers, some of whom had been involved in the events covered in this 
dissertation. 
Today one rarely hears praise for economists but rather mockery or ridicule. 
Australia is a society, as the Australian historian W. K. Hancock (1930) sagely noted, 
that upholds a collective disdain for 'scientific economists'. Today, that disdain for 
economics continues with students electing to bypass it and economic history at 
university. 
This thesis was partly written to partly counteract that mentality by showing 
how the interwar generation of Australian economists were pathfinders in devising new 
forms of macroeconomic management. They swept away the clouds to guide the 
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economy using either the exchange rate and, ultimately, full employment as their 
compass. Their insights and analysis was informed by the analytical framework 
provided by Keynes's General Theory. Coombs referred to being under the guiding 
influence of the star of Keynes. For the most part the economists in this triumph were 
never given any national acknowledgement, though this is often the lot of the 
economist. Nor, more importantly, have Australian economists been given much 
coverage or comprehensively examined in the international literature upon the spread of 
Keynesianism across nations. Yet when it comes to Australia and Keynes there was, and 
still is, a strong bond that carries through at the academic and advocacy level. This 
study explores for the first time how Keynes came to Australia and how it was 
expressed in thought, ideas and, ultimately, policy advice. In November 1939 Australian 
economists persuaded the Federal Treasurer to reject the orthodox Treasury line and 
adopt a Keynesian approach to war finance. While this action was politically expedient 
Keynes knew that this means to influence in shaping world outcomes was better than 
irrelevance. Politicians like Spender and Menzies saw the promise and power of 
economics expertise. 
It has been the purpose of this thesis to make a contribution to the history of 
economics in Australia by examining the thought and ideas of its leading economists in 
the decade before leading up to 1939. As Part One showed, a young Australian 
economics profession, formally established in 1925, was thrust into an economically 
turbulent decade. It was to Australia's fortune that she could call upon this small 
nucleus of economic expertise when policy-makers and politicians remained panic 
struck. While the economists' first act of stabilisation policy enshrined in the Premiers' 
Plan was deflationary they began to adjust their settings when the longed-for rise in 
export prices did not materialise. 
Australian economists had a difficult field to hoe. Australian policymakers were, 
and refused to be, guided by any coherently conceptualised view of the proper 
relationship between the government and the economy. Most did not assimilate a 
Keynesian framework of national income, aggregate demand, savings and investment 
until the war years. Fiscal consolidation, a conservative central bank and a complaisant 
government allowed a deflationary policy to become entrenched. It largely shut out the 
expansionary line being taken by economists. It was this propensity to cautious 
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expansionism than set the economists apart from policy makers and office holders, 
though their voices were muted somewhat by the economic recovery. 
Part Three focussed upon how the Keynesian crusade asserted itself first at the 
intellectual level, then ultimately at policy level. Economists had success in convincing 
monetary authorities to temper the level of economic activity. The acid test was, 
however, whether the same authorities would expand aggregate demand when 
circumstances and idle resources warranted it in 1939. This they did. 
In the post war era the Australian economics establishment for a while exhibited 
a distinctive Keynesian rubric making it more open to heterodox approaches than their 
North American counterparts. This heritage stemmed from the Keynesian-Cambridge 
culture sown in the mid thirties. 
The focus of this dissertation was to thematically undertake, then, an 
examination of how Australian economists underwent a change in their thinking and 
ideas about economic thought and economic policy in the 10 years leading up to 1939. 
As the leading players in this tale they were well aware of their changing world view. In 
April 1934 Giblin took stock of his colleagues' philosophical shift since 1929: 
'Dyason was the one firm and consistent inflationist. Copland went that way in 
waves with strong back eddies. I was inclined to sit on the fence, not sure of my 
ground, and opposed to whatever arguments was put forward too confidently. 
Brigden I think was the same, and Hytten. Melville was of course a strong 
deflationist. Melville gradually and reluctantly has moved a very long way, but 
with always a hankering backward, which found voice from time to time. Shann, 
more fitfully, has even moved further the same way, and with his regret.' 797 
It was a strikingly accurate assessment of his colleagues' state of mind but 
certainly not of himself. By 1934 Giblin had moved leftwards from a cautious 
deflationist of 1930 to assume the mantle of being a leading proto Keynesian voice. 
Missing from Giblin' s appraisal was, of course, the younger generation of Australian 
797 L.F. Giblin to E.R. Walker, 19/4/1934, Giblin Papers, NLA 
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economists who unlike their predecessors were professionally-trained economists . They 
undertook their studies when theoretical battles were raging in economics over 
monetary thought and lecture halls were filled to the rafters. 
This thesis attempts to build upon Giblin' s survey by carrying it forward to 1939 
when, according to L.G. Melville, all the Australian economic fraternity were 
Keynesian at least, in policy outlook. Giblin and Walker, were by 1939, respectively the 
most persuasive and erudite Keynesians in the land - though Giblin, like his older 
colleagues, would hate to be typecast. 
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COOMBS, H. C. (1916-1997), Commonwealth Bank economist served under Melville. 
One of the young Turks behind 'the Keynesian crusade.' 
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DYASON, E. C. E. (1886-1949), company director, economist, mining engineer and 
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the Premiers' Plan. President of the Economic Society 1930. 
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Professor of Economics at the University of Tasmania. 
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Visited Australia with Niemeyer in 1930 and helped in framing advice. Gave 
the 1930 Fisher Lecture. 
HANKEY, Sir M. (1887-1963), British Cabinet Secretary 1916-1936. Casey's London 
mentor. Visited Australia in 1934. 
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Ministry on a matter of principle. Economically liberal but ineffective personal 
style. 
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works of Keynes. He was a member of the short-lived Lang Labor Government. 
MASSEY-GREENE, Sir W. (1874-1952), politician and entrepreneur. Assistant 
Treasurer 193 3. 
MELVILLE, Sir L. G. (1902-2002), Professor of economics at Adelaide University. 
Economic Advisor to the Commonwealth Bank. Despite holding opinionated 
views about Keynesian economics Mcfarlane and Groenwegen (1990) hailed 
him the most conscious devotee of Keynesian economics. Played a key part in 
the formulation of the Premiers' Plan. 
MERRY, D. H. (1909-2002) Melbourne graduate. Economist with the Bank of NSW, 
studied at LSE. 
MILLS, R. C. (1886-1952), Sydney University professor of economics 1922-1945. 
Served on the Wallace Bruce Committee 1932. Played a significant role in the 
Royal Commission on Banking Systems. Mills pushed the case for greater 
Commonwealth powers over conduct over monetary policy. 
MURDOCH, Sir K. (1886-1952), newspaper proprietor of the Herald and Weekly 
Times, enthusiastic supporter of Lyons. Patron of the Arts and to some extent 
enlightened economics. 
NIEMEYER, Sir O. (1883-1971), Economic adviser to the Bank of England. Visits 
Australia 1930 and kept a wary, negative eye upon Australia. 
306 
PAGE, Sir E. C. G. (1880-1961), Country Party politician and surgeon. Federal 
Treasurer in the Bruce Government 1923-1929. 
NORMAN, Sir M. (later Lord) (1871-1950), Governor of the Bank of England 1920-
1946. Held a dismissive view of Australia's politicians though Lyons and 
Bruce's stewardship led to a more relaxed view of Australian's loan portfolio. 
PHILLIPS, J. Secretary to the Royal Commission of Banking Systems. 
PITT, H. A. (1872-1959) Undersecretary of the Victorian Treasury. Member of the 
Copland Committee, 1931. Founding-member of the Victorian Branch of the 
Economic Society. Commissioner on the Royal Commission into Banking and 
Monetary Systems 
POTTER, Sir I. (1904-1994), Economist with Assistant Treasurer Casey's 1933-1935. 
Had considerable contact with Labor and Non-Labor politicians. Sydney 
University graduate under Mills' influence. Served in Davidson's kindergarten. 
REDDAWAY, W. B. (1913-2002) Cambridge economist. Research fellow at 
Melbourne University 1936-37.Wrote first academic journal review of the 
General Theory 
RICKETSON, S. (1891-1967), financier with access to national financial markets, 
member of 'the Group' that backed Lyons' bid for power. Supporter of Lyons 
but opposed the Premiers' Plan especially the impact on monetary markets. 
RIVETT D. (1885-1961) Professor of chemistry 1924-1927. Deputy Chairman of the 
CSIR 1927-1945. 
ROBINSON, W.S. (1876-1967), Anglo-Australian businessman and stockbroker. 
Former financial editor of The Age. Critical of orthodox thinking and monetary 
pol~cy. Confidante of E.G. Theodore and J.M. Keynes. 
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SCULLIN, J. H. (1876-1953), Prime Minister of Australia 1929-1931. His 
administration put the Premiers' Plan into operation in June 1931. 
SHANN, E. 0. G. (1884-1935), economist and historian. Had an intellectual influence 
upon the shaping of Premiers' Plan with Copland and Giblin. Economic Adviser 
to the Bank of New South Wales. 
SHEEHAN, Sir H.J. (1883-1941), public servant and banker, Secretary of Treasury, 
1932-38, Governor of the Commonwealth Bank. Probably the true originating 
author of the Premiers' Plan written as a memorandum to Lyons in October 
1930. 
SMITH, W. F. (1887-1953), Premier of Queensland (1932-1943?). Smith queried the 
wisdom of the Premiers' Plan and orchestrated public works for his state. 
SMITHIES, A. (1907-1981), Treasury economist in the mid-thirties. Studied under 
J.A. Schumpeter at Michigan and also D.B. Copland. A 'staunch Keynesian' in 
his later life but conservatively inclined while Assistant Economist to Wilson at 
the Federal Treasury. 
SPENDER, P. C. Sir (1897-1985), UAP politician 1937-1951, Treasurer 1939-40. 
Saw the Keynesian era introduced and grasped its importance. 
STEVENS, Sir B. S. B. (1889-1973), N.S.W. premier and treasurer (1932-1939). Like 
his Queensland counterpart Stevens resisted purely orthodox economic policy 
and experimented with expansionist expedients. According to A.W. Martin, 
Stevens 'knew his Keynes'. 
SWAN, T. (1918-1989), Australian economist who developed the internal-external 
balance model in post World War II era. 
THEODORE, E. G. (1884-1950), Queensland Premier, Federal treasurer. Enigmatic 
figure. Proposed proto-Keynesian economic strategy in 1931 before lapsing 
back into more orthodox policy expedients. 
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WALKER, E. R. ( 1907-1988), one of the young economists who pushed the 
Keynesian cause. Walker had a doctorate from Cambridge supervised by D .H. 
Robertson. Close adviser to Stevens, pushed for the education of 
parliamentarians in economic matters. 
WENTWORTH, W.C., economic adviser to B.S.B. Stevens. Member of the Coffee 
Club 
WHISKARD SIR G. (1886-1957) High Commissioner for the United Kingdom 1936-
41. 
WICKENS, C. H. (1872-1939), Commonwealth Statistician and Actuary - wrote a 
memorandum to Acting Prime Minister Fenton urging financial stabilisation 
based on currency stabilization. 
WILSON, R. (1904-1996), Economist at the Commonwealth Bureau of Statistics. 
Influential force behind the establishment of the F and E Committee set up to 
deal with war preparations. 
WOOD, G.L. (1890-1953), Associate Professor in econormcs at University of 
Melbourne. Worked with Copland, Dyason and Giblin. Author of an earlier 
account of Australian crises and depressions in his Borrowing and Business in 
Australia (1930). Wrote review pieces in the Sydney Morning Herald and The 
Statist. 
YOUNG, W. J., Adelaide based businessman and political adviser. Advised and 
helped the S.A. Premier Hill implement the Premiers' Plan without question. 
Confidante of Melville. 
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